3. Quoted in Ashworth, A., Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 3rd edn. (London, Butter-worths 2000) p. 34Google Scholar.

4. Cf., however, Ambos, K. and Steiner, C., ‘Vom Sinn des Strafens auf innerstaatlicher und supranationaler Ebene’, Juristische Schulung (2001) pp. 9 et seq.Google Scholar (with further references).

5. Established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.

6. Established by an order of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas McArthur, on 19 January 1946.

7. It is interesting to note that the wording of Art. 1 of the London Agreement read: ‘[…] for the trial of war criminals […]’, meaning that there was no statutory restriction to criminals of the Axis Powers.

8. Referring to Japanese war criminals, the Potsdam Declaration of 2 August 1945 stated that ‘stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals’.

9. Quoted from The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Part 2 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office 1946) p. 45Google Scholar.

10. Ibid., Part 4, p. 377.

11. Judge Powers, Dissenting Opinion in the Wilhelmstraßen case, quoted from XIV Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington DC, Government Printing Office 1952) p. 876Google Scholar.

12. Judge Jaranilla of the IMTFE regarded some of the penalties imposed by the Tribunal as being too lenient, fearing that this ‘action may be construed as weakness and failure’. Quoted in Röling, B.V.A. and Rüter, C.F., eds., The Tokyo Judgment, Vol. I (Amsterdam, University Press Amsterdam 1977) p. 514Google Scholar. This statement seems to express a concern for the acceptance of international criminal law by the public. Judge Pal, in his Dissenting Opinion, emphasised that the prosecution and punishment of war criminals is ‘a weapon with which to enforce respect for the tenets of international law with its underlying principles of international justice’. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 575.

13. The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, Case No. IT–96–22–T, Sentencing Judgement, 29 November 1996, para. 62.

14. Quoted in The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Part 1 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office 1946) p. 51Google Scholar.

15. SC Res. 827 (1993); SC Res. 955 (1994).

16. Ibid.

17. For a discussion of the difference between the concepts of ‘redress’ and ‘retribution’, see Schabas, W.A., ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’, 7 Duke JCIL (1997) p. 498 at p. 502Google Scholar.

18. SC Res. 827 (1993); SC Res. 955 (1994).

19. Ibid.

20. UN Doc. S/PV.3453 at p. 14; quoted in Akhavan, P., ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment’, 90 AJIL (1996) p. 504 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. The Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR–96–3, Judgement, 6 December 1999, para. 456; The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR–98–39–S, Sentence, 5 February 1999, para. 20; The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT–96–21, Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 1234; The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR–97–23–S, Judgement and Sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 28.

22. Supra n. 13, para. 65.

23. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT–95–14/1–A, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 24 March 2000, para. 185; see also loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 502; for a critical view on the pursuit of repressive sentencing purposes by the ad hoc Tribunals, see Ambos, K. and Wirth, S., in Klip, A. and Sluiter, G., eds., Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994–1999 (Antwerp, Intersentia 2001) p. 708Google Scholar. It can be argued, however, that the consistent practice of the ad hoc Tribunals to pursue, among others, repressive goals of sentencing has already become a rule of international customary law.

24. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1234. It is not clear from the wording of the judgment whether or not the Chamber was of the opinion that deterrence should play a more significant role in cases against high-ranking perpetrators than in trials against low-ranking defendants.

25. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., Case No. IT–96–21–A, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, para. 803. The Appeals Chamber's reasoning has to be interpreted as an obiter dictum, because the ruling on the issue in question was not based on this statement. Nevertheless, it is an authoritative interpretation that can be taken into consideration in future judgments.

26. Ibid., paras. 801–803; The Prosecutor.v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1–Abis, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, Appeals Chamber, 26 January 2000, para. 48.

27. For an example in English national law cf., R. v. Le and Stark (1998), Criminal LR (1999) p. 96.

28. The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT–95–10–T, Judgement, 14 December 1999, para. 116.

29. Supra n. 13, para. 66.

30. Ibid., para. 111.

31. The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, Case No. IT–96–22–Tbis, Sentencing Judgement, 5 March 1998, paras. 16 et seq. Although in this judgment the issue of duress might have had a significant impact on the reduced length of the sentence, Trial Chamber lIter accorded considerable weight to post-crime circumstances, such as the defendant's cooperation with the authorities and his confession: this demonstrates the pursuit of rehabilitative aims of punishment.

