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The Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
Among the increasing number of publications on the Indonesian Revolution the survey of J. W. Meyer Ranneft and the larger studies of H. J. van Mook occupy something of a unique position. It is rather seldom that high-ranking Dutch colonial civil servants are willing and able to put down their recollections and criticisms in fairly extensive form. If one browses through the volumes of such journals as Koloniale Studien, Koloniaal Tijdschrift, De Indische Gids, or Tijdschrift voor Ambtenaren bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, one is indeed struck by the number of authors who are members of various government services. But their work in this connection is primarily of a specific and localized nature; their articles may range from vaccination to irrigation problems in the Indies, but they rarely strike the broad, interpretive note that characterizes the studies now under discussion. This fact gives the present publications of Meyer Ranneft and van Mook a special cachet: both by what is said and what (admittedly purposely in the case of Meyer Ranneft) remains unsaid, their work not only illuminates many aspects of the Indonesian Revolution, but, more significantly, also the mentality of two of the highest ranking officials in the colonial civil service, who helped materially in shaping the course of events in Indonesia since the 1930's. It should also be noted that Meyer Ranneft and van Mook are representative of the chief two opposing factions and schools of thought in the Dutch administration, and their present publications are nothing short of a credo of each of these respective schools. This is particularly evident when their earlier work is examined; both men have a rather extensive bibliography, which throws added light on their present studies.
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References
1 The restrictions and censorship imposed upon the public life and utterances of members of the Dutch colonial civil service in the Indies, which materially contributed to the unenlightened conservatism in Dutch colonial policy, as yet await a thorough investigation. Meyer Ranneft himself was indirectly involved in the muzzling of one civil servant, W. Middendorp, whose views ran counter to those of the Civil Servants Asso ciation and of the government. Cf. Het reactionaire B. B., Uitgave Hoofdbestuur I. S. D. P. naar aanleiding van Middendorp's royeering, Batavia, 1929. For the entire problem see Stokvis, J. E., “Geschiedenis van het Gezag,” Het Volk, July 22, 1929Google Scholar, and baron van Asbeck, F. M., “Onvrijheid en luister in de ambtelijke dienst,” Indonesië, III (1949), 76 ff.Google Scholar
2 See for example Meyer Ranneft's refusal to discuss the work of Edgar du Perron, one of Indonesia's finest social critics and novelists. HLV, p. 51.
3 Meyer Ranneft is made to appear as “crown witness à charge.” See the polemical pamphlet published by the “Comit é voor Actieve Democratie,” Indonesië, “Eerst Weten— Dan Oordeelen,” Amsterdam, 1946, pp. 15–19.
4 Onderzoek naar de Belastingdruk op de Inlandsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera, in collaboration with W. Huender, Batavia, 1926.
5 Ranneft, Meyeret al., Verslag van het onderzoek naar de ongeregeldheden, Bantam, Batavia, 1927, esp. pp. 12 ff.Google Scholar Like much of Meyer Ranneft's work, this report is strong on accurate factual delivery but weak, if not erroneous, on interpretation. His views of the supposedly “limited” extent of nationalist sentiment underlying the Bantam insurrections are not even borne out by the facts.
6 See his excellent critiques in “Holland's fout in Indië,” De Gids, 100. Jaargang (1936), II, 314 ff.; “Drie Stroomingen,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 28. J. (1939), 110 ff., and De Weg voor Indië, Amsterdam, 1945.
7 Handelingen der Staaten-Generaal, Royal Address, Sept. 18, 1901.
8 HLV, p. 47.
9 Ibid., pp. 55 ff.
10 Cf. van Mook, INW, p. 90: “… the Labour government was deeply impressed by the general tendency in Anglo-Saxon countries to accept uncritically every expression aiming at independence on the part of Asiatic countries… Every objection that could be brought against such expressions was nullified by this general craze of liberation [bevrijdingsmanie].
