The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have powerful incentives to promote economic growth, not out of concern for the welfare of their citizens, but because poor economic performance may lead to their removal by force. When the simultaneity of low income and coups is accounted for, we find that the aftereffects of a coup include a heritage of political instability in the form of an increased likelihood of further coups. Although the effect of income on coups is pronounced, we find little evidence of feedback from coups to income growth.

This essay makes four points: (1) despite the assertions of some of their proponents, static game-theoretic and optimal-tariff arguments suggest that states should not undertake hegemonic responsibilities to maintain an open trading system; (2) hegemonic states have, in fact, cooperated with others, despite risks to themselves; (3) Japan, the hegemonic successor or condominial associate of the United States in the years to come, is also likely to cooperate to prevent the collapse of the international trading system. This means (4) that hegemonic or near-hegemonic powers have either acted irrationally or that their calculations have rested upon a different and more dynamic rational foundation. Specifically, systemic as well as domestic considerations have influenced their thinking and determined their policies. A major creditor power like Japan must find means of allowing others to earn surpluses in its own market or of providing assistance on concessional terms.

Recent writing on the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrializing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—has been dominated by an institutionalist perspective that focuses on the “strength” of the state vis-à-vis societal actors. A study of Korea's stabilization efforts in the 1980s underlines the importance of organizational factors in explaining policy outcomes, but also suggests important limits on institutionalist arguments. These include the absence of unique institutional solutions for political problems and the indeterminacy of institutional configuration with respect to the economic efficiency of policy. A focus on characteristics of the state alone can overlook the organizational resources of societal actors and the interest of politicians in building bases of support even in “strong” states.

This essay explores the relationship between deterrence theory and two distinct notions of rationality associated with it. The author argues that the concept of procedural irrationality, which is the basis of many critiques of contemporary deterrence theory, is not necessarily inconsistent with the instrumental definition of rationality implicit in many models of deterrence. He also argues that some recent rational choice models of deterrence are, nonetheless, deficient in their application of the rationality postulate. Finally, he provides an outline of a possible resolution of the paradox of deterrence.

This article examines three models—moral economy, rational choice, and class structure—that have been applied to rebellions and revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. All three are found lacking in various ways and unable to provide convincing explanations for the growth and continuing strength of the contemporary revolutionary movement in the Philippines. The Aquino government is challenged by a movement that has a mass base of roughly ten million and fields a fighting force of twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand men and women. It is active in virtually every province and city of the nation. Based on the present case study, suggestions are made both for ways in which the insights of extant theories can be synthesized and ways in which these theories must be revised if they are to be made more generally applicable to today's revolutions.

Political movements are an increasingly common form of mass political mobilization, and the legitimacy and authority of democratic states depends to a growing extent on the relationship between movements and states. Existing case studies of political movements neglect that relationship in favor of issues of mobilization, organization, and societal impact. These studies can nonetheless be used to show that political movements employ a mixture of confrontation and collaboration in their relationship to the state. More centralized states, which offer fewer institutional channels for movement influence, face more confrontational movements. However, political movements in all democratic settings use confrontation primarily as a strategic device to enhance their leverage in negotiations with state authorities. Movements are not a challenge to state authority so much as they are a force for change within democratic society.