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Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position. Regardless of one's interpretation of the term or one's preference for or antipathy to it, the international relations scholar cannot escape dealing with it. The model is, of course, a multifaceted one, and it produces a fascinating array of corollaries; among these, the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system is one of the most widely accepted and persuasive. That is, as the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1964
References
1 Data-gathering on this topic is currently being carried on by David Singer.
2 This argument does not take into account, of course, the effects of any radical changes in the quantity or effectiveness of weapons, or of the quantitative increase of currently available weapons of mass destruction to very high levels.
3 Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Relations (New York 1957), 6–8.Google Scholar Kaplan has formalized many classic formulations of balance-of-power theory. For outstanding examples of these, see Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations (3rd edn., New York 1960), 167–226Google Scholar; Claude, Inis, Power and International Relations (New York 1962), 11–93Google Scholar; Schuman, Frederick L., International Politics (6th edn., New York 1958), 70–72Google Scholar, 275–78, 577–79, 591–92; Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore 1962), 117–32Google Scholar; and Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (Chicago 1942), 11Google Scholar, 743–46. For other attempts at formalization, see Liska, George, International Equilibrium (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 23–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 187–202; Gulick, Edward V., Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca 1955)Google Scholar; and, for significant recent contributions, Rapoport, Anatol, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor 1960)Google Scholar, and Rosecrance, Richard, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston 1963).Google Scholar
4 For an application of these and related concepts to a range of political questions, see Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government (New York 1963).Google Scholar
5 Dahrendorf, Ralf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (June 1958), 176–77.Google Scholar
6 Rapoport, 213–22; Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 83–118.Google Scholar
7 Cf. Cherry, Colin, On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism (Cambridge-New York 1957), 42 and passim.Google Scholar
8 For an earlier version of a related argument about mass attitudes to quarrels with a foreign country, sec Deutsch, Karl W., “Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (July 1957), 200–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Kaplan, , 21–53; Rapoport, 15–47; same author's essay, “L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (September 1957), 249–99.Google Scholar See also Richardson, L. F., Arms and Insecurity (Chicago 1960).Google Scholar
10 For some historical data, see the discussion of the reduction of Italian city states during the years 1300–1527 from 70 or 80 to 10, in Toynbee, A. J., A Study of History (London-New York 1945), III, 355–56Google Scholar; cf. also 301–4, 345–48. In addition, see Wright, II, 762–63 (“The Disappearance of Small States”).
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