¹ Editorial, “Who Wins If Gorbachev Wins?” New York Times, 30 September 1988Google Scholar. In a 27 July 1989 editorial, however, the Times contended that the West could affect Gorbachev's chances “at the margin.” See also remarks of Robert Gates to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 14 October 1988, 21, reported in the New York Times, 15 October 1988. Gates is now the deputy director of the National Security Council.

² Keller, Bill, “Soviet Military Wary of Arms Cuts,” New York Times, 23 December 1988.Google Scholar

³ Works on international influences on domestic politics include Hintze, Otto, “Military Organization and the Organization of the State,” in Gilbert, Felix, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Rogowski, Ronald, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American Political Science Review 81 (December 1987), 1121–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and Strategic Ideology (forthcoming), applying ideas found in Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Fall of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982)Google Scholar, and Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957)Google Scholar. Also relevant is Rosecrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic, 1986)Google Scholar.

⁵ A third pattern, which I examine at greater length in Myths of Empire (fn. 4), is the unitary autocrat or unitary oligarchy, which checks the logrolling of imperialist interest groups “from above,” just as liberal democracy checks it “from below.” As I will discuss later in this article, such checks have been an important constraint on imperial coalition making in the Soviet Union.

⁶ See Kurth, James, “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle,” International Organization 33 (Winter 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 1–34, and Gourevitch (fn. 3). Note also the effect on Germany of the Great Depression of 1873–1896, which ended the agrarian Junkers' preference for free trade and the comparatively liberal phase of Bismarck's political strategy, setting the stage for the formation of the protectionist-imperialist “marriage of iron and rye.” Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, The German Empire, 1871–1918 (Dover, NH: Berg, 1985)Google Scholar; Gourevitch (fn. 3).

⁷ Duus, Peter, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Silberman, Bernard and Harootunian, H. D., eds., Japan in Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

⁸ Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, chaps. 2 and 3.

⁹ James, Scott and Lake, David, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ On the linkage among free trade, the Washington treaty, a peaceful Japanese foreign policy, and Japanese democratization as seen by a contemporary observer, see Buell, Raymond Leslie, The Washington Conference (New York: Russell and Russell, 1922)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 10.

¹¹ Pollard, Robert, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New Columbia University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 379–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Kennedy, Paul, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870–1945 (London: Fontana, 1984)Google Scholar, chap. 1.

¹³ Posen, Barry, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and also conversations with the author.

¹⁴ Sundquist, James, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981)Google Scholar; Snyder (fn. 4), chaps. 4 and 7.

¹⁵ Snyder (fn. 4), chaps. 1 and 6.

¹⁶ Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar, esp. 262–75.

¹⁷ Cain, Peter, “Capitalism, War and Internationalism in the Thought of Richard Cobden,” British Journal of International Studies 5 (October 1979), 229–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Kemp, Tom, Economic Forces in French History (London: Dennis Dobson, 1971)Google Scholar, esp. 191; Dunham, Arthur, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930)Google Scholar, esp. 294.

¹⁹ For evidence and citations supporting this line of interpretation, see Snyder, Jack, “The Gorbachev Revolution,” International Security 12 (Winter 1987–1988), 93–131CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But note the anomalous fact that conditions of intense international threat during World War II led to a domestic relaxation in the Soviet Union.

²⁰ This point is made with varying degrees of emphasis by Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, 1917–1932 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Pethybridge, Roger, The Social Prelude to Stalinism (New York: St. Martin's, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ulam, Adam, Expansion and Coexistence, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 105.Google Scholar

²¹ Degras, Jane, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, 1917–1924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), 136.Google Scholar

²² Ullman, Richard H., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, Vol. iii, The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 37Google Scholar, also 438.

²³ Ibid., 439–42. Lloyd George and his political allies had strong political motives to believe such things. Their working-class constitutents were arguing that Russia's absence from world markets was driving up the price of food and depriving Britain of a major export market. The government was quite conscious of the fact that promoting an Anglo-Russian trade agreement would fend off criticism on these grounds (pp. 436–70).

²⁴ Day, Richard, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 47–68. See also Ulam (fn. 20), 148.

²⁵ Fischer, Louis, Russia's Road from Peace to War (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 56–58Google Scholar; White, Stephen, The Origins of Detente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-Western Relations, 1921–1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp, 30, 97.

²⁶ Day (fn. 24), 64–65, 104, no.

²⁷ Fischer (fn. 25), 169–70; Ulam (fn. 20), 164.

²⁸ Cohen, Stephen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1971), 245Google Scholar, 263.

²⁹ Reiman, Michal, The Birth of Stalinism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 67Google Scholar, 75–77. Evelyn Davidheiser puts this in a longer historical and more theoretical perspective in “The Politics of Backwardness: Russian Foreign Economic Policy, 1870–1930” (paper presented to a Soviet studies conference at the University of Toronto, June 1988). See also her dissertation, forthcoming from Duke University.

³⁰ See the evidence cited in Snyder (fn. 19), 97–98.

³¹ Reiman (fn. 29), 12.

³² Citations supporting arguments advanced in this section can be found, unless otherwise noted, in Snyder (fn. 19). Alternative interpretations are also cited there, especially in the footnotes on pp. 100–105.

³³ Taubman, William, Stalin's American Policy (New York: Norton, 1982), 136–40Google Scholar.

