Bob Hudec passed away on 12 March at the age of 68. In the world of GATT and WTO legal scholarship he was a towering intellectual figure of his generation.

Trade liberalization, particularly QR elimination, enhances border-to-domestic price transmission. A political obstacle to further liberalization (and to exposure to greater price transmission) in developing countries is fear of extended ‘low price’ periods in import-competing sectors. World commodity prices show shock persistence and asymmetry, with short-duration spikes and longer-duration troughs. Developing countries are unlikely to adopt fiscally burdensome domestic programs to compensate for persistent low-price episodes, making border measures attractive. WTO Special Safeguards could address low price problems, but present rules exclude their use by most developing countries. A possible modification of the Special Safeguard Clause could encourage reduction of overall protection. World price characteristics and the implications of low price periods for import-competing farmers are reviewed. To manage low-price risk under WTO commitments a restricted price floor policy could be implemented through a Special Safeguard Mechanism. An example illustrates the levels, frequency and duration of such a price-floor-based surcharge.

A WTO member state whose legislation is alleged to have infringed WTO rules often invokes the mandatory/discretionary distinction, which states that only legislation mandating actions inconsistent with WTO rules can be challenged; legislation merely granting the discretion to do so cannot be challenged. This article highlights the treatment of this distinction by the Panel and the Appellate Body in recent decisions, in particular, United States–Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998 (‘US–Section 211’), and United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities (‘US–Countervailing Measures’). The reasoning and analysis in these cases extended beyond the characterization of the form of the legislation to an examination of the effect of the legislation, and may portend a reconsideration of the mandatory/discretionary distinction and a reformulation of the test for reviewing a state's legislation for WTO-compliance.

This paper investigates how the Appellate Body has coped with its precarious position in the WTO. It must rely on decentralized enforcement of its rulings; interpret new regulatory rules that are complex and contested; hear and resolve all disputes; and deal with governments litigating issues on which they fail to achieve consensus in negotiations. In this setting, the Appellate Body cannot easily promote both its reputation for coherence and its record of compliance – the dual underpinnings of its perceived authority. In response, it has crafted an activist and politically sophisticated approach to several procedural issues. Despite underlying disagreements among member states, the Appellate Body has seized chances to enact procedural reforms that encourage consensus rulings, improve its access to information, and expand its judicial discretion. While no guarantee of success, these procedures should enhance the Appellate Body's ability to reduce the intrinsic political risks of WTO adjudication.

This article evaluates the extent to which the establishment of the Andean Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) has led to an improvement of intra-regional trade, as promised by open regionalism, without reducing extra-regional trade. Open regionalism is a dynamic process in which economic agreements serve as intermediate steps towards integration with the world economy. The calculations of ex post income elasticities of import demand show that the establishment of the AFTZ in 1993 led to an increase in Andean Community trade, and not to a contraction of extra-regional trade. The intensity of trade index and the propensity to export intra- and extra-regionally confirm this finding. The article discusses these results in the context of the multilateral trading system and the trade relations between the Andean Community and the rest of the world.