3. 249 UNTS (1954) 240; the Convention and its (First) Protocol entered into force on 7 August 1956.

4. See UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/7 as amended by the Plenary of the Diplomatic Conference on 26 March 1999 and as afterwards corrected in close cooperation with the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, text published in 38 ILM (1999) pp. 769 et seq.Google Scholar

5. See Clement, E., ‘Some Recent Practical Experience in the Implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention’, 3 International Journal of Cultural Property (1994) pp. 11 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar. with further references; Desch, T., ‘The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Revision’, 11 Humanitäres Völkerrecht (1998) pp. 103 et seqGoogle Scholar.; Hladik, J., ‘The Review Process of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Impact on International Humanitarian Law’, 1 YIHL (1998) pp. 313 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter, Protocol I), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter, Protocol II), 1125 UNTS (1977) 3Google Scholar.

7. See UN SC Res. 808 (1993) and 827 (1993).

8. See UN SC Res. 955 (1994).

9. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 17 July 1998.

10. See also the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the Second Protocol.

11. These measures include the publication by UNESCO in 1994 (in French) and in 1996 (in English, together with Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited) of a commentary on the 1954 Convention, written by J. Toman, and the organization in 1995, 1996 and 1997 of regional seminars in cooperation with the ICRC on the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

12. Boylan, P., Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague Convention of 1954), (Paris, UNESCO 1993) 1993 p. 7Google Scholar.

13. Ibid., pp. 7–18.

14. Ibid., pp. 16–18.

15. See UNESCO Doc. CLT/95/CONF/009/2.

16. See the final report of the Second Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Convention, UNESCO Doc. CLT-95/CONF.009/5, Paris, November 1995.

17. See the final report of this meeting of governmental experts, UNESCO Doc. CLT-96/CONF.603/5, Paris, 30 April 1997.

18. UNESCO Doc. CLT-97/CONF.208/2, Paris, October 1997.

19. See the final report of the Third Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the 1954 Convention, UNESCO Doc. CLT-97/CONF.208/3, Paris, November 1997.

20. The meeting was chaired by Adriaan Bos, Legal Advisor of the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

21. This meeting was chaired by Franz Cede, Legal Advisor of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

22. See the report submitted by the Director General to the Executive Board of UNESCO on the results of the Vienna expert meeting, UNESCO Doc. 155 EX/51, 17 August 1998.

23. Preliminary Draft Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/1, October 1998.

24. Namely, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Mali, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

25. Namely, Algeria, Botswana, Chile, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ireland, Japan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Suriname, Tonga, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and Vietnam.

26. An international non-governmental organization speaking on behalf of its constituent bodies: the International Council on Archives, the International Council of Museums, the International Council on Monuments and Sites, and the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions.

27. See the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, paras. 1–5.

28. Ibid., paras. 6–9.

29. UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/l/rev.l, February 1999.

30. UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/INF/1 and HC/1999/INF.l/Add. 1.

31. UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/4 and Add.

32. See the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, paras. 11–13.

33. Cf., Art. 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, and, as a practical example which has been frequently referred to in that context, the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

34. Only a few states, in particular France and Israel, claimed that the Conference was bound by Article 39, in particular its paragraph 5, and had therefore to take its decisions unanimously. Due to the ensuing dispute over the applicable decision-taking procedures, the Conference did not succeed in formally adopting its rules of procedure. The Draft Rules of Procedure — Doc. HC/1999/3 of February 1999, however, which provided that the Conference should use its best endeavours to ensure that the work is accomplished by general agreement and that, in case all feasible efforts to reach general agreement have failed and a matter is put to the vote, decisions on all matters of substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the 1954 Convention present and voting — were nevertheless provisionally used until the end of the Conference.

35. See Art. 39(5) of the 1954 Convention together with the title of Art. 39 and with its para. 7.

36. See the second, the third and the fourth paras, of the Preamble, and, in particular, Arts. 2, 4 to 7, 9, 16(2), and 21 of the Second Protocol; cf., also the clarification provided by the Working Group on Chapters 1 and 5 that the word ‘supplements’ in Art. 2 signifies that the Protocol does not affect the rights and obligations of States Parties to the Convention, see the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, para. 11.

37. See Art. 3(1) (in the following, references to Articles without indication of the treaty are meant to refer to the Second Protocol).

