¹ This categorization is suggested by offense-defense and security dilemma theories. Key works include Herz, John H., “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (January 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stephen W. Van Evera, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984); idem, “Offense, Defense, and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?” (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the APSA, Chicago, September 1987); and Quester, George H., Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley, 1977)Google Scholar. On potential confusion in defining the offense-defense balance, see Levy, Jack S., “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (June 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² On the importance of images, see Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), esp. 5–10Google Scholar.

³ Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 3. Jervis addresses the impact of both foreign and military policy. The security dilemma and offense-defense literature cited fn. 1 also bears directly on this issue.

⁴ I use “not-greedy” to refer to states frequently termed “status quo” and “greedy” to refer to states frequently termed “expansionist” or “aggressor” states. This somewhat awkward terminology is designed to avoid the following shortcomings of the common terminology. First, a status quo state may in fact be unwilling to accept the status quo—it is satisfied with existing international borders and thus uninterested in expansion, except if necessary to protect its security in the status quo. Given this definition, status quo powers may be willing to launch wars, and a country facing a status quo state may therefore need to deter it. Furthermore, some analysts argue there are no status quo powers, since all states are willing to pay something to increase their security. This observation, however, overlooks that the standard usage of “status quo” allows for this possibility. On different uses of “status quo,” see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 84–86, 125. Second, states can be interested in expansion for two types of reasons, but “expansionist,” as commonly used, blurs this distinction—often but not always referring to what I have termed a “greedy state.” On related issues, see Jervis (fn. 3), 48–50.

⁵ For an analysis of this debate, see Seay, Douglas, “What Are Soviet Objectives in Their Foreign, Military and Arms Control Policy?” in Eden, Lynn and Miller, Steven E., eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), esp. 54–55Google Scholar.

⁶ They may, however, sometimes share a single source. For example, poor evaluative capabilities might allow a state to justify its greedy actions in terms of insecurity and also to come to believe its justifications; similarly, such a state might exaggerate its insecurity because it fails to recognize that its own greedy policies provoked the alliances that formed to oppose it. On these possibilities, see Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Butow, Robert J. C., Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969)Google Scholar.

⁷ This formulation assumes these are dichotomous variables. There is, however, a continuum for each feature, for example, between not-greedy and extremely greedy states. Where the adversary lies along these continua can be important in weighing policy options.

⁸ Defining countries' insecurity with a single aggregate measure could be problematic. For example, is a country that sees a minor threat to vital interests more or less insecure than one that sees major threats to secondary interests? Even assuming they were equally insecure, might not the different nature of the insecurity demand quite different responses? To keep things reasonably simple, however, I assume that we can refer to the extent of a country's insecurity without specifying its detailed nature. I am indebted to Chaim Kaufmann for suggesting this refinement.

⁹ On the deterrence model's premise that the adversary is secure, see Jervis (fn. 3), 95, 109; and idem, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41 (January 1989), 190Google Scholar. For a description of a similar set of contrasting beliefs, see Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 298–310Google Scholar.

We should be aware that the label “deterrence model” creates confusion. The deterrence model (in Perception and Misperception, Jervis actually refers to it as deterrence theory) is often mistakenly taken for deterrence theory in general, which it is not. It draws on “second wave” deterrence theory, which developed many of the arguments that are contrasted with the spiral model, and makes a number of restrictive assumptions. In general, deterrence theory says little about (1) how expansionist the adversary is; (2) the extent of the countries' common interests; (3) how the adversary views the defender's motivations; (4) how concessions will be interpreted; and (5) the extent to which the defender's credibility is connected across disparate issues. In contrast, the deterrence model takes a position on all of these issues: (1) the adversary is highly expansionist (greedy); (2) common interests are small; (3) the adversary understands that the defender is a status quo (not-greedy) power; (4) concessions are interpreted to reflect weakness and thus generate misperceptions of the defender's resolve; and (5) credibility is tightly connected across issues. On the second wave, see Jervis, Robert, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31 (January 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Although I focus on two features of the adversary, a third feature—the extent to which the defender's credibility is connected across disparate issues—also plays a central role in Jervis's description of these models. Each of the above cases can be further divided along this dimension. In terms of the standard models, the deterrence model holds that credibility is tightly interconnected, thereby providing an additional rationale for competition; the spiral model sees little connection between credibility on disparate issues and, consequently, little collateral risk in cooperation.

