¹ Griffith, , “An Overview,” in Amirie, Abbas, ed., The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975). 23.Google Scholar

² Akhavi, , Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 168.Google Scholar On the nature of theses differences, see, among others, ibid., 168–80, and Fischer, Michael M. J., Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 218–22.Google Scholar

³ For a detailed analysis of this point, see Kennan, George F., The Decision to Intervene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Greaves, Rose, “1942–1976: The Reign of Muhammad Riza Shah,” in Amirsadeghi, Hossein, ed., Twentieth Century Iran (London: William Heinemann, 1977), 77.Google Scholar

⁵ Regarding the importance of this issue, Ulam, Adam B. writes, “certainly the events following Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, suggest that at least temporarily the whole governmental apparatus of the U.S.S.R. was thrown into disarray.” Ulam, , Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67 (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1968), 540Google Scholar; for more information, see 539–71.

⁶ It is important to note that even after the fall of the Shah, the events in Iran followed closely the pattern discussed in Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 250–64.Google Scholar For a brief analysis of this point, see Fischer (fn. 2), 223. It should be added, however, that the events in Iran did not support those theories—Western or Marxist—that emphasize the importance of the rural population in any revolutionary movement. For an analysis of these theories, see Goldstone, Jack, “Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation,” World Politics 32 (April 1980), 425–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 426–34.

⁷ Apter, , The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965).Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid., 22; for more information, see 22–42.

⁹ Types 3 and 4 seem to be practical alternatives to types 1 and 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., 28, 32.

¹¹ Ibid., 31.

¹² Ibid., 33.

¹³ Ibid., 28.

¹⁴ Ibid., 33–34.

¹⁵ Ibid., 35; for more information, see 22–36.

¹⁶ Martin, in Amirsadeghi (fn. 4), 235.

¹⁷ Huntington, , Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 41.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Ibid., 45.

¹⁹ Davies, , “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” in Davies, James C., ed., When Men Revolt and Why (New York: Free Press, 1971), 134–47.Google Scholar

²⁰ For more information on this subject, see Stempel, John D., Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 4Google Scholar; Rubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 23Google Scholar; Forbis, William H., Fall of the Peacock Throne: The Story of Iran (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 50Google Scholar; and De Villier, G. and others, The Imperial Shah: An Informal Biography (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1976), chap. VIII.Google Scholar

²¹ Binder, , Factors Influencing Iran's International Role (Rand, Rm-5968-FF, October 1969), 18.Google Scholar

²² Ibid., 19.

²³ Huntington (fn. 17), 59.

²⁴ On this point, see also Brinton (fn. 6), 34–38.

²⁵ The flourishing economy of Iran in the 1970s prompted an upward movement across class lines on a large scale, resulting in a situation where the newly arrived families in the first-class neighborhoods were neither made to feel at home by their new neighbors, nor could they go back to their old neighborhoods and old friends. On the theoretical aspects of this point, see Olson, Mancur Jr, “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History 23 (December 1963), 532.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ Ibid., 552; Olson concludes that “no one should promote [rapid economic growth] without bracing to meet [political instability].”

²⁷ Huntington (fn. 17), 47; also see sources cited on 47–49.

²⁸ Among other examples of international factors, the resistance of the Western countries to selling meaningful industries to Iran and to opening their markets to Iranian exports can be cited. For more information on the latter subject, see Nasri, Farzeen, The European Economic Community and the Third World (forthcoming).Google Scholar

²⁹ This is an example of how economic development induces political development automatically.

³⁰ Stempel (fn. 20), 22.

³¹ See Kayhan International (Tehran), August 2–3, 1974.

³² On the importance of this point, see Stempel (fn. 20), 80.

³³ Ibid., 263.

³⁴ See interview with Kissinger, in The Economist (London), February 10, 1979, p. 32.Google Scholar

³⁵ Keddie, , Roots of Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 231.Google Scholar

³⁶ Richards, , “Carter's Human Rights Policy and the Pahlavi Dictatorship,” in Nobari, Ali-Reza, ed., Iran Erupts (Stanford, Calif.: Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978), 95–96.Google Scholar

³⁷ Keddie (fn. 35), 231–34, at 231.

³⁸ Ziring, , Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1981), 153.Google Scholar

³⁹ Stempel (fn. 20), 314; see also 17, 56, 58, and 86; and Richards (fn. 36), 114.

⁴⁰ Stempel (fn. 20), 106.

⁴¹ Ibid., 113; see also 129.

⁴² Ibid., 133–34.

