Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T20:17:18.308Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

International Institutions and Economic Sanctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Edward D. Mansfield
Edward D. Mansfield
Affiliation:
Columbia University
Get access

Abstract

Economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policy makers. Despite the widespread use of sanctions, many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness. This article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions. These books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort. However, this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members, the type of institution being used for this purpose, the nature of the strategy being pursued, and the distribution of power among members. Although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions, they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner. One potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution, however, is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them. Additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft.

Type
Review Articles
Information
World Politics , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , July 1995 , pp. 575 - 605
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See, in particular, Baldwin, David A., Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., and Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990)Google Scholar.

2 It should be noted that there is a long tradition of research linking international institutions to economic sanctions. Indeed, much of the early literature on sanctions was concerned with improving the effectiveness of the League of Nations and the United Nations. For discussions of this literature, see Rochester, J. Martin, “The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Yalem, Ronald J., “The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965: A Survey of the Literature,” Background 10 (July 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See, for example, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1), 95–96.

4 On this point, see also Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

5 See Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1).

6 See the data on alliances compiled by Small, Melvin and Singer, J. David, “Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: An Extension of the Basic Data,” Journal of Peace Research 3, no. 3 (1969)Google Scholar. See also the more recent version of these data, dated March 1993, which were obtained from the Correlates of War Project.

7 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1), 4.

8 On this point, see also Bergeijk, Peter A. G. van, “Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions,” Kyklos 42, no. 3 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Baldwin (fn. 1); Crumm, Eileen M., “The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 1 (1955)Google Scholar; and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1).

10 On this point, see Baldwin (fn. 1); Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)Google Scholar; and idem, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

11 Knorr, Klaus, “International Economic Leverage and Its Uses,” in Knorr, Klaus and Trager, Frank N., eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1977), 99Google Scholar.

12 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1), 63.

13 On this point, see Kaempfer, William H. and Lowenberg, Anton D., International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

14 See, for example, Katzenstein, Peter J., “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” in Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. For a qualified dissent from this position, see Milner, Helen V., Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

15 On this point, see Joanne, GOWK, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; and Snyder, Glenn H., “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (July 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

17 It should be noted that exit and voice need not exhaust the range of options available to members of international institutions experiencing a deterioration in performance. In the case of COCOM, for example, disgruntled members could simply relax their enforcement of export controls, thereby threatening to compromise COCOMs effectiveness without actually exiting the institution.

18 See Gowa (fn. 15).

19 See, for example, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (fn. 13).

20 On cross-national variations in domestic institutions and their impacts on foreign economic policy, see Conybeare, John A. C., “Tariff Protection in Developed and Developing Countries: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis,” International Organization 37 (Summer 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter A., Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Katzenstein (fn. 14); Milner (fn. 14); and Rogowski, Ronald, “Trade and the Variety of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 41 (Spring 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 See, for example, Kalt, Joseph P. and Zupan, Mark A., “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics,” American Economic Review 74 (June 1984)Google Scholar; and Nelson, Douglas, “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey,” American Journal of Political Science 32 (August 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Mastanduno argues that, during this time, U.S. policymakers advocated economic warfare because they anticipated a protracted conflict with the Soviet Union. U.S. firms had similar preferences because they had little economic stake in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They also did not want to be viewed as cozying up to the enemy if they pushed for more open economic relations with the Eastern bloc.

23 See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, “Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage,” in Knorr and Trager (fn. 11).

24 For a discussion of some analytical limitations of the concept of state strength, see Ikenberry, G. John, Lake, David A., and Mastanduno, Michael, “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988)Google Scholar; and Milner (fn. 14).

25 On this point, see also Kaempfer and Lowenberg (fn. 13).

26 See Milner, Helen V., “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44 (April 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 On this point, see Bayard, Thomas O., Pelzman, Joseph, and Perez-Lopez, Jorge, “Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions,” WorldEconomy 6 (March 1983)Google Scholar; and Kaempfer and Lowenberg (fn. 13).

