This volume consists of a series of essays that were published in substantially the same form in various scholarly journals in 1957-1960. In them, Schelling attempts to adapt game theory to sociologically relevant aspects of the strategic process not encompassed within the formal mathematics of the theory. Thus his book represents a strikingly original contribution to the literature. In general, the essays share the theme that formal game theory is not a sufficiently good tool for sociological analysis of the bargaining process that takes place in real life. (This contention would not be denied by orthodox game theorists, since they do not regard the provision of such a tool as the purpose of game theory.) Except for this unifying thread, the various aspects of Schelling's analysis do not seem to me to evince a consistent point of view. To press this point, however, would be pedantic, for in The Strategy of Conflict the reader will discover a number of illuminating and penetrating sociological analyses of strategic problems.