Preferential trade agreements are an important feature of the global trade system. Several questions, ranging from the rationale for preferential arrangements to their impact on members, non-members and the broader multilateral trade system, are at the forefront of academic and policy debates in trade policy. This paper presents a new database that offers a detailed assessment of the content of preferential arrangements, examining the coverage and legal enforceability of provisions regulating a large set of policy areas. The database provides information on 279 agreements signed by 189 countries between 1958 and 2015. The analysis of the data confirms one of the key insights in the literature: preferential trade agreements are becoming deeper over time. A growing number of these treaties regulate an extended set of policies, frequently with legally enforceable provisions, in areas under the current World Trade Organization mandate and in areas outside the current World Trade Organization mandate, especially competition policy, investment, movements of capital, and intellectual property rights protection. Accounting for the changing scope of preferential trade agreements is essential to gain a more complete and accurate understanding of where the global trading system is going and how its governance can be improved.

India has actively tried to shape the WTO agricultural negotiations by submitting detailed proposals, building coalitions, and even taking hard stands (veto) at critical junctures. However, this aggressive posturing presents a sharp contrast with India's domestic agricultural space, where the situation highlights policy neglect, manifesting in agrarian distress and farmer suicides. This paper analyzes contradictions between India's internationally espoused negotiating positions and its domestic policy goals. It argues that India's core focus has been to preserve status quo in the domestic food markets, driven by the political need to provide food-based consumption subsidies and manage an assured price and supply protection to its vulnerable consumers. As a result, India's interests are divergent from most of its developing country coalition partners in the G-20 as well as the G-33 groups. Our discussion has significant implications for both the domestic policy, as well as the sustainability of India's strategy in global agricultural trade negotiations.

The value of preferential market access schemes has fallen sharply. Drawing on a relaxation announcement of July 2016 simplifying origin requirements for access to the EU that should help improve market access, thereby contributing to alleviate the refugee crisis in Jordan, this paper argues that a simplification of origin requirements is a straightforward way to enhance preferential market access. Yet, the EU decision limits the beneficiaries who must be located in designated special economic zones, which limits preferential market access. The paper compares the performance of Jordanian exports to the EU and the US under their respective FTAs. It shows that Jordanian exports to the US have grown more rapidly than exports to the EU over the last 15 years. The study documents lower utilisation of preferences in the EU than in the US, especially in Textiles and Apparel (T&A) in spite of non-negligible preferences. Three contributing factors are identified: (i) higher adjusted preferences for apparel in the US than in the EU; (ii) greater competition from other suppliers (mostly from LDCs) in the EU market than in the US market; (iii) simpler origin requirements in the case of the Jordan–US FTA. Comparative evidence from the two FTAs and econometric estimates suggest that this should help restore market access for Jordanian exports to the EU. These estimates provide additional evidence that origin requirements suppress market access. Other pathways to simplify origin requirements are offered in the conclusion.

WTO rules prohibit Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that provide tariff-free access or services liberalization in only one or a few sectors. In this sense, a narrow, sectoral approach to concluding an FTA between the EU and the UK would contravene WTO law. However, assuming the EU and the UK were able to agree a substantially broad tariff-free FTA, WTO rules would not prevent them from moving further to maintain the bulk of the benefits of the Customs Union and the Single Market in a few key sectors. They could establish customs union-like conditions by coordinating external tariffs in some sectors and agreeing on relaxed Rules of Origin (RoOs) administered lightly and Single Market-like access could be approximated through sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such an approach would enable continued deep integration, whose desirability has been signalled on both sides. It would fall short of current market access levels even in the selected sectors, and, in the case of tariff coordination, re-create some of the limits to an independent trade policy that Brexit aimed to remove. If the trade-off were deemed desirable, however, the approach could be reconciled with WTO rules including the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ requirement that equal treatment be awarded to all WTO Member States.

In March 2018, the United States enacted tariff increases on a vast range of imported steel and aluminum products. The Trump administration cited national security concerns as the justification, claiming an exception under GATT Article XXI. In response to these tariffs, several WTO Members, including the European Union, Canada, Mexico, China, Russia, and Turkey, adopted their own tariffs against imports from the United States, justifying their tariffs under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Other Members, such as South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina opted for quota agreements on these exports with the United States in exchange for exemption from the tariffs. This article argues that none of these measures is consistent with WTO rules. The sweeping tariffs that the United States have adopted, the retaliatory measures that several Members have implemented, and the bilateral quota agreements that three Members concluded with the United States are indeed ‘three wrongs’ that do not make a right, but rather endanger the stability of the international trading system under WTO legal disciplines.

Since 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

On 11 October 2017, an ad hoc tribunal seated in Geneva and chaired by Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, with co-arbitrators Gary Born (Claimants' appointee, dissenting) and Judge Peter Tomka (Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Jürgen Wirtgen & others v. The Czech Republic (the Award). The Tribunal dismissed the Claimants' claims in full and ordered the Parties to bear their own legal costs and expenses.

The dispute concerns certain market price support measures by China to domestic agricultural producers of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn, which the United States (US) claimed were inconsistent with China's obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Specifically, the US considered that China utilized market price measures in the period 2012–2015 to support farmer incomes and increase production of the said agricultural products, but that this support was in excess of China's WTO commitments. At the outset, the Panel found that the support measures for Chinese corn producers had expired, and that there were no factors weighing in favor of making findings on this expired measure. So, no findings were made with respect to this claim.

The dispute concerns a variety of Korean measures imposed in relation to food imports from Japan following its nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant on 11 March 2011. Korea imposed import bans and additional testing and certification requirements in relation to a broad range of fish and non-fishery products from Japan to ensure food safety arising from the possible presence of radionuclides in the food imports. These measures were subject to challenge by Japan under the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS Agreement’), which applies, among others, to WTO Members’ measures on food security.