38. The following Articles of the Second Protocol contain provisions which also apply in times of peace: Arts. 5, 10, 11, 14 to 21, 23 to 33, 37 and most of the final clauses, i.e., Arts. 39 to 47 with the exception of Art. 44.

39. See Art. 19(1) and (2) of the 1954 Convention.

40. See Art. 3(1) in combination with Art. 22(1). For further details see 2.5 infra.

41. The term does not appear under the definitions contained in Art. 2 nor is it defined in Arts. 3 or 22.

42. Cf., Art. 1(2) of Protocol II.

43. See the fifth paragraph of the Preamble of the Second Protocol. The term ‘armed conflict’ has recently been defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a situation of ‘resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’, in The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995, 35 ILM (1996) pp. 32 at 54, para. 70Google Scholar. For comment, see Greenwood, C., ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić case’, 7 EJIL (1996) p. 265CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. See Art. 3(2).

45. See Art. 1(b) which refers to Art. 1 of the 1954 Convention. This provides another example of a deviation from the UNESCO study's recommendations, which suggested to revise the definition of cultural property, see P. Boylan, op. cit. n. 12, at p. 16.

46. States Parties may also call upon UNESCO for technical assistance in that regard, see Art. 33.

47. According to this provision, the obligation to respect cultural property, i.e., the obligation to refrain from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict and to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property, may be waived ‘only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver’.

48. See for example, Art. 23(g) of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907 (‘unless…imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’); Arts. 12 (‘as far as military considerations permit’) and 42 (‘in so far as military considerations permit’) of the First Geneva Convention 1949; Art. 23 of the Third Geneva Convention 1949 (‘whenever military considerations permit’); Arts. 18 (‘in so far as military considerations permit’), 49 (‘unless…imperative military reasons so demand’), 83 (‘whenever military considerations permit’) and 143 (‘except for reasons of imperative military necessity’) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949; or Art. 54 (‘where required by imperative military necessity’), 62 (‘except in case of imperative military necessity’) and 71 (‘only in case of imperative military necessity’) of Protocol I.

49. The primacy of ‘Kriegsraison’ over ‘Kriegsmanier’ was rejected by the Nuremberg Tribunal, see, inter alia,Toman, J., The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Paris, UNESCO/Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing (1996) pp. 73 et seqGoogle Scholar. with further references; see also Carnahan, B., ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of Wan The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity’, 92 AJIL (1998) pp. 213 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50. See for example, Art. 23(g) of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907, Arts. 49 and 143 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949, or Arts. 54, 62 and 71 of Protocol I.

51. On the negotiating history as well as some guidance with regard to the interpretation of these terms, see Toman, op. cit. n. 49, at pp. 67–82 and 144–147.

52. Austria, for example, in its guidelines for the protection of cultural property issued by the Federal Ministry of Defence on 12 February 1993, has interpreted this provision as requiring a higher level of proof than normal military considerations; only in cases where there are no alternatives for fulfilling the mission and where the tactical cohesion of forces from the level of battalion upwards cannot be preserved or is seriously in danger of disruption, thereby depriving the superior level of command of its freedom of action, may the Austrian military commander from the level of battalion upwards avail itself of this waiver.

53. Protocol I entered into force on 7 December 1978.

54. See Art. 52 (2) of Protocol I.

55. See Art. 53(a) and (b) of Protocol I.

56. Precisely the words ‘only’ and ‘imperatively’ ensure the protection of cultural property from damage or destruction even if the cultural property concerned or its surroundings are used for military purposes, see the preparatory works for Art. 4 of the 1954 Convention, reproduced in Toman, op. cit. n. 49, at p. 70.

57. See Art. 53 of Protocol I. This provision, however, led to different standards of protection of cultural property in armed conflict, depending on whether all the parties to the armed conflict were parties to both the 1954 Convention and to Protocol I or not, see Sandoz, Y., et al. , eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Geneva, ICRC/The Hague, Nijhoff 1987) para. 2046Google Scholar.

58. While the UNESCO study published in 1993 recommended the deletion of the concept altogether, see Boylan, op. cit. n. 12, at p. 17, the ‘revised Lauswolt-Document’ formulated the obligation to respect cultural property in the way Protocol I did, i.e., no reference to a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity was made.