11 Ibid., pp. 56–61, 78–79, 88 ff.
12 For the effects of this transfer see Wehl, David, The Birth of Indonesia, London, 1948, pp. 24 ff.Google Scholar American aversion to “liberation of colonies” was probably basic.
13 INW, p. 61.
14 The best available source on the training of Indonesian youths and irregulars by the Japanese during the occupation and the effect of this on the political situation is probably the report of the van Poll Commission: The Report of the Parliamentary Commission (States-General) Dutch East Indies, The Hague, 1946, pp. 23 ff. See also van Mook's account in SDS, pp. 146 ff.
15 Petrus Blumberger, J. Th., De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië, Haarlem, 1931, pp. 78 ff.Google Scholar; Blumberger, , “Vakbeweging (Inlandsche),” Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-Indië, The Hague, 1919, Vol. VII (Appendix), p. 429Google Scholar; and van der Kroef, Justus M., “Economic Origins of Indonesian Nationalism,” in South Asia in the World Today, ed. by Talbot, Phillips, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950, pp. 174–201.Google Scholar
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17 Especially Du Perron's essays on “Indonesian Provincialism” in his Indies Memorandum, Amsterdam, 1946, pp. 17 ff. See also van der Kroef, Justus M., “Social Conflict and Minority Aspirations in Indonesia,” American Journal of Sociology, LV (1950), 450–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Significant in this connection is the following quotation from the report of the Visman investigating committee in 1940: “Social contact between persons of a different race but of the same education is according to the unanimous testimony of those questioned [by the committee] a t a minimum.” (Verslag van de Commissie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtelijke hervormingen, ingesteld bij Gouvernmentsbesluit van 14 September, 1940, no. LX/KAB, Batavia, 1940, pp. 85, 87. Hereafter referred to as Visman Report.)
17 HVL, pp. 14 ff.
18 Visman Report, I, 40–41; Kroef, Van der, “Economic Origins of Indonesian Nationalism,” cited above, p. 195Google Scholar; and Economisch Weekblad, Feb. 17, 1939.
19 Statistisch Abstract van Nederlandsch-Indië, Batavia, 1931, p. 22; ibid., 1939, p. 34.
20 Brugmans, , Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-lndië, Batavia, 1934Google Scholar, chaps. I–IV. Most pessimistic in this respect was the Dutch-Indonesian Education Commission in its report for 1931. Cf. Becijferingen over de toekemstige ontwikkeling van het westersch onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indië, Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs Commissie, No. 10b, Batavia, 1931, pp. 3–16. The commission particularly complained over lack of funds made available by the government for purposes of educational expansion in the areas beyond Java.
21 Cf. the interpretation of F. M. baron van Asbeck, onetime adviser to Mook, van, in his study “Indonesië in Azie,” Indonesië, I (1947), 13–15.Google Scholar
22 Snouck Hurgronje, C., Verspreide Geschriften, Amsterdam, 1925, Vol. IV, tweede afdeeling (Part II), p. 228.Google Scholar
23 Pieters, J. M., “De Zoogenaamde Ontvoogding Van Het Inlandsche Bestuur,” dissertation, Univ. of Leyden, 1933, pp. 7–9, 34–56, 78–119Google Scholar; Hadiningrat, Raden Ario, “De Achteruitgang van het prestige der Inlandsche hoofden en de middelen om daarin verbetering te brengen,” Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, XVII (1899), 370Google Scholar; Hadiningrat, , “De positie van de Regenten,” Indisch Genootschap, 1929, pp. 89 ff.Google Scholar; Nieuwenhuis, J. H., “Kan het aantal Controleurs bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur op Java en Madoera worden ingekrompen?” De Indische Gids, I (1908), 358 ff.Google Scholar These studies are uniformly critical of the value of the civil native service. On the failure of administrative decentralization see the following articles by van Vollenhoven, C., “De Lagere Rechtsgemeenschappen