¹ Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 30Google Scholar–32, 95–96; and Frieden, Jeffry, Debt, Development and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992Google Scholar).

² See Green, Philip and Levinson, Sanford, eds., Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York: Random House, 1968Google Scholar); and David Easton's 1969 APSA presidential address, “The New Revolution in Political Science,” American Political Science Review 68 (December 1969Google Scholar). The key critique of behavioral methods in foreign policy came from outside; see Chomsky, Noam, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Press, 1967), 23–159Google Scholar. The era spurred interest in the Frankfurt School, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and other philosophers. It is common to raid other disciplines for ideas; see Toulmin, Stephen, Human Understanding, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972Google Scholar).

³ Hirschman, , The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 29Google Scholar.

⁴ Alexander Wendt objects to the term “reflectivist” because it smacks of radical relativism. He prefers the label “constructivist” because it denotes that the social construction of reality occurs with at least a tenuous link posited between word and object. See Wendt, , “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), 393CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987Google Scholar).

⁵ “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently 'world images' that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest”; Max Weber “Social Psychology of the World's Religions,” in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 280Google Scholar. Keynes mocked: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, usually are the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of years back.” Keynes, See, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1936), 383Google Scholar.

⁶ John Hall acknowledges that Marx “did recognize the reality of belief.” See Hall, “Ideas and the Social Sciences,” in Goldstein and Keohane, 37. Engels called the notion that Marxism denies ideology any effectiveness in history “idiotic.” For where “is there a superstructure, however airy and delicate its construction, which is not just as real as the foundation? … [A] foundation is not constructed as an end in itself but only so that a superstructure can subsequently be erected upon it. … [T]he superstructure is therefore that part of the building in which its meaning and purpose are accomplished. … [T]he social superstructure is that part of society in which historical actions take shape; but in order to be effective they have to operate on the basis and within the limits and capacities of the foundation. … Ideas and views cannot arise out of themselves and exist out of themselves but require a foundation in men's relation of work and exchange, upon which they constitute themselves, and in relation to which they change, partly in correspondence, partly in contrast.” Cited in Max Adlers 1930 essay, “Ideology and Culture,” in Bottomore, Tom and Goode, Patrick, eds., Austro-Marxism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 254Google Scholar. See also Williams, Raymond, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” New Left Review 82 (November-December 1973Google Scholar); and Abercrombie, Nicholas et al., eds., The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980Google Scholar).

⁷ Stephen Krasner is a strong adherent of the “hooks” view. “Ideas have not made possible alternatives that did not previously exist; they legitimated political practices that were already facts on the ground. Ideas have been one among several instruments that actors have invoked to promote their own mundane interests. … Only after ideas became embedded in institutional structures were they consequential for political behavior.” See Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Goldstein and Keo-hane, 238, 257.

⁸ Other works in this vein are Hall, Peter, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989Google Scholar); King, Anthony, “Ideas, Interests and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 7 (October 1979Google Scholar); Rohrlich, Paul Egon, “Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy Making,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Adler, Emanuel, The Power of Ideology: The Questfor Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987Google Scholar); idem, “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress,” in Adler, and Crawford, Beverly, eds., Progress in Post- War International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991Google Scholar); Odell, John S., U.S. Monetary Policy: Money, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982Google Scholar); Haas, Ernst, When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990Google Scholar); Bullen, R. J., von Strandmann, H. Pogge, Polonsky, A. B., eds., Ideas into Politics: Aspects of European History, 1880–1950 (London: Croom Helm, 1984)Google Scholar; Furner, Mary and Supple, Barry, eds., The State and Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990Google Scholar); Reich, Robert R., ed., The Power of Public Ideas (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988Google Scholar); and Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁹ Countering this, see Gourevitch, Peter R., “The Second Image Reversed,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978Google Scholar); Putnam, Robert, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Stephen Haggard, “Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory,” in Adler and Crawford (fn. 8); and, most recently, Evans, Peter B., Jacobsen, Harold K., and Putnam, Robert, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993Google Scholar).

