¹ , O.E.C.D., Gaps in Technology: Electronic Computers (Paris: O.E.C.D. 1969).Google Scholar

² It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a sector of the American economy with a more impressive technological performance record and deep and pervasive applications than the computer industry. This statement could also include the closely related semiconductor and communications industries. The data processing industry has been doubling in volume every five years and is expected to continue to do so until 1990. By then, it has been estimated that 20% of the U.S. labor force will require some functional knowledge of data processing. One industry executive has characterized cost/performance improvement as follows: “If we compare the automotive and computer industries over the last 30 years, we find that if there had been similar progress in the auto industry as there was in the computer industry … then the auto industry would today be able to offer us a Rolls-Royce for $2.50 with an E.P.A. gas rating of 2 million miles per gallon.” “Computing for Business into the 1980s,” Fortune, June 5, 1978, pp. 23–86, at 25. Other readily available and relatively nontechnical sources include: Science (special issue), March 18, 1977; Scientific American (special issue), September 1977; and Information Processing in the United States: A Quantitative Summary (Montvale, N.J.: A.F.I.P.S. Press 1977).Google Scholar

³ The following articles should be consulted for summaries of technical details on early U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. computers: Rosen, Saul, “Electronic Computers: A Historical Survey,” ACM Computing Surveys, 1 (March 1969), 7–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ware, Willis H., ed., “Soviet Computer Technology—1959,” Communications of the ACM, in (No. 3, 1960), 131–66Google Scholar; Rudins, George, “Soviet Computers: A Historical Survey,” Soviet Cybernetics Review (January 1970), 6–44Google Scholar. The journal Soviet Cybernetics Review, known earlier under the title Soviet Cybernetics: Recent News Items, was published by the Rand Corporation from early 1967 to mid-1974.Google Scholar

⁴ Bauer, F. L. and Wossner, H., “The Plankalkiil of Konrad Zuse: A Forerunner of Today's Programming Languages,” Communications of the ACM, XV (1972), 678–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Randell, B., ed., The Origins of Digital Computers (Berlin: Springer Verlag 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ The commonly held view that the development of computing and cybernetics was politically suppressed under Stalin is something of a myth. There was, however, considerable and very serious ideological opposition to the use of economic theory and quantitative methods in economic planning, and thus indirectly to the use of computers for this purpose. For a discussion of the political pressures on the mathematically oriented economists, see Judy, Richard W., “The Economists,” in Skilling, H. Gordon and Griffiths, Franklyn, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), 209–52.Google Scholar

⁶ Hardware consists of the physical devices of a computer system. Software is the control logic used internally to manage computer resources (operating systems), facilitate the use of applications programs (e.g., translators for English-related programming languages), and the applications programs themselves. The early influence of the Western literature on the development of Soviet software is described in Ershov, A. P. and Shura-Bura, M. R., “Directions of Development of Programming in the U.S.S.R.,” Kibernetika, XII (November-December 1976), 141–60.Google Scholar

⁷ Apparently, Wiener's, NorbertThe Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1950)Google Scholar was read by the Politburo; see Dewhirst, Martin and Farrel, Robert, eds., The Soviet Censorship (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press 1973), 74.Google Scholar Unfortunately, the source of this information seems to have had no knowledge of the discussion that must have followed this group reading-assignment. Wiener's book became something of a best seller in the U.S.S.R. It should be noted that cybernetics and computing are not the same. The subject matter of the science of cybernetics is the dynamic control of complex (including social) processes. Cyberneticists see computing/communications as the technological means for implementing the practical application of cybernetic concepts.

⁸ Graham, Loren R., Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (New York: Knopf 1972).Google Scholar

⁹ The transistor was developed in 1948, but it was not until 1954–1955 that it became technically and economically possible to use it as the component base for computers. The first large-scale commercial transistorized computer was the Philco s-2000 (1958). Transistors had been used in military computers before then. By the midsixties, all new Soviet computers were based on transistors, although many vacuumtube machines were still in use.

¹⁰ R. Turn and others, “Computers and Strategic Advantage: II. Capability-Enhancing Applications,” RAND Corporation Report R-1643-PR, February 1976 draft.

¹¹ O.E.C.D. Report (fn. 1), 64, 176.

¹² Tilton, John E., International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of Semiconductors (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1971)Google Scholar.

¹³ See, for example, Schroeder, Gertrude E., “Recent Developments in Soviet Planning and Incentives,” in Hardt, J. P., ed., Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee 1973)Google Scholar. Soviet Cybernetics Review (fn. 3) regularly carried articles concerned with the use of computers for these problems.

