¹ “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” World Politics, xxiv (October 1971), 39–79Google Scholar.

² Determined advocacy of a particular explanatory hypothesis should be disciplined by the realization that an arms race is waged for many reasons—by different parties, on both (or more) sides, of the competition. This article is in no sense intended to be policy-prescriptive. However, much of the analysis does run counter to what might be termed the present “orthodox wisdom” on arms control and deterrence theory. I believe that because systematic effort has not been expended by social scientists upon the arms race phenomenon, strong advocates of arms control have felt intellectually comfortable with arguments that really address only a small number of the propositions that pertain to motivation and are worthy of consideration. If aid and comfort is unintentionally given to “conservative” arguments on defense policy, then it is up to the “liberal” advocates—who do, after all, dominate public discussion—to broaden the intellectual base of their position.

³ Cited in Harold, and Sprout, Margaret, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922 (Princeton 1943Google Scholar; first pub, 1940), 117.

⁴ One escape from the murderous implications of mutual assured destruction would be to stress the counterforce option. Such an option may or may not be linked with deliberate attempts of varying degrees of endeavor to ensure the sanctuary status of the urban civilian population. See May, Michael M., “Some Advantages of a Counterforce Deterrence,” Orbis, xiv (Summer 1970), 271Google Scholar–83; Lee Burns, Arthur, Ethics and Deterrence: A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities, Adelphi Papers, No. 69 (London 1970Google Scholar); Russett, Bruce M., “Short of Nuclear Madness,” Worldview, xv (April 1973), 31–37Google Scholar; and Stillman, Edmund O., “Civilian Sanctuary and Target Avoidance Policy in Thermonuclear War,” in “How Wars End,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 392 (November 1970), 116CrossRefGoogle Scholar–32. Without straining the evidence too far, it may be noted that a functional alliance is being forged by the moderate Left and the moderate Right (bodi categories containing only small numbers of analysts active in the journal literature) against the large “muscular liberal” center, on the issue of deterrence theory and a desirable defense posture. The Left may deplore large-scale ABM deployment (because of the corporate “rip-off” that could be presumed to follow, and because arms are “bad”), but it agrees with diose of the more conservative analysts who are highly critical of the criterion of assured destruction for an adequate deterrent. For example, the forceful assault on SALT I by Senator Buckley (New York) should touch a responsive chord in many analysts far to the left of center who also reject the idea that civilians should be hostages. For an example of Buckley's critique, see particularly U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Relations, Foreign, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington 1972), 256Google Scholar–71.

⁵ On the cruiser competition of the 1920's, see O'Connor, Raymond G., Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence, Kansas 1962Google Scholar); Roskill, Stephen, Naval Policy Between the Wars, I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929 (London 1968Google Scholar); Bull, Hedley, Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, Occasional Paper, Center for Policy Study (Chicago 1971Google Scholar), particularly 14–18, 31. Bull notes (p. 31) that “the 1922 Treaty channelled competition into the field of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Within two years of its conclusion all signatories were laying down cruisers up to the maximum treaty limits, and in 1927–29 the Anglo-American cruiser race became a source of serious friction.”

⁶ On the consequences of SALT I, the data are, of course, still missing. However, all the evidence available thus far—supported by historical reflection—suggests that SALT I has encouraged the technological arms race. See Hoeber, Francis P., SALT I: The Morning After, RAND Corporation P-4867 (Santa Monica 1972Google Scholar).

⁷ Naroll, Raoul, “Deterrence in History,” in Pruitt, Dean G. and Snyder, Richard C., eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969), 163Google Scholar.

⁸ The Fiscal Year 1969–73 Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget (Washington 1968), 50Google Scholar.

