For almost forty-five months now, Iran and Iraq have been locked in a tragic and bloody war. Though die number of deaths is estimated in the hundreds of thousands and the number of wounded and dislocated said to exceed the million mark, the conflict shows few signs of resolution or even abatement. Great powers and die small nations in the region monitor developments with growing consternation, but no outside party seems able to put a stop to the fighting.

For most of its young political life, beginning with the partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan has been in some sense an ally of the United States, a signatory to military agreements, and a recipient of foreign aid. The government of General Zia ul Haq, established by a military coup against the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, has now been in power for a full seven years. Two developments have attracted U.S. attention to Pakistan during this period: first, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Pakistan's neighbor, Afghanistan, in 1979; and second, the call on the part of Zia's government for the establishment of an Islamic regime. Despite a certain unease with that ideological goal, Americans—particularly in the wake of Afghanistan—have seen their interests firmly tied to the stability of the current regime and are currently in the midst of providing it with one of their largest military and development packages, some $3.2 billion. Clearly, the policy of Islamicization has not been an obstacle to the relations of Pakistan and the United States. In what sense, however, can the policy be called Islamic?

The Soviet Government has advanced several arguments to justify walking out of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations on November 23 of last year and proceeding with its so-called “counterdeployments.” Each is misleading and self-serving and requires a response.

One such argument is that the introduction of the Pershing IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) had the effect of upsetting an existing parity in Europe and, in fact, is the first step toward the establishment of U.S. superiority.

Ten years ago the United Nations sponsored the first conference of governments on global population. Held in Bucharest, the conference was spearheaded by the United States and planned as a rally in support of the notion that population was growing too rapidly around the world and that the right prescription was family planning. But Bucharest did not turn out as planned. Such developing giants as India and China questioned the cure, and the rallying cry became, rather, that development is the best contraceptive. The conferees produced a grandly-named World Population Plan of Action which, though it acknowledged the role of family planning and contraception, had more than one plan in its platform.