¹⁴ One of the few nontrivial, unclassified comparisons of U.S.-U.S.S.R. militaryrelated computing capabilities is Turn, R. and Nimitz, A. E., “Computers and Strategic Advantage: I. Computer Technology in the United States and the Soviet Union,” RAND Corporation Report R-1642-PR, May 1975.Google Scholar Given the conservative nature of the Soviet military, it is not unlikely that changes in the military's perception may have been partially the result of pressure by the Party.

¹⁵ See, for example, Holland, Wade B., “Party Congress Emphasizes Computer Technology,” Soviet Cybernetics Review, July 1971, 7–14.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Hoffmann, Erik P., “Soviet Views of the 'Scientific-Technological Revolution',” World Politics, XXX (July 1978), 615–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Hoffmann, , “The ‘Scientific Management’ of Soviet Society,” Problems of Communism, xxvi (May-June 1977), 59–67.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Wise, T. A., “IBM's $5,000,000,000 Gamble,” Fortune (September 1966), 116 ff.Google Scholar; Wise, , “The Rocky Road to the Marketplace,” Fortune (October 1966), 138 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ “IBM System/360 Models 22–195,” Datapro Reports, 70C–491–03, January 1974. The early s/360 units were based on hybrid circuits that represented a transition from discrete transistors to integrated circuits. The first large-scale commercial use of integrated circuits was in the R.C.A. Spectra 70/45 in late 1965. Many people consider the integrated circuit as the most important characteristic of third-generation hardware. The first Soviet computer to use integrated circuits was the small Nairi-3 (1968–1969), but it was not until 1972–1973 that this technology was really successfully used on a medium-scale Soviet computer.

¹⁹ Berenyi, Ivan, “Computers in Eastern Europe,” Scientific American (October 1970), 102–8Google Scholar. This reference contains a listing of many of the Western computers in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. before 1970, but Berenyi's estimate of the total number of computers in the U.S.S.R. before 1970 is much too low.

²⁰ Kazanskiy, G., Moscow Nedelya, No. 43 (December 4, 1967), 7Google Scholar. Kazanskiy was a deputy minister of the Radio Industry. Ryad, the Russian word for “row” or “series,” is the popular name for the Unified System of Computers, ES, an abbreviation of the transliterated Russian for Unified System, is used as a prefix to designate equipment numbers. Davis, N. C. and Goodman, S. E., “The Soviet Bloc's Unified System of Computers,” ACM Computing Surveys, X (June 1978), 9–122Google Scholar, presents an extensive description of Ryad. It should also be consulted for references to the Soviet technical literature.

²¹ The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Hungary, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. Cuba, Mongolia, Romania, and Vietnam are also affiliated.

²² The basic effort involved 70 to 80 R & D and production enterprises and several hundred thousand workers, engineers, and scientists. Rakovskiy, M., “Control and Cybernetics,” Pravda, May 31, 1973Google Scholar. Rakovskiy is a deputy chairman of U.S.S.R. Gosplan, and head of the CEMA commission supervising the development of the Unified System.

²³ Myasnikov, V. A., “Results and Priority Tasks in the Field of Automation of Control Processes in the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.,” Upravlyayushchie sistemy i mashiny (January-February 1977), 3–6.Google Scholar

²⁴ Holland, Wade B., “Ryad Arrives—And So Does the Party,” Soviet Cybernetics Review (May 1972), 7–11Google Scholar. Production was formally announced in 1972: Novikov, N., “Computers: Third Generation,” Pravda, January 21, 1972, p. 3Google Scholar; Shimanskiy, M., “All Powerful Electronics,” Izvestiya, January 22, 1972, p. 5.Google Scholar

²⁵ A. Reut, Director of the Minsk plant where the Es-1020 was built, in an interview in Sovetskaya Belorussiya, March n, 1972, p. 2.

²⁶ The largest Ryad model, the Soviet ES-1060, was not on display. It would not go into production until 1977.

²⁷ A. M. Larionov, interviewed in Pravda U\rainy, May 20, 1973, p. 4. Larionov was head of the main Ryad technical planning group in Moscow.

²⁸ “‘Reexporting’: How Peter Lorenz Shipped IBM Hardware to Russia,” Datamation (January 1975), 92–93.

²⁹ Koenig, R. A., “The Issue of 'Reverse Engineering,” Control Data Corporation, memo, July 25, 1978.Google Scholar

³⁰ Holland, Wade B., Comments on an article by M. Rakovskiy, Soviet Cybernetics Review (November 1971), 33Google Scholar. Ryad production may have only been a third of what was planned for the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

³¹ In addition to Ryad, other major efforts that seem to be based on U.S. products include large computers for scientific applications (the El'brus-i and -2) and minicomputers (the M-6000, M-7000, and new SM series). The El'brus-i appears to be patterned on the Burroughs B7700. The M-6000 and M-7000 are based on the HewlettPackard HP2IXX. The SM minicomputers seem to be based on Hewlett-Packard and Digital Equipment Corporation designs.

