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²¹ On the other hand, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which sought to assess the economic and sociopolitical consequences of strategic air warfare during World War II, constitutes an important large-scale tour de force, based on empirical efforts. In this case, the fact that it was sponsored by U. S. military authorities is irrelevant; the investigators' conclusions were at variance with the operational logic of the U. S. Air Force. Likewise, the fact that its findings had no impact on U. S. military policy is unfortunate, but its intellectual worth makes it a central contribution to the field of international relations. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Morale Division, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale, March-July, 1945, I (Washington, D.C. 1947)Google Scholar; U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Reports, Pacific War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington, D.C. 1945).Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ It remains to be explained why the U. S. military did not follow its own professional judgment. The appropriate form of dissent would have been token resignation of the Chief of Staff, particularly the Chief of Staff of the ground forces, when he was assigned a task that he believed could obviously not be achieved with the resources placed at his disposal. The publication of the Pentagon Papers has probably postponed an analysis of this central issue, since the answer lies not in examination of specific documents but in the analysis of the workings of a military bureaucracy which in effect has become “overprofessionalized”—more prepared to follow orders than to exercise independent professional skill and judgment.

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⁵⁴ The concern to maintain combat readiness also pervades the Russian forces. Their leaders are deeply concerned that they have had no combat experience for a quarter of a century; in their own terms, the occupation of allied socialist nations is not considered war. Their response has been to conduct frequent large-scale maneuvers, with which they are obsessed. The threat of a Sino-Soviet confrontation supplies a realistic stimulant. Russian military leaders cannot engage in candid discussion of these issues, and very litde is known of the scope and quality of their thinking on these points. They must accept the insistence of political leaders that ideological training is a device for maintaining combat readiness—although, of course, they are fundamentally aware of its limitations.

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