¹ Kissinger, Henry A., “Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, XXXIV, No. 3 (April 1956), pp. 349–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blackett, P. M. S., Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations, New York, 1956.Google Scholar

² Nitze, Paul, “Atoms, Strategy and Policy,” Foreign Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2 (January 1956), pp. 187–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Op.cit.

⁴ Secretary of Defense Wilson has stated that within a reasonable number of years the U. S. and the USSR will each have enough weapons so that either could “practically wipe out the world” (New York Times, March 30, 1956). Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, has said that the U. S. already has such a capability (Facts on File, XVI, No. 835, October 24–30, 1956, p. 359).

⁵ From this it follows that the two sides do not necessarily require offensive capabilities of equal strength; the requirement will depend largely on the vulnerability of the population of the opponent. Since it is probably true that the USSR is less vulnerable that the U. S., we should have a greater offensive capability than the USSR (assuming that the USSR does not make the mistake of building too great a capability). The requirements of each side will, of course, be increased if the other side makes its population less vulnerable.

⁶ Collapse resulting from destruction of control, communication, industrial facilities, etc., may seem preferable to collapse as a result of population destruction, at least to survivors. However, the deterrent effects of the two prospects are unlikely to be different.

⁷ It is conceivable that certain defense measures, e.g., a passive defense against the rather unpredictable effects of fallout, would result in a lessening in the uncertainty of damage and consequently in a reduction in the expected damage.

⁸ It is interesting to consider the Korean War in this light. It seems quite likely that the U. S. was really in control in Korea, in that at all increased scales of warfare the results probably would have been more disadvantageous to the Bloc. In introducing Chinese troops the Communists extended the scale as far as possible. The next logical relaxation of limitations would almost certainly have led to U. S. usage of nuclear weapons, a contingency for which the Bloc was obviously not prepared. One might consider that the war was limited to the extent it was because there was no possibility (on the basis of capabilities) of the Communists securing a more favorable outcome, and because the U. S. was unwilling to pay the price required for a more favorable outcome (in Nitze's second sense).

⁹ An attack on this basis, of course, carries the inference that the enemy is irrational or that there is also an error with respect to capabilities.

¹⁰ Indeed, it is so difficult to imagine such a situation that one is forced to regard such a response as irrational when the enemy's retaliatory capabilities are sufficient.

¹¹ Op. cit.

¹² Cf. Speier, Hans, “Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance,” World Politics, IX, No. 3 (April 1957), pp. 307–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ The long-term possibilities of providing a secure system based near the periphery are, on the basis of technological capabilities, probably restricted to weapons the security of which is dependent on their frequent movement. One arrives at this conclusion from a consideration of ballistic missile capabilities. Flight times for these weapons will be so short that one cannot rely on early detection and rapid launching of one's own weapons as a means of ensuring retaliation. Moreover, the prospects for active defense against such missiles are dim. Finally, passive defense, i.e., making bases, etc., relatively invulnerable to blast, must be regarded as at best an interim measure, particularly at the short ranges involved, because of the almost certain eventual attainment of high accuracy and large warhead weight for Soviet ballistic missiles.

¹⁴ Manual of Civil Defense, Vol. I, Pamphlet I, Nuclear Weapons, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956. This source conveniently summarizes data on large-yield weapons based on results released by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission for the explosion of March 1, 1954. From it one can estimate that the fallout from a large weapon will result in a lethal area (an area enclosed by a contour within which 500 or more roentgens will be received in 36 hours) of perhaps 3000 square miles. One can also calculate that a person completely protected from radiation for a day or two, but exposed thereafter, will receive by the end of three months about one-half the radiation that he would have received without any protection at all (assuming fallout occurs after several hours); to reduce the radiation dosage to one-tenth, complete protection for about a month after the explosion would be required. It can also be seen from Nuclear Weapons that areas enclosed by isodosage contours are approximately proportional to the reciprocal of the dosage on the contour (at least over the range 300 to 800 R). Thus, one might expect that a shelter program which provided complete protection for a month would not reduce lethalities by a factor of more than about 10. Similarly, one- to two-day shelters would reduce casualties by perhaps one-half. Some further reduction in casualties would be possible, of course, if a decontamination program were instituted as soon as people came out of shelters.

¹⁵ There is also the threat of blockade, particularly in the case of the U. K.

¹⁶ Logically, though perhaps not practically, there may be an exception to this; if an offensive system is absolutely secure there will be no incentive for enemy attack (except perhaps a desire to destroy population).

¹⁷ The price of “buying,” say, one of the northern European nations might conceivably be a civil-defense and warning system, and location of offensive capabilities in remote areas, such mat their destruction would cause little damage to the host nation—probably an impossible requirement.

¹⁸ There may be some exceptions. Belgium and the Netherlands are so small and so close together that a large nuclear weapon exploded over one would cause great damage in the other. Thus, there may be an unusual willingness to surrender national prerogatives in such an instance. Indeed, this suggests that the area of common interest among separate states in a nuclear age may be of the same order as that susceptible to damage from a single weapon. The existing cohesiveness of the larger states is probably sufficient to insure unity of action within each one even though only a part of it is directly threatened.

¹⁹ Most of the arguments cited here would seem to apply to many other areas of interest to the U. S., with some modifications. In these other areas, development of indigenous nuclear capabilities would entail greater risks because of lesser degrees of political stability and responsibility. Also, delivery systems would be more costly for countries such as Japan because of the requirement for greater range.

²⁰ In the absence of an effectively policed disarmament system, it is unlikely that the development of nuclear capabilities by small states can be long deferred. It is less a question of whether the smaller nations should have such capabilities than of when. It would seem likely that such developments would be more disadvantageous to the USSR than to the U. S.