59. For critical remarks on this particular aspect of the review process of the 1954 Convention, see Desch, loc. cit. n. 5, at pp. 103 et seq., and, by the same author, ‘Revision of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict — wherefore?’, Lecture given on the occasion of the General Assembly of the Austrian Society for the Protection of Cultural Property on 22 October 1998 in Vienna, Writings of the Austrian Society for the Protection of Cultural Property No. 5, Vienna 1999Google Scholar.

60. See Art. 6(1)(a)(i) and (ii). The wording of sub-para. 1(a)(i) is the result of a compromise between two conflicting views: Some delegations, in particular Egypt and other Arab states, were only ready to accept that cultural property could by its use become a military objective, whereas they rejected the idea that cultural property could become a legitimate military target by its mere nature, location or purpose. Other delegations, however, in particular the United States and other NATO States, were afraid of setting a dangerous precedent by modifying the definition of ‘military objectives’ by adapting it to a particular category of objects, and were of the opinion that cultural property could also by its location or purpose become a legitimate military target even if it was not used by the adversary at the moment of the attack. The compromise solution was to explicitly refer to the definition of ‘military objectives’ used in Art. 52 of Protocol I in Art. 1(f) of the Second Protocol, while at the same time making it clear in Art. 6 that cultural property could only become a military objective if ‘by its function’ it has ‘been made into’ such an objective.

61. See Art. 6(b).

62. See Art. 6(c) and (d).

63. Cf., Arts. 57 and 58 of Protocol I.

64. Cf., Art. 1(1) of the (First) Protocol to the 1954 Convention and Art. 9(1)(a) of the Second Protocol.

65. The term ‘illicit’ is defined as meaning ‘under compulsion or otherwise in violation of the applicable rules of the domestic law of the occupied territory or of international law’, see Art. 1(g); the main element of this definition is taken from Art. 11 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

66. See Art. 9(1).

67. See Art. 9(2) which, in that respect, even goes further than the respective Principle 32 of the UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations, adopted by the General Conference at its ninth session, New Delhi, 5 December 1956.

68. For further details see Desch, loc. cit. n. 5, pp. 103 et seq., at 106.

69. According to Art. 1(e), ‘enhanced protection’ means the system of enhanced protection established by Arts. 10 and 11.

70. See Art. 4(b).

71. The term ‘greatest’ was deemed necessary to distinguish that property from cultural property of ‘great’ (regular protection) and of ‘very great’ (special protection) importance. The term ‘humanity’ as opposed to ‘all peoples’ underlines the common interest in safeguarding important cultural heritage.

72. See Art. 10 in combination with Art. 11(7).

73. See Art. 11(8).

74. See Art. 11(2) and (9). Due to the importance to humankind of the property concerned, it was felt necessary to allow for as many states as possible to make such a request The granting of enhanced protection is, however, dependent upon a declaration by the State Party which has control over the cultural property, confirming that it will not use the property concerned for military purposes or to shield military sites, see Arts. 10(c) and 11(7) and (9).

75. This Committee is established by Art. 24; see 2.6 infra. One of its functions is to grant, suspend or cancel enhanced protection for cultural property, see Art. 27(1)(b).

76. See Art. 11(1) to (3).

77. See Art. 11(4).

78. See Art. 11(5).

79. In deviation from the regular decision-taking procedure pursuant to Art. 26, which requires a majority of the members of the Committee present and a majority of two-thirds of its members voting, Art. 11(5) requires a majority of four-fifths of its members present and voting.

80. See Art. 11(10) in combination with Art. 1(h). According to Art. 27(1)(b), this List shall be established by the Committee.

81. See Art. 11(11).

82. See Art. 14(1) and (4).

83. See Art. 14(3).

84. See Art. 11(9).

85. As the term ‘Party’ with a capital ‘P’ is defined in Art. 1(a) as meaning a State Party to the Second Protocol, the right to make a request under the emergency procedure does not extend to non-state Parties to a non-international armed conflict which occurs on the territory of a State Party; on the applicability of the Second Protocol to non-international armed conflicts see 2.5 infra.

86. Art. 11(9) requires a majority of four-fifths of its members present and voting.

87. See Art. 26(3).

88. The term ‘immunity’ in Art. 12 has been taken from Art. 9 of the 1954 Convention, where it is misleading as well, since it is normally used in international law to describe situations where a state is barred from exercising its jurisdiction with regard to particular persons or objects.

