5. In the following text, Articles without further reference are those of the Rome Statute.

6. For the need to bear that in mind in interpreting Part 9 of the Statute see Kreß, C., Prost, K., Schlunck, A. and Wilkitzki, P., in Triffterer, O., ed., Commentary on the ICC Statute (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999)Google Scholar Preliminary Remarks on Part 9, marginal n. 2.

7. To illustrate this point: The option for a ground for refusal to surrender a person to the Court contained in Art. 87(3) option 2(a) of the Draft Statute (UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/2/Add. 1, p. 159) was explicable solely on the basis of a jurisdiction regime based on specific state consent. This option for a ground for refusal to surrender remained pending during the Rome conference, with virtually no discussion being devoted to it, until the final decisions on jurisdiction were made.

8. At a late stage of the negotiations of what finally became Art 89(2) of the Statute, an effort was made by some delegations to introduce the right to a final say of State Parties on the issue of jurisdiction through the back door of cooperation.

9. ICTY Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995, reprinted in 16 HRLJ (1995) p. 458 (para. 97)Google Scholar.

10. Cf., the challenging study of Allott, Ph., ‘The Concept of International Law’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 31 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, concluding with ‘The New Paradigm’ (p. 50) that shows some ressemblance with the statement of the ICTY.

11. Scheffer, D., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’, 93 AJIL (1999) p. 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. Kirsch, Ph. and Holmes, J.T., ‘The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process’, 93 AJIL (1999) p. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. Aggression, being the fourth international core crime, is not dealt with in this article.

14. The universality approach does not entail the wider-reaching assertion that all states have a duty to prosecute international core crimes.

15. At this point, the article does not aim at an analysis of the political motivations underlying these criticisms.

16. Both points are made by Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 18.

17. For criticisms of the treaty law argument see also Hafner, G., Boon, K., Rübesame, A. and Huston, J., ‘A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 116 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cassese, A. ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 159 et seqGoogle Scholar.

18. Cf., Art. 6 of the Statute; for a detailed demonstration of the applicability of the principle of universal jurisdiction under customary international law over genocide see Zimmermann, A., ‘The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court’, 2 MPYIL (1998) pp. 206 et seqGoogle Scholar.

19. Judgment of 4 September 1998 in Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97–23-S, para. 16.

20. Art. 49 of the First Geneva Convention, Art 50 of the Second Geneva Convention, Art. 129 of the Third Geneva Convention and Art. 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

21. Cf., esp. para. 79 of the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, 35 ILM (1996) p. 827Google Scholar.

22. These provisions even enshrine an unqualified duty for States Parties aut dedere aut judicare.

23. Zimmermann, loc. cit. n. 18, at p. 212.

24. Cf, Art 7 Statute.

25. Randall, K.C., ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’, 66 Texas Law Review (1988) pp. 800 et seqGoogle Scholar.

26. Zimmermann, loc. cit, n. 18, at p. 211.

27. ICJ Rep. (1970) para. 33. In Barcelona Traction the Court only dealt with basic ‘rights of the human person’ and correspondingly with erga omnes obligations of states. The concept of a international core crime implies the idea of ‘basic duties of the human person’ and correspondingly erga omnes obligations of individuals. For a similar view cf., Randall, loc. cit. n. 25, at p. 830.

28. Para. 73 of the judgment This view has been endorsed by another Trial Chamber on 11 November 1999 (para. 28 of the judgment; with references to the corresponding jurisprudence of the ICTR in n. 47 Judge Robinson diss. Sub 1. of the sep. opinion) following the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999.

29. On this point of terminology see Kreß, C., ‘Der Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshof im Grenzbereich zwischen internationalem bewaffneten Konflikt und Bürgerkrieg’, in Fischer, H. and Lüder, S.R., eds., Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen vor dem Jugoslawien-Tribunal, nationalen Gerichten und dem Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin, Berlin Verlag 1999) p. 36Google Scholar.