⁹ This same thought has occurred to Mueller, John: see Mueller, , ed., Approaches to Measurement in International Relations (New York 1969), 11–12Google Scholar. Persuasive analysis along very similar lines may be found in Luard, Evan, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System (Boston 1968), 223Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The view that arms control both begins and (for most purposes) ends at home leads to the conclusion that transnational effort is required in order to “interdict” the policy-making processes of the racing states. Public focus upon the apparently endless sessions of the formal inter-state type at Geneva, Helsinki, or Vienna is really attention devoted to the “small change” of arms control. In this view, public policy and private endeavor should be directed toward the encouraging of “friendly” forces within the arena of domestic defense policy of the other side(s). The most comprehensive presentation of the need for and possible rewards of “political interdiction” is to be found in the writings of Franklyn Griffiths. See “Images, Politics, Arms Control: Aspects and Implications of Postwar Soviet Policy Toward the United States,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University 1972), esp. 484–509; “The Political Side of Disarmament,” International Journal, xxii (Spring 1967), 293–305Google Scholar; and “Transnational Politics and Arms Control,” International Journal, xxvi (Autumn 1971), 640Google Scholar–74. The arms control community would do well to focus its analytical attention upon an area of analysis created by a fusion of bureaucratic political and transnational participatory interests. Illustrative of the lacunae in the past (and present) study of arms control are the following two statements: “[I]t is common in seeking arms limitations to find that neither side really has any deep understanding of the motivations of the opposing bureaucracy” (Stone, Jeremy, Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue [New York 1967], 15Google Scholar); “Each power is aware that its actions have some impact within the other systems, and speculation about the nature of that impact is an unspoken—or seldom spoken—question in the decision-making processes of presumably both Moscow and Washington. But, to judge by the public evidence, this question has relatively little effect upon policy. . . .” (Caldwell, Lawrence T., Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Papers, No. 75 [LondonGoogle Scholar 97])])

¹¹ The term “crisis slide” is borrowed from Bell, Coral, Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (London 1971), 14–15Google Scholar. Dr. Bell identifies “crisis slides” in the periods 1936–39 and 1906–14. Of more immediate relevance, the author seeks to explain why such a slide has not occurred since 1945.

¹² The fact that a particular arms race ends in war proves nothing (except possibly that the competitors may well have been wise to seek to improve their relative military postures). Drawing up a list of arms races and identifying those which had war as an “outcome” has so far not proved to be a very valuable exercise. Balanced, though brief, commentaries upon the connection between arms races and war are in Nicholson, Michael, Conflict Analysis (London 1970), esp. 133Google Scholar–36; and Blainey, Geoffrey, The Causes of War (London 1973), 135CrossRefGoogle Scholar–41. The listing of arms races most often reproduced is that of Huntington, Samuel P., “Arms Races: Pre-Requisites and Results,” in Fried-rich, Carl S. and Harris, Seymour G., eds., Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 43Google Scholar. Mueller (fn. 9, p. 12) has taken Huntington to task for contending that Anglo-German naval rivalry ended in 1912 and thereby indicating a “non-war” outcome, whereas a good argument could be made for extending this competition, for purposes of analysis, to 1914.

¹³ One may argue that in 1914 the political leaders of each of the major continental powers expected their side to win. It is, however, a considerable analytical leap to assert that those leaders went to war because they thought they would be victorious.

¹⁴ Every War Must End (New York 1971Google Scholar), esp. 2–8. “Since war plans tend to cover only the first act, the national leadership, in opting for war, will in fact be choosing a plan without an ending” (p. 8).

¹⁵ The acceptance by well-meaning American arms controllers of a mission civilisatrice in strategic theory has led to profound disappointment and to the erection of a barrier to the views of strategists from other cultures, defending different interests. See Lee, William T., “The ‘Politico-Military-Industrial Complex’ of the USSR,” Journal of International Affairs, xxvi, No. 1 (1972), 73–86Google Scholar. “If we would listen to what the Soviets are saying, cease to lecture them and to belitde their achievements as only emulations of earlier U.S. developments, we might even learn something about strategy and force development in the nuclear age” (p. 86).

¹⁶ Comprehensive justification for granting first call on United States resources for strategic forces to die assured-destruction mission may be found in McNamara (fn. 8), 41–54, 56–61; also, Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 (New York 1971), 165–242Google Scholar. In the 1960's the criterion of assured destruction did provide a bureaucratically exploitable “yardstick of sufficiency” (the title of Chapter 6 in Enthoven and Smith): 400 one-megaton equivalents were deemed to be “sufficient,” from the perspective of economic theory, but the theory has foundered upon the political rocks of both domestic defense politics and inter-state competition. The operation of the law of diminishing returns (to effort) is demonstrated in the Table in Enthoven and Smith, 207.