¹⁰ See Pierson, Paul, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change,” World Politics 45 (July 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹¹ On values, see Inglehart, Ronald J., Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992Google Scholar); on political culture, see Laitin, David, “Political Culture and Political Preferences,” American Political Science Review 82 (June 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Street, John, “Political Culture: From Civic Culture to Mass Culture,” British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994CrossRefGoogle Scholar). On political psychology, see Greenstein, Fred, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969Google Scholar). On psychoanalysis, see Lasswell, Harold, Psychopathology and Politics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977Google Scholar); and Roazen, Paul, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968Google Scholar). On symbolism, see Edelman, Murray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967Google Scholar). See, in addition, Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977Google Scholar); and Larson, Deborah Welch, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985Google Scholar).

¹² On leader-specific studies, see Holsti, Ole, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia,” in Finlay, Douglas, Holsti, Ole, and Fagen, Richard, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967Google Scholar); Holsti, , “Foreign Policy Viewed Cognitively,” in Axelrod, Robert, ed., Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976Google Scholar); and George, Alexander L., “The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 'Operational Code' Belief System,” in Falkowski, Lawrence, ed., Psychological Models in International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979Google Scholar).

¹³ Nina Halpern, “Creating Socialist Economies: Stalinist Political Economy and the Impact of Ideas,” in Goldstein and Keohane. The Yugoslav official was Milovan Djilas.

¹⁴ These beliefs form an “economic culture,” that is, a “definitive set of agreed-upon assumptions about how social economics functions and which social outcomes are desirable”; Rohrlich (fn. 8), 68–69. Furner and Supple (fn. 8) define “economic knowledge” as “those things that people 'know' in the essence of believing them,” including “theories or assumptions about the ways in which different types of economic structures promote or hamper civic progress, equality, and welfare; the relations between economic expansion and individual liberty (and indeed the very nature of liberty) and the links that unite particular forms of government and prosperity” (p. 24).

¹⁵ Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982CrossRefGoogle Scholar); and Przeworski, Adam and Wallerstein, Michael, “Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads,” Democracy 2 (July 1982Google Scholar).

¹⁶ Furner and Supple (fn. 8), 34. Likewise, Sikkink notes that the Reagan administration, despite a deep aversion to getting involved in such matters, could not entirely abandon a concern with human rights. See Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe,” in Goldstein and Keohane, 166.

¹⁷ As a special assistant in Washington, Daniel Ellsberg witnessed “a whole dimension of policy consideration that is often discussed but almost never written down for fear of leaks both within government and to the public.” See Ellsberg, , Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 77–78Google Scholar.

¹⁸ William Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis hold that “the issue is not where community members sit but what they say”; Drake and Nikolaidis, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: 'Trade in Services' and the Uruguay Round,” in Haas, IO, 39. It must be noted there are usually “many Pareto-optimal alternatives open to a society” and that it is a “value judgment” that a Pareto-optimal situation is superior to any number of suboptimal ones. Barry, Brian and Hardin, Russell, eds., Rational Man and Irrational Society? (New York: Sage, 1982), 141Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Franklin, H. Bruce, MIA or Mythmaking in America ((New York: Lawrence Hill, 1992Google Scholar).

²⁰ See the pertinent essays in American Prospect 16 (Winter 1994Google Scholar); and Stewart, Michael, Keynes in the 1990s (London: Penguin, 1993Google Scholar).

²¹ Wendt (fn. 4), 393.

²² Geoffrey Garret and Barry R. Weingast take a different position from the others in arguing that “the central concern of reflectivists—the social and institutional bases of shared beliefs—holds the key to overcoming the deficiencies of functional logic.” See Garret and Weingast, “Ideas, Institutions and Interests: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market,” in Goldstein and Keohane, 176.

²³ See also Elster, Jon, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 1–27Google Scholar; and idem, “Further Thoughts on Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory,” in Roemer, John, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986Google Scholar).

²⁴ Peter Haas and Emanuel Adler, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Program,” in Haas, IO.

²⁵ An anonymous referee raises this objection.

²⁶ Dryzek, John, “How Far Is It from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt? Public Choice as Critical Theory,” British Journal of Political Science 22 (October 1992), 407–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. He discusses the work of Viktor Vanberg and James Buchanan.

²⁷ See Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960Google Scholar); and Habermas, Jurgen, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973Google Scholar).

²⁸ On Britain, see Gilmour, Ian, Dancing with Dogma (London: Simon and Schuster, 1992Google Scholar); on the U.S., see Stockman, David A., The Triumph of Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1986Google Scholar).