32. The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR–97–32–I, Judgement and Sentence, 1 June 2000, para. 68. The defendant was sentenced to two sentences of 12 years imprisonment (to be served concurrently) for direct and public incitement to commit genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity.

33. Supra n. 21, para. 39. For a critical appraisal of this sentence cf., K. Ambos and J.C. Nemitz, in Klip and Sluiter, eds., loc. cit. n. 23, at pp. 838–840.

34. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR–95–1–T, Sentence, 21 May 1999, para. 2 (with further references); The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1233.

35. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT–95–14, Judgement, 3 March 2000, para. 782 (referring to the Judgement in Furundžija, in which the judges ruled that ‘this may be said of many accused and cannot be given any significant weight in a case of this gravity’. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT–95–17/1-T10, Judgement, 10 December 1998, para. 284).

36. ‘Public reprobation and imposition of punishment is, according to this theory, a useful and necessary means to demonstrate the continued validity of the norm and to prevent imitation of the offender's conduct by others’. Weigend, T., ‘Sentencing and Punishment in Germany’, in Tonry, M. and Frase, R.S., eds., Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 209Google Scholar (with further references).

37. Supra n. 13, paras. 64–65; cf., also The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 763 (referring to Erdemović).

38. Cf., The Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR–96–3-T, Judgement and Sentence, 6 December 1999, para. 455; The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra n. 34, para. 1.

39. For a critical view on the ability of the punitive criminal justice model to contribute to the process of national reconciliation by punishing a limited number of perpetrators cf., Drumbl, M. A., ‘Sclerosis. Retributive Justice and the Rwandan Genocide’, 2 Punishment and Society (2000) pp. 292 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40. The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT–95–16, Judgement, 14 January 2000, para. 848.

41. Supra n. 21, para. 1234.

42. Rwandan Organic Law on the Organisation of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity, committed since 1 October 1990, adopted on 30 August 1996, published in the Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 35th year, No. 17, 1 September 1996.

43. The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 27; the Chamber went on to state that the sentences have to be directed at retribution ‘and over and above that […] at deterrence’. Ibid., para. 28.

44. Cf., also Ambos and Steiner, loc. cit. n. 4, p. 13 (with further references in fn. 66); the importance of this sentencing purpose in international criminal law is also highlighted in Lahti, R., ‘Towards a Rational and Humane Criminal Policy — Trends in Scandinavian Penal Thinking’, 1 Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2000) p. 150CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. Cf., Arendt, H., quoted in Osiel, M. J., ‘Why prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity’, 22 Human Rights Quaterly (2000) pp. 128 et seq.Google Scholar

46. Cf., Schirra, B., ‘Die Gräuel der Frenkie Boys’, Die Zeit (49/1999)Google Scholar.

47. The fate of Mr Pinochet and Mr Milošević, to name only two, illustrates this development (for a critical appraisal of the Pinochet case, see Wirth, S., ‘Staatenimmunität für internationale Ver-brechen — das zweite Pinochet-Urteil des House of Lords’, 22 Juristische Ausbildung (2000) pp. 70 et seq.Google Scholar).

48. Supra n. 13, para. 111.

49. In an interview with Le Monde, the French General Marcel Bigeard stated that the torture inflicted by French troops on Algerians during the Algerian war was ‘a necessary evil’. Quoted in Hénard, J., ‘Erinnerung ohne Reue’, Die Zeit (50/2000) p. 21Google Scholar. Similarly, Robert Elliott, a judge of the civil district court of Columbus, Ohio, who, in the late stages, was involved in the trial against Lt. William Calley, held: ‘Keep in mind that war is war and it is not at all unusual for innocent civilians to be numbered among its victims […] It was so when Joshua took Jericho in ancient Biblical times […] Now Joshua did not have charges brought against him for the slaughter of the civilian population of Jericho. But then “the Lord was with Joshua” we are told’. Quoted in Bilton, M. and Sim, K., Four Hours in My Lai (New York, Penguin Group 1992) p. 356Google Scholar. Telford Taylor highlighted this problem by saying: ‘The trouble is no one sees the Vietnamese as people. They're not people. Therefore it doesn't matter what you do to them’. Quoted in Solis, G.D., Son Thang. An American War Crime (New York, Bantam Books 1997) p. 115Google Scholar.

