¹ For the analysis of linkage between oil and NIEO diplomacy, see Gosovic, Branislav and Ruggie, John G., “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” International Organization, xxx (Spring 1976), 309–45.Google Scholar

² Sauvant, Karl P. and Hasenpflug, Hajo, eds. The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South? (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1977), 6.Google Scholar In addition, the resolution on Development and International Economic Cooperation, adopted September 1975 by the Seventh Special Session, is often included in the basic NIEO documents.

³ Ries, Charles, “The New International Economic Order: The Skeptics' Views,” in Sauvant and Hasenpflug (fn. 2), 69Google Scholar; Kim, Samuel S., China, The United Nations, and World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 272.Google Scholar

⁴ Rothstein, Robert L., Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 119.Google Scholar Also see Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1), 312.

⁵ The socialist countries have essentially remained bystanders, giving rhetorical but not financial support to the NIEO. See Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1).

⁶ Rothstein (fn. 4), 125.

⁷ For examples, see Rothstein, ibid.; Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1); Cox, Robert W., “Ideologies and the New International Economic Order,” International Organization, XXXIII (Spring 1979). 257–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Pempel, T. J., “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior,” International Organization, XXXI (Autumn 1977), 754–55.Google Scholar

⁹ Wilensky, Harold L., The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 30–31.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cox (fn. 7).

¹¹ , Gordon, International Stability and North-South Relations (Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1978), 20.Google Scholar

¹² Ries (fn. 3), 67.

¹³ Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1), 324.

¹⁴ ibid.

¹⁵ Rothstein (fn. 4), 23.

¹⁶ Gwin, Catherine B., “The Seventh Special Session: Toward a New Phase of Relations between the Developed and the Developing States?” in Sauvant and Hasenpflug (fn. 2), 107.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ries (fn. 3), 64.

¹⁸ Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1), 314.

¹⁹ Ries (fn. 3).

²⁰ Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) internal report, “Dai rokkai kokuren toku-betsu sokai” (Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly). All translations are by the author.

²¹ ibid., statement by Ambassador Saito, May 2, 1974.

²² ibid.

²³ See Gwin (fn. 16); Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1).

²⁴ Ries (fn. 3), 69; Kim (fn. 3), 274–75.

²⁵ ibid.

²⁶ General Assembly Official Record, 29th Session, Second Committee, 1648th Meeting; 2315th Plenary Meeting.

²⁷ Ries (fn. 3).

²⁸ Kaizu Itaru, “Kokka-kan no keizai kenri gimu kensho ni miru nan-boku mondai no genjo” (The present situation of North-South problems as observed from the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States), MFA internal report.

²⁹ Rix, Alan, Japan's Economic Aid (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 21.Google Scholar

³⁰ Such difficulties in intra-group policy coordination were observed in Negotiating Group I, when non-oil-producing Latin American states in the Group of 77 demanded inclusion of energy issues in the agenda against the majority led by OPEC, causing a week's delay in the submission of the Group's position paper. The strong reaction of the Group of 77 to the DCs' plan for differentiation of the generalized system of preference according to the level of economic development (which it regarded as a “divide and rule” policy) also reflected this potentially serious problem of maintaining Third World unity.

³¹ Shonfield, Andrew, “The World Economy 1979,” in Bundy, William P., ed., America and the World 1979 (Elmsford; N.Y.: Pergamon, 1980), 613.Google Scholar

³² MFA, Dai gokai kokuren boeki kaihatsu kaigi hokoku [hereafter cited as UNCTAD V Report] (Tokyo: MFA, 1979), 97.Google Scholar

³³ Voting records of the five major DCs in eight roll-call votes are as follows:

UNCTAD V Report, 187, 225, 325; Appendix, 48, 84, 86, 89.

³⁴ STABEX was designed to transfer funds, either as grants or as interest-free loans, to ACP countries that suffer shortfalls in earnings from exports of particular products to the EEC. A concise account of more recent developments is found in issues Before the 36th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1981–82 (UNA-USA) [hereafter cited as Issues] (New York: United Nations, 1981), 69.Google Scholar

³⁵ UNCTAD V Report (fn. 32), 10.

