¹ See, e.g., B. Hoekman and A. Mattoo (2013), ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from Regional and WTO Negotiations’, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2013/34.

² See, for example, H. Kox and A. Lejour (2005), ‘Regulatory Heterogeneity as Obstacle for International Services Trade’, CPB Discussion Paper No. 49, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, www.cpb.nl/en/publication/regulatory-heterogeneity-obstacle-international-services-trade; C. Schwellnus (2007), ‘The Effects of Domestic Regulation on Services Trade Revisited’, CEPII Working Paper No. 2007–2008, Paris: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales; H. Kox and H. K. Nordås (2007), ‘Services Trade and Domestic Regulation’, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 49, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/154365452587; H. Kox and H. K. Nordås (2009), ‘Regulatory Harmonization and Trade in Services: Volumes and Choice of Mode’, FREIT Trade Working Paper No. 040; Van der Marel, E. and Shepherd, B. (2013), ‘Services Trade, Regulation, and Regional Integration: Evidence from Sectoral Data’, World Economy, 36 (11): 1393–1405CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The recently created OECD database on regulatory barriers to trade in services has the potential to make a valuable contribution on this matter, but it is still at early stages. See H. Nordås (2016), ‘Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): The Trade Effect of Regulatory Differences’, OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 189, Paris: OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlz9z022plp-en. For professional services, see Mattoo, A. and Mishra, D. (2009), ‘Foreign Professionals in the United States: Regulatory Impediments to Trade’, Journal of International Economic Law, 12(2), 435–456CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ C. Malström (2015), ‘Trade in the 21st century: The challenge of regulatory convergence’, 19 March, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/march/tradoc_153260.pdf.

⁴ A. Mattoo (2015), ‘Services Trade and Regulatory Cooperation, E15 Initiative’, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, July 2015, at 5, www.e15initiative.org/.

⁵ See Sykes, A. O. (1999), ‘Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 66(1)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ For a thorough discussion of the nature of the balancing exercise at stake in the GATS context, see Delimatsis, P. (2008), International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar.

⁷ The BREXIT affair is an example. One of the arguments for those who supported to leave the EU was the excessive intrusion of EU law on Members’ right to regulate and the need for the UK to take back control of its own laws. See Prime Minister Lancaster Speech, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech, 17 January 2017.

⁸ GATS, Article III.

⁹ Ibid., Articles VI.1–VI.3 and VI.6.

¹⁰ Ibid. Articles VI.4 and VI.5. For a thorough discussion on GATS disciplines on regulatory diversity, see Delimatsis, supra n. 6.

¹¹ This is reflected in the seven textual submissions tabled since September 2016: Administration of Measures (JOB/SERV/239/Rev.2), Development of Measures (JOB/SERV/250/Rev.1 and JOB/SERV/252/Rev.2), Transparency (JOB/SERV/251/Rev.2), Technical Standards (JOB/SERV/257/Rev.2), and Gender Equality (JOB/SERV/258/Rev.3), Development for LDCs (JOB/SERV/261).

¹² See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Report of the Meeting held on 7 and 8 November 2017, S/WPDR/M/73.

¹³ For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union and its Member States (CETA), and the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (EU–JPN) are among the first PTAs to include horizontal chapters on transparency, regulatory coherence, and/or regulatory cooperation.

¹⁴ In 2000, there were 79 PTAs in force which had been notified to the WTO, out of which only eight (10%) covered trade in services. In 2008, there were 176 PTAs in force, out of which 62 (35%) covered trade in services. At the time of writing, there are 287 PTAs in force, out of which 145 (50%) cover trade in services. See http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (accessed 22 July 2018).