³⁴ The Soviets were not entirely wrong in believing that U.S. leaders intended the Marshall Plan to be an instrument to roll them back in Eastern Europe. See Gaddis, John Lewis, “U.S. Influence in Europe,” in Riste, Olav, ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985), 73Google Scholar; and Pollard (fn. 11), 137.

³⁵ Letteney, Ronald, “Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin, 1949–1950” (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1971), 77.Google Scholar

³⁶ Dinerstein, Herbert, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1959)Google Scholar, chap. 4. Also making this point is Richter, James, “Action and Reaction in Soviet Foreign Policy” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1989)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Report to the National Security Council by Task Force “A” of Project Solarium (Washington, DC, 16 July 1953), 131–32, 137. Thanks to Richard Immerman and Robert Jervis for this citation.

³⁸ The foregoing interpretation relies on Richter (fn. 36). Malenkov, too, talked about the correlation of forces, but unlike Khrushchev, he did not link that concept to a strategy of offensive détente. Khrushchev had much more ambitious ideas about the compatibility of detente with active Soviet support for “progressive change,” especially in the third world.

³⁹ Schick, Jack, The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ A dissertation-in-progress by Richard Anderson at the University of California, Berkeley, is by far the most detailed and analytically ambitious account of this period. He goes far beyond the simple points I have made here in reviewing the connections between the international setting and the domestic political maneuvering of Soviet leaders.

⁴¹ However, the two major histories of this period disagree about the extent of U.S. restraint, if any. See Gelman, Harry, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and Garthoff, Raymond, Detente and Confrontation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁴² Because of the evolution of Soviet society since the early 1950s, and because of the thorough discrediting of old approaches by the stagnation of the Brezhnev years, Gorbachev now has a much better chance of carrying out such a transformation than did previous reformers like Malenkov, Khrushchev, or Kosygin. For elaboration on this and other points, see Snyder (fn. 19). For an alternative view, stressing the intellectual rather than domestic political origins of Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy, see Legvold, Robert, “War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Bialer, Seweryn and Mandelbaum, Michael, eds., Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 97–132Google Scholar.

⁴³ Shevardnadze, Pravda, 26 July 1988, 4; Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV), 26 July 1988, 29–31.

⁴⁴ Ligachev speech made in Gorky, Vremya TV version, 5 August 1988; FBIS-SOV, 8 August 1988, 40–43; see also Teague, Elizabeth, “Kremlin Leaders at Loggerheads,” Radio Liberty Research, No. 362, 16 August 1988.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ FBIS-SOV, 8 August 1988, 37. For the rebuttal to Ligachev by Gorbachev's ally in ideological matters, A. N. Yakovlev, see Pravda, 11 August 1988, 2; FBIS-SOV, 12 August 1988, 40–44.

⁴⁶ New York Times, 6 October 1988.

⁴⁷ The term is from Slusser, Robert, “America, China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition,” in Juviler, Peter and Morton, Henry, eds., Soviet Policy-Making (New York: Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Eley, Geoff, Reshaping the German Right (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Martin, Kingsley, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston (London: Hutchinson, 1924)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ The defeat of several military officers in the March 1989 elections for the Congress of Peoples' Deputies bodes well in this regard.

⁵⁰ Meyer, Stephen, “Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the U.S.S.R.,” in Art, Robert et al. , eds., Reorganizing America's Defense (Washington, DC: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985)Google Scholar; Rice, Condoleezza, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40 (October 1987), 55–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵¹ Colton, Timothy, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar, also 26–30, 173–74; Rice (fn. 50) 58.

⁵² See Colton (fn. 51), passim.

⁵³ A dissertation-in-progress by Matthew Partan at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is examining the absence of an independent civilian defense-analytical community as a factor in the failure of Khrushchev's military innovations.

⁵⁴ See Snyder, Jack, “Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options,” International Security 12 (Spring 1988), 48–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ Arbatov, , “Glasnost”, Talks, and Disarmament,” Pravda, 17 October 1988, 6Google Scholar; FBIS-SOV, 18 October 1988, 1–4.

⁵⁶ Falin on Moscow TV, 15 October 1988; FBIS-SOV, 18 October 1988, 82–89, esp. 85.

⁵⁷ Arbatov (fn. 55), 3; Falin (fn. 56), 88.

⁵⁸ Rice (fn. 50), 79; Shevardnadze (fn. 43), 30.

⁵⁹ Lebedev, Major-General Iurii and Podberezkin, Aleksei, “Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost'” [Military doctrine and international security], Kommunist 13 (September 1988), 110–19Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ On NATO, Falin (fn. 56), 88; Arbatov (fn. 55), 2; on the Soviet military, author's interviews in Moscow, October 1988.

⁶¹ See, for example, Kokoshin, Andrei, “From the Standpoint of the New Thinking,” Krasnaia zvezda, 16 September 1988, 3Google Scholar; FBIS-SOV, 21 September 1988, 2–5.

⁶² Evangelista, , “Economic Reform and Military Technology in Soviet Security Policy,” Harriman Institute Forum 2 (January 1989)Google Scholar. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff, was the prototypical military modernizer, though he has no obvious successor.

⁶³ For relevant arguments and citations, see Brabant, Jozef van, “Planned Economies in the GATT Framework: The Soviet Case,” Soviet Economy 4 (January-March 1988), 3–35Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Shmelev, Nikolai and Popov, Vladimir, The Breaking Point: Revitalizing the Soviet Economy (New York: Doubleday, 1989)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Farr, Michael, “New Soviet Credit Line Is Expected,” New York Times, 18 October 1988Google Scholar.