30. Supra n. 9, at pp. 454 et seq. (paras. 80 et seq.).

31. Ibid., at p. 470 (sub IV.)

32. Cf., supra in the text following n. 23.

33. For a detailed analysis of this crucial element of the Tadić Decision see Kreß, C., ‘Friedenssicherungs- und Konfliktsvölkerrecht auf der Schwelle zur Postmodeme. Das Urteil des Internationalen Straftribunals fur das ehemalige jugoslawien (Appeals Chamber) im Fall Tadić’, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1996) pp. 645 et seqGoogle Scholar.

34. ICJ Rep. (1986) p. 114 (para. 218).

35. For references see Zimmermann, loc. cit. n. 18, at p. 213 (fn. 163).

36. Condorelli, L., ‘La Cour pénale Internationale: un pas de géant (pourvu qu'il soit accompli …)’, 103 RGDIP (1999) p. 19Google Scholar; for a contrary view see Slade, T.N. and Clark, R., ‘Preamble and Final Clauses’, in Lee, R.S., ed., The International Criminal Court. The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) p. 427Google Scholar, who call this preambular paragraph ‘delightfully ambiguous’.

37. For an interesting analysis of the evolution of the rationales of universal jursidiction see Randall, loc. cit. n. 25, at pp. 803 et seq.

38. For a recent elaboration of this thesis see Merkel, R., ‘Universale Jurisdiktion bei völkerrechtlichen Verbrechen’, in Luderssen, K., ed., Aufgeklärte Kriminalpolitik oder Kampf gegen das Böse. Band III: Makrodelinquenz (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1998) pp. 261 et seqGoogle Scholar.

39. As convincingly demonstrated by the authors cited supra n. 17, the treaty law argument can also be refuted on the basis of a much more narrow jurisdictional concept.

40. This marks an important difference between core crimes of international law and the so-called treaty-based crimes which, for good reasons, have not found their way in the Statute. For a detailed analysis of the treaty law argument in the context of the treaty-based crimes see Randall, loc. cit. n. 25, pp. 821 et seq.

41. For an extended analysis see Bassiouni, Ch., ‘Réprimer les crimes internationaux: jus cogens et obligatio erga omnes’, in Comité International de la Croix Rouge, , ed., Répression nationale des violations du droit international humanitaire. Rapport de la réunion d'experts à Genève, 23–25 septembre 1997, p. 29Google Scholar; cf., also Carrillo-Salcedo, J.-A., ‘La Cour pénale Internationale: l'humanité trouve une place dans le droit international’, 103 RGDIP (1999) pp. 23 et seqGoogle Scholar.

42. See supra n. 27.

43. Sur, S., ‘Vers une Cour internationale pénale: la Convention de Rome entre les ONG et le Conseil de sécurité’, 103 RGDIP (1999) p. 35Google Scholar, holds that the Statute defines the individual as an object rather than as a subject of law because individuals cannot directly trigger the Court's jurisdiction. This is a matter of perspective. Sur chooses the perspective of procedural law. The qualification as ‘independent subject of international law’ in the above text refers to the individual's position under substantive international criminal law.

44. Cf., Oehler, D., Internationales Strafrecht, 2nd edn. (Köln, Carl Heymanns Verlag 1983) p. 543 (fn. 902)Google Scholar.

45. Cf., the conclusion of Oehler, ibid.: ‘Obviously an international criminal court […] could best express the idea of solidarity of States’ (translation by the authors).

46. Instead Art. 6 of the Genocide Convention appears to restrict the internal criminal jurisdiction to prosecute genocide to the territorial state.

47. We refer to the following passage in the article by Wedgwood, R., ‘The International Criminal Court: An American View’, 10 EJIL (1999) p. 99CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘A broad criminal jurisdiction has certainly been exercised by the United States in the prosecution of extraterritorial conduct […]. But there is arguably a difference between exercising jurisdiction as part of a national criminal justice authority, and turning a defendant over to an international body in which his own state has chosen not to participate.’