³² The CEMA countries were neither the first nor the most successful users of this policy. The first was R.C.A. with their Spectra 70 series. The most successful have been the Japanese. An important consideration for these non-communist companies was the possibility of capturing part of I.B.M.'s share of the market by using the architecture of the s/360 and s/370. Program compatibility was expected to make it easier for a customer to switch vendors.

³⁴ Davis and Goodman (fn. 20), 118–19.

³⁵ At the start of the Ryad project, the Bulgarians had by far the lowest technological capabilities of any of the participating countries. It is thus surprising that they should become “masters” of this difficult technology. They may have received considerable help from the U.S.S.R., as they did in their production of the ES-1020. The Soviet Union seems to have something of a paternal interest in helping Bulgaria. During the last decade, the Bulgarians have built up a substantial export-oriented electronics industry. See, for example, Vunshna Turgovia, Sofia, (No. 10, 1978), 9–12.Google Scholar

³³ See, for example, Kipnis, S., “Integrated Family of Computers,” Nauka i zhizn' (No. 8, 1973), 2–11.Google Scholar

³⁶ Rakovskiy, M., “According to a Single Plan,” Pravda, February 3, 1978, p. 4.Google Scholar

³⁷ The adaptation of the huge number of applications programs available for the s/360 has not yet occurred to the extent that the CEMA countries might have planned. Reasons include the lack of adequate quantities of memory at most Ryad installations (actual deliveries seem to be running at not much more than half of what was planned), a shortage of trained people to make the adaptations, and the realization that much of the software may not be appropriate for their needs.

³⁸ Another possibility is Japan, but it is not yet clear, at least to this author, how unified the Japanese computer industry is.

³⁹ A more extensive discussion may be found in Goodman, S. E., “Software in the Soviet Union: Progress and Problems,” Advances in Computers, XVIII (1979), 231–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This source contains many references to the Soviet literature.

⁴⁰ See Bornstein, Morris and Fusfeld, Daniel R., eds., The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings (4th ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Irwin 1974)Google Scholar; Berliner, Joseph S., The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1976).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See, for example, Brock, Gerald W., The U.S. Computer Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1975), 204.Google Scholar

⁴² I.B.M. itself has been realistic and frank in its assessments of the technical quality of its competition. See I.B.M., “Quarterly Assessment of the Product Line,” March 16, 1971 (Telex vs. I.B.M., Plaintiff's Exhibit 224); Brock (fn. 41), 206–7.

⁴³ See, for example, Fadeyev, V., “Who is to Answer for Computer Servicing?” Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, September 4, 1977, p. 2Google Scholar; Perlov, I., “The ASU—Its Use and Return,” Ekonomika i zhizn' (Tashkent; No. 6, 1977), 83–86Google Scholar; Taranenko, Yu., “How to Service Computers,” Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, July 19, 1977, p. 2Google Scholar; Izvestiya, March 14, 1978, p. 2.

⁴⁴ “The First R-22 Has Been Started Up. Favorable Experiences at the ELGAV,” Szamitastechnihfl (March 1977), 3.

⁴⁵ Perlov (fn. 43). Letov, V., in “Computer in the Basement,” Izvestiya, August 22, 1975, p. 3Google Scholar, tells of mice eating a calculator in Kunya-Urgench.

⁴⁶ Of course, there is a hierarchy of users in the U.S.S.R. Special users, such as the military, KGB, and CPSU, are not in the habit of accepting poor service. Their peacetime consumer privileges are almost beyond comprehension in the United States.

⁴⁷ Some complaints that appear in the public press are quite outspoken (see fns. 43– 45), but not effective. In theory, the Soviet legal system allows wronged parties to take their suppliers to court. In practice, however, the Party and military-industrial representatives get satisfaction for special customers (usually themselves); ordinary customers just complain in print.

⁴⁸ Difficulties of this sort seem to be at the root of the problems described in Novikov, I., “Follow-Up on a Letter: They Put Their AMS Up for Sale,” Pravda, March 13, 1978, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Military and other high-priority users probably come closest, but we know very little about how—and how well—computers are used at such installations. It is important to emphasize that we do not have a good, detailed, overall picture of how well the Soviets are using the computing capabilities (particularly in software) that they have recently announced, or even those they are known to have had for a long time. We have had limited access to Soviet installations. Most installations described in the open literature and those that have been seen by visitors from the U.S. are clearly much better than average; but it is hard to say how they compare to high-priority installations.

⁵⁰ Berliner (fn. 40); Gorlin, Alice C., “Industrial Reorganization: The Associations,” in Hardt, J. P., ed., The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee 1976).Google Scholar