Overzee,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 17. J. (1928), 264 ff.Google Scholar; “Deconcentratie van het Regeeren Overzee,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 18. J. (1929), 99 ff.; “Old Glory,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 22. J. (1933), 248 ff. Van Vollenhoven's view is sufficiently indicated by the fact that he termed the Indonesian Provinces, created by the decentralization, “miserable abortions.” See also Verslag van de Commissie tot Herziening van de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië, Batavia, 1922; Roskott, B. F., “De Lagere Nederlandsch-Indische Rechtsgemeenschappen en haar verkouding tot de centrale gemeenschap,” diss., Univ. of Leyden, 1935, pp. 77 ff.Google Scholar; Schrieke, J. J., De Indische Politiet, Batavia, 1933, p. 74Google Scholar; Aalders, A. A., “Het Toezicht op de lagere Rechtsge-meenschappen in Nederlandsch-Indië,” diss., Univ. of Leyden, 1934, pp. 27 ff.Google Scholar; and Rückert, J., “Hoe moet de indische gemeente meer contact krijgen met haar in heemsche bevolking?” Koloniale Studien, 13. J. (1929), I, 470 ff.Google Scholar
24 Drijvers, J., De Praktijk der Conflictenregeling tussen Volksraad en Regeering, diss., Univ. of Leyden, 1935, pp. 84 ff.Google Scholar; Samkalden, I., Het College der Gedeelegeerden uit den Volksraad, diss., Univ. of Leyden, 1937, pp. 34–56Google Scholar; Visman Report, I, 113–25.
25 See the studies by Schrieke, J. J., “Heeft de Volksraad het recht van interpellatie,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 25. J. (1936), 8 ff.Google Scholar, and “Een parlementaire enquête in Nederlands-Indië,” Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 26. J. (1937), 115 ff. No less an authority than Kleintjes, Ph. (Staatsinstellingen van Nederlandsch-lndië, 6th ed., The Hague, 1929, I, 270–71)Google Scholar believed that the Volksraad had the right of investigation and interpellation which the government persistently refused to give practical meaning. As a former Volksraad member, Meyer Ranneft too expressed his disapproval of the government's curtailment of the Volksraad's right in this connection. Cf. his article, “Holland's fout in Indië,” loc. cit., p. 315.
26 The characterization made by the competent, if often overly critical, French scholar Bousquet, G. H. in La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays-Bas, Paris, 1939, pp. 106–7.Google Scholar
27 Cf. the following quotation in van Mook, INW, pp. 14–15, o n the failure of the Dutch to provide adequate measures for political emancipation of the Indonesian world: “… it is absolutely certain that Dutch policy since 1931 had become stratified in conservatism, which it seemed incapable of altering, even after 1937. It has been the chief malady of this policy that during an entire century it was unable to visualize the inevitable emancipation of the Asiatic colonies and the growth of nationhood in these areas. The thus resulting retardation of political development was not even so much expressed in the existing political institutions themselves, but particularly in the insufficient absorption of Indonesians in the upper strata of administrative direction.”
One large Indonesian group informed the Visman investigating committee that “a matter of ever-recurring bitterness was the small number of Indonesians who are considered for the higher [administrative] functions.” According to this group “the government should have more confidence in the abilities of Indonesian intellectuals.” (Visman Report, II, 23.)
28 Cf. Engers, J. F., Indië in de Branding, de Geallieerde Wereld over de Toekomst van N ederlandsch-lndië van Pearl Harbor tot Hollandia, New York, Querido, 1945, pp. 72 ff.Google Scholar, and The Netherlands Commonwealth and the Future, New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1945.
29 See van Mook's comments concerning Staatsblad D 65, which provided for the reestablishment of the Netherlands Indies government after the war, in INW, pp. 48, 101, 107 ff.
