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² At June 1992 exchange rates, that would amount to U.S. $645 billion.

³ Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Establishing Advanced Communications in Europe: IBC Strategic Audit 1988 (Brussels: CEC, February 1989), 1.Google Scholar

⁴ Bar, François and Borrus, Michael, “Information Networks and Competitive Advantage,” in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (OECD-BRIE), Information Networks and Business Strategies (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, October 1989), 3.Google Scholar

⁵ For examples of this approach, see Zysman, John, Governments, Markets and Growth (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter J. Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Hall, Peter, Governing the Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

⁶ See Cowhey (fn. 1).

⁷ See Borrus, Michael et al., Telecommunications Development in Comparative Perspective: The New Telecommunications in Europe, Japan and the U.S., Working Paper no. 14 (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1985).Google Scholar

⁸ Numerous sources discuss the technological and regulatory changes in telecommunications during the 1980s. See, e.g., Borrus et al. (fn. 7); Cowhey, Peter F., “Telecommunications,” in Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ed., Europe 1992: An American Perspective (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990)Google Scholar; Hart, Jeffrey A., “The Politics of Global Competition in the Telecommunications Industry,” Information Society 5 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hills, Jill, Deregulating Telecoms: Competition and Control in the United States, Japan and Britain (London: Frances Pinter, 1986)Google Scholar; Nguyen, Godefroy Dang, “Telecommunications: A Challenge to the Old Order,” in Sharp, Margaret, ed., Europe and the New Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986);Google Scholar OECD, Telecommunications: Pressures and Policies for Change (Paris: OECD, 1983)Google Scholar; Office of Technology Assessment, International Competition in Services, OTA-ITE-328 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987)Google Scholar; Ungerer, Hubert, with Costello, Nicholas P., Telecommunications in Europe, European Perspectives Series (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1988).Google Scholar

⁹ See Borrus et al. (fn. 7).

¹⁰ Roundtable of European Industrialists, Clearing the Lines: A User's View on Business Communications in Europe (Paris: European Roundtable, 1986), 9–12Google Scholar; Dawkins, William, “High EC Telephone Charges Attacked,” Financial Times, July 5, 1988, p. 2.Google Scholar

¹¹ By “cooperation” I mean something more than a class of outcomes in strategic games. When actors' independent choices produce Pareto-optimal outcomes, the result is cooperation only in the sense in which game theorists use the term. For my purposes, cooperation in international politics requires policy adjustment by each player; it implies that each participant follows a course different from what it would have pursued in the absence of a joint effort. In this essay, I use the terms cooperation and collective action interchangeably. Cooperation, or collective action, occurs when a group of actors seeks to provide a good (public ot private) through agreed-upon joint means.

¹² Haas, , When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)Google Scholar; idem, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (April 1980).

¹³ Keohane, , After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Haas, Peter M., “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Frohlich, , Oppenheimer, , and Young, , Political Leadership and Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 6.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973);Google Scholar Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (April 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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¹⁹ See Sandholtz, Wayne, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

²⁰ International organizations do not act or lead; their officials do. Thus when I write that ios do something, or exercise leadership, it is a shorthand for describing the actions of 10 officials.

²¹ Cox, and Jacobson, , The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 20.Google Scholar

²² See Odell, John S., U.S. International Monetary Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 367–71.Google Scholar

²³ After January 1989 the powers to authorize rested with the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA), which replaced the Commission Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés (CNCL) created by the Chirac government. A decree of May 1989 created a Direction de la Réglementation, which functions as an independent regulator. This paragraph relies on Coriat, Benjamin, “Regime reglementaire, structure de marché et competitivité d'entreprise,” in OECD-BRIE (fn. 4).Google Scholar

²⁴ See Hart (fn. 8); and Cogez, Patrick, “Telecommunications in West Germany,” in Borrus, Michael et al., Telecommunications Development in Comparative Perspective: Appendix (Berkeley. Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, 1985).Google Scholar

²⁵ “From Bundespost to Telekom,” Telecommunications Policy 11 (December 1987), 407–8; “RFA: Les recommandations (en substance) de la commission Witte,” Telecoms Magazine 8 (October 1987), 91.

²⁶ A brief note on some of the institutions of the European Community might be in order. The Commission is the executive arm of the Community; its members are appointed by the member state governments but do not take instructions from them. The Council (its full name is the Council of Ministers) is the body in which national governments are represented and vote. For general EC business, the foreign ministers meet and vote. But ministers with other portfolios can also constitute a Council when the subject under discussion indicates it would be appropriate. For instance, the ministers of agriculture meet and vote on agricultural questions, ministers of research handle technology questions, and so on. Most EC laws and policies must be approved by the Council of Ministers; votes of the Council carry equal authority regardless of which set of ministers is involved. The European Council is composed of the heads of state or government. It meets three times per year and deals with broad issues. Major new policies and institutions are always agreed on at this level. Meetings of the European Council are also referred to as European summits, the terminology I will use in this paper so as to avoid confusion with the Council of Ministers.

²⁷ Interviews conducted by the author in 1987. Officials interviewed were promised anonymity. Interview notes are in the author's possession.