¹¹ This claim is potentially misleading, since it may incorrectly suggest that the defender would never want an offensive doctrine. However, as discussed below, in certain circumstances offense does not increase insecurity. Thus, although the objective of reducing the adversary's insecurity tends to militate against offensive military doctrines, it does not necessarily preclude them. Further, although not addressed in this article, if the defender is interested in compellence (in addition to deterrence), it might want to increase the adversary's insecurity, then promising to reduce its threat to the adversary's security in return for satisfaction of its compellent demands.

¹² Jervis (fn. 1), 168—69; on the cumulativity of resources, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), chap. 5.

¹³ Additional reasons for the increase in the probability of war as states become more insecure include the following: (1) insecure states become less willing to compromise in political disputes; (2) they are more inclined to adopt more confrontational tactics in crises; and (3) they have increased incentives for preventive war. See Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), pt. 1; on preventive war, see Levy, Jack S., “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics 40 (October 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ For related discussion, see Downs, George W., “Arms Races and War,” in Tetlock, Philip et al. , eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Although conceptually distinct, the argument that the adversary can be simultaneously greedy and insecure can lead to the same policies as the argument that the defender's policy should be designed to account for uncertainty about whether the spiral or deterrence model applies; Jervis (fn. 3) suggests the latter (p. 111).

¹⁶ Ibid., 92–94.

¹⁷ On the role of British cooperation, sec Lynn-Jones, Sean M., “Detente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911–1914,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

We should note that arguments that the Germans were interested in expansion and intentionally provoked World War I are not inconsistent with the central claims of the spiral model. These arguments suggest that the war was not primarily inadvertent, but discrediting the spiral model requires going a step further—showing that German interest in war was not driven by insecurity.

¹⁸ This does not mean that there were necessarily policies adequate to prevent war. On this point, see Evera, Stephen Van, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” in Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 116–17Google Scholar.

¹⁹ On structural theories, see Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Confusion on this point is common, however, with analysts arguing that structural theories predict that states will try to maximize their power, not their security, which could lead to expansionist behavior by secure states. Some realists have made this argument, but Waltz does not. See Waltz, Kenneth N., “Reflections on Theory of International Relations: A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 334Google Scholar; and Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 68–69Google Scholar.

²¹ Thus, the deterrence model rejects third image explanations and is built on first and/or second image theories. On these categories of explanations, see Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

²² See, e.g., NSC 68, reprinted in Etzold, Thomas H. and Gaddis, John Lewis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945—1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 385–442Google Scholar.

²³ Although Jervis's chapter emphasizes misperceptions, it is clear on this point. See Jervis (fn. 3), 62–67.

²⁴ I use “bilateral” to refer to policies in which the defender uses arms control to achieve the objectives of its military policy. Bilateral policies do not include alliances made by the defender to balance against the adversary; such alliances would be part of a unilateral policy.

²⁵ These terms can be a source of confusion, however. As we will see below, a purely defensive strategy that is effected unilaterally will have most of the key features of a cooperative policy.

²⁶ On these points, see Jervis (fn. 1), 187–214.

²⁷ However, even optional offense might not lead the adversary to impute malign intentions to the defender, since there are other possible explanations for it, including defensive motivations, for example, deploying offense as an arms control bargaining chip. Optional offense could also be the product of the defender's domestic politics. Since this analysis requires going beyond basic assessments of necessary capabilities, however, even an adversary with highly effective evaluative capabilities is more likely to impute malign objectives to optional offense than to necessary offense.

