The surface indices of political life in Germany suggest that that nation has embarked upon a moderate pro-European and pro-Western course, and that political extremism and nationalism have no significant appeal at the present time. Thus the elections of 1953 produced an overwhelming majority for the “moderate” parties. Neither the Communist Party nor specifically neo-Nazi formations attained significant votes or representation in the Bundestag in the election of that year. On the whole, the statements made by governmental, political, and interest group leaders have been cautious and responsible. Occasional manifestations of neo-Nazism have been local and limited in character. There is no evidence to suggest that such tendencies have widespread organized support either aboveground or underground.

There is general agreement among Western scholars that the modern totalitarian state is distinguished in part by its possession of a unitary and systematically elaborated ideology. While it will be found that expert opinions vary considerably in regard to the importance of the role played by ideology in the origin and continuation of totalitarianism, there is little question but that the ruling power of the totalitarian society is not indifferent to the relationship between national ideology and popular attitudes. Indeed, history shows that the rulers of twentieth-century totalitarian states have devoted considerable effort to the development among their citizenries of attitudes of acceptance toward the social philosophies and goals associated with their regimes.

While much is known about the impact of bombing on an economy's material ability to produce—in terms of the physical survival of resources—comparatively little thought has been devoted to the broader social consequences of truly major bombing. The social and political consequences, however, may well dominate the material or more narrowly economic ones; resources potentially of value may either remain unutilized or may be improperly or anti-socially employed, as a result of the impairment or collapse of our accepted processes of social decision. Our purpose here is to attempt to explore the social consequences of a major bombing disaster by an examination of the effects of bombing upon the organization of society, upon the distribution of political and economic power, and upon institutions relevant to the effective functioning of society. Needless to say, we can only make preliminary or tentative conjectures (or, rather, speculations), in view of the complexity of the subject and the limited degree of historical knowledge of the functioning of human societies under conditions of extreme stress. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to explore these questions—since the answers may have important implications for prewar planning designed to promote the ability of our society to cope with such disasters.

Reliable disarmament, particularly of nuclear weapons, requires inspection and control, which in turn require much mutual trust. None of this is yet in sight. Disarmament of nuclear weapons is therefore still a long way off, although a measure of conventional disarmament may be nearer.

Nothing compels the reexamination of basic constitutional postulates so much as the possibility of their peaceful revision. Hence the much-advertised United Nations Review Conference underscores the need for contrasting the theoretical structure of the Charter with the reality of the practices which have evolved within its framework. Such an effort, while it might give support to those who strive for severe alterations of the structure, may also lead to the conclusion that even though the operational practices of international organization fail to meet the specifications of the Charter, peace might be more secure in the Cold War era if it is permitted to depend on operational vagaries rather than on legal precision. What, then, is the basic theory of the Charter and what the actual practice?

It is only natural that a period anxiously seeking to wrest peace from the threat of nuclear extinction should look nostalgically to the last great successful effort to settle international disputes by means of a diplomatic conference, the Congress of Vienna. Nothing is more tempting than to ascribe its achievements to the very process of negotiation, to diplomatic skill, and to “willingness to come to an agreement”—and nothing is more dangerous. For the effectiveness of diplomacy depends on elements transcending it; in part on the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order, in part on their power relationship.

The outsider who presumes to instruct specialists in the needs of a field which is theirs and not his is very like the bachelor who dares to lecture parents on the requirements of child-rearing: having learned everything secondhand, he is in frightful danger of talking nonsense and, what is worse, of thinking it sagacity.

Two things encourage me to undertake the risk: (1) The difficulties which beset the study of international politics do not seem to me peculiar to that field alone, but are encountered firsthand and in substantially the same form in other fields of which I have direct knowledge. (2) It is apparent from even a casual exposure to the field that its own practitioners are currently in a stock-taking mood in which they seem eager to scrutinize their own product and to have its value assessed. This mood of disquiet has also begun to express itself in proposals for new general approaches to the field, new areas of inquiry, new schemes for collating and analyzing data, explorations into questions once thought remote from the concerns of international politics, and other such developments signifying vitality and a lively spirit of inquiry. The two works which provide the occasion for this essay are items in point, but many others could be cited.

The Communist conquest of China has been the topic of a heated American debate. This debate has been concerned mainly with American politics, and has often been based more on opinion than on knowledge and has dealt more with political argument than with historical fact. The result has been a good deal of confusion and of misinformation, which is always hard to eradicate. However, as we gain more perspective on the events of the Chinese tragedy, it is becoming possible to reconstruct the basic story of the fall of China.

This story cannot be understood merely by tracing Chinese postwar developments: the moves of the Chinese Communists, the obvious weaknesses of the National government, the question of American support to the Nationalist side, and of aid given by the Russians to their fellow Communists. These developments have to be seen against the double background of world Communism and the modern history of China. The Communist victory in China is but one case of a worldwide struggle, the special problems of which must be examined within the setting of the Communist system, its general aims, its strategy and tactics, its use of dogma, and its inner conflicts.