²⁸ Agence Europe, November 7, 1979, p. 8; Agence Europe, November 26, 1979, p. 9; Agence Europe, November 28, 1979, p. 5.

²⁹ CEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council on the Status of the Community Telecommunications Policy, COM (85) 276 final (Brussels: CEC, 1985), 5.Google Scholar

³⁰ Agence Europe, June 17, 1983, p. 10.

³¹ Interviews (see fn. 27); CEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications, COM (84) 277 final (Brussels: CEC, 1984), 2Google Scholar; Agence Europe, November 7, 1983, p. 7.

³² CEC, Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications: Lines of Action, COM (83) 573 final (Brussels: CEC, 1983).Google Scholar

³³ CEC (fn. 31), 3–7, 10.

³⁴ For a detailed account of the origins and operation of the RACE program, see Sandholtz(fn. 19), chap. 8.

³⁵ GEC, ICL, and Plessey from Britain; Bull, CGE, and Thomson from France; AEG, Nixdorf, and Siemens from Germany; Olivetti and STET from Italy; and Philips from the Netherlands.

³⁶ ISDN is the next step in telecoms evolution. It will constitute a digital network capable of simultaneously carrying voice, text, high-speed data, and low-quality images.

³⁷ CEC, Proposal for a Council Decision on a Preparatory Action for a Community Research and Development Programme in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: R&D in Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe (RACE), Definition Phase, COM (85) 113 final (Brussels: CEC, 1985).Google Scholar

³⁸ La Tribune, July 2, 1985; Le Monde, June 6, 1985.

³⁹ CEC, Information and Communications Technologies in Europe, EUR 13413 EN (Brussels: CEC, 1991), 44Google Scholar; Agence Europe, March 7, 1991; CEC, Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe: RACE 1992 (Brussels: CEC, 1992), 1.Google Scholar

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⁴¹ CEC, Information and Communications Technologies (fn. 39), 64.Google Scholar

⁴² Council Directive of April 29, 1991 (91/263/EEC), in Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L 128/1 (1991).

⁴³ See, e.g., McKendrick, George G., “The INTUG View on the EEC Green Paper,” Telecommunications Policy 11 (December 1987), 325—29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁴⁵ Sunday Times (London), April 24, 1988, p. D6.

⁴⁶ Target 92 (May 1991), p. 2.

⁴⁷ Agence Europe, March 20, 1991; March 21, 1991.

⁴⁸ Williamson, John, “Intervention Is the Slogan,” Financial Times, October 7, 1991Google Scholar, World Telecommunications Survey, p. 6.

⁴⁹ Agence Europe, April 11, 1991.

⁵⁰ Dawkins, William, “Ministers Baulk at EC Telecom Reform Plans,” Financial Times, July 1, 1988, p. 6.Google Scholar The definition of which services are “basic” and which are “value-added” is not that simple. In general, however, the consensus is that value-added services are those that involve something beyond simple transmission. Thus the transmission of a computer file in unchanged form is a basic service. Any sort of operation to alter the format or the content of the file would imply a value-added service. Clear examples of VANS include electronic mail, voice messaging, data banks, and videotex. The Commission argues that the only truly basicservice is voice telephony; the French argue that packet switching should be considered basic.

⁵¹ Dawkins, William, “EC May Delay Telecoms Move,” Financial Times, April 25, 1989, p. 24.Google Scholar

⁵² Dixon, Hugo, “Paris and Bonn Seek Accord on Telecom Market,” Financial Times, June 23, 1989, p. 2.Google Scholar

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⁵⁴ Dickson, Tim, “EC Move to Open Telecoms Market,” Financial Times, December 8, 1989, p. 24Google Scholar; Times (London), December 9, 1989, p. 21.

⁵⁵ Commission directive of June 28, 1990 (90/388/EEC), Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L 192/15 (1990).

⁵⁶ Cowhey (fn. 8), 200; “Phone Service Monopoly under Review,” Eurecom 4 (February 1992), 3.

⁵⁷ “EC Ministers Reach Agreement on ONP and Service Provision,” Telecommunicatie (January 1990), 11; Tim Dickson, “EC Move to Open Telecoms Market,” Financial T December 8, 1989, p. 24; Times (London), December 9, 1989, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Council directive of June 28, 1990 (90/387/EEC), Official Journal of the European communities, no. L 192/2 (1990).

⁵⁹ Agence Europe, February 23, 1991.

⁶⁰ Agence Europe, October 26, 1991, and November 5, 1991.

⁶¹ Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C216/8 (1990).

⁶² CEC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament: Council Common Position on Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors, SEC (91) 1609 final (Brussels: CEC, 1991)Google Scholar; Agence Europe, September 26, 1991, and September 28, 1991.

⁶³ Kellaway, Lucy, “A Definite Article of Dissent,” Financial Times, April 19, 1990Google Scholar, International Telecommunications Survey, p. 3.

⁶⁴ CEC, “Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector,” Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 233 (September 6, 1991).Google Scholar

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⁶⁷ Krasner (fn. 1).