50. ‘Wer im Kriege erlebt hat, mit welcher Leichtfertigkeit sich auf beiden Seiten hohe Kommandobehörden über das Völkerrecht hinwegsetzten, weil sie es für eine Angelegenheit von untergeordneter Bedeutung hielten, wird zugeben müssen, daß der erzieherischen Wirkung der Strafe im Kriegsvölkerrecht ebenso große, wenn nicht noch größere Bedeutung zukommt als im staatlichen Strafrecht’, Jescheck, H.-H., Die Verantwortlichkeit der Staatsorgane nach Völkerstrafrecht (Bonn, Röhrscheid Verlag 1952) p. 196Google Scholar.

51. Bilton and Sim, op. cit. n. 49, at p. 376.

52. Expectations in this context, however, should not be unduly optimistic. According to a general public survey (GPS) conducted in England and Wales in October 2000, 60 percent of those polled thought that sentencing has little impact on crime levels and only 31 percent thought that it has quite a lot or a great deal of impact; cf., ‘The Halliday Report (Making Punishments Work: Review of the Sentencing Framework for England and Wales)’, July 2001, p. 109.

53. Similarly Danner, A.M., ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’, 87 Virginia LR (2001) p. 489CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54. For an analysis of this concept see Jäger, H., Makrokriminalität. Studien zur Kriminologie kollektiver Gewalt (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1989)Google Scholar.

55. Supra n. 28, para. 133.

56. Cf., Drumbl, op. cit. n. 39, at pp. 300 et seq.

57. E.g., Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Norway and Venezuela.

58. However, Gacaca trials will not deal with the masterminds of the Rwandan genocide but only with offenders from the other three categories of guilt established by the government in the Rwandan Organic Law, supra n. 42.

59. For an extensive survey of the difficult negotiation process that ultimately led to the wording of this article, cf., Schabas, W.A., ‘Life, Death and the Crime of Crimes’, 2 Punishment and Society (2000) pp. 263 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

60. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, Case No. IT–96–22–A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 7 October 1997, para. 40; Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li paras. 2 et seq.; Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 11; Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, paras. 24 et seq.; Art. 21 of the ICC Statute adopts a similar approach.

61. Although the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties is not directly applicable for an interpretation of the Statutes, which are annexes to Security Council Resolutions 827 and 955, the principles of interpretation embedded in these provisions reflect general principles of legal interpretation.

62. The Appeals Chamber has taken a somewhat different approach in Aleksovski: after an examination of the applicability of the stare decisis principle in some national legislation, the Chamber held: ‘References to the law and practice in various countries and in international institutions are not necessarily determinative of the question as to the applicable law in this matter. Ultimately, that question must be answered by an examination of the Tribunal's Statute and Rules, and a construction of them which gives due weight to the principles of interpretation (good faith, textuality, contextuality, and teleology) set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, supra n. 23, para. 98. The approach taken by Judges Cassese and Stephen in Erdemović, supra n. 60, however, contradicts this ruling. Since the question of duress as a defence to murder was not addressed in the Statute, the judges searched for and found an answer to this question in international customary law (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 44) or in the general principles of law (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, para. 66). Judges McDonald and Vohrah adopted the same approach but ultimately relied on an interpretation of the goals and aims of the Tribunal, thus leaning more towards the ruling in Aleksovski (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 75).

63. Cf., Simma, B., ‘Das Völkergewohnheitsrecht’, in Neuhold, H.P., Hummer, W. and Schreuer, Chr., eds., Österreichisches Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. 1, 3rd edn. (Vienna, Manz 1997)p. 197Google Scholar.

64. Degan, V.D., Sources of International Law (The Hague, Nijhoff Publishers 1997) pp. 142 et seq.Google Scholar; Virally, M., ‘The Sources of International Law’, in Sørensen, M., ed., Manual of Public International Law (London, Macmillan 1968) p. 139Google Scholar.