¹⁵ See, inter alia, Roy, M., Marchetti, J., and Lim, H. (2007), ‘Services Liberalization in the New Generation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): How Much Further than the GATS?’, World Trade Review, 6(2): 155–192CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marchetti, J. and Roy, M. (2008), ‘Services Liberalization in the WTO and in PTAs’, in Marchetti, J. and Roy, M. (eds.), Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and WTOGoogle Scholar; Sauvé, P. and Shingal, A. (2011), ‘Reflections on the Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade’, Journal of World Trade, 45(5): 953–963Google Scholar; Roy, M. (2014), ‘Services Commitments in Preferential Trade Agreements: Surveying the Empirical Landscape’, in Sauvé, P. and Shingal, A. (eds.), The Preferential Liberalization of Trade in Services: Comparative Regionalism, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarGoogle Scholar; Sauvé, P. and Shingal, A. (2016), ‘Why Do Countries Enter into Preferential Agreements on Trade in Services? Assessing the Potential for Negotiated Regulatory Convergence in Asian Services Markets’, Asian Development Review, 33(1): 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shingal, A., Roy, M., and Sauvé, P. (2017), ‘Do WTO+ Commitments in Services Trade Agreements Reflect a Quest for Optimal Regulatory Convergence? Evidence from Asia’, The World Economy (April): 1–27Google Scholar; P. Lamprecht and S. Miroudot (2018), ‘The Value of Market Access and National Treatment Commitments in Services Trade Agreements’, OECD Trade Policy Papers 21.

¹⁶ See Working Party on Domestic Regulation, Overview of Regulatory Provisions in Services Economic Integration Agreements, Informal Note by the Secretariat, JOB(05)175, 14 September 2005; Wang, G. (2011), ‘China'S FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications’, The American Journal of International Law, 105: 493–516CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Araujo, M. (2014), ‘Regulating Services Trade Agreements: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Disciplines Included in EU and US Free Trade Agreements’, Trade Law and Development, 6(2)Google Scholar; Chanda, R. (2014), ‘Mapping the Universe of Services Disciplines in Asian PTAs’, in Sauvé, P. and Singhal, A. (eds.), Preferential Liberalization of Trade in Services, Cheltenham: Edward ElgarGoogle Scholar; Latrille, P. (2016), ‘Services Rules in Regional Trade Agreements: How Diverse and How Creative as Compared to the GATS Multilateral Rules?’, in Acharya, R. (ed.), Regional Trade Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge Univeresity PressGoogle Scholar; M. Wu (2017), ‘Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing Models and Lessons for the Multilateral Trade System’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development); Gao, H. (2018), ‘Regulation of Digital Trade in US Free Trade Agreements: From Trade Regulation to Digital Regulation’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 45: 47–70Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Lazo, R. Polanco and Sauvé, P. (2017), ‘The Treatment of Regulatory Convergence in Preferential Trade Agreements’, World Trade Review, 17(4): 575–607.Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Ibid., at 4.

¹⁹ See sections 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1.

²⁰ The TPP was signed on 4 February 2016 and provides evidence of the USA position on the disciplines on trade in services up to the beginning of the Trump administration. On 23 January 2017, President Trump ordered the USTR to notify the TPP parties of the withdrawal of the United States as a signatory of the TPP and from the TPP negotiating process. On 8 March 2018, the remaining 11 TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (hereinafter referred to as CPTPP). The CPTPP kept the TPP text almost unchanged, including the disciplines on trade in services.

²¹ In 2016, the combined exports of China, EU, Japan, and USA accounted for 55% of world exports of commercial services, and their combined imports accounted for 52% of world imports of commercial services. See World Trade Statistical Review 2017, www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts17_toc_e.htm.

²² Trade disciplines are classified as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ according to the extent to which they are legally enforceable. This is a text-based classification. When the text of the provision includes an unqualified expression such as ‘shall’, it is regarded as ‘hard’. By contrast, when the text qualifies the verb ‘shall’ by terms such as ‘to the extent possible’, or where there is an explicit textual exclusion of the said provision from the jurisdiction of the PTA enforcement mechanisms, then it is regarded as ‘soft’. Such criteria are inspired by the methodology developed in H. Horn, P. C. Mavroidis, and A. Sapir (2010), ‘Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements’, The World Economy, at 1572–1573.