³⁶ ibid., 352.

³⁷ Hasegawa, Sukehiro, Japanese Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1975), 13.Google Scholar

³⁸ UNCTAD V Report (fn. 32), 67–68.

³⁹ ibid., 247.

⁴⁰ Issues (1980–81), 81.

⁴¹ Issues (1981–82), 69.

⁴² Ewing, A. F., “UNIDO III,” Journal of World Trade Law, XIV (May-June 1980), 251.Google Scholar

⁴³ Nakamura, Taizo, “UNIDO III,” ECFA UNIDO News, No. 30 (March 1980), 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ MFA, Waga gaiko no kinkyo (annual report on foreign policy, customarily referred to as Blue Paper), chaps, on “Japan's Fundamental Tasks,” 1975”1980.

⁴⁵ MFA Document, KOKKEI No. 80–11, Keizaika suteitomento shu—1979 nen (Collection of Economic Section Statements, 1979), February 26, 1980, p. 58.

⁴⁶ Cox (fn. 7); Pempel (fn. 8); MFA, Blue Paper, 1975–80Google Scholar, chaps, on “International Economic Relations.”

⁴⁷ E.g., Prime Minister Suzuki's speech in New York, May 5, 1981; see Asahi Shinbun, May 6, 1981.

⁴⁸ E.g., Foreign Minister Miyazawa's statement, Blue Paper, 1966, p. 69.

⁴⁹ Blue Paper, 1975, p. 76.

⁵⁰ ibid., 1.

⁵¹ Blue Paper, 1976, p. 69.

⁵² Blue Paper, 1977, p. 20.

⁵³ , Miyazawa, Blue Paper, 1976, p. 69.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ , Kimura, Blue Paper, 1976, p. 59.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ UNCTAD V Report (fn. 32), 31.

⁵⁶ Saito, Shizuo, Kokusai Rengo Josetsu (On the U.N.), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Shinyu-do, 1979), 221.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Blue Paper, 1980, Nippon Keizai Shinbun [Nikkei], January 21, 1981; Hokkaido Shinbun, January 20, 1981; Asahi Shinbun [Asahi], January 20, 1981; Foreign Minister Itoh's foreign policy statement, Mainichi, October 23,24,25, 1981. In 1968, Robert McNamara, on assuming the presidency of the World Bank, stressed the need to pay more attention to the effect of aid on the total economy; earlier concentration of aid on dams, industrial facilities, transportation, and the like was shifted to include substantial support for agriculture, education, and population planning. Rejecting the idea of a trickle-down effect, McNamara urged attention on the impact of aid upon the poorest 40 percent of the people within each state. LeRoy Bennett, A., International Organization, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 263–64.Google Scholar Alan Rix explains why Japanese aid policy appeared to be out of step with that of many other donors: her bureaucratic tradition which rigidified the pattern of decision, diffuse structures which complicated procedures, and lack of precise definition of aid objectives. Rix (fn. 29), 268.

⁵⁸ Blue Paper, 1979, p. 322.

⁵⁹ The concept of “comprehensive security” was adopted upon the proposal of Prime Minister Ohira's policy advisory group. Asahi, July 3, 1980. (Suzuki is Ohira's successor).

⁶⁰ Asahi, May 2, 1981.

⁶¹ Asahi, July, 21, 1981.

