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Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Forrest C. Pogue
Forrest C. Pogue
Affiliation:
War Department Historian
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Extract

On April 12, 1945, the day of President Roosevelt's death and eighteen days before the Russians took Berlin, American forces crossed the Elbe near Magdeburg, some fifty miles from the German capital. A second bridgehead was established across the Elbe on the 13th. On the following day, a German counterattack forced U.S. units to withdraw from their northern bridgehead, while retaining the one in the south. These elements were ordered to hold in place, and other units arriving at the Elbe were turned toward objectives south and north along the west bank of the river. On May 5, a week before the Russians entered Prague, the Third U.S. Army had advance spearheads inside the Czechoslovak frontiers and, on the day the war ended, General Patton was in a position to send aid to the Czechoslovak capital. Despite the pleas of Czechoslovak leaders in Prague and London, these units were not sent forward.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , April 1952 , pp. 356 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1952

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References

1 Eisenhower, Dwight D., in Crusade in Europe (New York, 1949, p. 396)Google Scholar, says: “This future division of Germany [into post-hostilities occupation zones] did not influence our military plans for the final conquest of the country. Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory; by later adjustment troops of the several nations could be concentrated into their own national sectors.” See also, ibid., pp. 396–403; and Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, New York, 1951, pp. 531–37.Google Scholar

2 Philip E. Mosely, adviser to the U.S. delegation to the European Advisory Commission in London which drew up the boundaries, has written an authoritative article on the subject: “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No. 4 (July 1950), 580–604.

3 Eisenhower, , op. cit., p. 396.Google Scholar

4 SHAEF Planning Staff Draft of Post NEPTUNE Course of Action after Capture of the Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axes of Advances, I, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.

5 Eisenhower to Bradley, Montgomery, and Devers, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.

6 This view was expressed in several letters of the period, but the particular figure of speech was that of Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who used it in explaining SHAEF'S policy (interview with General Smith by author, 1 Nov 51).

7 Bradley, , op. cit., pp. 531–37, 544.Google Scholar

8 Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, Personal to Marshal Stalin, SCAF-252, 28 Mar 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

9 The British reactions were indicated in Marshall to Eisenhower, w-60507, 29 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file. The Prime Minister's reactions and those of General Eisen-hower are given in Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-18345, 30 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

10 Marshall to Eisenhower, w-61337, 31 Mar 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

11 Ibid.

12 For a similar view and for General Eisenhower's reactions, see Eisenhower, , op. cit., p. 399.Google Scholar

13 Draft of message for the President to the Prime Minister (with notation “dispatched as is per White House”) in reply to message of 1 Apr 45, Operations Division (War Department) files ABC-384 Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec I-D.

14 Paraphrase of U.S. views given in Marshall to Eisenhower, w-64349, 6 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

15 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-18710, 7 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

16 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8 Apr 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

17 Leahy, William D., I Was There, New York, 1950, pp. 350–51.Google Scholar

18 WD Memo, with covering note by General Bissell, G-2, subject: “German Line of Demarcation Between Anglo-American and Soviet Operations,” 22 Mar 45, OPD-381. General Marshall, perhaps prompted by this memorandum, later wrote General Eisenhower on March 26: “One of the problems which arises … is that of meeting the Russians. What are your ideas on control and coordination to prevent unfortunate incidents and to sort out the two advancing forces? One possibility is an agreed line of demarcation. The arrangements we now have with the Russians appear quite inadequate for the situation you may face and it seems that steps ought to be initiated without delay to provide for the communication and liaison you will need with them during the period when your forces may be mopping up in close proximity or in contact with Russian forces”(Eisenhower Personal file).

19 Eisenhower to War Dept., 5 Apr 45, War Dept. to SHAEF, 12 Apr 45, Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-23875, 14 Apr 45, Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, SCAF-282, 15 Apr 45, SHAEF ses Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5. I.

20 Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 21 Apr 45, Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 22 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

21 Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24032, 24 Apr 45, Military Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24055, 25 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, I.

22 Marshall to Eisenhower, w-74256, 28 Apr 45, SHAEF cable log (this also contains a statement of the British position).

23 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-20225, 29 Apr 45, SHAEF cable log. In a letter to the author of 20 Feb 52, General Eisenhower said that no political directive was ever given him to stop at the Elbe or to go to Berlin and Prague.

24 Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, SCAF-323, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF ses Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, II.

25 Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 4 May 45, Military Mission Moscow, MX. 24166, 4 May 45, Military Mission Moscow, MX-24193, 5 May 45, SHAEF ses Bomb-line, Liaison and Coordination of Fronts 373.5, II.

26 Series of messages, 6, 7, and 8 May 45, SHAEF EACS Czechoslovakia SH/9.

27 Churchill to Eisenhower, 2920, 7 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

28 Note on transmittal slip of request from Czech Military Mission, 9 May 45, SHAEF EACS Czechoslovakia SH/9.

29 Czech Military Mission to SHAEF, 6 May 45,12th A Gp to SHAEF, 7 May 45, SHAEF to Military Mission Moscow, FWD-21OO1, 8 May 45, SHAEF SGS Czechoslovakian Resistance Groups 370.64; Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 8 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.

30 Col. Meyer-Detring Report of 10 May 45 on visit to Field Marshal Schörner (initialed by Keitel and Jodl), German files; V Corps History of Operation in ETO, p. 454; Eisenhower to OKW, 10 May 45, and Eisenhower to Military Mission Moscow, 10 May 45, Eisenhower Personal file.