The following announcement may be of interest to World Trade Review readers.

Depending on how one classifies market intervention, trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as a ‘market access restriction’ and that defined as ‘domestic regulation’. Both the GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary. Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it finds crucial differences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the paper's basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning certain imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty.

The paper deals with regional policies towards temporary labour migration (or the movement of natural persons) with specific reference to the liberalization of trade in services. The paper deals with policies towards labour migration, and progress in related Mode 4 negotiations within the GATS framework, among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. It finds that unilateral, national policies rather than regional or multilateral commitments dominate in policies towards temporary foreign workers. Despite advances on administrative issues, little progress has been made towards achieving ‘GATS-Plus’ outcomes, partly because of the lack of a strong political commitment among member countries to liberalizing the entry of foreign workers and partly because of real or imagined shortcomings in the ‘architecture’ for Mode 4 negotiations. Weak political will has led to relatively shallow commitments with a focus on skilled workers over unskilled migrants. With regard to architectural issues, we draw attention to the weaknesses of the ‘positive list’ approach in services trade negotiations, specifically with regard to the case of labour migration. However, the interpretation of the relationship between different modes of supply has also tended to inhibit regional negotiations for Mode 4. In particular, we point to the neglect of the potential importance of independent suppliers of services. It is concluded that the ASEAN countries need to place more emphasis on regional priorities and problems in seeking more open worker flows within the region.

The following four articles are revised versions of papers presented at the symposium ‘Why Have a WTO? Focusing on the Welfare Effects of WTO Law’, hosted jointly by the Institute for International Business, Economics, and Law at the University of Adelaide and the Sydney Centre for International and Global Law at the University of Sydney in February 2004. All of the articles went through the World Trade Review's standard refereeing process.

Over the past decade, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have implemented widely divergent regulatory systems to govern the production and consumption of genetically modified (GM) agricultural crops. In the US, many GM varieties have been commercially produced and marketed, while in the EU few varieties have been approved: a de facto moratorium limited EU production, import and domestic sale of most GM crops from late 1998 to April 2004, and since then strict labelling regulations and a slow approval process are having a similar effect. The EU policies have substantially altered trade flows and led in September 2003 to the WTO establishing a WTO Dispute Settlement panel to test the legality of European policy towards imports of GM foods. This paper seeks to better understand the economic forces behind the different regulatory approaches of the US and the EU. It uses a model of the global economy (GTAP) to examine empirically how GM biotechnology adoption would affect the economic welfare of both adopting and non-adopting countries in the absence of alternative policy responses to this technology, and in their presence. These results go beyond earlier empirical studies to indicate effects on real incomes of farm households, and suggest the EU moratorium on GM imports helps EU farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost they could receive from the new GM biotechnology.

The fundamental objective of the negotiations on agriculture that are taking place in the Doha Round is to establish a new set of rules, which will correct current distortions and prevent future distortions in international markets for agricultural products while taking into account non-trade concerns and special and differential treatment. A summary of the chronology of the very slow progress to date in the negotiations is provided. This rate of progress is explained through considering the weights the different groups of governments are giving to removing trade distortions, on the one hand, and to non-trade concerns and special and differential treatment, on the other. Some results from the economic theory of distortions and welfare are used to explain the conditions under which the twin pursuits of non-trade concerns domestically and fairness internationally are compatible. These results are contrasted with the realities of the current negotiations on the agriculture component of the ‘July 2004 package’.

There is growing concern over the use of domestic product regulations as technical barriers to trade on the one hand, and the WTO's incursion into domestic regulatory autonomy on the other. The TBTA seeks to balance competing interests – acknowledging but disciplining Members' regulatory control over traded goods. The effectiveness of these disciplines is limited by the exclusion of many modern domestic regulations from the scope of the TBTA; the surest way to prevent abuse of process-based product specifications is to subject them to the TBTA's disciplines. The WTO dispute settlement tribunals have affirmed the importance of the use or adoption of international standards. While Members are still entitled to introduce their own measures in some circumstances, the emphasis on international standards raises the status of standard-setting bodies. Despite their important new role, the composition, accountability, and decision-making procedures have so far escaped the kind of civil society scrutiny to which WTO deliberations are now subject. To achieve the TBTA's harmonization objectives, the development, and use of international standards and their legal recognition within the WTO regime should be revised to safeguard legitimate non-trade regulatory objectives.

When the WTO was created as an outcome of the Uruguay Round, one of the major differences from its predecessor, the GATT, was the addition of new areas of rules of trade. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and to some extent also the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) added sets of rules that were entirely new. By adding trade in services, the rules of the multilateral trade organization now encompass trade in all produced goods and services. The WTO rules, however, encompass neither the international movements of capital or labour, nor other non-trade policies, such as those relating to the environment, labour standards, and competition policy, with minor exceptions.

This arbitration on the level of countermeasures, pursuant to Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 22.6, originates from findings against the United States with respect to a provision of the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, which permits a private cause of action for treble damages against an alleged dumping importer or producer where the dumping meets certain criteria, notably including a predatory intention. An unusual feature of this case is that, apparently, the provision in question had not yet been used against the EC, the complainant. In any case, the provision in question was found to be in violation of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, both because it would impose measures on dumping other than and in addition to anti-dumping duties, and because in so doing the procedural requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement would not be followed.