¹ He asked that the talks be kept in strictest confidence, since not even the Soviet minister was aware of them! Cf. Tanner, Väinö, Finlands Väg, 1919–40, Helsingfors, 1950, p. 9.Google Scholar

² Ibid., pp. 14–17; also Mannerheim, Gustaf, Minnen, II, Helsingfors, 1951, p. 76Google Scholar; and Wuorinen, John H., ed., Finland and World War II, 1939–1944, New York, 1948, pp. 44ff.Google Scholar (The anonymous author of the Wuorinen manuscript is a respected and responsible Finnish scholar.)

³ This situation was fully understood by the German minister in Helsinki. Cf. his report of August 1, 1938, to the German Foreign Office, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. v, Washington, 1953, pp. 589–93Google Scholar (hereafter cited as DGFP).

⁴ For the observations of the German envoy in Helsinki, cf. Blücher, Wipert von, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie, Wiesbaden, 1951, pp. 91–93.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., p. 67, in which the source given is former President Svinhufvud.

⁶ Tanner, , op. cit., p. 20.Google Scholar

⁷ Cf. Blücher, , op. cit., pp. 115–17.Google Scholar The sharply critical, almost tragically toned article of the left-wing Social Democrat, Atos Wirtanen, in Arbetarbladet, were exceptional in their specific indictment of Hitler's program and their implied criticism of Western diplomacy. Articles for September 28–30, 1938, reprinted in his Ofärd och Gryning, Helsingfors, 1946, pp. 91–93.

⁸ This is paraphrased from a confidential Finnish source, which in turn is based upon archival research.

⁹ Wuorinen, , op. cit., p. 46.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cf. Palmstierna, Carl-Fredrik, Alandsfrågan, 1918–1951 (Världspolitikens dagsfrågor, No. 4), Stockholm, 1951, pp. 18f.Google Scholar Although these islands were a part of Finland, Sweden had peculiar interests there because she was a signatory to the “Guarantee” of 1921, the vast majority of the population was Swedish-speaking and looked to Sweden as a kind of “protector” of its minority status, and the islands lay in waters which were of strategic importance to Sweden.

¹¹ It is noteworthy that Germany gave its assent despite the categorical warning from Minister Blücher in Helsinki that the remilitarization was directed primarily not at the USSR but at Germany. See DGFP, Series D, Vol. v, pp. 607–9.

¹² Chicherin to foreign ministers of France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, in Degras, Jane, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, London, 1951, p. 169.Google Scholar

¹³ Tanner, , op. cit., pp. 22–23Google Scholar; and Wuorinen, , op. cit., p. 46.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Erkko “confidentially” kept the German government informed of these proposals. Von Blücher to Ribbentrop, March 14, 1939, DGFP, Series D, Vol. v, pp. 628–29.

¹⁵ Mannerheim, , op. cit., 11, p. 85.Google ScholarBlücher, , op.cit,. p. 142Google Scholar, furnishes the information that Erkko knew the islands were so located that they were defenseless, and “One rightist politician went even further and conceded that the [Karelian] isthmus lay in the Russian sphere of influence.”

¹⁶ The Finnish minister in London, Gripenberg, made several informal protests to Halifax, stating that any common guarantee of Finland by the three powers would tend “… to drive the Finnish Government into the arms of Germany.” Halifax to Snow, minister in Helsinki, July 8, 1939, Documents on British Foreign Policy, III: 6, London, 1953, p. 308. Wuorinen, , op. cit., p. 50Google Scholar, says that Sweden supported this Finnish protest.

¹⁷ Earlier Mannerheim had told the English envoy, Snow, that it was his opinion that such a pact would be the most dangerous of several alternatives for Finland. Snow to Halifax, June 20, 1939, DBFP, III: 6, p. 121.

¹⁸ Tanner, , op. cit., p. 32.Google Scholar

¹⁹ This seemingly casual handling of such an obviously important matter subsequently came in for sharp criticism by other Finns. See Frietsch, C. O., Finlands Ödesar, Stockholm, 1945, p. 59.Google Scholar

²⁰ Source as indicated in note 8 above.

²¹ Paasikivi's instructions are included in The Finnish Blue Book, New York, 1940, pp. 46–49.

