¹ The range of these fluctuations is apparently greater than anyone has suspected. Cf. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1200, Man-Hours per Unit of Output in the Basic Steel Industry, 1939–1955, Washington, D.C., 1956.

² The figure includes the tentative results for 1956, as announced by Jean Filippi, Secrétaire d'Etat au Budget. Le Monde, January 4, 1957, p. 10.

³ The comparison with Germany is interesting (England, of course, represents an extreme case of the predominance of industry over agriculture):

SOURCES: France—Annuaire statistique, 1952, p. 74; 1954, p. xvi. The figures for 1954 are based on a one-in-twenty sample of the census returns of that year, not yet available in complete form. Germany—Statistisches Jahrbuch für the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1956, pp. 112–19. After 1950, the basis of the German enumeration shifts (self-employed persons and their families are excluded), and the statistics are no longer comparable with those for France.

⁴ The first to formulate this hypothesis was Clark, Colin; see his Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd rev. ed., London, 1951, p. 395.Google Scholar The thesis has recently been called into question: see Bauer, P. T. and Yamey, B. S., “Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution,” Economic Journal, LXI (December 1951), pp. 741–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the rebuttal by S. G. Triantis, “Economic Progress, Occupational Distribution and International Terms of Trade,” ibid., LXIII (September 1953), pp. 627–37.

⁵ The extent of this hypertrophy is not easy to determine. On the one hand, the percentage of the population devoted to commerce is lower in France than in countries like Britain, Germany, or the United States—though, to be sure, these are more industrialized and would be expected to have a larger trade sector. On the other hand, the productivity of French distribution in terms of turnover per head is much lower than in these other countries, and the number of business units is disproportionately high. In 1952 it was estimated that France had one shop for every 62 inhabitants; Great Britain, one for every 89; the United States, one for every 91. The food trades are particularly overloaded in France. Jeanneney, J. M., Les commerces de détail en Europe occidentale, Paris, A. Colin, 1954Google Scholar; idem, Forces et faiblesses de l'éeacute;conomie française, Paris, A. Colin, 1956, pp. 89–90; Le Monde, December 10, 1952, p. 14.

⁶ Note the mystic virtues accorded the word petit by the Poujadist movement. Cf. Hoffmann, Stanley, Le mouvement Poujade, Paris, A. Colin, 1956, p. 171Google Scholar; also pp. 33, 220, 245 n. 103, 256.

⁷ “France in the Economic Race: Ten Years On,” The Economist, January 14, 1956, p. 1. The figure of twenty years is given for France in 1939 by L'industrie française (special number of Etudes et conjuncture), Paris, Presses universitaires, 1953, p. 25.

⁸ On French iron and steel equipment, see ibid., pp. 13–16; also Chardonnet, J., La sidérurgie française, Paris, A. Colin, 1954.Google Scholar On the continuous strip mill, see United Nations, The European Steel Industry and the Wide-strip Mill, Geneva, 1953.Google Scholar

⁹ According to Fourastié, J., L'économie française dans le monde, Paris, Presses universitaires, 1945, p. 49.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Truly comparable national statistics on over-all changes of productivity before the war are few and far between; really adequate data exist only for the United States. For France, the calculations that have thus far been established consist of one-third imagination, one-third ingenuity, and one-third approximations to empirical fact. The mass of evidence, however, direct and indirect, does convey certain general impressions of the kind expressed above. Cf. France, Service National des Statistiques, Institut de Conjoncture, Etude spéciale No. 3, Le progrès technique en France depuis 100 ans, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1944; Clark, , Conditions of Economic Progress, op. cit., ch. vi.Google Scholar

¹¹ Cahen, Mme, “Evolution comparée de la productivité dans l'industrie en divers pays: essai de mesure,” Etudes et conjoncture, XI (July 1956), pp. 633, 636.Google Scholar

¹² Those interested in the problems created by the disparity between French and foreign prices should consult the Rapport général présenté à M. Edgar Faure, Ministre des Finances et des Affaires économiques, et à M. Bernard Lafay, Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires économiques, by the Commission créée par arrêté du 6 janvier 1954 pour l'étude des disparités entre les prix français et étrangers [the Commission Nathan], Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1954, especially the conclusion, pp. 45–47. I am indebted to Mr. Warren Baum for making this report available to me.

¹³ I am told by Mr. George Ball, who directed a U.S. Army survey of bomb damage in Europe after the war, that the effect of heavy air attack on the overequipped industry of Germany was less damaging (indeed, promoted a certain amount of rationalization) than that of occasional attack, systematic looting, and forced obsolescence on the under-equipped industry of France.