⁶² The major items on the recent agenda of North-South dialogue at various U.N. forums include: (1) the call for global negotiation in raw materials, energy, trade, development, and monetary and financial issues, which has been deadlocked on the procedural dispute (rooted in philosophical differences) over which international bodies should hold the ultimate decision-making power; (2) promotion of LDC industrialization through redeployment of manufacturing facilities from DCs to LDCs, with the aim of achieving a new, more equitable division of labor in the world; (3) demand for better access for LDC exports to DC markets through removal of protectionist measures and through the DCs' adoption of positive structural adjustment policies; (4) improvement of the commodity-price stabilization scheme, and linking the prices of primary commodities (main export items and source of the LDCs' foreign exchange) to the prices of industrial products imported by LDCs; (5) greater and better economic/technical aid and faster, larger-scale debt relief; (6) international monetary reform to give greater voice in the decision-making process to LDCs hitherto largely excluded from the IMF, and to use the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as an automatic device to increase aid; (7) improved special assistance to the least developed countries; and (8) promotion of collective self-reliance among LDCs. Summarized from Issues (1981–82), 56–93.

⁶³ Krasner, Stephen D., “Oil is the Exception,” Foreign Policy, No. 14 (Spring 1974), 68–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Varon, Bension and Takeuchi, Kenji, “Developing Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals,” Foreign Affairs, LII (April 1974), 497–510CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Smith, Tony, “Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations since 1945,” International Oiganization, XXXI (Winter 1977), 1–27.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Nikkei, June 25, 1981.

⁶⁵ World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, D.C., 1980), 29.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Asahi, August 29, 1981.

⁶⁷ Asahi, October 8, 1981.

⁶⁸ Asahi, August 27, 1981.

⁶⁹ Hasegawa (fn. 37).

⁷⁰ ibid.

⁷¹ UNCTAD V Report (fn. 32), 30–31.

⁷² Sauvant and Hasenpflug (fn. 2), 48–52.

⁷³ Helleiner, G. K., International Economic Disorder (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), 74.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ ibid., 77.

⁷⁵ Weinstein, Franklin B., “Multinational Corporations and the Third World: The Case of Japan and Southeast Asia,” International Organization, xxx (Summer 1976), 373–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁶ In crude form, the goal of industrial adjustment is to help LDC industrialization by making room for LDC exports of semi-manufactured and manufactured goods in the DC market; to do this, the DCs must phase out those industries in which the LDCs have developed export capacity (usually labor-intensive light industries at first and more capital-intensive ones later). The adoption of a positive adjustment policy would minimize the cost and friction of such phasing out and of the transfer of labor and capital into other areas with higher productivity and competitiveness (more sophisticated capital- and technology-intensive areas). Industrial redeployment in this context means transfer of production capacities (UNIDO includes capital, technology, know-how, plants) by industrial firms in a developed country to a less developed one in order to establish a manufacturing capacity in the latter.

In rhetoric, the DCs agree on those goals as rational from the viewpoint of the rules of comparative advantage. Disagreement focuses on the means. The LDCs want to plan and control the process by formulating an internationally accepted set of principles and guidelines through which they would harmonize national and international needs and perspectives. The DCs contend that the process should ultimately rely on market forces and should not be controlled by an international body, although it would require some action by individual governments to facilitate proper functioning of the market mechanism.

On the analysis of Japan's industrial adjustment, see Kojima, Kiyoshi, ed., Structural Adjustments in Asian Pacific Trade (Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 1973)Google Scholar; Kitamura, Hiroshi, Choices for the Japanese Economy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976).Google Scholar The 1981 IMF World Economic Prospect praised Japan's positive adjustment policies, in contrast to other DCs' continued protection of declining industries.

⁷⁷ Blue Paper, 1979, pp. 334–40.

⁷⁸ Issues (1981–82), 72.

⁷⁹ UNCTAD V Report (fn. 32), 98.

⁸⁰ ibid.

⁸¹ Manuscript copy of the statement by Ambassador T. Kato at UNIDO III (obtained through Ambassador Ushiba).

⁸² Pempel describes the central role that government policies have played in the selective development of key industries and economic sectors in Japan; they moved the country “directly from an agrarian feudal economy to a moderately planned industrial economy, without being impeded by the constraining facade of [free market]” (fn. 8), 733, 743.

⁸³ Gosovic and Ruggie (fn. 1).