²³ Lida, K. and Nielson, J. (2003), ‘Transparency in Domestic Regulation: Practices and Possibilities’, in Mattoo, A. and Sauvé, P. (eds.), Domestic Regulation and Services Trade Liberalization, World Bank, at 8Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ PTAs’ disciplines on transparency applicable to services regulations are included in chapters on trade in services, chapters on specific service sectors (telecommunications and financial services), or modes of supply (electronic commerce and movement of natural persons), in stand-alone transparency chapters (e.g. USA PTAS, EU PTAS, CPTPP), in the ‘General provisions’ or ‘Final provisions’ chapter (e.g. Japanese PTAs and some Chinese ones) and in the ‘Regulatory coherence’ chapter (e.g. EU–JPN).

²⁶ See Table 2 Transparency.

²⁷ GATS I.3 (a).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ GATS III.2

³⁰ See, e.g., EU–KOR, Article 12.1 and CETA, Article 27.1.

³¹ CHN–CHE Article 1.5; All Japanese PTAs but JPN–AUS.

³² See, e.g. USA–KOR, Article 21.1.

³³ See Delimatsis, P., ‘Article III’, in Wolfrum, R., Stoll, P.-T., and Finaugle, C. (eds.) (2008), WTO – Trade in Services Max Plank Commentaries on World Trade Law, Leiden, NetherlandsGoogle Scholar: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at 98, citing Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R, para 11.76.

³⁴ See, e.g. USA–KOR, Article 21.1 and EU–KOR, Article 12.3.

³⁵ See, e.g. CHN–AUS, Article 13.2.

³⁶ See, e.g. CPTPP, Article 26.2.3.

³⁷ Para. 4A.

³⁸ Paras. 2.3 and 2.4.

³⁹ See USA–KOR, Article 14.8.

⁴⁰ CPTPP, CHN–AUS, JPN–MNG, JPN–AUS, JPN–PER, EU–JPN, and all USA PTAs.

⁴¹ See the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 2.9. Most PTA TBT chapters also include such a duty.

⁴² CHN–CHE, CHN–ISL, JPN–IND, and JPN–CHE do not include a duty to consult on services regulations.

⁴³ JPN–MNG, JPN–AUS, JPN–PER, EU–COL, and EU–CEN.

⁴⁴ CHN–AUS, CHN–KOR, CHN–CRC, USA–KOR, USA–PAN, UCA–COL, USA–PER, USA–OMN, EU–JPN, CETA, and CPTPP.

⁴⁵ EU–VNM, EU–SGP, and EU–KOR.

⁴⁶ USA–KOR, Article 21.1.2.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Article 21.1.3.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Article 21.4(c).

⁴⁹ Ibid., Article 12.8(c).

⁵⁰ EU–KOR, Article 12.3.

⁵¹ EU–KOR, Article 12.1.

⁵² CPTPP, Article 13.22 and USA–KOR, Article 21.1.

⁵³ See CPTPP, Annex 11-B, Section E.

⁵⁴ For further details on how the duty to consult could facilitate trade in services, see OECD (2000), Trade in Services: Transparency in Domestic Regulation: Prior Consultation, TD/TC/WP(2000)31/FINAL, at 4.

⁵⁵ See OECD studies of domestic regulatory practices covering OECD members and selected developing countries See www.oecd.org/ech for additional information, cited by Lida and Nielson, supra n. 23, at 12.

⁵⁶ The African Group of Countries have highlighted this issue as a matter of particular concern. See Disciplines on Domestic Regulation: African Group Elements for Ministerial Decision, WT/MIN(17)/8, 4/12/17, para. 2.1. See also Analysis of the Tisa ‘Annex on Transparency’ (version dated 14 September 2016), Greenpeace, November 2016.

⁵⁷ CHN–KOR, Article 8 and CHN–ISL, Article 86.

