¹ See, for example, the discussion by Pridham, Geoffrey, “Comparative Perspectives on the New Mediterranean Democracies: A Model of Regime Transition?” in West European Politics 7 (April 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Unfortunately, the insightful work of Juan Linz on transitions to democracy is not yet available in one volume. His essays on the topic include “II fattore tempo nei mutamenti di regime” [The time factor in regime change], in Teon'a Polttica 2, No. 1 (1986); “Lideranca inovadora na transicao para a democracia a uma nova democracia: o caso da Espanha” [Innovative leadership in the transition to democracy and in a new democracy: The case of Spain], in Gilberto Dupas, ed., A transicao que deu certo: O exemplo da democracia espanhola [The transition that worked out: The Spanish case] (Sao Paulo: Trajetoria Cultural, 1989), and “The Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy” (paper presented at the IPSA Roundta-ble, Tokyo, March 29-April 1, 1982).

³ Excellent complementary essays on Italy's return to democracy after Fascism include Gianfranco Pasquino's chapter in the Transitions volume and an earlier chapter by Palma, Giuseppe Di, “Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?” in Herz, John H., ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

⁴ The most influential example is Poulantzas, Nicos, The Crisis of the Dictatorships (London: New Left Books, 1976)Google Scholar. Although few empirical data are supplied by Poulantzas or others in support of his interpretation, some important insights may be found in this work. For more recent essays stressing international political economic arguments and class arguments, see Arrighi, Giovanni, ed., Semiperipheral Development: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁵ See, for example, the important study of Spanish business and political change by Robert Martinez, “Business Elites in Democratic Spain” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984).

⁶ This is not to argue that class forces or the international context are irrelevant; rather, the point is that these forces are not the sole determinants of political developments and actions.

⁷ See Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown Sr Reequilibra-tion, and the other three volumes included in Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁸ A significant literature does exist on social forces and the transitions. For insightful essays with abundant data on civil society and political change in Spain, see Díaz, Víctor Pérez, El retorno de la sociedad civil [The return of civil society] (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1987)Google Scholar. An important recent comparative analysis of labor and the transitions is Valenzuela, J. Samuel, “Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politics 21 (July 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

Strong arguments for the central role of social forces in undermining authoritarian rule may be found in two recent articles by Foweraker, Joseph: “The Role of Labor Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain,” in Clark, Robert and Haltzel, Michael, eds., Spain in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987)Google Scholar, and “Corporatist Strategies and the Transition to Democracy in Spain,” Comparative Politics 20 (October 1987)Google Scholar. This view contrasts sharply with the position of Share, Donald, The Making of Spanish Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1986)Google Scholar, and Carr, Raymond and Fusi, Juan Pablo, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979)Google Scholar, both of whom stress the internal evolution of the Franco regime itself. Other analysts, such as Jose Maria Maravall, in La politico de la transi-cion [The politics of the transition] (Madrid: Taurus, 1981), adopt an intermediate position stressing both the pressure “from below” and the reform “from above.” In Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1990)Google Scholar, I analyze the role of labor in the larger political transformation. However, this is not the place to focus on the role of social forces such as labor, despite their importance, or to attempt to draw a compelling balance between social and political determinants.

⁹ Schmitter, Philippe C., “Liberation by Golpe,” Armed Forces and Society 2 (November 1975)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹¹ On the failure of the Portuguese regime to reform itself, and the contrast with Spain, see Linz, Juan, “Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices,” in Landes, David, ed., Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977)Google Scholar. A comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions that features, in part, differences in the relations between regime and opposition in the two cases, is Bermeo, Nancy, “Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal,” Comparative Politics 19 (January 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² For a recent analysis emphasizing the differences in the current democratic polities of Southern Europe, see Lijphart, Arend, Bruneau, Thomas, Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, and Gunther, Richard, “A Mediterranean Model of Democracy? The Southern European Democracies in Comparative Perspective,” in West European Politics 11 (January 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ See, for example, the useful essay by Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar. Despite Cardoso's insights, the essay is somewhat marred by its unresolved ambivalence between a Marxian and Weberian conception of the state, thereby limiting its ability to clarify the issue.

¹⁴ To some extent, the distinction is suggested by Stepan, Alfred in “Paths to Redemocra-tization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” in O'Donnell, , Schmitter, , and Whitehead, , eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. In that essay and in his recent book, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar, Stepan differentiates three forms of what he calls “redemocratization from within the authoritarian regime”: transition initiated by a civilian political leadership, by the military as government, and by the military as an institution. However, Stepan's insightful discussion still fails to emphasize the major analytical distinction between state and regime, and ends up placing in the same category (transition initiated by the military as institution) two quite different cases: Portugal and Greece.

¹⁵ See especially the extremely broad and insightful essay by Linz, Juan, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. Ill, Macropolitical Theory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ My own understanding of the state is clearly Weberian, and follows the rich discussion in Economy and Society (American ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)Google Scholar and “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946)Google Scholar as well as the strongly argued thesis on the state in Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and in her other writings.