⁸⁴ Ries (fn. 3), 55.

⁸⁵ General Accounting Office Report, U.S.-Japan Trade: Issues and Problems ID-79–53 (Washington, D.C.: September 1979), 189Google Scholar, 191.

⁸⁶ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Adjustment, Trade and Growth in Developed and Developing Countries (Geneva: September 1978), 60–62.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ ibid.; World Bank (fn. 65).

⁸⁸ Ushiba, Nobuhiko and Hara, Yasushi, Nihon keizai gaiko no keifu [Genealogy of Japanese Economic Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1979), 226–29.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ These views have been expressed by various public and private economic research groups. See, for instance, studies by (1) the Industrial Structure Council (ISC) of MITI, including the frequently quoted “A Long-Term Vision for Industrial Structure” (Tokyo, 1974)Google Scholar; (2) the Japan Economic Research Centre (JERC), “Japan in 1985—A Long-Term Outlook of Welfare Economy” (Tokyo, 1973)Google Scholar; (3) the Industrial Policy Committee, Kei-danren (Federation of Economic Organizations), “The Confused World Economy and Future Industrial Structure” (Tokyo, 1975).Google Scholar The JERC and ISC studies suggested the transfer of pollution-prone “intermediate goods industries” abroad; Keidanren opposed the idea, stating that the prevention of pollution was imperative at home and abroad, and stressing the importance of R&D in pollution control technology, which is now a growing industry in Japan. Keidanren's objection was based on doubts about “knowledge industrialization” (a prospect advocated by JERC, ISC, and others), and a belief that heavy and chemical industries would remain the mainstay of the Japanese economy (they were the most profitable ones even after paying the costs of antipollution devices) and should not be lightly encouraged to relocate overseas. Underlying the business leaders' cautiousness was, as Kojima points out, their consciousness of a lag in Japan's technological development. Kojima, Kiyoshi, Japan and a New World Economic Older (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1977), 120–67.Google Scholar More recently, however, business seems to have become more confident of the prospect for large-scale transformation to “postindustriell” enterprises. In August 1981, for instance, the Japan Economic Research Council (a research body of the financial community) compiled a report, “Industrial Adjustment and Technology Transfer.” It urges that Japan's ability to carry out industrial adjustment be the basis of a long-term plan for international industrial adjustment. The government should also consider the formulation of international rules to prevent economic problems from turning into political issues. The report calls attention to the importance of technology and warns against narrow-mindedness in its transfer to smaller countries because of fear of their competition. Asahi, August 14, 1981.

⁹⁰ This interpretation is based on the analysis of relevant government publications, research institute reports, press reports, journal articles, books, published or broadcast speeches and conversations, and the interviews I conducted with politicians, business and labor leaders, government officials, journalists, and academicians in Japan in 1973–74, 1978, 1980, and 1981.

⁹¹ For concrete examples of activities of Japanese multinational corporations in Southeast Asia, see Weinstein (fn. 75). Comparison with China's perspective and its widespread emotional appeal to LDC leaders would illuminate the potential pitfalls involved in Japan's pragmatic perspective. See Kim (fn. 3), 276, 246.

⁹² On this subject, see Rothstein (fn. 4).

⁹³ Helleiner (fn. 73), 7.

⁹⁴ According to a Japanese press report, Foreign Minister Sonoda's energetic lobbying activities as a “coordinator” between North and South seem to have been received favorably by both sides at the preparatory foreign ministers' meeting held in early August for the 22-nation North-South summit (October 1981 in Cancun, Mexico). Asahi, August 4, 1981. Despite her expressed intention before the summit, however, Japan failed to narrow the gap between the U.S. and the developing countries at Cancun in regard to their attitudes toward global negotiation. The Japanese press expressed skepticism about self-congratulatory statements made by , Suzuki and , Sonoda. Asahi, October 25, 1981Google Scholar; Yomiuri Shinbun, October 25, 1981.