¹⁴ This is necessarily something of a simplification. For a more thoroughgoing discussion of the competitive position of the French steel industry, see Chardonnet, , La sidérurgie française, op. cit., pp. 115Google Scholaret seq., and Rideau, E., Essor et problèmes d'une région française: houille et sidérurgie de Moselle, Paris, Editions ouvrières, 1956, pp. 139–44.Google Scholar

¹⁵ After Portugal, Ireland, Holland, and Spain, in that order. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1955, p. 617.Google Scholar

¹⁶ It is impossible in the space available to discuss this problem with all the detail and caveats it requires. The reader may refer to two of my earlier essays: “French Entrepreneurship and Industrial Growth in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History, IX (March 1949), pp. 45–61; and “French Business and the Businessman: A Social and Cultural Analysis,” in Earle, E. M., ed., Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics, Princeton, N.J., 1951, pp. 334–53Google Scholar; also a debate on the historical significance of the entrepreneurial factor: Gerschenkron, A., “Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, VI (October 1953), pp. 1–19Google Scholar; Landes, “Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Development: A Comment,” ibid., VI (May 1954), pp. 245–72; Gerschenkron, “Some Further Notes,” ibid., VIII (December 1954), pp. 11–19; Landes, “Further Comment,” ibid., pp. 119–20.

¹⁷ It has been argued, notably by Habakkuk, H. J., “The Historical Experience on the Basic Conditions of Economic Progress,” in Dupriez, L. H., ed., Economic Progress, Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1955, p. 159Google Scholar, that the success of family enterprises in other contexts—in promoting, for example, an industrial revolution in England—tends to disprove the above bill of particulars. It seems to me that the analogy is incorrect. Aside from differences of structure and character between the family firms of divers countries, the effectiveness of any species of the genus is clearly a function of the nature and stage of development of the economy in which it operates. An organization that was eminently suited to build a factory system step by step from the ground up was poorly fitted to establish de toutes pièces a more advanced and expensive technology (witness the need for investment banks and joint-stock companies on the Continent in the mid-nineteenth century); or to the sustaining of growth once the cost of equipment and the pace of technological change had gone beyond a certain point (witness the difficulties of England in the late nineteenth century).

¹⁸ I was told in 1953 that the portfolio of the Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur showed less than 10 per cent of the credits outstanding in foreign trade operations. The problem is an old one.

¹⁹ This kind of price rivalry does not contradict the above analysis of the nature of the market and the attitude of society toward competition. For one thing, the two products are economically not the same: the off-brand set is assumed to be markedly inferior—through in fact it may not be. For another, the impact of artisanal sales on the prosperity of the large firms and the security of their employees is negligible—hardly the sort of thing to invite public condemnation. Besides, in France—as in any country-the little fellow is allowed certain liberties.

²⁰ To be sure, one may point to measures in recent years designed to break down market rigidities and encourage the diffusion of more efficient techniques. But one can as easily cite measures of an opposite tendency. This taking with the one hand and giving with the other, which sometimes is the expression of division within the government but more often reflects the fundamental difficulty of reconciling economic rationality with political expediency, is well illustrated by the whole approach to tariff reform.

²¹ A convenient and authoritative discussion of the housing problem, although not entirely up-to-date, is the drily official report of the Inspection des Finances, Rapport sur les travaux de l'Inspection Générale en 1951, 11: Les interventions des pouvoirs publics dans le domaine du logement, Paris, 1952. No thorough study of French housing standards exists, but even the abstractions of the official census convey something of their inadequacy and even poverty. Cf. L'espace économique français (special number of Etudes et conjoncture), Paris, Presses universitaires, 1951, pp. 100–43 (a later edition appeared in 1955); also “Structure des logements en France: principaux résultats du recensement de la population de mai 1954,” Bulletin hebdomadaire de statistique (January 21, 1956).

²² Cf. “L'évolution récente des revenus salariaux modestes en France,” Etudes et conjuncture, IX (1954), pp. 754–79.

²³ It must be admitted that sentiments of this kind are hard to pinpoint and evaluate. Most observers would agree that housing is a sore point with French workers and that there is a keen feeling of discontent with the distribution of the national product. Yet a recent small survey of housing conditions showed that over 50 per cent of the workers questioned were satisfied with their present lodgings. “Les premiers résultats de l'enquête ‘logement’ de l'INSEE,” Bulletin hebdomadaire de statistique (April 21, 1956). Assuming that this picture is correct, part of the explanation may lie in the limited expectations held by many Frenchmen; this has long been a source of frustration to leaders of the labor movement. One often finds a strange combination of specific satisfaction (or resignation) and generalized discontent.

²⁴ For one thing, money would tend to blur distinctions that the French consider important; for another, the French are not “conspicuous” consumers and often conceal wealth deliberately. To be sure, even with concealment the presumption of wealth remains, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain any degree of status without the appropriate material resources.