¹⁷ President Nixon has expressed a desire for just such a flexibility in US. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, Report to the Congress (Washington, February 25, 1971). “I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges” (p. 58).

¹⁸ See the testimony of Warnke, Paul C. in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, Hearing-Symposium, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1972), 108Google Scholar.

¹⁹ With the United States occupying the role of defender “with a civilian target only” option, William Van Cleave has outlined a scenario with implications critical of SALT I; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Services, Armed, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington 1972), 578Google Scholar–79.

²⁰ The most fully developed exercises in an analysis of bureaucratic politics are by Halperin, Morton H.: see Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, unpub., The Brookings Institution (Washington 1972Google Scholar); and “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics, xxv (October 1972), 62–95Google Scholar.

²¹ For the various agencies of the United States Department of Defense, the Soviet Union (at present) provides a general legitimizing function for the real contest: between “sister services,” with the Office of Management and the Budget, etc. That the strategic arms race is really a form of analytical shorthand for both international and transnational arms-race systems has long been appreciated—in principle. For example, in his foreword to Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York 1961), Jerome Wiesner writes: “One of the most ironic aspects of the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves is that each is running an arms race with itself” (p. 14).

²² perry Smith, McCoy, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945 (Baltimore 1970Google Scholar), 69; also see 51–53.

²³ Soviet-American naval interaction has been a subject covered only very sparsely in the literature. A n excellent recent review of the various schools of thought concerning, for example, the question of whether Soviet naval deployment of an increasingly forward character is reflective of essentially strategic defensive requirements, or whether it betokens a bid for attainment of a blue-water fleet for the open ocean, is in Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and its Influence on Soviet Naval Development, RAND Corporation P-4913 (Santa Monica 1972Google Scholar).

²⁴ This last point may be true, but it rests upon assumptions concerning the working of the adversary's defense bureaucracy that may not be sound. Attention, in the contemporary context, is at last beginning to be focused upon this problem. See Gallagher, Matdiew P. and Spielmann, Karl F. Jr., Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race (New York 1972Google Scholar).

²⁵ Fn. 1, 71–78.

²⁶ For Foster's critique of the dominant action-reaction model, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1971), 46–47. Abram Chayes’ analysis is in “An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements,” Harvard Law Review, LXXXV (March 1972), 910Google Scholar–19.

²⁷ A Farewell to Arms Control? (London 1972Google Scholar), 195. Mrs. Young's incisive book should make bitter reading for many of America's leading arms controllers. Cries of mea culpa are perhaps better late than never, but the most vociferous and apparently tireless critics of, for example, the Safeguard ABM system, were precisely those individuals most closely associated—in both executive and advisory positions—with the Administrations that put the United States’ arms-race effort into very high gear in the early and mid-1960's. Herbert York's excellent book, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York 1970Google Scholar), epitomizes the dilemma of the sympathetic reader. “What took you so long?” is not an unfair question to ask. Mrs. Young has been so unkind as to state that “the Kennedy academics stood fast against their President's Minuteman purchase of 1961 by opposing Nixon's Safeguard purchase of 1969” (p. 221).

²⁸ Even if bureaucracies do function according to similar laws at different times and places, not all bureaucracies are as open to Cartesian investigation as is the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Hence the quality of the analysis is certain to vary to a degree that is fatal to confidence in the conclusions, should a hopeful analyst seek to crack open the games played by arms-racing bureaucrats in different capital cities. Also, the amount of “baronial power” enjoyed by department heads and chairmen of congressional committees is unlikely to be reflected in different structures of government—particularly diose with a more directive form of political leadership. Indeed, it is very possible that the degree of bureaucratic freedom (to play games for sub-national stakes) suggested by the “bureaucratic politics paradigm” has been exaggerated.

²⁹ Discussion of the desirable relation of forces to be maintained vis-à-vis useful pacing states is a prominent feature of the defense politics (or at least of the rhetoric offered in partisan debate) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, as the recent debate in the United States has demonstrated, a variety of “numbers games” may be played with (at least) two far from homogeneous strategic arsenals. The classic example of the fixed standard of military strength was the two-power standard, formally enshrined for die Royal Navy in the Naval Defence Act of 1889. The timeless flavor of debates concerned with the maintenance of a fixed relationship of strength to one or several external “pacers” may be savored in Marder, Arthur J., The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905 (Hamden, Conn. 1964Google Scholar; first pub. 1940), 105–16; Woodward, E. L., Great Britain and the German Navy (London 1964Google Scholar; first pub. 1935), 455–73.