48. For such a view see Sur, loc. cit. n. 43, pp. 32 et seq.

49. Corrao, M.E., ‘Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and State Consent’, in Lattanzi, F., ed., The International Criminal Court. Comments on the Draft Statute (Naples, Editoriale Scientifica 1998) p. 92Google Scholar.

50. For an instructive overview about the course of the discussion up to the Rome Conference see E. Wilmshurst, ‘Jurisdiction of the Court’, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at pp. 127 et seq.

51. In summarizing the different options, the hypothesis of the ICC's jurisdiction being triggered by the Security Council is excluded. Many options reserved a special treatment for this hypothesis. For a more detailed description of these proposals mentioned infra in the text see Sh.A. Williams, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6., marginal n. 5 et seq.

52. See A/AC.249/1998/DP. 2, 23 March 1998 (the crime of aggression was not dealt with in this discussion paper). The first detailed proposal in this direction was submitted by Germany in February 1996.

53. See most recently Amnesty International's paper ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ (May 1999; IOR 53/01/99). Most recently, Sur, loc. cit. n. 43, at pp. 35 et seq., has heavily criticised the active role which the NGOs played in the whole process of elaborating the Statute. It is difficult to understand Sur's anger. The support which virtually all NGOs lent to the proposal based on the universality approach is a good example of the fact that overall the NGOs' activities cannot be reduced to a narrow perspective of particular interests. The NGOs' preference for the universality approach was clearly a principled one, as has been shown supra sub II. 1., and gives certainly less reason to question the underlying ‘political’ motivation than the attitude taken by some states; for a positive judgment about the input of the NGOs in the process of negotiating the Statute see A. Bos, ‘The International Criminal Court: a perspective’, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36 at p. 470.

54. See the information conveyed by New Zealand, A/CONF.183/INF/9, 13 July 1998.

55. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 6, 18 June 1998.

56. A/AC.249/WG.3/DP.1.

57. Williams, loc. cit. n. 51.

58. See Art. 22 of the ILC Statute; A/51/22, Supplement 22a, p. 73.

59. Cf., Art. 36 of the ICJ Statute.

60. In the light of the principles at stake in the particular context of international core crimes, principles which — as elaborated supra in the text sub II. I — differ markedly from those applicable in the purely interstate context of the ICJ jurisdiction, one can only subscribe to Dugard, J.'s statement that an opt-in/opt-out-regime is ‘unduly deferential to state sovereignty’ (‘Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court’, 56 CLJ (1997) p. 336)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61. See Art. 34 of the French Draft Statute, A/AC. 249/L. 3, 6 August 1996.

62. For the ‘authentic’ description of the United States' proposal see Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 19.

63. This part of the study partly draws upon Kaul, H.-P., ‘Special note: the Struggle for the International Court's Jurisdiction’, 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (1998) pp. 364 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf., also H.-P. Kaul, ‘Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof: Das Ringen um seine Zuständigkeit und Reichweite’, in Fischer and Lüder, op. cit. n. 29, at pp. 177 et seq.

64. In the meantime Ph. Kirsch has given two accounts of the Rome negotiations; cf., the contributions, loc. cit. n. 12 (together with J. T. Holmes) and in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at pp. 451 et seq.

65. A/CONF/C. 1/L. 53.

66. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 59.

67. For a summary of these papers see Bergsmo, M., ‘The Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court’, 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (1998) p. 32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68. For India's proposal see A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 79, L. 95.

69. The NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court made the process of consultations transparent by publishing its own, very carefully-produced evaluation reports.

70. In the words of Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 19: ‘During the final week of the Rome Conference, the delegations of the Governments of the five permanent members of the Security Council […] met intensively to arrive at a compromise package that could be presented to the conference.’

71. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 90; cf., Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11 at p. 20.