²⁸ For the basic strategic critique, see Jervis, Robert, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (Winter 1979–1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on the dangers, see Nitze, Paul, Deterring Our Deterrent, Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976–1977)Google Scholar. Reviewing this debate is Charles L. Glaser, “Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?” in Eden and Miller (fn. 5).

²⁹ This example is more complicated than my discussion here suggests, since U.S. views on Soviet counterforce were divided. I return to this example with an alternative interpretation based on domestic political dynamics and biased national evaluative capabilities.

³⁰ On related points, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987), 12–13.

³¹ The discussion in the text focuses on misperceptions that increase the difficulties facing the defender, but not all misperceptions lead to worse outcomes. For example, a potentially insecure adversary that incorrectly views the defender's offense as defense will be less insecure than if it were clear-sighted. On related points, see Stein, Arthur A., “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics 34 (July 1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² On the role of expectations, see Jervis (fn. 3), 143–201; and Larson, Deborah Welch, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

³³ On this type of misperception, see Snyder, Jack, Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 24–26, 211–14Google Scholar.

³⁴ These broad political purposes of offensive policies complement more common arguments based on military requirements, which hold that the defender requires offensive capabilities to deter a highly expansionist adversary. For example, proponents argued that the United States required nuclear superiority to make its threats sufficiently credible to deter Soviet attacks on U.S. allies. See Gray, Colin S., “Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory,” International Security 4 (Summer 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for disagreements, see Jervis, Robert, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Glaser, Charles L., Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which addresses the negative political consequences of superiority. Similarly, proponents of an offensive conventional strategy claimed that the ability to defeat a Soviet conventional invasion was insufficient to deter it. See Huntington, Samuel P., “Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” International Security 8 (Winter 1983—1984), 36—40CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the range of possible military requirements for offense, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987). On the political and military benefits of counteroffensive capabilities, see Posen, Barry R., “Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control,” Daedalus 120 (Winter 1991)Google Scholar.

³⁵ Jervis (fn. 3), 67–76, 349–53; and Larson (fn. 32), 37–42.

³⁶ Jervis (fn. 3), 354–55.

³⁷ The international relations literature has focused on psychological limitations: see Jervis (fn. 3); Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice Gross, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Larson (fn. 32); and Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar. On the difficulty of determining whether decision makers suffered from misperceptions, see Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Spring 1988). Chaim Kaufmann explains how to identify nonrational misperceptions. See Kaufmann, “Deterrence and Rationality in International Crises” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1990), chap. 3.

³⁸ Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), pt. 2, emphasizes organizational interests; Jack Snyder (fn. 6) emphasizes domestic political dynamics. Earlier work on organizations and bureaucracies focused on explaining foreign policy not national misperceptions. A good summary of the biases produced by bureaucratic politics is George, Alexander L., Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 109—14Google Scholar. Graham T. Allison identifies factors that influence bureaucratic bargaining; Allison, see, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), esp. 168–69Google Scholar.

³⁹ On these conditions, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), 272–73.

⁴⁰ This is a specific type of what Snyder has termed a “perceptual security dilemma,” in Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 37).

⁴¹ Snyder (fn. 33), 28; Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), 254–73.

⁴² Snyder (fn. 6).

⁴³ Van Evera (fn. 1, 1984), chap. 8; idem, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Washington, D.C., 1988).