³⁰ Marder (fn. 29), 31.

³¹ In Chayes, Abram and Wiesner, Jerome, eds., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (New York 1969), 145Google Scholar.

³² On the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex, see Aspaturian, Vernon V., “The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does it Exist?” Journal of International Affairs, xxvi, No. 1 (1972), 1–28Google Scholar; and Lee (fn. 15). Military-industrial complexities in the United States may be approached through such committed yet informative works as Barnet, Richard J., The Economy of Death (New York 1969Google Scholar); and Melman, Seymour, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York 1970Google Scholar). For an intelligent critique of this literature, see Cimbala, Stephen J., “New Myths and Old Realities: Defense and its Critics,” World Politics, xxiv (October 1971), 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar–57. The lack of novelty in recent studies is easily demonstrated by reference to the “merchants-of-death” controversies of a previous generation—plus ça change. . . . See Engelbrecht, H. C. and Hanighen, F. C., Merchants of Death (New York 1934Google Scholar); and Seldes, George, Iron, Blood and Profits: An Exposure of the Munitions Racket (New York 1934Google Scholar). For useful recent comment, see Trebilcock, Clive, “Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890–1914: A Prevision,” Journal of Contemporary History, v, No. 4 (1970), 3–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ferrell, Robert H., “The Merchants of Death, Then and Now,” Journal of International Affairs, xxvi, No. 1 (1972), 29–39Google Scholar.

³³ Marder (fn. 29), 30.

³⁴ Chayes (fn. 26), 919–35.

³⁵ It is not implied here that vested interests are not in existence everywhere. However, some structures of government facilitate “exploitable access” to special-interest pleadings to a greater degree than others do.

³⁶ Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston 1971), 176Google Scholar.

³⁷ This estimate of the “total number of Russians directly engaged in running and supporting the Soviet military-industrial complex” is provided in Lee (fn. 15), 75.

³⁸ The three “assurances” may be located in U.S. Congress, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (fn. 4), 69–70. Senator Fulbright's concern (expressed for example on p. 71) is easily comprehended, considering such provisions as: ”Assurance II—‘Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs.’ Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by die ABM Treaty and the interim offensive agreement. Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreements to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations. Assurance III—‘Vigorous Research and Development Programs.’ Maintain weapons systems technological superiority” (p. 70).

³⁹ Incredible though it may seem, no case study exists of the Soviet-American arms race, its structure, development, and dynamic functioning.

⁴⁰ The SALT parallel is a compelling one. For example, two commentators upon the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty have stated, “Professional naval opinion among the signatory nations unanimously condemned the Five-Power Naval Treaty. Almost as one, these naval officers concluded that their nations’ interests, honor or military security had been sacrificed by politicians in quest of a popular delusion—peace through disarmament.” Burns, Richard Dean and Urquidi, Donald, Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919–1939, Vol. III, Limitation of Sea Power, ACDA/RS-55 (Washington 1968), 65Google Scholar.

⁴¹ For an impressive example, see Wolfers, Arnold and others, The United States in a Disarmed World (Baltimore 1966Google Scholar). Indeed, the principal thrust of the “new” arms-control thinking of the late 1950'5 and early 1960's was that arms control was to be thought of as an adjunct, rather than as a competitor, to national defense policy. For the classic statement of this position, see Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton H., Strategy and Arms Control (New York 1961Google Scholar). Unfortunately, in the 1960's strategy has been recorded in plenty, but arms control to only a marginal degree.

⁴² The arguments of prestige or self-esteem (and, more dangerously, the esteem expected to be accorded by third parties) are frequently scorned by states in competition with adversaries who are believed to be partially motivated by them. In the early 1900's, and from 1918 to 1922 (and possibly to 1930), Great Britain accepted the fact that its principal contemporary rivals (Germany and the United States, respectively) had no immediate belligerent intent. But in British eyes the bids (or apparent bids) for naval supremacy were reflective of general expansionist desires and could easily become serious security threats. After all, the distinction between a “prestige” and a “fighting” fleet is not easily drawn. In British perspective, the German naval challenge was frivolous, because it stood no prospect of success; the challenge of the United States after 1918 was frivolous because it was not reflective of an American interest that required a navy equal to that of Great Britain. The reaction of British authorities provides eloquent proof of the sensitivity of a leading power to challenges primarily significant in terms of prestige.