72. A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L. 76/Add. 2; Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 20, portrays this package — it is respectfully submitted, not quite accurately — as the product of a ‘mysterious, closed-door and exclusionary process of revision by a small number of delegates, mostly from the like-minded group’.

73. The negative answer of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in its Judgment of 29 October 1997 on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, para. 25, to the question whether an enforcement power can be seen as an inherent function is rightly related to any international judicial body.

74. Cassese, A., ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 MLR (1998) pp. 9 et seqGoogle Scholar.

75. On several occasions, the President of this Tribunal reported to the Security Council a failure to comply with the obligation to cooperate as contained in Art. 29 of the Tribunal's Statute (for references see the judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 29 October 1997 (supra n. 73) n. 47. Cf., also the Fourth Annual Report of the Tribunal in UN/Doc. S/1997/729, para. 183. For a case of failure to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda see Sluiter, G., ‘To Cooperate or not to Cooperate? The Case of the Failed Transfer of Ntakirutimana to the Rwanda Tribunal’, 11 LJIL (1998) p. 383CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

76. Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 15; similarly the coordinator of the debates on Part 9, Ph. Mochochoko (in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 317) speaks of ‘a hard fought political compromise on complex issues’.

77. Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, speaks of a conflict between the ‘interstate’ and the ‘supra-state’ model.

78. See the UN Model Treaties on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, UN Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1, pp. 64 and 75.

79. In its Judgement of 29 October 1997 (supra n. 73) the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated in para. 47 with regard to its Statute: ‘Clearly, a ‘vertical’ relationship was thus established.’

80. For a brief summary of this criticism see Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 15.

81. See Sluiter, loc. cit. n. 75.

82. Cf., on this issue the excellent study by Plachta, M., ‘(Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Never-ending Story?’, 13 Emory International Law Review (1999) pp. 77 et seqGoogle Scholar. and Rinio, C., ‘Die Auslieferung eigener Staatsangehöriger: Historische Entwicklung und neuere Tendenzen’, 108 Zeitschrif für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1996) pp. 356 et seqGoogle Scholar.

83. For the ongoing debate about the scope of Article 16(2) of Germany's constitution cf., Schöbener, B. and Bausback, W., ‘Verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche Grenzen der Überstellung mut-maßlicher Kriegsverbrecher an den Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshof’, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (1996) pp. 621 et seq.Google Scholar, contra Schmalenbach, K., ‘Die Auslieferung mutmaßlicher deutscher Kriegsverbrecher an das Jugoslawientribunal in Den Haag’, 36 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1998) pp. 285 et seqGoogle Scholar. It is likely that Germany will amend Art 16(2). To some, including the present authors, this will be no more than a constitutional clarification.

84. The following text partly draws upon Kreß, C., ‘Penalties, Enforcement and International Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (1998) pp. 442 et seqGoogle Scholar.

85. UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1, pp. 156 et seq.

86. Mochochoko gives his account of the negotiation process in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, pp. 305 et seq.

87. For a comprehensive commentary on the cooperation regime see C. Kreß et al., in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6, Arts. 86 to 102.

88. The effort to touch upon this cornerstone has been referred to supra n. 8.

89. For a detailed analysis see the comments by Kreß, Prost and Prost and Schlunck on Art. 89 para. 2 and Art. 95, respectively, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6.

