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The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

W. B. Sherwood
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Abstract

In a world in which popular democracy sometimes seems on the defensive, the rise of the Justice party has a significance that goes beyond the borders of Turkey. That nation's continuing social and political revolution, obscured as it has been in the eyes of most foreigners by the cruel impasse of Cyprus and the revival of Greek-Turkish antagonisms in the eastern end of the Mediterranean, is worth trying to understand. Not only does multiparty rivalry exist, but political power in this important American ally is held by the Near East's only genuine grass-roots political party. This party has its roots deep in the country's social structure and is currently headed by an energetic and intelligent young leader of relatively humble origins.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , October 1967 , pp. 54 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1967

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References

1 I have chosen to ignore the issues that developed, or seemed to develop, during the 1965 electoral campaign. Rather, in this analysis I have concentrated on the broad appeal of the Justice party and on what I conceive to be the fundamental differences between it and the Republican People's party. Joseph Szyliowicz has treated the election campaign in some detail in “The Turkish Elections: 1965,” Middle East Journal, xx (Autumn 1966), 473Google Scholar–94. While Mr. Szyliowicz's facts are correct, I must take issue with his interpretation. For instance, he writes that the chief issues were “land reform, foreign policy, petroleum, foreign capital, and foreign trade.” These topics did receive a great deal of newspaper attention, but, I submit, were “issues” only to a handful of intellectuals. The real issue was the clash of opposing socioeconomic groups.

2 For discussions of the composition of Turkish political parties, particularly at the local level, see Ulman, A. Haluk and Tachau, Frank, “Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization With Democracy,” Middle East Journal, xix (Spring 1965), 153Google Scholar–68; and Karpat, Kemal H., “Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” World Politics, xvii (October 1964), 50–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 It should not be inferred that the aghas support only the Republican People's party. They are quite flexible in their loyalties.

4 The relations between the Justice party and the army are discussed in the following section.

5 For a few months, Tiirkes, in his capacity as secretary-general to the chief of state, General Giirsel, was virtually prime minister of Turkey.

6 It is interesting to note that Demirel, as a university graduate, qualifies as an “intellectual” by Turkish standards. It should be noted that he and several of his closest associates graduated from the relatively new Istanbul Technical University, rather than from the traditionally elitist Istanbul Law Faculty or Ankara Political Science Faculty, which have produced most of Turkey's civilian leaders.

7 See Harris, George S., “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics,” Middle East Journal, xix (Winter 1965 and Spring 1965), 54–66Google Scholar, 169–76.

8 Since this article was written, the Republican People's party has split. Forty-four deputies, representing the party's more conservative and traditional elements and led by Turhan Feyzioglu, have resigned and formed the Giiven party. The city intellectual-bureaucrat element, calling itself “left of center,” has remained. Ismet Inonii remains party leader, but real leadership is for the most part exercised by Biilent Ecevit.

9 Traditional Islamic theological schools in which the scholars memorized the Koran.