⁵⁸ Chapter 8, Section D, ‘Entry and Temporary Stay of Natural Persons’, Article 3.3.

⁵⁹ Delimatsis, supra n. 33, at 102.

⁶⁰ CHN–KOR (Article 18.2) and CHN–CHE (Article 1.5) refer to a period of 30 days following the receipt of the request.

⁶¹ See Table 2 Transparency.

⁶² EU–KOR, Article 12.4.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ On the distinction between substantive and procedural disciplines, see United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, para. 6.432, cited by Krajewski, Markus (2008), ‘Article VI GATS’, in Wolfrum, R., Stoll, P.-T., and Finaugle, C. (eds.), WTO – Trade in Services Max Plank Commentaries on World Trade Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at 167Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Article VI.4.

⁶⁶ Article VI.5.

⁶⁷ See Decision adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 14 December 1998, WTO Document S/L/63.

⁶⁸ See above n. 12.

⁶⁹ See Table 3 Substantive disciplines on domestic regulation.

⁷⁰ CHN–AUS, CHN–KOR, CHNIS, JPN–IND, and EU–COL.

⁷¹ Five PTAs include a duty to review the results of the GATS negotiations, with a view to their incorporation in the Agreement plus a temporary obligation pending the conclusion of such negotiations, similar to GATS VI.5 (CHN–AUS, CHN–KOR, CHNIS, JPN–IND, and EU–COL). One PTA does not refer to substantive disciplines on domestic regulation at all (EU–CEN).

⁷² All five USA PTAs, CPTPP, CHN–CHE, CHN–CRC, JPN–AUS, and EU–KOR. Article 2.2 of the Annex on Trade in Services of CHN–CHE uses hard language only for licensing requirements and procedures.

⁷³ See Gari, G. (2016), ‘Is the WTO's Approach to International Standards on Services Outdated?’, Journal of International Economic Law, 19(3): 589–605CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ In the context of the multilateral negotiations pursuant to GATS Article VI.4, the proposal for adopting this standard has been fiercely resisted by many WTO Members. The 2011 Chairman's progress report refers to it as ‘one of the most difficult subjects in these negotiations’ (WTO Document S/WPDR/W/45, 14 April 2011, para. 14).

⁷⁵ The remaining seven PTAs – PNAUS, CHN–CHE, CHN–CRC, and all USA PTAs (but USA–KOR) – use soft language.

⁷⁶ See, e.g., EU–JPN, Article 8.30.

⁷⁷ JPN–CHE, Article III, Annex IV Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in Services.

⁷⁸ This observation refers to licensing requirements and procedures, qualification requirements and procedures, and technical standards only. Many PTAs do refer to international standards when disciplining other types of domestic regulations, such as financial regulations or regulations on data protection.

⁷⁹ JPN–AUS, Articles 9.8.8 and 9.8.9.

⁸⁰ EU–JPN, Article 8.32.

⁸¹ Article VI.3.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See Table 4 Disciplines on authorization to supply services.

⁸⁶ See, e.g. EU–SNG, Article 8.20.6 and CETA, Article 12.3.12.

⁸⁷ All Chinese PTAs, JPN–IND, JPN–CHE, and all EU PTAs but CETA and EU–JPN and CPTPP.

⁸⁸ All USA PTAs, CETA, EU–JPN, JPN–MNG, JPN–AUS, and JPN–PER.

⁸⁹ See, e.g. CETA, Article 12.3.

⁹⁰ CETA, Article 12.1.

⁹¹ CHN–CHE Annex on Trade in Services, Article 2.2(i).

⁹² TRP, para. 4.

⁹³ TRP, para. 4.

⁹⁴ CHN–CRC also include commitments on telecommunications, but only the Chinese schedules include the TRP by reference.

⁹⁵ CHN–AUS, Article 8.19.2.

⁹⁶ EU–JPN, Article 8.51.

⁹⁷ The exceptions are CHN–CRC, CHN–CHE, CHN–ISL, CHN–CRC, JPN–IND, EU–SGP, and EU–KOR.