90. Cf., the critical observations by Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 166.

91. First of all it must be noted that Part 9 refers to a non-State Party by using the words ‘a State not party to the Statute’ (cf., e.g., Art. 87(5)) instead of ‘third State’, and second, the drafters of this provision intended to take account of the fact that the inviolability of a diplomatic premise (the issue which was at the heart of the debate on the whole of Art. 98(1)) may be an obstacle to execute a request both vis-à-vis a State Party or a non-State Party. It is true, though, that such a meaning of ‘third State’ marks a departure from Art. 2(1)(h) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

92. Prost and Schlunck, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6, Art. 98, marginal n. 1.

93. Cf., Broomhall, B., ‘The International Criminal Court: A Checklist for National Implementation’, in Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ed., ICC Ratification and National Implementing Legislation, (Association International de Droit Pénal, érès 1999) pp. 113, at 137Google Scholar. There was simply no time for the Working Group on Cooperation to adequately discuss (and then possibly reach consensus) whether and, if so, to what extent immunities still exist under international law in case of the prosecution of an international core crime. When the case arises, the international judges may well hold that immunities of (former and serving) Heads of State or Government and of diplomats do not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over a person coming within one of these categories. In other words, the Court may well take the exclusion of immunities (the term immunity being understood as to include immunity from arrest (inviolability)) in Art. 27 to accurately reflect the current state of customary international law (cf., Watts, A., ‘The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers’, 247 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International (1994) p. 84)Google Scholar. Such a view would not be inconsistent with the judgment of 24 March 1999 of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case (2 All ER 97) because of their Lordships’ reaffirmation of an absolute immunity of serving Heads of State and serving diplomats is confined to national proceedings (a point which is explicitly made by Lord Brown-Wilkinson (ibid., 114), Lord Goff (ibid., 120–121), Lord Hope (ibid., 147 by reference to Lord Slynn's opinion in the judgement of 25 November 1998 (4 All ER 914)) and Lord Phillips (ibid., 189).

94. On the legal significance of this principle see Kreß, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6, Art. 86, marginal n. 10.

95. Infra n. 174.

96. Cf., the similar requirements in the context of requests for forms of cooperation other than surrender in Art. 96 of the Statute.

97. Cf. Art. 96(3) on requests for forms of cooperation other than surrender.

98. Cf., the — deliberately — broader reference to ‘the law of the requested State’ in the catch all clause for not specified forms of cooperation (e.g., interception of communication) in Art. 93(11).

99. For an excellent analysis of this Article and the story behind it cf., Piragoff, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, pp. 270 et seq.

100. Supra n. 73.

101. An explicit reference to mala fide cooperation was not acceptable to some delegations.

102. The alternative route to empower the Court to order or to request disclosure in such a case was part of a proposal of the United Kingdom which was supported by many delegations but remained unacceptable to some key states, particularly the United States and France.

103. In the eyes of the coordinator, this candidate for a ground for refusal was ‘by far the most difficult’ one; Mochochoko, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 311.

104. These states mostly belonged to the civil law family (broadly understood to include Latin American and the Scandinavian legal systems) and to the Arab group. Amongst the common law countries, only Israel invoked the same kind of problem.

105. See Mochochoko, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at pp. 311 et seq.

106. It reads: ‘In addition to its other functions under the Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may:

… authorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the territory of a State Party without having secured the cooperation of that State under Part 9 if, whenever possible having regard to the views of the State concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that case that the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any authority or any component of its judicial system competent to execute the request for cooperation under Part 9.’

107. For more details on these long hours of tension and suspense see Mochochoko, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 316.

108. Correctly in this sense Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 166.

109. Supra n. 73.

110. For an analysis of the interplay of the Statute and general international law see Kreß and Prost, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6, Art. 87 marginal n. 35 et seq.