⁴³ On the confusion and disharmony in U.S. policy toward Iran, and its effect in confusing the Shah, see ibid., 272, 279, 284, 290; also 151–52.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 27, 315.

⁴⁵ On the direct and very important role played by the BBC programs in the Iranian Revolution, see ibid., 102. The media publicized lists of the belongings of the Pahlavi family exceeding $200 billion in value; they also made assertions to the effect that there were over 100,000 political prisoners in Iran. This grossly inflated figure was quoted by Amnesty International from dissident sources; it was later widely used as an Amnesty International figure, which gave it legitimacy—especially since that organization did not make much of an effort to correct this misuse of its name.

⁴⁶ For more information on this subject, see U.S. Department of State, Iran: Reform and Human Rights, news release, September 8, 1976.

⁴⁷ Ironically, for such an approach to have any chance of success, the continued leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini during a transitional period is called for. The present high government officials in Iran do not have much incentive for following the path to moderation: (1) they have been too involved in the past harsh policies of the regime to expect being admitted to the ranks of the moderates; (2) their religious positions are not high enough to guarantee them the kind of political status in the post-Khomeini era that they enjoy today.

⁴⁸ On December 15, 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini issued an eight-point decree ordering the government to clean up its law-enforcement system. This decree, which the Majlis Speaker refers to as the “start of a new chapter” in the history of Iran, stipulates among other things that: (1) “No one is allowed to arrest or summon anyone without a judge's order …”; (2) “No one is permitted to confiscate or impound anyone's property, unless ordered by the judges, and only after prior investigation”; (3) “No one is allowed to eavesdrop on anyone's telephone … unless authorized in advance by the courts.” Iran Times (Washington), December 24, 1982. For more information and analysis, see Keddie, Nikki R., “Iran's Revolutionaries Flirt with Moderation,” in Los Angeles Times, February 13, 1983, Part V, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, for example, the English translation in The Manchester Guardian of Ayatollah Khomeini's interview with Lucien George, in Nobari (fn. 36), 14.

⁵⁰ On the importance of this point, which is based on the Iranian people's negative attitude toward weak leaders, see Stempel (fn. 20), 12–13, and Taheri, Amir, “Internal Political Dynamics,” in Amirie, Abbas and Twitchell, Hamilton A., eds., Iran in the 1980s (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1978), 54–55.Google Scholar On the resistance of this and similar attitudes to change under pressure, see Brinton (fn. 6), 262.

⁵¹ On this point, see Rush, Myron, “Andropov's Fight May Not Be Over,” Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1983, Part II, p. 5.Google Scholar

⁵² Another important force, the Tudeh Party, has recently been dissolved by the government. For detailed coverage of this new development, see Iran Times (Washington, D.C.), May 6, 1983.

⁵³ The foremost representative of this group is Ayatollah Shariatmadari. He believes that an Islamic government can take the form of, for instance, a constitutional monarchy. After the revolution, Shariatmadari refused to accept any official posts; he maintains that the “ulama must abstain from direct intervention in politics,” and has “gathered around him various currents—liberal, moderate, and conservative: bazaar traders unhappy with the recession, and Azerbaijani regionalists” (Keddie, fn. 35,209). It should be added that “several top ayatollahs are in disagreement with Khomeini and closer to Shariatmadari” (ibid., 210), who has “condemned the constitution's undemocratic character, establishing as it did a special position through which Khomeini could exercise almost unlimited powers” (Rubin, fn. 20, 306). Shariatmadari has been under virtual house arrest since early 1981. For more information on Shariatmadari and his views, see Keddie (fn. 35), 208–10; Rubin (fn. 20), 211, 213, 216, 221, 285, 291, 306, 310, 339, 361; “Iran after the Revolution,” Strategic Survey, 1979 (London: IISS, 1980), 44–45.

⁵⁴ The status of the Iranian military has changed a great deal since 1979. At the time the Shah's government fell, the military was described as “an alienated army equipped to its teeth by Americans” (Nobari, fn. 36, 195). As a result of the war with Iraq, the armed forces are now once again a proud organization; the government has not stinted its public admiration of their bravery on the battlefield “in defense of Islam.” The military, however, does not have much in common with the present regime. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military forces have witnessed the systematic elimination of their highest-ranking commanders, have been constantly involved in battles—internal and external—and have experienced the demolition of their weaponry, once considered to be among the best in the world. They are fully aware that the present regime in Iran does not trust them, and that the government is trying its best to increase the strength of the Pasdaran—a paramilitary organization with strong ties to the religious leaders.