30 Veenstra, J. H., Diogenes in de Tropen, Amsterdam, 1946, p. 54.Google Scholar
31 INW, p. 103.
32 HLV, pp. 32, 42, 48, 51. Contrast van Mook in SDS, pp. 99–92: “As layer upon layer of Western management and authority was built over these countries [i.e., of Southeast Asia] yet another development threatened to widen the gulf between the white and colored races, particularly in those colonies where the government was most efficient and the old abuses of exploitation and venality had been most successfully combatted. The numerous white communities in those countries found in their very modernization a possibility of living as they were used to living at home. They no longer had to conform to the customs and the food of the country; they no longer depended for their comfort and their company on at least a minimum of native resources and native friends. Particularly in the cities this segregation became ever more evident…”
33 Pieters, J. M., op. cit., pp. 108 ff.Google Scholar One Dutch official described the native regents as “barely capable of performing the simplest of duties and then only under the guidance of their Dutch colleagues” (Nieuwenhuis, , loc. cit., p. 385).Google Scholar In the late 'twenties the Dutch East Indies government had to devise special measures in order to rescue the prestige of numerous native civil servants who had fallen into the bands of usurers and who seemed incapable of managing their own financial affairs. Cf. Coolhaas, W. Ph., Indonesië, Mens en Maatschapptj. The Hague, 1947, p. 122.Google Scholar
34 Among the many native aristocrats, most of them members of the former c ivil service, who joined the Dutch in opposing the Indonesian Republic and the revolution were Raden Abdoelkadir Widjoatmodjo (“acting Governor-General” and assistant to van Mook), Raden Ario Wiranata Koesama (“director for general affairs,” a vaguely defined but highly influential office), Raden A. A. Tjakraningrat (“Wali negara”—i.e., head of state—of the puppet state of Madoera, created by the Dutch), Tjokorde Gde Rake Soekawati (former Dutch-appointed member of the Volksraad and head of the Dutch puppet state of East Indonesia), and Sultan Hamid II o f Pontianak (officer in the Dutch East Indies Army and leading figure in the Dutch-created federalist movement). For descriptions of these and other figures see INW, pp. 191, 199, 201.
35 Snouck Hurgronje, C., “Vergeten Jubilé's,” De Gids, 87. J. (1923), IV, 79.Google Scholar
36 Cf. the policy declaration in De Stuw, I (1930), 2.
37 HLV, p. 38.
38 De Weg voor Indië, pp. 16–26. See also“Holland's fout in Indie,” loc. cit., pp. 319–20.
39 HLV, pp. 64 ff.
40 INW, pp. 113 ff.
41 Cf. de Graaff, S., Parhmentaire Geschiedenis van de Wet op de Staatsinriching van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1925, The Hague, 1938, p. 281Google Scholar; Verslag Herzieningscommissie, 1918, Batavia, 1918, pp. 500–502 (the Minderheidsnota of G. Ritsema van Eck); Hunger, F., Federatieve Staatsbouw, Amsterdam, 1928, pp. 71, 80Google Scholar; Eigeman, J. A., De Onvoltooide Organisatie van het Koninkrijk, The Hague, 1932Google Scholar; and Handelingen van de Volksraad, session of 1923–24, p. 1012, session of 1928–29, p. 572.
42 Visman Report, II, 149–51, 159–60.
43 United Nations Documents, S/689, March 1, 1948; S/787, May 26, 1948; S/960, May 10, 1948; S/842, June 16, 1948.
44 Ibid., S/960, May 10, 1948. See also INW, p. 183; and Overdijkinfc, G., Het Indo-nesische Probleem, Nieuiue Feiten, The Hague, 1946, pp. 167 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
45 The tactics employed by the Dutch in creating additional states were highly questionable. After these states were created, political life stood still due to strict Dutch supervision. In the State of East Indonesia, for example, the Dutch converted the government to that of a police state. See Kahin, George McT., Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics and Nationalism, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950Google Scholar, Secretariat Paper No. 6, pp. 31–32.