89. See Art. 12 of the Second Protocol which applies to military operations in the event of armed conflict only. Both the terms ‘object of attack’ and ‘military action’ are narrower man the respective terms ‘acts of hostility’ and ‘military effort’ or ‘military purpose’, which are (partly) used in Arts. 4 and 9 of the 1954 Convention and in Art. 53 of Protocol I.

90. See Art. 13(l)(a) in combination with Art. 14(2) of the Second Protocol. See also Art. 14(1) according to which the use for military purposes or to shield military sites in contravention of Art. 10(c), which also applies in peacetime, may also lead to a suspension or cancellation of the enhanced protection status.

91. See Art. 13(l)(b). In contrast to cultural property under regular protection (see 2.2 supra), cultural property under enhanced protection can only become a military objective by its use. This different wording was deliberately chosen in order to mark the different level of protection and to keep that provision in line with Art. 10(c).

92. Earlier proposals required that the decision should be taken at the highest national level of command. This requirement, however, was considered to be unworkable in practice, since, in armed conflicts involving multinational forces, attacks are ordered at multinational or allied command level only.

93. See Art. 13(2).

94. See Art. 15(1)(a) and (b) in combination with para. 2 (see 2.4 infra).

95. See Art. 27 on the functions of the Committee, in particular sub-paras, (a) and (c).

96. 6. See 1.1 supra.

97. In particular, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

98. See in particular, Art. 85 of Protocol I.

99. Such as, for example, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1997, text published in 37 ILM (1998) pp. 251 et seqGoogle Scholar.

100. See Arts. 15(2) and 17(1).

101. See Art. 15(2).

102. See Art. 21.

1 03. See Art. 15(l)(a) to (c).

104. See Art. 15(1)(d) and (e).

105. See Art. 21(a) and (b).

106. See Art. 15(2), which further indicates that not only the perpetrator of the act shall be held criminally responsible but also those who contribute to the commission of the act, inter alia, by participating as an accomplice or by organizing or directing others to commit the act.

107. See Art. 16(2)(a) of the Second Protocol and, for example, Art. 5(1)(c) and 8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9.

108. It is questionable whether the offences defined in Art. 15(1) are also intended to apply in situations of armed conflict not of an international character, see 2.1 supra as well as 2.5 infra.

109. See Art. 15(2), second sentence. Besides the principle nullum crimen sine lege, these principles include the punishability of the attempt to commit such crimes, or the responsibility of superiors for offences committed by their subordinates, see, inter alia, Arts. 22, 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9.

110. See Art. 16(l)(a) and (b).

111. See Art. 16(2)(a).

112. See Art. 16(l)(c). Though the wording of this provision does not contain the further qualification ‘and it does not extradite that person’ (cf., for example, Art. 6(4) of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings), it was the clear understanding of the Diplomatic Conference that jurisdiction has only to be established when the state concerned does not extradite the alleged offender to another state having established jurisdiction according to Art. 16(1) (a) and (b).

112. See Art. 17(1). Compare also Arts. 49 of the First, 50 of the Second, 129 of the Third and 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

114. See Art. 18(1).

115. See Art. 18(2).

116. See Art. 18(3).

117. See Art. 18(4).

118. See Art. 20(1). Under the Second Protocol, a request for extradition may only be refused on the grounds listed in Art. 20(2).

119. Cf., Art. 3(2).

120. See Art. 16(2)(b).

121. See Art. 19. In an interpretative statement, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chapter 4 declared that ‘[n]othing in this Protocol, including Art. 19, in any way limits the State's ability to legislate, criminalize or otherwise deal with any substantive offences including conduct addressed in this Protocol. Nothing in Art. 19(2)(b) should be interpreted as in any way affecting the application of Art. 19(l)(a)’; see the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, para. 11.

122. See Art. 20(1). Under the Second Protocol, a request for mutual legal assistance based on serious violations of the Second Protocol may only be refused on the grounds listed in Art. 20(2).

123. See Art. 21 of the Second Protocol, as well as, similarly, Art. 28 of the 1954 Convention. Cf., also the respective provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, such as Art. 146(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

124. See Art. 22; regarding the scope of application of the Second Protocol, see also 2.1 supra.

125. Cf., Art. 19 of the 1954 Convention, common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or Art. 16 of Protocol II, which require the parties to a non-international armed conflict to apply those provisions which must be regarded as a minimum standard under customary international law, and beyond that encourage them to endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other treaty provisions.

