¹ On Merriam's work more generally, see Karl, Barry D., Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1974)Google Scholar.

² See, for example, Morgenthau, Hans J., Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1946)Google Scholar, and the careful and sympathetic evaluation of the work of the most influential members of the realist school in Thompson's, Kenneth W.Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Merriam, , Systematic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1945)Google Scholar.

⁴ Merriam, , The Making of Citizens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1931)Google Scholar.

⁵ Merriam, , New Aspects of Politics (1st ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1925)Google Scholar.

⁶ Schuman, , International Politics (1st ed., New York: McGraw-Hill 1933)Google Scholar.

⁷ Lasswell, , World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: McGraw-Hill 1935)Google Scholar.

⁸ Wright, , A Study of War, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1942)Google Scholar.

⁹ Cf. Dunn, Frederick S., “The Scope of International Relations,” World Politics, I (October 1948), 142–46, at 144CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Merriam, , Prologue to Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1939), 92Google Scholar.

¹¹ Merriam, , Political Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1934), 203Google Scholar.

¹² Merriam, , Public and Private Government (New Haven: Yale University Press 1944), 16Google Scholar.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Spykman, , America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace 1942)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations (1st ed., New York: Knopf 1948)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Aron, , Paix et Guerre (Paris: Calmann-Levy 1962)Google Scholar. A slightly revised version appeared in English as Peace and War, translated by Howard, Richard and Fox, Annette Baker (New York: Doubleday 1966)Google Scholar. There is also an abridged edition of the English version in which topical references to the world politics of the 1960's are largely deleted (New York: Anchor Press 1973).

¹⁷ Ibid., pt. IV.

¹⁸ Public and Private Government (fn. 12), 29.

¹⁹ Political Power (fn. 11), 61.

²⁰ Merriam, like most other political scientists of the time, failed to foresee the speed of decolonization and disimperialism. In 1931 he wrote that “the continuing existence of the far-flung empire is a signal proof of the weakness of regionalism in our day” (The Making of Citizens, 252). He could not have imagined the creation of a multitude of tiny sovereignties such as those which in 1975 form a majority in the United Nations. Since in most of these states the new governing elites had the job of nation building ahead of them, the nations to be built, he might well have urged, should have been ones with more ample human and material resources.

²¹ Political Power (fn. n), 268.

²² Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 263.

²³ Prologue to Politics (fn. 10), 63.

²⁴ Political Power (fn. 11), 217. A contrasting view is that of Lt. General Whitehead, Ennis C., who declared in 1951 that “wars are won with power, not brains.” Deutsch, Karl W., in his Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press of Glencoe 1963)Google Scholar, described power as “not having to think,” thus equating it with Merriam's “raw force.”

²⁵ Prologue to Politics (fn. 10), 59.

²⁶ Political Power (fn. 11), 89.

²⁷ Thus, to build a world society he saw the need to explore “the possibilities in the direction of international symbolism” (The Making of Citizens, 318). Harold D. Lasswell undertook perhaps the first such exploration in the final chapter of his World Politics and Personal Insecurity.

²⁸ “The answer is, in part, that the custodians themselves would be checked by their own temperament and training” (Systematic Politics, 343). Carl J. Friedrich and Samuel P. Huntington have made the helpful distinction between “objective” control, including self-control, and the “subjective” control which derives from effective powersharing arrangements. See Huntington, , The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957)Google Scholar.

²⁹ On categories of those who call themselves pluralists, and of their respective doctrinal and intellectual positions, see Henry S. Kariel, “Pluralism,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XII, 164–69.

³⁰ See, for example, Merriam's discussion of “Politics in Relation to Inheritance and Environment” in New Aspects of Politics (fn. 5), chap. 5. It remained for V. O. Key, Jr., two decades after he left Chicago, to provide an empirical base for, and the fully articulated expression of, his teacher's belief that the processes and choices of politics determine the relative influence of various economic and social “determinants” (H. Douglas Price, “V. O. Key, Jr.,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, VIII, 366–68).

³¹ “The power of the creative and constructive type,” he asserted, “is slowly being ground out with infinite pains and with vast and widespread effort, often with temporary disillusionment” (Political Power, 303).

³² Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 277.

³³ Public and Private Government (fn. 12), 73.

³⁴ Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 338.

³⁵ Merriam stood with Dewey and Mead when he wrote: “We cannot assume that man is created wholly by ‘environment,’ for he is himself a part of it, and he likewise and in some measure creates the environment just as truly as the environment creates him” (New Aspects of Politics, 153–54). He was fascinated by the possibilities afforded by advancing biotechnology. Genetic as well as social tinkering might be employed to build a democratic society of well-adjusted personalities, or alternatively the biotechnologist might be used to produce a genetically superior elite and a mass of obedient morons to hew the wood and draw the water (ibid., 146–47). Cf. Harold D. Lasswell's presidential address to the American Political Science Association, “The Political Science of Science,” American Political Science Review, L (December 1956), 961–79Google Scholar.

³⁶ Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 329.

³⁷ The Making of Citizens (fn. 4), 312–15. Merriam did not deal with the problem of introducing the international component on a system-wide basis or the consequences of “internationalizing” civic education in some countries while it remained nationalistic in others.

³⁸ “For the first time in history,” Merriam wrote, “utopias need not be woven from fancy and hope but may be constructed from a wealth of science and reason to show indisputable opportunities lying before mankind at this very hour” (Systematic Politics, 339).

³⁹ The phrase is Harold Lasswell's (”Policy Sciences,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XII, 189). Merriam himself concluded Political Power by asserting his basic credo: “The future belongs to those who fuse intelligence with faith, and who with courage and determination grope their way forward from chance to choice, from blind adaptation to creative evolution” (p. 326)

⁴⁰ Merriam called for a thorough, systematic, and scientific study of human nature and especially for “more facts about thoughts and feelings.” What J. David Singer has taught international relationists to call the level-of-analysis problem and what economists call the micro-macro problem still remain, even after such facts have been gathered, as V. O. Key, Jr., one of the best-known members of the Chicago school, observed. He wrote that it would be “a truly formidable task to build a bridge from observation of the atoms of the political system to the system itself” (Price, fn. 30, 367, quoting from Key, “The Politically Relevant in Surveys,” Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV [1960], 60Google Scholar). Key's penetrating critique of survey research in this and other writings just before and after i960 indicates that he formulated the micro-macro problem much more sharply than Merriam, and indeed more sharply than those who call attention to the level-of-analysis problem without really suggesting how to build bridges between levels.

⁴¹ “The realists know,” Merriam wrote, “that brutality is ignorance, violence is relative failure” {Political Power, 215). “War,” he acknowledges, “may have been, and at times is still, a necessary element … [but] its trend is to become unnecessary” (Systematic Politics, 277).

⁴² “Hate, fear and force are controllable impulses, not to remain masters of our fate,” said Merriam while proclaiming “the inexorable trend toward their controlled existence” (ibid., 341).

⁴³ Ibid., 275.

⁴⁴ Lasswell, writing in the 1970's, describes this task as “building a social planetarium,” so that the political scientist may step forward experimentally into a range of possible futures and so bring the future to bear on the present. See his essay, “Policy Sciences” (fn. 39), and his Pre-View of the Policy Sciences (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. 1971)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Lasswell refers to the “partial moratorium among political scientists on ‘normative controversy’” in “The Cross-Disciplinary Manifold: The Chicago Prototype,” an essay in The Search for World Order, edited by Lepawsky, A., Buehrig, E., and Lasswell, H. D. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1971)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Political Power (fn. 11), 284.

⁴⁷ New Aspects of Politics (fn. 5), 162.

⁴⁸ Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 284–85.

⁴⁹ The Making of Citizens (fn. 4), 313.

⁵⁰ Political Power (fn. 11), 303. Power potential unexercised because immobilized, and unmobilized because of inattention, miscalculation, or ignorance, because education has not done its work perfectly, is one thing. Power potential not exercised because of a considered decision not to sacrifice nonpower values is another. Merriam's concern is with the former. Robert A. Dahl's “influence gap” appears to refer to both kinds of unexercised potential.

⁵¹ Systematic Politics (fn. 3), 340.

⁵² Prologue to Politics (fn. 10), 48.