65. Art. 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute.

66. As Sir Lauterpacht stated, ‘the distinction between the evidence and the source of many a rule of law is more speculative and less rigid than is commonly supposed. […] The imperceptible process in which the judicial decision ceases to be an application of existing law and becomes a source of law for the future is almost a religious mystery into which it is unseemly to pry’. SirLauterpacht, H., The Development of International Law by the International Court (London, Stevens 1958) p. 21Google Scholar.

67. Cf., Art. 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute; Art. 21(1)(c) ICC Statute.

68. Cf., Arts. 7(2), 29 UN Charter.

69. Cf., the Agreement on Security and Order which was concluded on 14 July 1994 between the ICTY and the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, printed in Basic Documents of the ICTY, 1998. In the words of Jaenicke: ‘The legal capacity of subsidiary organs with external or operational functions to act on the international or national plane follows from their status as organs of the UN [and] the internationally recognized legal personality of the UN […]’; Jaenicke, G., in Simma, B., ed., The Charter of the United Nations (Oxford University Press 1995) Art. 7 mn 26Google Scholar; see also with respect to international courts in general Bernhardt, R., ‘Customary International Law’, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam, Elsevier 1992) p. 900Google Scholar.

70. Cf., generally O'Connell, D.P., International Law, Vol. 1, 2nd. edn. (London, Stevens 1970) p. 32Google Scholar; Bernhardt, ibid.; Castel, J.-G., International Law chiefly as interpreted and applied in Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press 1965) p. 16CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wengler, W., Völkerrecht, Vol. 1 (Berlin, Springer 1964) p. 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a critical view cf., Doehring, K., Völkerrecht (Heidelberg, C.F. Müller 1999) pp. 131 et seq.Google Scholar

71. Cf., Art. 2 of the ICC Statute.

72. Cf., Art. 34 of the ICC Statute.

73. Cf., Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1984) 3rd edn.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, para. 555 (referring to the ICJ's Lotus case).

74. Cf., Kreß, C., ‘Zur Methode der Rechtsfindung im Allgemeinen Teil des Völkerstraf-rechts’, 111 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1999) p. 603CrossRefGoogle Scholar (with further references).

75. The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, supra n. 60, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, paras. 21, 26, 28.

76. Ibid., Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and Judge Vohrah, paras. 53 et seq. Additionally, the judges referred to a national case that was ‘quashed by the superior court in the French zone for contravening Control Council Law No. 10 and thus is of doubtful authority’ (emphasis added), ibid., para. 48.

77. The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT–98–33–T, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 541.

78. Cf., Kreß, loc, cit. n. 74, p. 603.

79. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, 6 June 2000.

80. The post-World War I trials in Germany, with their unduly lenient verdicts, demonstrated the risk that is attached to national trials in the perpetrators' own state.

81. Art. 24(2) ICTY Statute; Art. 23(2) ICTR Statute.

82. The Appeals Chamber has already ruled that this provision does not comprise the general practice regarding prison sentences of the courts in the different entities that emerged from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, because these courts are not ‘“;courts of the former Yugoslavia” within the meaning of Article 24 (1) of the Statute’; The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95–10–A, Judgement, 5 July 2001, paras. 114 et seq.

83. Art. 24(1) ICTY Statute; Art. 2 (1) ICTY Statute.

84. Supra n. 25, para. 813 (with further references) However, if this general practice diverges from the sentencing practice of an ad hoc Tribunal, the practice of the Tribunals should be thoroughly explained (for the ICTY: The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, Case No. IT–96–23–T & IT-96–23/1-T, Judgement, 22 February 2001, para. 829).

85. Other aggravating circumstances than the ones mentioned in para. 2(b) may also be taken into consideration, cf., para. 2(b)(vi).

86. This problem could arise if a superior is accused of intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated (Art. 8(2)[b][iv] ICC Statute). The question is whether the fact that the accused was acting in the capacity of a superior can be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing process, although such an order can only be issued by a superior, in other words: would it be inappropriate to consider the same circumstance twice?