⁴⁴ On these points, see Evera, Van, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War, International Security 9 (Summer 1984), esp. 66–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem (fn. 18), 93–95; Snyder, , “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984), esp. 115–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem (fn. 33); Herwig, Holger H., “Imperial Germany,” in May, Ernest R., ed., Knowing One's Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. On the faulty analysis that underpinned Tirpitz's arguments for the naval buildup, see Kennedy, Paul, “Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race,” in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (Aylesbury, England: Fontana, 1984)Google Scholar. Arguing that the extent of poor evaluation is exaggerated, others hold that Germany had strong strategic rationales for its policies. See Sagan, Scott D., “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard in Arms Control Implications of Current Defense Budget, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st sess., July 13, 1971, pp. 171–77; and Dr. John Foster, Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st sess., July 1969, pp. 244–45, 258–63. Garthoff, Raymond L., Detente and Confrontation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 135Google Scholar, reports that, to support their case, proponents of MIRV also exaggerated Soviet progress in developing MIRV capabilities. In fact, the Soviets did see U.S. MIRVS posing an increased threat; see fn. 80 below.

⁴⁶ On Soviet views, see Parrott, Bruce, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987)Google Scholar, 24–25; and Garthoff, Raymond L., “BMD and East-West Relations,” in Carter, Ashton B. and Schwartz, David N., eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), 292–98Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 23Google Scholar; and Gerald M. Boyd, “Reagan Proposes U.S.-Soviet Accord on Mobile Missiles,” New York Times, November 2, 1985, p. 4.

⁴⁸ For example, Committee on the Present Danger, “Has America Become Number 2?” (June 29, 1982), reprinted in Charles Tyroler II, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 208Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ On U.S. and Soviet forces and views of the balance in the 1970s, see Garthoff (fn. 45), 785—800; for interesting comparisons, see Schilling, Warner R., “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity,” International Security 6 (Fall 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on the evolution of counter-silo forces, see Blair, Bruce G., Strategic Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985)Google Scholar, Appendix A; and Congressional Budget Office, Trident II Missiles (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Michael Salman, Kevin J. Sullivan, and Stephen Van Evera, “Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capability, 1969–1988,” in Eden and Miller (fn. 5).

⁵¹ On this point, see Mearsheimer, John J., “Numbers, Strategy and the European Balance,” International Security 12 (Spring 1988), 180 n. 8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne, How Much Is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁵² Along these lines, Jack Snyder suggested that conventional arms control negotiations could contribute to the growing role of civilians in Soviet defense policy. See Snyder, , “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics 42 (October 1989), 26–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I do not mean to imply by making this recommendation that militaries always advocate dangerous policies and civilians always champion safe ones. However, militaries do appear, in general, to favor offensive policies; when these are unduly offensive, civilian involvement might offer a valuable counterbalance.

⁵³ Matthew Evangelista argues that interactions between Western European proponents of nonoffensive defense and Soviet civilian reformers influenced Gorbachev's policy on conventional forces. See Evangelista, “Transnational Alliances and Soviet Demilitarization” (Paper prepared for the Council on Economic Priorities, Project on Military Expenditures and Economic Priorities, October 1990).

⁵⁴ Matthew Evangelista notes the inadequacy of learning models and the importance of “second-image models” in explaining arms competition and cooperation. See Evangelista, , Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1960s, World Politics (July 1990), 526–28Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Snyder, Jack, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security 14 (Spring 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ For example, in the Soviet case compare the views of moderates (e.g., Gorbachev and proponents of the new political thinking) with opponents of reform. See Meyer, Stephen M., “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Garthoff, Raymond, “Raymond” New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine, Washington Quarterly 11 (Summer 1988)Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ On some of these basic points, with examples from a range of great power cases, see Snyder (fn. 52), who considers additional factors, including whether the regime is weakly or strongly institutionalized; see also James G. Richter, “Action and Reaction in Khrushchev's Foreign Policy: How Leadership Politics Affect Soviet Responses to the International Environment” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989).

⁵⁸ The exception occurs if adversary moderates successfully argue that the defender's competitive policies are a reaction to more competitive policies pursued by the adversary in the past. However, moderates will likely be unable to sustain this interpretation unless the defender reciprocates in the near future.