¹⁷ This seems to have been the case in the waning days or months of the Shah's regime in Iran when first government bureaucrats and ultimately the army itself refused to carry out state functions. Such a configuration, if sustained for any significant period of time, is likely to lead to the type of crisis that, according to Skocpol (fn. 16), underpins social revolution.

¹⁸ Good sources in English include Preston, Paul, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carr and Fusi (fn. 8); and Share (fn. 8).

¹⁹ For an analysis of the role of Juan Carlos in the transition to democracy, see Joel Podolny, The Role of Juan Carlos, the King of Spain, in the Consolidation of the Spanish Parlia mentary Monarchy (Social Studies Honors Thesis, Harvard College, Spring 1986).

²⁰ For an especially good discussion in English of the coup attempt and its political antecedents, see Preston (fn. 18).

²¹ For excellent discussions of the Portuguese transition, with the expected emphasis on the role of the military, see the chapters by Kenneth Maxwell in the Transitions volume, and in Herz (fn. 3). An outstanding analysis of the revolution in agrarian social relations is found in Bermeo, Nancy G., The Revolution within the Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Bermeo, ibid., emphasizes this point.

²³ See Pinto, Antonio Costa, “Revolution and Political Purge in Portugal's Transition to Democracy” in Larsen, Stein U., ed., Modern Europe after Fascism: 1945–1980's (Bergen: Norwegian University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

²⁴ For data from an empirical study of the Greek military during the junta's time in power, see Kourvetaris, George Andrew, “Professional Self-images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military,” American Sociological Review 36 (December 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ See Skocpol (fn. 16).

²⁶ A rich discussion of differing configurations of relations (under authoritarianism) between the coercive apparatus and the governmental institutions is presented by Stepan (fn. 14, 1988).

²⁷ This is most clearly the case in some Central American countries; see Schirmer, Jennifer, “Oficiales de la Montaña: Based on an Exclusive Interview with the Guatemalan Golpistas of May ii, 1988,” Human Rights Internet Reporter 13 (Spring 1989), 13–16Google Scholar. In the case of Brazil, analysts have questioned the fully democratic character of the political formation; see Frances Hagopian, “'Democracy by Undemocratic Means'?: Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil,” Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming), and Stepan (fn. 14).

²⁸ This distinction is to some extent suggested by the formulation of Adam Przeworski in his essay, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (fn. 14). Synthesizing the arguments of others, Przeworski proposes that, to the extent that legitimation is a significant factor, a regime may lose its legitimacy when “it has realized the functional needs that led to its establishment” or for other reasons (p. 50). This suggests that we might counterpose crises of failure and of success. However, I prefer to think in terms of historical obsolescence rather than success since regimes may be overtaken by historical developments that are in no sense their own successes. Moreover, the notion of historical obsolescence suggests more forcefully the need of central political actors to argue that the regime is obsolete, and to support this assertion with their actions and rhetoric. Political arguments (albeit with material referents) rather than objective conditions such as ‘the realization of functional needs’ are, after all, the essence of legitimation or delegitimation.

²⁹ On the virtual disintegration from within of the Portuguese First Republic and the foundations for five decades of authoritarian rule, see Wheeler, Douglas, The First Portuguese Republic (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar, and Payne, Stanley, A History of Spain and Portugal (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973)Google Scholar. The bibliography on the social and political conflict in Spain in the 1930s, culminating in the outbreak of civil war, is too lengthy to be covered adequately here.

³⁰ These features of the Greek case obviously raise the question whether it should be seen as an “authoritarian situation” in the terms of Juan Linz's formulation of the Brazilian case. See Linz, , “The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil” in Stepan, Alfred, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

³¹ See Przeworski (fn. 28).

³² For differing approaches to the legitimacy of democracy in Spain, see McDonough, Peter, Barnes, Samuel, and Pina, Antonio Lopez, “The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain,” American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and chaps. XIV and XV of Linz, Juan, Gomez-Reino, Manuel, Orizo, Francisco Andres, and Vila, Dario, Informe Sociológico sobre el cambio político en España: 1975–1981 [Sociological report on the political change in Spain: 1975–1981] (Madrid: Euramerica, 1981)Google Scholar.

³³ I attempt an operationalization of the Weberian conception of legitimacy in Wording Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain (fn. 8). My research findings show the legitimacy of the state under democracy to be a remarkably good ‘predictor’ of workplace union leaders' support for nationally negotiated wage restraints. See esp. chaps. 5 and 7.

³⁴ Dahl, Robert, in Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)Google Scholar, stresses the fundamental importance of mutual security for democracy to survive.

³⁵ On the complexities and internal divisions of Basque politics, see Linz, Juan, Conflicto en Euskadi [Conflict in the Basque Country] (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986)Google Scholar.

³⁵ This is, in Max Weber's phrase, a fundamental objective of the social sciences.