¹ “The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics,” World Politics, XII (July 1960), 585–99.Google Scholar

² Wiles, P. J. D., The Political Economy of Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 3.Google Scholar

³ I have begun exploring this problem in “Building a Communist Nation in China,” in R. A. Scalapino, ed., Comparative Communism in Asia (Prentice-Hall, forthcoming).

⁴ The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York 1963), 4.Google Scholar

⁵ See, e.g., Pye, Lucian, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building (New Haven 1962), 16–31.Google Scholar

⁶ Professor Tsou of the University of Chicago is working on this problem. The description of his research in progress in the “Newsletter, Collaborative Studies of China and Japan, 1900–1945” reads: “Twentieth-century China—a study in the disintegration and reintegration of a political community” (7).

⁷ Fairbank, John K., “Dilemmas of American Far Eastern Policy,” Pacific Affairs, XXXVI (Winter 1963–1964), 433.Google Scholar

⁸ A stimulating and undoctrinaire discussion of the nature and degree of community formation is Weilenmann, Hermann, “The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure,” in Deutsch, and Foltz, , eds., Nation-Building (New York 1963), 33–55.Google Scholar One of the best studies of prenational community is Banfield's work on the Mezzogiorno. He writes: “Most of the people of the world live and die without ever achieving membership in a community larger than the family or the tribe. Except in Europe and America, the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organizations is a rare and recent thing. … The extreme poverty and backwardness [of Montegrano] is to be explained largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate material interests of the nuclear family.” This would be an appropriate description of premobilization Chinese in the lower (and larger) section of Redfield's model of peasant society. The quoted remarks arc from Banfield, Edward C., The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), 7, 10.Google Scholar

⁹ See Riggs, Fred W., “Prismatic Society and Financial Administration,” Administrative Science Quarterly, V (June 1960), 1–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Reflections on Development,” preliminary unpublished MS, East-West Center, February 1963; “The Theory of Developing Polities,” World Politics, XVI (October 1963), 147–71Google Scholar; Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Houghton-Mifflin, in press); and several other articles.

¹⁰ The most important new development in this field is Howard Boorman, ed., Republican China: Recent Political and Social History (University of California Press, fordicoming). Boorman also has completed for publication a brief summary and appraisal of the career of Chiang Kai-shek.

¹¹ For the idea of “politically relevant stratum,” see Deutsch, K. W., “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, LV (September 1961), 497–98Google Scholar; and The Nerves of Government, 40.

¹² See the forthcoming volume sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the SSRC, Education and Political Development, James S. Coleman, ed. (Princeton University Press). The relevance of education to community formation can be illustrated by two well-known examples: (1) The Japanese Imperial Rescript on education (1890) was one of the key pieces of social engineering that the Meiji oligarchy undertook in moving Japan quickly from Tokugawa feudalism to nationhood. (2) In Burma today grandmothers still educate the children, as they did in Japan before 1890. Lucian Pye, in his Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, dramatically illustrates the incoherent socialization that results.

¹³ See Schurmann, H. F., “Peking's Recognition of Crisis,” Problems of Communism, X (September-October 1961), 9Google Scholar; and Lewis, John W., “The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune,” Asian Survey, III (October 1963), 463.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The two main works on this subject are Coser, Lewis A., The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956)Google Scholar, and Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford 1959).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Riggs, , World Politics, October 1963Google Scholar; and “The Prevalence of Clects,” American Behavioral Scientist, V (June 1962), 15–18.Google Scholar His trichotomous distinction among “primary groups,” “clects,” and “associations” is particularly apt for describing Chinese political groups (e.g., the wartime KMT was fractured into “clects”—part clique and part sect). It would be interesting to explore whether the Hunan group in the CCP also constitutes a elect.

¹⁹ Nolte, Ernst, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich 1963).Google Scholar Cf. Epstein, Klaus, “A New Study of Fascism,” World Politics, XVI (January 1964), 302–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Commenting on the movement to force cadres to perform physical labor, the People's Daily stated on July 21, 1963: “It is a revolution in leadership style and working methods, aimed at revising the bureaucratic practices left behind by organs of the old society. It is a revolution in the bureaucracy aimed at preventing and overcoming the erosive effects of bureaucracy and safeguarding the purity of our Party and state organs.”

¹⁸ The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers (New York 1962).Google Scholar

¹⁹ The conclusion of Professor Wiles, an economist, on this point is directly relevant to political science research: “Communism [as an economic theory] has no secret weapon, no way of allocating capital that enhances growth, unless it be the ruthless application of market criteria to education. Quite the contrary, communist allocation policy is irrational and therefore a brake on growth, and all the more tribute must be paid to … other factors [emasculation of trade unions, abrogation of consumers' sovereignty, dedication of the government to the single task of growth, forced savings, absence of patents and commercial secrets, ‘sharp stick and distant carrot’]: a conclusion comforting to orthodox welfare economists but disturbing to parliamentary democrats.” (The Political Economy of Communism, 329.)

²⁰ For an important functional interpretation of ideology, see Apter's, David E. introduction to Ideology and Discontent, Apter, , ed. (New York 1964).Google Scholar

²¹ We need not accept a rigorously functional interpretation of ideology in order to acknowledge the need to examine ideology in terms of its emotional, as distinct from explanatory, value. Cassirer was arguing this point many years ago on the basis of primitive (simplified) examples: “If in a savage tribe the men are engaged in warfare or in any other dangerous enterprise and the women who have stayed at home try to help diem by dieir ritual dances—this seems to be absurd and unintelligible when judged according to our standards of empirical thought and 'causal laws.' But it becomes perfectly clear and comprehensible as soon as we read and interpret this act in terms of our social rather than of our physical experience. In dieir war dances the women identify themselves with their husbands. They share their hopes and fears, their risks and dangers. This bond—a bond of ‘sympathy,’ not of ‘causality’—is not enfeebled by the distance diat lies between them; on the contrary it is strengthened. … When a Dayak village has turned out to hunt in the jungle, those who stay at home may not touch either oil or water with their hands; for if they did so the hunters would all be ‘butter-fingered’ and the prey would slip dirough their hands. This is not a causal but an emotional bond. What matters here are not the empirical relations between causes and effects, but the intensity and depth with which human relations are felt. The same feature appears, therefore, in all the other forms of human kinship.” (The Myth of the State [New Haven, Yale paper ed., 1961], 38.)Google Scholar

²² Compare: “The term ‘the people’ has different meanings in different countries and in different periods in each country. Take our country, for example. During the war of resistance to Japanese aggression, all those classes, strata and social groups which opposed aggression belonged to the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, Chinese traitors and the pro-Japanese elements belonged to the category of enemies of the people. During the war of liberation, the United States imperialists and their henchmen—the bureaucrat-capitalists and landlord class—and the Kuomintang reactionaries, who represented these two classes, were the enemies of the people, while all other classes, strata and social groups which opposed these enemies belonged to the category of the people. At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata and social groups which approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people, while those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction, are enemies of the people.” (Tse-tung, Mao, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” in Harvard University, Communist China, 1955–1959 [Cambridge, Mass., 1962], 275–76.Google Scholar)

²³ For an example of the rich archives we now have on the Yenan and civil war bases, see Ch'i Wu, I-ko ko-ming ken-chü-ti ti ch'eng-chang: K'ang-Jih chan-cheng ho chieh-fang chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti Ch'in-Chi-Lu-Yü pien-ch'ü kai-k'uang [The Establishment and Growth of a Revolutionary Base: A General Account of the ShansiHopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region During the Anti-Japanese War and the War of Liberation] (Peking 1958), 323 pp.