111. Sub. 2.1. and 3.1.

112. Sub. 2.3.3 and 3.2.3.

113. Cf., the severe criticism by Condorelli, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 16 et seq.: ‘Ce système n'est pas seulement tres critiquable el insatisfaisant en soi, vu qu'il n'ouvre même pas la compétence de la Cour au cas que ledit futur Pol Pot (ou Pinochet!) serait capturé à létranger, sur le terriloire d'un autre Etat partie au Statut ou reconnaissant la compétence de la C.P.I. Il risque aussi, me semble-t-il, d'aboutir à des conséquences singulièrement perverses. En effet, tous les Etats dont les équipes dirigeantes. pour se maintenir au pouvoir, n'excluent pas d'avoir recours aux violations des droits de l'homme et du droit humanitaire contre les oppositions internes, auront doublemenl intérêt à ne pas devenir parties au Statut: en premier lieu, afin que la Cour ne puisse être saisie contre leurs hauls responsables par un autre Etat ou par le Procureur; en deuxième lieu, pour retarder autant que possible la mise en place de la Cour, c'est-à-dire le moment à partir duquel le Conseil de sécurité disposera effectivemet de la possibilité de mettre en branle la procédure de son propre chef.’; Wedgwood, loc. cit. n. 47, concludes at p. 101: ‘Thus, the final text gives undue shelter to the very civil war conflicts that were the moral impetus for the negotiation of a Rome treaty’; cf., also the criticism by Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, p. 161.

114. Sub. 2.1.

115. Correct Hafner et al, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 119.

116. For a reference to the dangerous potential of this ‘safeguard clause’ with regard to French practices see Sur, loc. cit. n. 43, p. 42.

117. Cf., in particular the reference to ‘fundamental principles of general application’ in Art 93(3) and the ill-defined postponement clauses in Art. 89(4) and Art. 94 (supra 3.2.2.1.3).

118. Supra n. 94.

119. Bergsmo, loc. cit. n. 67, at p. 37; Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 164, holds that Part 9 represents ‘a largely state-oriented approach’; compare the more positive assessment by Mochochoko, in Lee, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 317; Swart, , Sluiter, , von Hebel, , Lammers, and Schukking, , eds., Reflections on the International Criminal Court, Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 1999) pp. 124 et seq.Google Scholar; Kreß, loc. cit. n. 84, at p. 459.

120. Cf., supra n. 9.

121. Supra n. 78.

122. On the implications of this customary obligation as embodied in common Art. 1 of the Geneva Conventions see Condorelli, L. and de Chazournes, L. Boisson, in Swinarski, C., ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l'honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva, CICR/The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1984) pp. 26 et seqGoogle Scholar. For a confirmation of this view in light of recent practice see Condorelli, L., in Condorelli, L., ed., Les Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire (Paris, Pedone 1996) pp. 450, 461Google Scholar; for a more skeptical view see, Greenwood, C., ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, 1 YIHL (1998) pp. 9 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and F. Kalshoven at pp. 3 et seq. of this volume.

123. On the possible interplay between the statutory cooperation regime and customary international law see Kreß and Prost, in Triffterer, op. cit. n. 6, Art. 87, marginal n. 20.

124. Cf., Cassese, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 146.

125. Supra n. 11.

126. Supra n. 47.

127. Scheffer, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 19; Wedgwood, loc. cit. n. 47, at p. 101.

128. Supra section II. 1. text following n. 49.

129. See generally J.T. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’, in Lee op. cit. n. 36, pp. 41 et seq.

130. Bergsmo, loc. cit. n. 67, at p. 35

131. Loc. cit. n. ll, at p. 19.

132. Wedgwood, loc. cit. n. 47, at p. 102, asserts that ‘a realist understands that the scrutiny of methods is often far more searching in an unpopular conflict’. If that is to suggest that the Court could be influenced in its judgment over questions of ius in bello by his (implicit) position on the issues of the ius ad bellum we respectfully disagree. There is no reason, even for a realist, to expect that the judges of the ICC would ignore a legal distinction so fundamental in international law as the one between between the ius in bello and the ius ad bellum.

133. See the recent compilation of proposals on the crime of Aggression in UN Doc. A/PCNICC/1999/INF/2, 2 August 1999.

134. Wedgwood, loc. cit. n. 47, at pp. 102 et seq.

135. ‘The Court We Want’, Washington Post (13 10 1998)Google Scholar.

136. Supra section 2.2 in fine.

137. Supra section 2.1.

138. On this point see Hafner et al, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 120.