⁹⁸ JPN–CHE, Article V, Annex VI Domestic Regulation in Services.

⁹⁹ CPTPP, Article 11.16.

¹⁰⁰ The USA PTAs do not include a separate chapter on the movement of natural persons, while the EU PTAs (other than EU–JPN and CETA) include a separate chapter, but its content is limited to the provision of definitions for specific categories of natural persons supplying services (e.g. Key personnel and graduate trainees, business service sellers, contractual service suppliers and independent professionals, short-term visitors for business purposes).

¹⁰¹ CPTPP, JPN–CHE, and EU–JPN.

¹⁰² CHN–AUS, CHN–CHE, and CHN–ISL.

¹⁰³ Examples include 20 working days (JPN–PER), 45 working days (CHN–CHE), and 90 days (EU–JPN).

¹⁰⁴ CHN–AUS and EU–JPN.

¹⁰⁵ See EU–JPN, Annex 8-C, ‘Understanding on the Movement of Natural Persons’.

¹⁰⁶ CHN–KOR and all Japan PTAs but JPN–CHE.

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g. CPTPP, Article 12.10; CHN–AUS, Article 10.7, and JPN–MNG, Article 8.7.

¹⁰⁸ See Price Waterhouse's survey cited by G. Feketekuty (1988), International Trade in Services. An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations, Cambridge, MA: American Enterprise Institute and Ballinger, at 141.

¹⁰⁹ GATS, Article VI.1.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ JPN–MNG, Article 7.8.1 and JPN–AUS, Article 9.8.1.

¹¹² CPTPP, CHN–AUS, CHN–KOR, CHN–CRC, JPN–MNG, JPN–AUS, JPN–IND, EU–JPN, and EU–COL include disciplines on administration of measures of general application both in the services chapter and on their transparency chapter.

¹¹³ See, e.g. USA–KOR, Article 21.3.

¹¹⁴ Krajewski, supra n. 64, at 175.

¹¹⁵ CHN–CHE, CHN–ISL, and JPN–CHE do not include horizontal provisions on administrative proceedings and remedies. JPN–PER only includes a provision on remedies but not one on administrative proceedings.

¹¹⁶ See CHN–CRC, JPN–CHE, EU–JPN, CETA, EU–COL, EU–CEN, and EU–KOR.

¹¹⁷ See, e.g. CPTPP, Article 26.4.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ The origin of this practices can be traced back to the APEC–OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform (2005), a voluntary tool to evaluate regulatory reforms.

¹²⁰ EU–JPN, article 18.2 defines regulatory measures as follows: for EU regulations and directives and implementing and delegated acts; for Japan laws, cabinet orders and ministerial ordinance (18.2).

¹²¹ Ibid., Article 18.4.

¹²² Ibid., Article 18.6.

¹²³ Ibid., Article 18.7.

¹²⁴ Ibid., Article 18.8.

¹²⁵ Ibid., Article 18.9.

¹²⁶ Ibid., Article 18.19.

¹²⁷ CPTPP, Article 25.3.

¹²⁸ Ibid., Article 25.5.4.

¹²⁹ Ibid., Article 25.5.8.

¹³⁰ Ibid., Article 25.11.

¹³¹ See country reviews conducted under the OECD Regulatory Reform Project.

¹³² This idea has been advocated by B. Hoekman and A. Mattoo (2007), ‘Regulatory Cooperation, Aid for Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services’, WB Policy Research Working Paper 4451, 2007, and (2011), ‘Services Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Reform: Re-invigorating International Cooperation’, WB Policy Research Working Paper 5517.

¹³³ P. C. Mavroidis (2016), ‘Regulatory Cooperation: Lessons from the WTO and the World Trade Regime’, E15 Task Force on Regulatory Systems Coherence, Policy Options Paper, E15 Initiative, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, at 8.

¹³⁴ OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation Addressing Global Challenges (accessed 24 May 2018).