²⁹ Kurth, James A., “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle,” International Organization 33 (Winter 1979CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986Google Scholar); Ferguson, Thomas, “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

³⁰ Policy entrepreneurs do not descend from Mount Olympus; they are usually interested actors who benefit when their ideas are adopted. Indeed, Sikkink refers to Premiers Frondizi in Argentina and Kubitscek in Brazil as policy entrepreneurs. See Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions, 245.

³¹ Note Albert Hirschman on the dangers of currozione “by which [Macchiavelli] meant … the loss of public spirit.” Hirschmann, “How the Keynesian Revolution Was Exported from the United States and Other Comments,” in Hall (fn. 8), 357, 354.

³² “He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power.” Schattschneider (fn. 27), 66.

³³ “Epistemologically, the world and our representations of it are not isomorphic; our concept of reality is mediated by prior assumptions, expectations, and experiences. There is no such thing as the direct and true apprehension of reality itself,” writes Haas, IO, 21. This is the litany across the hermaneutic fields. As Robert Wallerstein writes, “The realities with which psychoanalysis concerns itself… are created, evolved and constructed realities…. The psychological impact of reality on the individual varies according to what a human being makes of it, consciously or unconsciously. There is no objective reality per se that carries psychological weight of its own.” See Wallerstein, , “Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the Problem of Reality,” Journal of American Psychiatric Association 21 (Spring 1973), 7Google Scholar.

³⁴ Block, Fred and Somers, Margaret, “Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Science of Karl Polanyi,” in Skocpol, Theda, ed., Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 62Google Scholar.

³⁵ An exception is Maier, Charles S., In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987Google Scholar).

³⁶ Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962Google Scholar). See Peter Euban's essay on Kuhn's impact on political science, in Green and Levinson (fn. 2).

³⁷ Paul Feyerabend makes this case; Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1975Google Scholar). On political implications, see Jacobsen, J. K. and Gilman, Roger, “The Dialectical Character of Paul Feyer-abend's Philosophy of Science,” Nature, Society and Thought 4 (January—April 1991Google Scholar).

³⁸ See Oyrzanowski, Bronislaw and Palecny-Zapp, Magda, “From One Economic Ideology to Another: Poland's Transition from Socialism to Capitalism,” InternationalJournal of Politics, Culture and Society 7, no. 1 (1993Google Scholar).

³⁹ On ideologies as “maps of problematic social realties” that “so construe [these realities] as to make it possible to act purposefully within them,” see Geertz, Clifford, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 220Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations”; Sikkink, 9; Haas (fn. 8), 2; Goldstein, 3.

⁴¹ Hall, “The Politics of Keynesian Ideas,” in Hall (fn. 8), 369.

⁴² Ibid., 370.

⁴³ Peter Gourevitch, “Keynesian Politics: The Political Sources of Economic Policy Choices,” in Hall (fn. 8), 73. See also Weir, Margaret, “Ideas and The Politics of Bounded Innovation,” in Steinmo, Sven, Thelan, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Frank, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992Google Scholar). Bounded innovation characterizes “institutions whose existence channelled the flow of ideas, created incentives for political actors, and helped to determine the political meaning of policy choices” (p. 189). An earlier formulation appears in Claus Offe,”The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation,” in Lindberg, Leon et al., eds., Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975Google Scholar). Weir suggests that “economic coalition arguments overlook the more independent role that new ideas can play in causing existing groups to rethink their interests and form alliances” (p.190). The point is worth exploring although we lack any examples of this occurring in the absence of the uptake of similar (potentially threatening) ideas by competitors.

⁴⁴ “Policy ideas matter because they provide opportunities for elites to pursue their interests in more effective ways. This may be the most profound way in which ideas matter.” G. John Ikenberry, “Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian 'New Thinking' and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” in Goldstein and Keohane, 84.

⁴⁵ A very good recent example is Verdier, Daniel, “The Politics of Preference Formation: The United States from the Civil War to the New Deal,” Politics and Society 21 (December 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁴⁶ Ellis S. Krause and Simon Reich argue that the nature and competitiveness of a particular sector influences both the extent and the exact form of aid that the executive will extend. They find that the U.S. “free but fair” trade fluctuations in policy make perfect sense for everyone but labor. Krause, and Reich, , “Ideology, Interests and the American Exports: Toward a Theory of Foreign Competition and Manufacturing Trade Policy,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992Google Scholar).