126. See Art. 22(1).

127. See, inter alia, Shaw, M.N., International Law, 4th edn. (New York, Cambridge University Press 1997) pp. 798–800, with further referencesGoogle Scholar.

128. Tadić, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 43 paras. 126 and 127.

129. Cf., the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, Merits, ICJ Rep. (1986) pp. 14 et seq. (para. 218)Google Scholar.

130. Cf., the State practice referred to in Tadić, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 43 at paras. 102–107.

131. See Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 8 ILM (1969) p. 679Google Scholar.

132. See Art. 22(3) to (6).

133. Cf., for example, most of the provisions of Chapters 4, 6 and 8 of the Second Protocol, which can be applied by States Parties only.

134. Compare also the third para, of the Preamble of the Second Protocol.

135. See Art. 23(1).

136. See Art. 23(4).

137. See Art. 23(3).

138. See Arts. 24(1) and 25(1).

139. See Art. 24(3) and (4).

140. See Arts. 24(2) and 27(1).

141. See Art. 27(2) and (3).

142. See Art. 28.

143. See Art. 29(1) and (2).

144. See Art. 29(4).

145. See Art. 29(3).

146. Cf., in contrast thereto, Chapter VII of the 1954 Convention where practically all the issues dealt with under Chapters 7 and 8 of the Second Protocol are addressed in a single chapter on the execution of the Convention.

147. See for example, Art. 33(1) and (3).

148. See Art. 30(1), (2) and (3) sub-paras, (a) to (c).

149. See Art. 30(3)(d).

150. Cf., ICRC Commentary on Art. 89 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, where the prescribed action is — with a reference to Art. 56 of the UN Charter — summarized as ‘acting for the protection of man, also in time of armed conflict’, and where ‘issuing of an appeal to respect humanitarian law’, ‘setting up enquiries on compliance’ and ‘coercive actions which include the use of armed force’ are mentioned as examples of UN actions to which Art. 89 refers, Commentary, op. cit n. 57, paras. 3595–3597.

151. The chapeau of Art. 15(1) clearly indicates that it merely defines offences committed by individuals, see also 2.4 supra.

152. Cf., also Art. 38 which provides that no provision in the Second Protocol relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of states under international law, including the duty to provide reparation.

153. It is interesting to note that during the 1977 Conference the meaning of the words ‘in situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol’ was not elucidated, and that both in Committee and in the plenary Conference several delegations regretted that this provision was not considered and discussed in greater detail, see Commentary, op. cit. n. 57, at paras. 3587–3588.

154. See Art. 32(1).

155. See Art. 32(2).

156. See Art. 32(3) and (4); see also the Resolution annexed to the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference.

157. See Art. 33(1) and (3).

158. See Art. 33(2).

159. See for example, Arts. 34, 35 and 37.

160. See, inter alia, Desch, loc. cit. n. 5, at pp. 103 et seq., at 107, with further references.

161. See Arts. 21 and 22 of the 1954 Convention.

162. See Art. 36(1).

163. See Art. 36(2).

164. Cf., Art. 3 of the Regulations for the Execution of the 1954 Convention.

165. See Art. 26 of the 1954 Convention.

166. See Art. 27(1)(d).

167. See in particular the text of the draft articles on state responsibility provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 48th Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10) pp. 125 et seq.

168. The official versions of the text of the Second Protocol in Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish were provided by UNESCO after the end of the Conference and authenticated before the day of signature on 17 May 1999, see the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, paras. 12 – 14. Compare the 1954 Convention which was drawn up in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the four texts being equally ‘authoritative’, and has been translated into the other official languages of UNESCO's General Conference according to Art. 29 of the Convention.

169. See Arts. 40 to 42. At the official signing ceremony, held at The Hague on 17 May 1999, the following 27 states out of 95 States Parties to the 1954 Convention signed the Second Protocol: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Côte d'lvoire, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Luxembourg, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen.

170. See Arts. 41(2), 42(2), 44, 45(2), 46 and 47.

171. See Art. 43.

172. See Arts. 44 and 45(3).

173. See in particular, Art. 19 et seq. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.