¹³⁵ See Table 5 Regulatory Cooperation.

¹³⁶ In addition, the following EU PTAs refer to regulatory cooperation but through a single provision and on very general terms: EU–KOR, Chapter 12 Transparency, Article 12.7; EU–SNG Chapter 13 Transparency, Article 13.7 and EU–VNM Chapter on Transparency, Article 7.

¹³⁷ EU–JPN, Article 18.1.1.

¹³⁸ Ibid., Article 18.1.2.

¹³⁹ Ibid., Article 22.3.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Article 18.12(b).

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Article 18.14.2.

¹⁴² Ibid., Article 18.12.

¹⁴³ Ibid., Article 18.16.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Article 18.11.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., Article 18.13.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., Article 18.14.3.

¹⁴⁷ Article 18.12.6 expressly stipulates the non-binding character of the regulatory cooperation activities, and Article 18.19 carves out the provisions of this chapter from the dispute settlement mechanism's jurisdiction.

¹⁴⁸ CPTPP, Article 25.2.1.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., Article 25.2.2 (b).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., Article 25.6.1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., Articles 25.2.2(d), 25.7.1(b), and 25.8.

¹⁵² Ibid., Article 25.7.1.

¹⁵³ Ibid., Article 25.11.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., Article 25.3.

¹⁵⁵ CETA Chapter 21, Regulatory Cooperation.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., Articles 21.2.2 and 21.3.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., Article 21.4.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., Article 21.5

¹⁵⁹ CHN–ISL, CHN–CRC, JPN–MNG, JPN–PER, EU–VNM, EU–SGP, EU–COL, EU–CEN, and EU–KOR.

¹⁶⁰ JPN–IND, Article 7, Annex 4 and CHN–CHE, Article 13, Annex VI.

¹⁶¹ CPTPP, CETA, CHN–AUS, JPN–AUS, JPN–CHE, and all USA PTAs but USA–KOR.

¹⁶² CHN–KOR, Annex 9-A Specific Commitments and USKOR, Annex 13-B Specific Commitments Section G Supervisory Cooperation.

¹⁶³ EU–JPN, Annex 8-A, para. 8.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

¹⁶⁵ USA–PAN and all EU PTAs but for EU–JPN and EU–COL.

¹⁶⁶ CHN–AUS, CHN–KOR, CPTPP, JPN–MNG, JPN–AUS, JPN–CHE, USA–KOR, USA–COL, USA–PER, EU–JPN, and EU–COL.

¹⁶⁷ JPN–AUS, Article 13.10.5 and USKOR, Article 15.5.3.

¹⁶⁸ JPN–AUS, JPN–CHE, EU–VNM, EU–SGP, EU–COL, and CPTPP.

¹⁶⁹ JPN–CHE, Annex 7, para. 10.

¹⁷⁰ EU–SGP, Article 8.48.3(b).

¹⁷¹ CPTPP, Article 13.26 and JPN–AUS, Article 10.22.

¹⁷² EU–COL, Article 150.2; EU–VNM, Article on Resolution of telecommunications disputes (number still unavailable).

¹⁷³ For example, some Chinese PTAs establish a working group with the task of exploring the possibility of streamlining procedures for certified Chinese natural persons to work in the other party in fields with Chinese characteristics, such as Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioners. See CHN–ISL, para. 5, Annex VIII and CHN–CHE, Article 14.2, Annex VI.

¹⁷⁴ CETA, Article 21.7.2.

¹⁷⁵ See A. Mattoo, supra n. 4 at 6.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., at 6.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., at 1.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., at 6.

¹⁷⁹ CPTPP, Article 14.11.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., Article 14.7.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., Article 14.8.

¹⁸² This observation was made by Aaditya Mattoo in a Public Lecture at the WTO on 25 April 2018. PPT file on record.

¹⁸³ EU–JPN, Annex 8 C, para. 7.

¹⁸⁴ See CPTPP, Article 28.22 and CETA, Article 30.6.