²⁵ The best analysis is still that of Goblot, Edmond, La barrière et le niveau: étude sociologique sur la bourgeoisie française moderne, Paris, Alcan, 1925.Google Scholar The analysis of Lipset, S. M. and Rogoff, N., “Class and Opportunity in Europe and the U.S.: Some Myths and What the Statistics Show,” Commentary, XVIII (December 1954), pp. 562–68Google Scholar, is unconvincing on methodological grounds; among other things the choice of categories and the character of the inquiry that the statistics are based on leave much to be desired. See the criticism by H. Luethy, “Social Mobility Again—and Elites: A European View,” ibid., XX (September 1955), pp. 270–73. More serious is the lack of direct knowledge of European conditions; it is extremely difficult to write of social patterns at second hand, particularly when the only data employed are statistical.

²⁶ Most French employers whom I have spoken to assume that the return from any gain in productivity due to the introduction of more efficient capital equipment should accrue entirely to the employer. It has taken some effort to instill a different attitude and give labor a stake in the improvement of techniques.

²⁷ For an enlightening comparison and contrast of the French and American labor movements, see Lorwin, Val, “Reflections on the History of Two Labor Union Movements: France and the United States,” Journal of Economic History, XVII (1957), pp. 25–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ See Lüdiy, H., “Why Five Million Frenchmen Vote Communist,” Commentary, XII (September 1951), pp. 199–208Google Scholar; also Micaud, C. A., “The Bases of Communist Strength in France,” Western Political Quarterly, VIII (September 1955), pp. 354–66Google Scholar; “Le particommuniste,” in Duverger, M., ed., Partis politiques et classes sociales en France, Paris, A. Colin, 1956, pp. 181–93Google Scholar; Jacques Fauvet, “Les paysans,” ibid., pp. 155–77.

²⁹ There is some disagreement about this, and so expert a student of French taxation as Carl Shoup is inclined to depreciate the extent of evasion. Cf. “Taxation in France,” National Tax Journal, VIII (December 1955), p. 332. Yet even he notes that evasion is serious enough to make the government set tax rates higher than the taxpayer can afford, in order to discount expected evasion. This in turn encourages the taxpayer to evade further, which induces higher rates, and so on. Houghteling, J. J. Jr “The Income Tax in France,” Public Policy, v(1954), p. 311.Google Scholar One key difference must be noted between French tax evasion and, say, American: the Frenchman takes evasion for granted and feels that only a fool pays all his taxes; he has no hesitation in expressing this opinion even to strangers. No American would admit to evasion in this manner.

³⁰ See the New York Times, November 19, 1956, p. 16, for the contrasting reactions of Frenchmen and Britons to the same situation.

³¹ A recent report of the Ministry of Finance announces that the government is spending some $200,000,000 a year in subsidies and tax cuts in order to keep consumer prices down. New York Times, December 17, 1956, p. 43. The sum total of all such distortionary expenditures is of course much greater; in 1955, one billion dollars went into so-called “economic” subsidies, many of them designed, not to lower prices, but to keep them up. See Jeanneney, , Forces et faiblesses, op. cit., p. 231.Google Scholar

³² This is a simplification, and ignores the second chamber. Yet in spite of reforms designed to increase the importance of the Council of the Republic, ministerial responsibility remains essentially unicameral. Cf. Lidderdale, D.W.S., The Parliament of France, London, [1951]Google ScholarPierce, Roy, “Constitutional Revision in France,” Journal of Politics, XVII (May 1955), pp. 221–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Campbell, Peter, “Constitutional Reform in France, 1950–1954,” Political Science (Wellington, N.Z.), VII (September 1955), pp. 76–100Google Scholar; Williams, P. M., “Constitutional Revision in France,” Political Studies, III (June 1955), pp. 153–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³³ It is no coincidence that the efforts to create a stronger executive at the end of the war failed; or that the attempt to stabilize ministries by providing for dissolution of the Assembly was long thwarted by technical evasions.

³⁴ The French do pay as much taxes in proportion to national income as Americans. But because of widespread evasion and the desire to spare certain economic interests, the burden is unfairly distributed, and more man two-thirds must be realized in the form of indirect taxes.

³⁵ This, at any rate, is the contention of the French government. But to my knowledge no official account of the cost of the Indo-Chinese war has ever been made public, and it is impossible to say how much of the outlay went for military requirements, how much for the normal administrative expenses of the area, and how much for such questionable purposes as supporting the value of the piaster.

³⁶ On the general implications of current American foreign policy for French diplomacy and France's “agonizing reappraisal” of her relations with the United States, see the important article of Maulnier, Thierry, “Lettre aux Américains,” Figaro, January 9, 1957Google Scholar; reproduced in New York Times, February 6, 1957. The article is significant because it expresses the feelings of many of those in France who have been our strongest supporters.