⁴³ Quoted in Woodward (fn. 29), 10.

⁴⁴ For examples of advocates of the assured-destruction theory paying some very limited attention to the question of appearances, see U.S. Congress, Military Implications . . . (fn. 19), 211 (Jerome Kahan), and 302 (George Rathjens).

⁴⁵ The entry fee to a particular international rank is established by the power or powers already enjoying that rank. The much-advertised new global reach of Soviet maritime capabilities was a requirement for a continental (really a regional great) power to bid seriously for the status of a world superpower. On the meaning of great-power status, see Howard, Michael, Studies in War and Peace (London 1970), 254Google Scholar–55. The standard definition is a power capable of standing alone against any other great power.

⁴⁸ See Burns and Urquidi (fn. 40), 55–56, 63–65, 105–11, 156–64.

⁴⁷ The refusal of France to accept Part III of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 led Italy to follow suit. This refusal also encouraged Great Britain to insist upon (and the United States to accept) the inclusion of an escalator clause, permitting the High Contracting Parties to increase their naval construction so as to counterbalance construction underway in countries not signatory to the treaty. For the details surrounding the London Naval Conference, see O'Connor (fn. 5).

⁴⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, S. J. Res. 241, Amendment No. 1406, Calendar No. 929, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, August 7, 1972Google Scholar). Press coverage of SALT in August and September 1972 was dominated by the Jackson Amendment For examples, see the New York Times, August 10, 1972, p. 10, and September 15, pp. 1, 11.

⁴⁹ The Jackson Amendment could provide material for many scholarly analyses of strategic debate and defense politics. Thus far, however, no such analyses have appeared. For a reasonable defense of the Senator's position, see Hoeber, Amoretta and McGarvey, David, “Jackson Amendment and SALT II,” Washington Post, November 30, 1972Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ The viability of a comparative analysis of arms races is illustrated by reference to the following comment upon the Washington Conference, offered by Burns and Ur-quidi (fn. 40), 31: “The British Empire's larger number of ships and greater tonnage was oil-set by American qualitative superiority.” For the view that comparisons between arms limitation talks in the 1920's and the 1970's “would distort rather than clarify our understanding of the arms limitation process,” see Roger Dingman, Statesmen, Admirals and SALT: The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar (Santa Monica 1972).

⁵¹ Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton 1941), 252Google Scholar–57.

⁵² See Brodie, Bernard, “Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons,” World Politics, v (April 1953), 281–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵³ Clause 2 of Article XII of the ABM Treaty of 1972 contains the vital provision that “Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party. . . .” The texts of the total SALT I package may be located in U.S. Congress, Military Implications . . . (fn. 19), 87–97. This does not mean that satellite-killing or -impeding capabilities have ceased to be relevant or of concern. Treaties may be broken or abrogated through formal withdrawal procedures. For recent analyses of “the national technical means of verification,” see Klass, Philip J., Secret Sentries in Space (New York 1971Google Scholar); and Ted Greenwood, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control, Adelphi Papers, No. 88 (London 1972Google Scholar).

⁵⁴ Burns and Urquidi (fn. 40), Vol. IV, Conclusions, 1.

⁵⁵ In U.S. Congress, Arms Control Implications . . . (fn. 26), 83.

⁵⁶ This is an example of the world view provided by the rational-actor model. The importance of strategic doctrine in the determination of defense posture is as yet untilled as an analytical field. See Holloway, David, “Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy,” Survival, xiii (November 1971), 364CrossRefGoogle Scholar–70. Two recent examples of public official and private academic analysis reveal the same pervasive rational-actor belief. Henry Kissinger apparently believes that only those arms-control agreements which enhance the security of both sides are ever signed. U.S. Congress, Military Implications . . . (fn. 19), 122. This view of rational strategic men, infallibly charting the arms-control course of their ships of state, is also to be found in Coffey, Joseph I., Strategic Power and National Security (Pittsburgh 1971Google Scholar). “Which arms control measures (if any) are actually put into effect depends on the strategic objectives and the national interests of the powers concerned” (p. 142).