⁴⁷ Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957Google Scholar); and Hobsbawm, Eric J., Industry and Empire (London: Penguin, 1971Google Scholar).

⁴⁸ See the case studies in Rodgers, Daniel T., Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence (New York: Basic Books, 1987Google Scholar).

⁴⁹ Maier (fn. 35), 45; Kasson, John, Civilising the Machine (New York: Vintage, 1981Google Scholar); and Noble, David F., Forces of Production (New York: Knopf, 1984Google Scholar).

⁵⁰ Paul Goodman's comment remains apposite: the average citizen may not be equipped to “judge the substantive issues relevant to the vast sums for research and development; medicine, space exploration, and technical training; but it would be helpful if he understood the interests and politics involved.” Goodman, , People or Personnel and Like a Conquered Province (New York: Vintage, 1969), 315Google ScholarPubMed; emphasis added.

⁵¹ For an example regarding nonproliferation, see Jacobsen, J. K. and Hofhansel, Claus, “Safeguards and Profits: Civilian Nuclear Exports, Neo-Marxism and the Statist Approach,” International Studies Quarterly 26 (March 1984Google Scholar).

⁵² The most glaring example of the triumph of ideology over economic sense was the Nazi holocaust; from a purely cold-blooded economic view, it was inherently wasteful and diverted valuable resources from the war effort. However, this was a ghastly victory of racial ideology, not of one economic idea over another, which is the concern of this essay.

⁵³ On rationales used to justify central direction as a means of achieving the official goal of worker rule, see Bailes, Kendall, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin, 1917–1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978Google Scholar).

⁵⁴ See Graham, Loren, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage, 1974Google Scholar); Fisher, George, ed., Science and Society in Soviet Society (New York: Atherton Press, 1967Google Scholar): Joravsky, David, Soviet Marxism and Natural Science (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1961Google Scholar); and Baylis, Thomas, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change under Mature Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974Google Scholar).

⁵⁵ Checkel, Jeff, “Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” World Politics 45 (January 1993), 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 275. See Halliday, Fred, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1985), 11Google Scholar. Mikhail Gorbachev interestingly invokes Lenin as a shrewd interpreter of trends and one capable of adjusting as needed. Gorbachev, , Perestroika (New York: Harper and Row, 1987Google Scholar). For an internal view of Soviet flip-flops on foreign policy, see Shevchenko, Arkady N., Breaking with Moscow (New York: Ballantine, 1985), 77–79Google Scholar, 108–9, 120.

⁵⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen makes an argument similar to Checkel's about how transnational elites influence one another across the iron curtain regarding arms control, and he likewise does not pin down a causal influence upon policy. See Kappen, Risse, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48 (Spring 1994Google Scholar).

⁵⁸ Halpern does observe such flexibility in China, where there were “distinct limits to the ideological reformulations that have been permitted, for example, the debate must still revolve around the proper combination of plan and market, the proper role of the law of value, and new forms of management rather than ownership”; in Goldstein and Keohane, 104.

⁵⁹ Maier (fn. 35), 16.

⁶⁰ Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1957), 120Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Steinmo, Sven, “Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain,” World Politics 41 (July 1989), 501CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶² Ibid., 502.

⁶³ Haas and Adler's “limited constructivist view” is that although “no description can exist independently of the social circumstances under which that description is made,” some consensus is possible; hence, “correct beliefs may evolve over time, as progressively more accurate characterizations of the world are consensually formulated.” This stance parallels that of Charles Sanders Peirce. See Haber-mas's pertinent critique (fn. 27), 91–141.

⁶⁴ Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology,” International Organization 29 (Summer 1975CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁶⁵ Ott, Melvin, “Shaking up the CIA,” Foreign Policy 93 (Winter 1993–1994), 42Google Scholar. See Hans Morgan-thau's prescient article on the dangerous adaptation of intelligence to preconceptions; Morganthau, , “Vietnam and the National Interest,” in Gettleman, Marvin E., ed., Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1965), 374Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Gourevitch, in Hall (fn. 8), 89.