87. Supra n. 77, para. 698 (with reference to supra n. 25, paras. 756–758).

88. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1225; this ruling has been endorsed by The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 25, para. 731 (‘the gravity of the offence is the primary consideration in imposing sentence’).

89. The Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, Case No. IT-95–9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, 31 July 2001, para. 114; The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, supra n. 32, para. 80; The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 37.

90. According to the German Bundesgerichtshof(BGH), circumstances posterior to the commission of the crimes can influence the guilt of the perpetrator as expressed in the gravity of the crime, provided that the circumstance admits of the conclusion that the perpetrator's guilt at the time of the commission of the crimes was higher or lower (so called doppelspurige Indizkonstruktion); cf., Bruns, H.-J., Strafzumessungsrecht. Gesamtdarstellung (Köln, Carl Heymanns Verlag 1974) 2nd edn., pp. 592 et seq.Google Scholar; BGH Monatsschrift des Deutschen Rechts 1954, p. 693.

91. Ashworth, A., Sentencing & Criminal Justice, 3nd edn. (London, Butterworths 2000) pp. 139 et seq.Google Scholar

92. von Hirsch, A. and Jareborg, N., ‘Sweden's Sentencing Statute Enacted’, Criminal LR (1989) pp. 275, 277Google Scholar. This article includes English translations of the most important sentencing provisions of the Swedish Criminal Code. A bilingual German translation of the Swedish Criminal Code and an introduction into Swedish Criminal Law can be found in Cornils, K. and Jareborg, N., Das schwedische Kriminalgesetzbuch — Brottsbalken (Freiburg i.Br., Edition Iuscrim 2000)Google Scholar.

93. Cf., Chapter 29 paras. 2, 3 and 5 of the Swedish Criminal Code.

94. ‘Guilt’ in the sense of this provision is a broader term than the notion of guilt as one of the prerequisites for criminal responsibility.

95. 7 BGHSt 28, at 32; quoted in Weigend, loc. cit. n. 36, p. 204.

96. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, Case No. iT-95–14/2, Judgement, 26 February 2001, paras. 846 et seq.; supra n. 32, paras. 46 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96–13-T, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 2000, paras. 1001 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić supra n. 28, paras. 121–134; The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda, supra n. 21, paras. 466–473; The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1-T, Judgement, 25 June 1999, paras. 235–243; The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, supra n. 21, paras. 27–42; The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, supra n. 35, paras. 281–284; The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96–4-T, Sentence, 2 October 1998, paras. 24–32.

97. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 765.

98. The Chamber made clear that the character was not so much considered in order to examine the defendant's reasons for the crime — in that case, the character could be relevant for the gravity of the crime, but rather in order to give a prediction about his rehabilitation prospects, ibid., para. 780.

99. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1218; similarly, in Erdemović, Trial Chamber I distinguished between those mitigating circumstances contemporaneous with the commission of the crimes and those following the carrying out of the crimes; the Chamber did not, however, elaborate on the issue whether the former circumstances were more important than the latter; cf., supra n. 13, paras. 86 et seq.

100. The individual circumstances of the convicted person, e.g., his age, social background or health condition, are generally part of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances; although they are explicitly mentioned in Art. 24 (2) of the ICTY Statute and Art. 23(2) of the ICTR Statute, their significance in the sentencing process can only be derived from their status as either aggravating or mitigating factors. Individual circumstances of a neutral character, e.g., an average age of the offender, do not have an impact on the sentencing decision.

101. Increasing the sentence beyond the margin would violate the guilt principle.

102. Supra n. 35, paras. 803 et seq.

103. Supra n. 89, para. 32. Similarly, The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 43.

104. Para. 4 of the Preamble and Art. 5(1) of the ICC Statute.

105. The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 16.

106. Art. 5(h) ICTY Statute; cf., also The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 244. Contrary to the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICC, Article 3 of the ICTR Statute requires a discriminatory intent for every sub-characterisation of a crime against humanity.

107. Cf., Jäger, op. cit. n. 54.

108. Supra n. 89, para. 109.

109. The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra n. 82, para. 97.

110. The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, supra n. 96, para. 243.

111. The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, supra n. 23, para. 184.

112. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Appeals Chamber, 21 July 2000, para. 237. In Jelisić, however, the Appeals Chamber seemed to indicate that this perception might change, cf., The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra n. 82, para. 96.