²² Mannerheim, , op. cit., II, pp. 100–3.Google Scholar

²³ For all of these proposals, cf. Tanner, , op. cit., pp. 38–39.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 40–42, for this and others of Stalin's statements.

²⁵ The Russian memorandum is available in Finnish Blue Book, pp. 51–54.

²⁶ For one observer's comments, cf. Blücher, , op. cit., p. 154.Google Scholar

²⁷ Tanner, , op. cit., p. 47.Google Scholar He was supported in large part by the Minister of Defense, Niukkanen. Cf. Niukkanen, Juho, Försvarsminister under Vinterkriget, Helsingfors, 1951 pp. 78–79.Google Scholar

²⁸ Mannerheim, , op. cit., II, p. 108.Google Scholar

²⁹ Finnish Blue Book, pp. 51–54.

³⁰ Tanner, , op. cit., p. 58.Google Scholar

³¹ Dated October 23, Finnish Blue Book, pp. 54–56.

³² In a personal talk with the present writer in June 1952, Tanner expressed the view that a compromise could have been achieved had the delegates been fully empowered to act.

³³ These reports are summarized in Tanner, , op. cit., pp. 75–80.Google Scholar

³⁴ Finnish Blue Book, pp. 61–66.

³⁵ Cf. his note, in Tanner, , op. cit., pp. 81–83.Google Scholar Tanner himself confesses, “I have never learned what motivations Erkko had for his self-confidence. Under any circumstances they dominated his handling of the affair.” Blücher, , op. cit., p. 153Google Scholar, also indicated Erkko's low opinion of Paasikivi's powers of resistance.

³⁶ For the full speech and its proper context, cf. Pravda and Izvestia for November 1, 1939. Selections are reprinted in Finnish Blue Book, pp. 56–60.

³⁷ That opinion was general among many critics of Soviet policy. See, for example, Essen, Rütger, Den Ryska Ekvationen, Stockholm, 1940, p. 185.Google Scholar

³⁸ Tanner, , op cit., p. 84.Google Scholar

³⁹ Quoted in ibid., p. 93.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 94.

⁴¹ Quoted in ibid., p. 103; Tanner is the only available source for the Helsinki con, versations and communiqués of November 7–8.

⁴² Izvestia, November 14, 1939.

⁴³ Ibid., November 29, 1939.

⁴⁴ Pravda, November 16, 1939.

⁴⁵ From Defense Minister Niukkanen's notes of the meeting, Försvarsminister under Vinterkriget, p. 96.

⁴⁶ Source as given in note 8 above. This source also intimates that only the English minister, Snow, had any real fears of imminent hostilities.

⁴⁷ Mannerheim, , op. cit., II, pp. 112–14.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Finnis Blue Book, pp. 70–71.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 71.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 71–73.

⁵¹ Mannerheim, , op. cit., II, p. 115Google Scholar, states that he had been assured a month earlier by General Nenonen that no Finnish batteries had been so placed that they could shoot over the frontier.

⁵² See his note in Finnish Blue Book, pp. 73–74.

⁵³ An indication of the confidence with which the Soviet government played this game is that Pravda and Izvestia, on November 29, printed both the Finnish note and Molotov's reply in full on the front page.

⁵⁴ Finnish Blue Booh, p. 76.

⁵⁵ Some of the information in this paragraph comes from the source indicated in note 8 above.

⁵⁶ Paasikivi reported, after his final return from Moscow, “It is my belief that Russia's interest in Finland has always been of a strategic nature, and that other considerations … have never been of any significance.” Source as indicated in note 8 above.

⁵⁷ Cf. a recent work by “Candidate of Historical Science” Ivashin, I. F., Nachalo vtoroy mirovoy voiny i vneshnaya politika SSSR, Moscow, 1951, pp. 9–10.Google Scholar (The present writer is grateful to Professor Arvi Korhonen of Helsinki University for bringing this monograph to his attention.)

⁵⁸ Mannerheim, , op. cit., II, p. 115Google Scholar, states, “During the war of 1941–44 a number of prisoners were taken who described in detail how that clumsy provocation had been arranged.”

⁵⁹ For some suggestive reflections on Finnish social psychology, cf. Frietsch, , op. cit., pp. 57–78.Google Scholar