⁵⁷ As Hedley Bull has commented: “ ‘Stability’ is a vogue word which in common parlance has become meaningless. By the stability of the strategic nuclear balance we mean its built-in tendency to persist. . . .” (fn. 5), 5. Considerable enlightenment on different models of arms-control stability may be gleaned from Brown, Thomas A., Models of Strategic Stability, California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar (Santa Monica 1971Google Scholar). “Stability” embraces a confused mix of concepts, norms, and specific policy prescriptions that is much in need of systematic attention. See Gray, “Arms Races and Their Influence upon International Stability, with Special Reference to the Middle East” (unpub.).

⁵⁸ See Steinberg, Jonathan, “The Copenhagen Complex,” Journal of Contemporary History, 1, No. 3 (1966), 23–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Ritter, Gerhard, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. II: The European Powers and the Wil-helminian Empire, 1890–1914, 2nd ed. (London 1972Google Scholar, first pub. 1965), 137–91.

⁵⁹ Why Germany's leaders should have chosen, as early as 1898 (and certainly by 1900), to make a “not incredible” bid for naval supremacy is a question still unsettled among historians. To take a quite negative view of Anglo-German naval competition, it is certain that fault must have lain in the area of politics rather than technology. Bids for “a place in the sun,” for an enhanced alliance value, for a useful diplomatic lever (to be applied in the hope that Britain would agree to remain neutral in a war on the Continent in return for a German acknowledgment of Britain's maritime supremacy), and, eventually, for a “fleet in being” that would cramp Great Britain's imperial policies and protect the German coastline (and keep the Baltic a German lake)—all of these factors have greater explanatory power for an attempt to comprehend the German urge to compete than the factors of changes in naval architecture, or fuel and gun/armor technologies.

⁶⁰ See the following examples: Kolkowicz, Roman and others, The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore 1970), 21–69Google Scholar, 181–202; kowicz, Kol, “Strategic Parity and Beyond,” World Politics, xxiii (April 1971), 431CrossRefGoogle Scholar–51; and “Strategic Elites and Politics of Superpower,” Journal of International Affairs, xxvi, No. 1 (1972), 40–59Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Parity is not a concept enjoying much currency in Soviet defense politics; the Soviet Union still has no recognizable equivalent to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Contrary to the expectations and hopes of many people, the SALT exercise would not seem to have yielded any very clear picture as to the nature of Soviet thinking on deterrence theory. See the testimony of Gerard Smith, in U.S. Congress, Military Implications . . . (fn. 19), 383.

⁶² Competition in ideas is an ineradicable feature of an arms competition. If we accept Huntington's proposition (fn. 12, 27) that a qualitative arms race will tend to resuit in an equality of relative power, it follows that war-waging success will most likely be the consequence of the more intelligent employment of the weapons-mix acquired in the competition. Furthermore, because of distinct national military doctrines, different states will elect to purchase qualitatively dissimilar arsenals.

⁶³ For the most convincing obituaries upon the first phase of the “new arms control” of the late 1950's and early 1960's, see Hedley Bull, “Arms Control: A Stock-taking and Prospectus,” in Problems of Modern Strategy, Part 2, Adelphi Papers, No. 55 (London 1969), 11–20Google Scholar; and Young (fn. 27).

⁶⁴ See Gray, , “Social Science and the Arms Race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xxix (June 1973), 23–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁵ Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, A/8469, UN General Assembly (New York 1971), 37Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ An arms race may continue, even though its driving political antagonisms have been substantially ameliorated by time, growing symmetries (or functional asymmetries), or new challenges. Bureaucratic lag (or trie limited control exercised over government organizations by the political leadership) is likely to ensure that political and military policies are kept out of phase to some degree. Even if an arms race were sustained by mutual aspiration for the attainment of a particular measure of military (im)balance that would offer good prospects for a knock-out blow, the protracted absence of war contributed by the arms race might yield an eventual non-war outcome.

⁶⁷ From time to time, states do emerge whose apparent aspiration for local, regional, or global hegemony ought to be discouraged. An arms race, vigorously waged, is one instrument by which such discouragement may be effected.

⁶⁸ Fn. 1, 79.