113. Supra n. 61, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, paras. 20 et seq.; Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, para. 5 Judge Cassese joined the majority in this issue, Judgement, Disposition; Judge Li dissented, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, paras. 20 et seq.

114. The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, supra n. 26, para. 69; Judge Cassese dissented, ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 1.

115. The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, supra n. 112, para. 242.

116. Supra n. 84, para. 851.

117. Supra n. 77, para. 700.

118. For a thorough discussion of this issue cf., Danner, A.M., ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’, 87 Virginia LR (2001) pp. 453 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frulli, M., ‘Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious Than War Crimes?’, 12 EJIL (2001), pp. 329 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nemitz, J.C., ‘Sentencing in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Fischer, H., Kreß, C. and Lüder, S.R., eds., International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law. Current Developments (Berlin, Verlag Arno Spitz 2001) pp. 615–620Google Scholar; Bohlander, M., ‘Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić: Waiting to Exhale’, 11 Criminal LF (2000) pp. 234–248Google Scholar.

119. Cf., Arts. 2, 3 ICTY Statute and 4 ICTR Statute. The wording of Art. 8(1) of the ICC Statute (‘The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’) does not differ in substance from these provisions: a plan, a policy or a large-scale commission are not elements of a war crime, but rather guiding circumstances for the Prosecutor's decision to commence an investigation, cf., Fenrick, W.F., in Triffterer, O., ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999) Art. 8, mm 4Google Scholar.

120. Supra n. 35, para. 785.

121. Art. 5 ICTY Statute; cf., also Art. 7 ICC Statute. Art. 3 ICTR Statute, however, requires a discriminatory intent for each crime against humanity.

122. Supra n. 89, paras. 52, 53.

123. Ibid., para. 57; similarly, but less clear: The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, paras. 852, 867 874 and 879.

124. Art. 23(2) ICTR Statute and Art. 24(2) ICTY Statute.

125. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1284 (Landžo).

126. Cf., The Prosecutor v. DraŽen Erdemović, supra n. 31, para. 16.

127. Cf, for the German law Schmehl, M. and Vollmer, W., Die Assessorklausur im Strafprozeß, 3rd edn., (München, C.H. Beck 1994) p. 142Google Scholar.

128. Cf., for the German law Pfeiffer, G., StPO. Strafprozeßordnung. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 3rd edn., (München, C.H. Beck 2001), § 267 mn 2, 5.Google Scholar

129. The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, supra n. 32, paras. 47 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, supra n. 96, paras. 1001 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda, supra n. 21, paras. 468 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, supra n. 21, para. 27; The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, supra n. 35, paras. 281 et seq.

130. The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, supra n. 96, paras. 846 et seq.; The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, supra n. 96, paras. 235 et seq.

131. The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, supra n. 96, paras. 24 et seq.

132. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, para. 867; The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić supra n. 28, para. 130; The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra n. 34, para. 18; The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra.n 21, paras. 1275, 1277.

133. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, para. 858; The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 784.

134. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., supra n. 40, para. 852; The Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda, supra n. 21, paras. 469, 470.

135. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 793 (with further references).

136. In this context, the use of the term ‘allegations’ is at least misleading: as the Appeals Chamber has ruled in Delalić et al., ‘only those matters which are proved beyond reasonable doubt against an accused may be the subject of an accused's sentence or taken into account in aggravation of that sentence’, supra n. 25, para. 763. The use of the term ‘allegations’, however, gives the impression that this circumstance was not proved beyond reasonable ground.

137. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, paras. 1244, 1251.

138. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, para. 850.

139. Ibid.

140. Cf., Bruns, op. cit. n. 90, p. 566.

141. Cf., Rule 85(A)(vi) of the ad hoc Tribunals' Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

142. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 25, para. 788.

143. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, para. 854.

144. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, supra n. 89, paras. 75–88, 114; The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, supra n. 32, paras. 53–55; The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra n. 28, para. 127; The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, supra n. 21, paras. 31–33, 35,41; The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, paras. 52–61; The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, supra n. 31, 5 March 1998, para. 16 (ii); The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, supra n. 13, paras. 97, 111.

145. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, supra n. 60, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 8. This reasoning corresponds with the argumentation in English law, for example, cf., R. v. Fearon (1995), Criminal LR (1996) p. 213 (‘The law required sentencing judges to give a discount for guilty pleas however strong the case might be’); R. v. Buffrey (1993), Criminal LR (1993) p. 320.

146. The Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, supra n. 31, para. 21.

147. Ibid.

148. The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 61.

149. Supra n. 32, para. 55.

150. Supra n. 28, para. 127. Similarly, German jurisprudence requires a showing of remorse in order to consider the guilty plea in mitigation, cf., German Federal Court of Appeals (BGH) Strafverteidiger 1991, pp. 106, 108; cf., for the English law R. v. Sharkey and Daniels (1994), 16 Criminal Appeal Reports (Sentencing) 1995, p. 260.

151. The accused knew that photographs were produced at trial in which he could be seen committing crimes, cf., The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra n. 28, para. 127.

152. The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, supra n. 21, para. 62.

153. The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, supra n. 21, para. 42.

154. ‘There is no doubt that abuse of positions of authority or trust will be regarded as aggravating’, The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 1220; this reasoning was upheld by the Appeals Chamber, supra n. 25, para. 736.

155. The Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović, supra n. 89, paras. 2–17.

156. ‘The content of the offence of murder under Article 3 is the same as for wilful killing under Article 2’. The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 21, para. 422. This ruling was upheld in The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, para. 181.

157. In Delalić et al., the Appeals Chamber stated ‘that, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven’; The Prosecutor v. Žejnil Delalić et al., supra n. 25, para. 400. Therefore, the Prosecution must have the right to present cumulative charges and the Trial Chamber may subsequently determine which of these charges will be proved; cf., also The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, para. 548; The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., supra n. 40, paras. 720 et seq.

158. Supra n. 25, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt and Judge Mohamed Bennouna, para. 23.

159. E.g., The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, supra n. 35, paras. 805 et seq.; supra n. 28, paras. 136–140.

160. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra n. 34, paras. 625–650; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96–4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, paras. 461–470.

161. The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, supra n. 34, para. 627.

162. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra n. 160, para. 468. Additionally, the Chamber held that multiple convictions for the same facts are not allowed if ‘(a) one offence is a lesser included offence of the other […], or (b) where one offence charges accomplice liability and the other offence charges liability as a principal’; ibid.

163. The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., supra n. 40, paras. 637–719. For an illustrative and thorough discussion of this ruling and the general issue of multiple offences in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, see C.-F. Stuckenberg, ‘Multiplicity of Offences: Concursus Delictorum’, in Fischer, Kreß, Lüder, eds., op. cit. n. 118, pp. 573 et seq.; cf., also Walther, S., ‘Cumulation of Offences’, in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. and Jones, J. R. W. D., eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court — A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002)Google Scholar.

164. Blockburger v. US (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180.

165. Supra n. 25, para. 412; in the same sense The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, paras. 549–557; The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, supra n. 96, paras. 811–826.

166. Supra n. 25, para. 412; ibid., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judges Hunt and Bennouna, para. 25.

167. Ibid., para. 33.

168. The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, paras. 400–402.

169. Cf., The Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, supra n. 26, Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese.

170. In a similar vein, the requirement of the victim being a ‘protected person’ (grave breach; war crime) or a ‘civilian’ (crime against humanity), and the requirement of the existence of an ‘international or internal armed conflict’ (grave breach; war crime) or an ‘armed conflict’ (crime against humanity under the ICTY Statute) are not reciprocal elements which denote different levels of offence seriousness.

171. The jurisprudence of the ICTY, however, would accept a multiple conviction in this case, cf., The Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98–30/1-T, Judgement, 2 November 2001, para. 219; The Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, supra n. 82, para. 82 (with further references).

172. The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić et al., supra n. 40, para. 866 (with further references).

173. E.g., The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, supra n. 77, para. 727; The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, supra n. 84, paras. 883–890; The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, supra n. 96, Disposition.