No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Preventing Systematic Circumvention of the SCM Agreement: Beyond the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2016
Abstract
Under the prevailing WTO jurisprudence, the mandatory/discretionary distinction is applied to Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement whenever a Member's measure is challenged ‘as such’ pursuant to the SCM Agreement. However, applying the mandatory/discretionary distinction vis-à-vis Article 1.1(b) may render the entire SCM Agreement vulnerable against certain subsidies designed to confer benefits systematically through private intermediaries. In order to prevent such vulnerability, Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement should be construed to cover benefits conferred as consequences of underlying financial contributions, without being limited by the mandatory/discretionary distinction.
- Type
- Review Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Haneul Jung and Jeongmeen Suh 2016
References
Adamantopoulos, K. (2008), ‘Article 1 SCMA’, in Wolfrum, Rudiger, Stoll, Peter-Tobias, and Koebele, Michael (eds.), WTO – Trade Remedies, Leiden: Martinus Mijhoff, pp. 423‒452.Google Scholar
Akhtar, S. I. (2015), ‘Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues’, Congressional Research Service, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43581.pdf (accessed 4 May 2015).Google Scholar
Export‒Import Bank of the United States (2014), ‘Report to the US Congress on the Export‒Import Bank of the United States and Global Export Credit Competition’, http://www.exim.gov/about/library/reports/competitivenessreports/upload/Ex-Im-Bank-2013-Competitiveness-Report-to-Congress-Complete.pdf (accessed 4 May 2015).Google Scholar
Jung, H. (2012), ‘Tackling Currency Manipulation with International Law: Why and How Currency Manipulation should be Adjudicated?’, Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, 9(2): 184‒200.Google Scholar
Levit, J. K. (2004), ‘The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’, Harvard International Law Journal, 45: 65‒182.Google Scholar
Mendelowitz, A. I. (2000), ‘The New World of Government-Supported International Finance’, Institute for International Economics, 1‒57, https://www.econbiz.de/Record/the-new-world-of-government-supported-international-finance-mendelowitz-allan/10002002403 (accessed 28 April 2015).Google Scholar
Shadikhodjaev, S. (2012), ‘How to Pass a Pass-Through Test: The Case of Input Subsidies’, Journal of International Economic Law, 15(2): 621‒646.Google Scholar
Sim, K. K. (2003), ‘Rethinking the Mandatory/Discretionary Legislation Distinction in WTO jJurisprudence’, World Trade Review, 2(1): 33‒64.Google Scholar
Sykes, A. O. (2014), ‘An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial verses As Applied Challenges in the WTO and US Constitutional Systems’, The Journal of Legal Analysis, 6(1): 1‒33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
The United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter XXIII Law of Treaties’, The United States Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (accessed 28 October 2014).Google Scholar
The United States of America (2002), ‘Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Congress Second Session’, Congressional Record, 148(3): 3302.Google Scholar