⁶⁷ Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, “Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence,” in Haas, IO.

⁶⁸ See Broad, William J., Teller's War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992Google Scholar).

⁶⁹ See Cole, Leonard A., Politics and the Restraint of Science (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983Google Scholar); Perrin, Charles, The Fail-Safe Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)Google Scholar; and Schrecker, Ellen W., No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986Google Scholar).

⁷⁰ Haas recognizes that “choices remain highly political in their allocative consequences,” especially “where scientific evidence is ambiguous and the experts themselves are split into contending factions”; in Haas, IO, 11. But what is rare in policy debates is scientific unanimity, not divided opinions.

⁷¹ Peter Haas distinguishes his “internally defined validity test” from Ernst Haass requirement that an epistemic community “professes beliefs in extracommunity reality tests”; in Haas, IO, 17 n. 39.

⁷² Mazur, Allan, The Dynamics of Technical Controversy (Washington D.C.: Communications Press, 1981), 81–82Google Scholar. See also Latour, Bruno, Science in Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987Google Scholar).

⁷³ This accords with the spirit of Geertz's comment (fn. 39) that “competing ideologies are at least as important a check on ideological claims” as is scientific analysis (p. 230).

⁷⁴ The Chinese went to the extreme of dispatching their unwanted “epistemic community” of market economists to a most severe reeducation, because they had failed to provide for party power-retention needs.

⁷⁵ G. John Ikenberry, “A World Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” in Haas, IO, 294.

⁷⁶ See Hirschman (fn. 31).

⁷⁷ Gramsci, Antonio, The Modern Prince (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 112Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Mouffe, Chantal, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci,” in Tony Bennett et al., eds., Culture, Ideology and Social Process (London: Open University, 1987), 223Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Cosmopolitan and nationalist developmentalists “agree about vertical industrialization programs promoted by vigorous state action but disagree over the role of foreign investment and the degree of state involvement in the economy.” Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions, 39.

⁸⁰ On the implications of debt for Brazilian democracy, see Freeman, John R., The Politics of Indebted Growth (Denver, Colo.: Graduate School of International Studies, 1983), 20Google Scholar, 65.

⁸¹ Ibid., 157. Sikkink notes that these “rings” aided the 1964 coup (p. 151).

⁸² See Geertz's discussion (fn. 39) of why the claim that the Taft-Hartley Act was “a slave labor law” misfired (pp. 208–10).

⁸³ See Jacobsen, J. K., “Peripheral Postindustrialism: Ideology, High Technology and Development,” in Caporaso, James A., ed., A Changing International Division of Labor (Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 1987Google Scholar); and idem, “Microchips and Public Policy: The Political Economy of High Technology,” British Journal of Political Science 22 (October 1992Google Scholar).

⁸⁴ See Touraine, Alaine, The Return of the Actor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 1–14Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Maier (fa. 35), 268.

⁸⁶ Margaret Archer reminds us of “the quintessential reflective ability of human beings to fight back against their conditioning [which] gives them the capacity to respond with originality to the present context—either by taking advantage of inconsistencies within it and generating new forms of syncretism, or by exploring novel combinations of compatible elements.” Archer, , Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), xxivGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁷ Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms,” in Bennett (fa. 78), 12.

⁸⁸ Grossberg, Lawrence, We Gotta Get Out of This Place; Popular Conservativism and Modern Culture (London: Routledge, 1992), 54Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Ibid. See Eagleton, Terry, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 115Google Scholar, 193–220.

⁹⁰ On cultural studies, see Grossberg (fn. 88); Bennett (fn. 78); Hebidge, Dick, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Metheun, 1979Google Scholar); Fiske, John, Reading the Popular (Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1986Google Scholar); and Brantlinger, Patrick, ed., Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America (London: Routledge, 1990Google Scholar).

⁹¹ Archer (fn. 86), xiii. See Touraine (fn. 84).

⁹² For historical illustrations, see Salvatore, Ricardo D., “Market-Oriented Reforms and Popular Protest: Latin America from Charles III to the IMF,” Social Science History 17 (Winter 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁹³ Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford, and Jack Donnelly, “Defining and Conceptualizing Progress in International Relations,” in Adler and Crawford (fn. 8), 27.