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⁵⁶ Sagan and Turco also state that if nuclear winter research indicates the “threshold” at about one hundred weapons each, “nuclear winter would then suggest that we move quickly from minimum sufficiency to abolition” (p. 416).

⁵⁷ Snow, Donald M., “Strategic Uncertainty and the Nuclear Winter: Implications for Policy,” in Viotti, Paul, ed., Conflict and Arms Control: An Uncertain Agenda (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 63.Google Scholar

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⁷⁰ Indeed, several recent, notable books on nuclear strategy and defense policy fail to address the issue of nuclear winter at all. See Jervis, Robert, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Kruzel, Joseph S., ed., American Defense Annual, 1989–1990 (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989)Google Scholar; Nolan, Janne E., Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989)Google Scholar; Sagan, Scott D., Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; and Weinberger, Caspar W., Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990).Google Scholar

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⁷⁵ Gray notes four assumptions that “make up the bedrock of what must pass for a body of knowledge”: the prenuclear world is beyond retrieval; nuclear weapons must be fitted into national or coalition military strategy; investments in command and control improvements are worthwhile; and “the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers cannot be regarded as instruments of military decision”; Gray (fn. 63), 311–13.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 315.