28 Of course, it is also possible that policymakers will be able to use international commitments to bind themselves, thereby convincing societal actors that they have little ability to accommodate those actors who have an interest in abrogating existing international agreements. On this point, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (fn. 10), esp. chap. 2; and Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Krasner (fn. 23).

30 Gowa (fn. 15).

31 See, for example, Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Keohane (fn. 4); Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen D., “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (April 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Among the many studies addressing this issue, see Gilpin (fn. 31, 1981); idem, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, chap. 3; Keohane (fn. 4); Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)Google Scholar; idem, “Dominance and Leadership in the World Political Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Riders,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981)Google Scholar; and Snidal (fn. 31).

33 See, for example, Keohane (fn. 4); Oye, Kenneth A., “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Cooperation and Strategies,” in Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation underAnarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Snidal (fn. 31).

34 See, for example, Crawford, Beverly and Lenway, Stefanie, “Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade,” World Politics 37 (April 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Jentleson, Bruce W., Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

35 It should be pointed out that Mastanduno does argue that U.S. leadership facilitated cooperation within COCOM. However, because he focuses on the power of the U.S., Mastanduno does not analyze the extent to which variations in cooperation within COCOM depended on power relations among all of its members.

36 See, for example, Gilpin (fn. 31, 1981); idem (fh. 32); Keohane (fn. 4); Kindleberger (fn. 32); Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,” World Politics 28 (April 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nye, Joseph S., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990)Google Scholar; and Organski, A. F. K. and Kugler, Jacek, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

37 See, for example, Kugler, Jacek and Organski, A. F. K., “The End of Hegemony?” International Interactions 15, no. 2 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Russett, Bruce M., “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony,” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Strange, Susan, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38 On this point, see Mansfield, Edward D., Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

39 See, for example, Gilpin (fn. 31, 1981); idem (fn. 32); and Kindleberger (fn. 32).

40 Further, in combination with Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's conclusion that cooperation among senders tends to be inversely related to the amount of economic damage senders impose on a target, Martin's results suggest that hegemons tend to impose sanctions that both generate less cooperation and are more successful than is the case when smaller states are the leading sender. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott also find that sanctions imposed by the U.S. are far more successful prior to, than after, 1973. Since this is roughly the date at which many analysts mark the end of American hegemony, these results also support the view that hegemons impose more effective sanctions than their smaller counterparts. Indeed, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott explicitly endorse this view. These findings also cast doubt on Martin's position that her results contradict hegemonic stability theory. See Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1).

41 Gilpin (fn. 32), 89.

42 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (fn. 1), 95–96.

43 On this issue, see Mansfield, Edward D., “Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements and Sanctions,” Journal of InternationalAffairs 48 (Summer 1994)Google Scholar.

44 See Stigler, George J., “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peltzman, Sam, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Becker, Gary S., “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” QuarterlyJournal of Economics 98 (August 1983)Google Scholar. For an excellent overview of this literature, see Sam Peltzman, “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1989).

45 Frey, Bruno S., “The Public Choice View of International Political Economy,” in Vaubel, Roland and Willett, Thomas D., eds., The Political Economy of International Organizations:A Public Choice Approach (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 18–19Google Scholar.

46 Ibid., 19; and Roland Vaubel, “A Public Choice View of International Organization,” in Vaubel and Willett(fn.45).

47 See Vaubel (fn. 46).

48 See Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

49 Perrow, Charles, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1986), 11Google Scholar.

50 Krasner (fn. 31), 362.

51 See, for example, Vaubel (fn. 46).

52 Haas, Peter M., Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

53 Krasner, Stephen D., Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

54 Cox, Robert W. and Jacobson, Harold K., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974)Google Scholar.

55 In principle, all members of COCOM can veto changes in the list of controlled items. However, Mastanduno argues that “The practical veto power … [within COCOM] has been held by the United States” (p. 22).

56 See, for example, Vaubel (fn. 46); and Bruno S. Frey and Beat Gygi, “International Organizations from the Constitutional Point of View,” in Vaubel and Willett (fn. 45).