⁵⁹ See Yanov, Alexander, “In the Grip of the Adversarial Paradigm,” in Crummey, Robert O., ed., Reform in Russia and the U.S.S.R. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989)Google Scholar; George F. Minde II and Michael Hennessey, “Reform of the Soviet Military under Khrushchev and the Role of America's Strategic Modernization,” in Crummey; William Taub-man (“Khrushchev and Detente,” in Crummey), who argues that the United States pursued the correct policy, given Khrushchev's belligerent policies; and Richter (fn. 57), chaps. 6, 7.

⁶⁰ Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Forces, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 2d sess., March 1974, p. 18; and Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, before the same subcommittee, September 11, 1974, p. 9.

⁶¹ U.S. doctrine preceded the Soviet buildup, and counterforce had influential supporters in the U.S. military. On doctrine, see Ball, Desmond, “The Development of the slop, 1960–1983,” in Ball, Desmond and Richelson, Jeffrey, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. On the Air Force, see Allison, Graham T. and Morris, Frederic A., “Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons,” Daedalus 104 (Summer 1975), 120Google Scholar. On the influence of the military in the MIRV decision, see Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975)Google Scholar; and Smith, Gerard, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I (New York: University Press of America, 1985)Google Scholar, chap 4.

⁶² Critics included Carter, Barry E., “Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons,” Scientific American 230 (May 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rathjens, G. W., “Flexible Response Options,” Obis 18 (Fall 1974)Google Scholar; and Jervis (fn. 28). Along similar lines, Snyder (fn. 44) finds that although the offensive strategies of the European powers before World War I were primarily domestic in origin, they were also partly imported; he also notes the export of Soviet counterforce doctrine in the 1970s (p. 146).

⁶³ An alternative explanation argues that the Reagan and Bush administrations learned that cooperation was preferable. In varying degrees this seems likely. But the more important point here is that even if they continued to prefer intense competition, shifts in American public opinion would have undermined the appeal of their arguments for competing, while supporting moderate elites who offered more cooperative policies.

⁶⁴ On the need for cooperative policies, which are sometimes described as reassurance or a mix of deterrence and reassurance, see, e.g., Richard Ned Lebow, “The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?” in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (fn. 37); and Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, who review a variety of approaches from cooperation theory in Lebow and Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43, no. 4 (1987)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ When I say that cooperative policies are desirable, I am referring narrowly to the political consequences they are likely to generate. In certain of these cases, the defender should nevertheless pursue competitive policies because the military benefits of competition exceed the political benefits of cooperation. For example, in extreme cases the adversary's misperceptions may be so severe that war is unavoidable and the defender should give priority to preparing to fight it.

⁶⁶ The offense-defense balance reflects the relative cost of equal protection provided by offensive and defensive strategies. Jervis (fn. 1), 187–88.

⁶⁷ For additional possibilities, see Van Evera (fn. 1, 1987), who considers factors that influence whether defense can meet extended deterrence commitments, for example, by stationing denial forces on allies' territory (pp. 8–12).

⁶⁸ Of course, this possibility assumes Germany wanted only to protect its borders and was otherwise willing to forgo expansion. On the feasibility of a defensive option, see Snyder (fn. 33), who argues that the best option might have included a limited offensive in the East (pp. 116–22).

⁶⁹ Arms control might also be valuable when offense and defense are indistinguishable. When combined with adequate verification provisions, it could increase both countries' security by increasing their confidence that the other was not going to launch an arms buildup and that they would therefore not fall behind in an arms race. This could reduce misperceptions of motivations, as well as concerns about military capabilities.

⁷⁰ Jervis (fn. 1), 201.

⁷¹ Unfortunately, barriers to agreements grow with the advantage of offense, since the defender's security becomes more sensitive to cheating. However, this risk can be reduced by allowing the deployment of additional defensive systems.

