This paper addresses the issues of whether the linking of core labor standards with multilateral or bilateral trade agreements is an effective way of promoting the improvement of labor standards. We review the determinants of core labor standards over time and conclude that efforts to improve these standards have to be tailored to the economic and social circumstances prevailing in a country at a specific time. Legalistic means to prod governments into revising their domestic laws or enforcing them will therefore be unsuccessful unless economic incentives can be changed to erode prevailing social norms and ease the way for the acceptance of new norms that will meet with public approval and be consonant with the distribution of political power. Moral suasion from both domestic and external sources may work more slowly than more legalistic means but is preferred because it contributes to altering the social norms that underlie and will reinforce the acceptance and effectiveness of labor standards.

Two broad interpretations currently prevail in the literature on developing country participation in the GATT. The first suggests that developing countries spent most of their time in the GATT negotiating to be relieved of various commitments, focusing on the pursuit of industrialization through import substitution and/or free-riding on the commitments made by their industrial counterparts. The second interpretation suggests that developing countries spent the majority of their time in the GATT either as ‘quiet bystanders’ lacking the expertise or political representation to participate fully, or else attempting to redress biases in the institution's design. The problem with both of these interpretations is that while each has merit neither offers a sufficiently rounded account of developing country participation. Our purpose in this paper is to offer an alternative account of developing country participation that shows more accurately the extent and variation of that participation. We argue that throughout the development of the GATT developing countries were active participants that consistently sought to have an impact on the nature and direction of the multilateral trading system. We also argue that while the energy of developing countries was often directed towards negotiating more favourable treatment for themselves, this was a result more of the asymmetrical manner in which the GATT was deployed and a consequence of their relative underdevelopment than of a desire to free-ride on the favourable trading conditions created by the concession exchanging activities of others.

The current dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) creates a particular challenge for WTO Members with limited exports since litigation costs are more or less independent of the commercial stakes involved in a dispute. Small Members with small trade stakes may therefore find it too costly to pursue legitimate claims. Reviewing the aims and practices of small claims procedures at the national and supranational level, we analyse whether a similar institution could be introduced at the WTO. While a strong empirical case can be made for such an innovation, the legal and political challenges should not be underestimated. As an initial step, we make a prima facie case that the current dispute settlement system effectively discriminates against small claims and hence owners of small claims, and thus, in particular, against least developed countries, small island economies and low income developing countries. This empirical task is carried out in Part 2. In Part 3 we explain what small claims procedures are at the national level, what purpose they serve, how they are organized in different jurisdictions involving alternative design features, and what challenges they have faced. Part 4 explores the issues raised by adding a small claims procedure in the WTO context, and indicates specific design features that could address them.

The past seven years have seen a rapid proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the East Asian region. Many of the recently concluded PTAs are comprehensive in their coverage, seeking not only the dismantling of barriers to trade in goods but also the liberalization of trade in services. This paper offers an assessment of this recent wave of services agreements in East Asia, focusing on their liberalization content and their compliance with WTO rules on regional integration. It draws on a database in which the authors recorded the value added of PTA liberalization undertakings relative to pre-existing multilateral services commitments. Among other things, this database is used to empirically assess the effect of the scheduling approach on the depth and breadth of liberalization undertakings.

The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) allows Members to enact SPS measures necessary to protect health so long as they are based on scientific evidence. This scientific evidence requirement has attracted controversy among academics, policy-makers, and civil society. The argument has been advanced that the requirement inappropriately excludes the consideration of public opinion in the domestic risk regulatory decision-making process. The article addresses the question of whether it is possible to reconcile the SPS Agreement's requirement for scientific evidence with concerns regarding exclusion of the public voice in the domestic regulatory process. It responds positively to this query, subject to certain caveats to ensure that trade liberalization goals are not undermined. It argues that the scientific evidence requirement is not only the most appropriate means available for advancing the SPS Agreement's objectives, but that it provides countries with more flexibility than critics contend, including to respond to public sentiment in cases of scientific uncertainty. Recommendations are made as to how panels and the Appellate Body should proceed in disputes under the SPS Agreement, and how governments can comply with their trade obligations while remaining responsive to public concerns.

This article aims at analysing the merits and limits of ‘cross-retaliation’ as a mechanism to induce compliance in WTO dispute settlement, specifically from the perspective of developing countries. The focus is on cross-agreement retaliation, in particular with respect to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as this seems to be the most ‘promising’ area for developing countries. Although there are several legal, economic, and administrative difficulties related to the implementation of a suspension of TRIPS obligations and there is so far no practical experience, this seems to remain an interesting option for developing countries – or at least for the largest ones among them – wishing to obtain greater leverage in the system.

In the softwood lumber dispute, the United States argues that Canada's forestry practices, especially the fees charged by provincial governments to private firms to harvest trees on public lands (stumpage rights), result in undue subsidization of Canadian lumber. Within the World Trade Organization, the concept of subsidy is defined as a ‘government financial contribution’ that confers a ‘benefit’ on firms and that is ‘specific’. In US–Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO authorities ruled that stumpage rights were specific and constituted a financial contribution through the provision of a good (timber). However, in order to demonstrate whether and to what extent these rights confer a benefit on lumber producers, the United States still has to ensure that its methodology to assess the ‘adequacy of remuneration’ is compatible with WTO provisions and to conduct a satisfactory ‘pass-through’ analysis of the alleged input stumpage subsidy to unrelated downstream lumber producers.

The present article examines what influence various domestic constituents exert on the negotiating positions member states adopt in WTO trade rounds based on a survey of national delegations to the WTO. The findings show that in both developed and developing countries, a broad array of governmental and non-governmental actors substantially shape trade policy-making. At the cost of those ministries traditionally in charge of trade policy-making, many domestic constituents have increased their influence since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This leads to a discussion of the problematic implications of these developments towards more participatory trade policy-making for WTO negotiations.

Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs on farm products continue to provide an incomplete indication of the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in national markets. As well, in developing countries especially, non-agricultural policies indirectly impact on agricultural and food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy measures including import or export taxes, subsidies, and quantitative restrictions plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the practical methodological issues that need to be faced when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981–2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide CGE model of the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets of the project's measured distortions globally as of 2004.

Since its creation, the GATT/WTO has experienced a vast number of changes, from being a small agreement with 23 contracting parties to becoming an international organization with 151 Members; from negotiations on a limited number of tariff reductions and general rules to embracing wider and more sensitive areas, such as agriculture, services, intellectual property and environment; and from a main-trading-powers' leadership to a wider participation and more balanced reflection of interests from both developed and developing countries alike. This article attempts to demonstrate the pragmatism of coalitions, as well as both the costs and benefits of creating or joining them in the current framework of negotiations in the Doha Round.