Civil society organizations are often seen as playing a crucial role in helping to mitigate the exclusion of weaker states, giving voice to marginalized communities, and raising environmental and developmental concerns within the trade system. The politicization and demystification of the global trade agenda by civil society also opens up space for a more diverse set of actors to influence trade negotiations. This article examines the evolution of the WTO secretariat's engagement with civil society within this context and argues that the dominant mode of engagement, as manifest in WTO Public Forums and civil society participation in ministerial conferences, is no longer fit for purpose. Rather it reflects an outmoded strategy that once served to underscore the existence and value of the WTO as an international organization and works to neutralize political contestation and publicly promote the benefits of free trade. It is now in need of reform.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was adopted in order to establish meaningful liberalization rules, while preserving the right of Members to regulate. To that end, three provisions form the centerpiece of liberalization: market access (Article XVI GATS), national treatment (Article XVII GATS), and domestic regulation (Article VI GATS). Although these provisions contain different obligations, in certain conditions they can overlap. How this issue is resolved could undermine the delicate balance between liberalization and the right to regulate. As the GATS provides no guidance, the task of determining the applicable rules has been delegated to the World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicating bodies. This paper examines how the three provisions have been interpreted, and analyzes the most applicable way to address the diversity of barriers to trade in services.

The impact of the idea of ‘development’ in multilateral trade lawmaking is often reduced to the principle of ‘special and differential treatment’, which exempts developing countries from certain obligations imposed by the trade regime. The article shows that ‘development’ has always presented a much wider challenge to the vision of the trade regime championed by the major trading nations. The development discourse has conceived the trade regime's historical significance, the regime's aims, and the relationships among its members in ways that were often fundamentally at odds with the conception preferred by most developed countries. The article explores how the development discourse has informed lawmaking initiatives by developing countries throughout the history of the trade regime. While not all of these initiatives were successful or necessarily fruitful, they show that the pursuit of development in trade lawmaking has always been more than an effort to seek exemption from trade rules.

This article examines how fragmentation of the global trade regime into preferential agreements, built on a multilateral baseline of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, affects trade governance. The analysis relies on 105 interviews with trade policy professionals in core WTO members and a conceptual distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ institutionalism to capture institutional changes in the global trade governance architecture. The WTO's thick institutionalism facilitates institutionalized interactions among members of the trade policy community that are essential for transparency and dialogue and the rule of law character of the trade regime. It secures the continued belief of trade policy professionals in the WTO's centrality in trade governance. The thin institutionalism of the network of preferential agreements spells the return to à la carte forms of trade governance and benefits those with the technical and political capacity to successfully navigate the fragmented governance architecture. Ongoing institutional transformations shift global trade governance away from rules-based back to more power-based forms.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a non-reciprocal preferential trade programme that the US offers to 49 sub-Saharan African countries. President Obama's decision to extend AGOA, which was set to expire at the end of September 2015, for another ten years (2015 to 2025), was highly controversial. The Extension and Enhancement of AGOA Act, signed into law by President Obama, on the 29 June 2015, had thus included many new provisions to incorporate the views of the US Congress on the implementation of the ten-year extension and the future trajectory of AGOA. In this paper, the new Extension and Enhancement of AGOA Act is analysed to elucidate the new and additional powers that the new AGOA Act provides the US Congress, the US Administration, and US business lobbies, and the implications of these changes for sub-Saharan African countries. At least three new trends in the 2015 AGOA Act can be identified: payment for preferences, institutional attrition, and a shift to reciprocity. These trends, it is argued in this paper, are potentially contrary to a more mutually beneficial relationship between the US and Africa. The paper offers some reflections on the future of AGOA.

This dispute concerned two measures of the European Union (EU): (i) the anti-dumping measure imposed by the EU on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina; and (ii) the second subparagraph of Article 2(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (Basic Regulation). Argentina challenged various aspects of the anti-dumping measure on an ‘as applied’ basis, and challenged the second subparagraph of Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation on an ‘as such’ basis.

This dispute concerned domestic content requirements (DCR measures) imposed under India's National Solar Mission. These requirements are imposed on solar power developers selling electricity to the government under the National Solar Mission. They concern solar cells and solar modules, which are used to generate solar power.

On 8 July 2016, an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal chaired by Professor Piero Bernardini, with co-arbitrators Gary Born (the Claimants' appointee) and Judge James Crawford (the Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay (Award). The Award dismissed all of the Claimants' claims and ordered the Claimants to pay 70% of Uruguay's legal costs and expenses.