⁷² In addition, when offense has an advantage over defense, these agreements enhance the defender's military capability for defense and/or deterrence. Although not formulated explicitly in terms of offense-defense, classical arms control theory focuses on this objective. See, e.g., Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton H., Strategy and Anns Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁷³ For an overview of this period and citations to more extensive discussions, see David N. Schwartz, “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy,” in Carter and Schwartz (fn. 46).

⁷⁴ On GRIT, see Osgood, Charles E., An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962)Google Scholar; Larson, Deborah Welch, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M., Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), esp. 41–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ Huntington (fn. 34), 32–56.

⁷⁶ On the requirements of conventional deterrence, see Mearsheimer, John J., Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; on the conventional balance, see the policy focus section in International Security 12 (Spring 1988)Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ We can imagine this as a situation in which the adversary has prisoner's dilemma payoffs, and sequential moves enable the defender's Tit-for-Tat policy to end the arms race.

⁷⁸ On the sensitivity of Tit-for-Tat to misinterpretation, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” in Oye (fn. 18), 137–43.

⁷⁹ Russia is used here to refer to whatever major power emerges from the former Soviet Union; it could therefore include other former Soviet republics in addition to Russia, if the recently formed Commonwealth of Independent States or some successor develops an integrated military and foreign policy.

⁸⁰ This possibility is supported by the fact that U.S. military policies did fuel Soviet insecurity during the cold war. On Soviet concerns during the cold war, see Garthoff (fn. 45); specifically on views of U.S. nuclear policy, see Garthoff, pp. 417–18, 768–70, 796–800; Payne, Samuel B., “The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation, 1968–1972,” Soviet Studies 27 (January 1975)Google Scholar; and Parrott (fn. 46), 9–21.

⁸¹ On the effect of U.S. policy on Soviet domestic politics, see Snyder (fn. 52); Richter (fn. 57); and Matthew Evangelista, “Missed Opportunities and Closed Archives: Did the Eisenhower Administration Defeat Khrushchev's Disarmament Initiatives?” (Paper presented at a conference on Eisenhower's World Legacy, Moscow, November 1990).

⁸² Whether the United States should shift to competitive policies if hard-liners regain power is a more difficult question. If Russian national-level evaluative capabilities are weak, then this approach is likely to backfire. On the weaknesses of civilian institutions that provided military advice in the former Soviet Union, see Snyder (fn. 52), 25—28; Rice, Condoleezza, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40 (October 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Meyer, Stephen M., “Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race,” in Art, Robert J., Davis, Vincent, and Huntington, Samuel P., eds., Reorganizing America's Defense (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁸³ For analysis of American counterforce requirements, see Glaser (fn. 34), chap. 7; idem, “International Security” 16 16 (Spring 1992)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ On these recent initiatives, see “Text of Bush's Message: Heating Up the Economy, and Looking Beyond,” New York Times, January 29, 1992, p. 16; and John Lancaster and Barton Gellman, “Navy Subs, Big Army Programs Facing Ax,” Washington Post, January 19, 1992, p. 12.

⁸⁵ On the basic cold war naval missions and the debate over them, see Mearsheimer, John J., “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Brooks, Linton F., “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁶ On the feasibility of this approach, see Posen, Barry R., Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ See Bunn, Matthew, “Star Wars Redux: Limited Defenses, Unlimited Dilemmas,” Arms Control Today 21 (May 1991), 12–18Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ This policy is outlined in Glaser (fn. 83).

⁸⁹ For arguments supporting security guarantees, see Huntington, Samuel P., “America's Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival 33 (January-February 1991), 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁰ For useful discussion, see Evera, Stephen Van, “Managing the Eastern Crisis: Preventing War in the Former Soviet Empire,” Security Studies 1 (Spring 1992)Google Scholar.

⁹¹ The case for collective security is well presented in Kupchan, Charles A. and Kupchan, Clifford A., “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹² On the wide range of views on the prospects for avoiding tensions between Western European states, see Lynn-Jones, Sean, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospectsfor Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991)Google Scholar.