46 Foster Collins, J., “The United Nations and Indonesia,” International Conciliation, No. 459 (March 1950), p. 122.Google Scholar
47 United Nations Doc. S/586, Oct. 22, 1947 (Report by the Consular Commission at Batavia to the Security Council), p. 4.
48 INW, pp. 192 ff.; Overdijkink, , op. cit., pp. 167 ff.Google Scholar
49 See Collins, , loc. cit., pp. 152 ff.Google Scholar
50 Cf. United Nations Doc. S/842, June 16, 1948.
51 United Nations Doc. S/1270, March 1, 1949; and Collins, , loc. cit., p. 177.Google Scholar
52 INW, p. 113.
53 van der Kroef, Justus M., “Indonesia: Federalism and Centralism,” Current History, XIX (1950), 88–95.Google Scholar
54 News From Indonesia, I (1950), Nos. 38–44. In some areas this merger came by force.
55 INW, pp. 215 ff. The B.F.O. particularly had the tendency to by-pass the Dutch-sponsored Provisional Federal Government set up by van Mook and packed with pro-Dutch Indonesian civil servants as well as former members of the Dutch colonial government. Disappointment of B.F.O. leaders that they had not been invited to become part of the provisional government perhaps also influenced this attitude.
56 HLV, pp. 57–58: “All these foreign powers [i.e., of the United Nations] who motivated by envy, cupidity, the urge to dominate, or by hatred concern themselves with Indonesia have three things in common. First, they are completely ignorant. Secondly, they only seek their own gain: the people of Indonesia do not concern them. Thirdly, they choose in favor of the Republic.”
INW, pp. 186 ff.: “The interference of the Security Council has made the speedy and only satisfactory solution of the Indonesian problem impossible,” etc.
57 Remarks such as that made by van Mook at the opening of the first Dutch -sponsored conference of federal leaders had an adverse effect on the Security Council: “It does not seem possible to continue waiting for the moment when the Republic will join us.” Cf. United Nations Doc. S/842, p. 22; and Collins, , loc. cit., p. 155.Google Scholar
58 INW, p. 214. According to van Mook, conservative groups demanded his recall as Lieutenant-Governor-General and Crown Representative as a condition for their s upport of the new revision of the Constitution.
59 Bernard H. M. Vlekke's review of INW in Indonesië, III (1949), 93.
60 INW, p. 182.
61 Handellngen der Staaten-Generaal, Second Chamber, Dec. 3-Dec. 20, 1946.
62 Ibid., Dec. 10, 1946. Members of this Commission were C. S. Schermerhorn, former premier and chairman of the Dutch Labor party; Max van Poll, Catholic State party deputy in the lower house and chairman of the investigating committee of 1946; and F. de Boer, a former mayor of Amsterdam.
63 van Helsdingen, W. H., Op weg naar een Nederlandsch-Indonesische Unie, The Hague, 1947, pp. 396–98.Google Scholar
64 Cf. Collins, , loc. cit., p. 123Google Scholar; Handelingen der Staaten-Generaal, Second Chamber, Dec. 19, 1946.
65 Helsdingen, Van, op. cit., p. 444.Google Scholar
66 De Telegraaf, Mar. 18, 1947 et seq.
67 INW, p. 169.
68 See Wolf, Charles, The Indonesia Story: The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Indonesian Republic, New York, Day, 1948, pp. 94, 110, 115.Google Scholar
69 INW, p. 182.
70 For details of other Indonesian attempts to break the deadlock see United Nations Doc. S/1129, Dec. 19, 1948.
71 Collins, , loc. cit., p. 125Google Scholar; and United Nations Doc. S/426, July 22, 1947.
72 United Nations Doc. S/1129, Dec. 19,1948; S/1138, Dec. 22, 1948.
73 Van Mook admits that the Republican government did not support, nor have control over, extremist elements. INW, pp. 173–74.
74 HLV, pp. 66 ff.
75 Merdeka, The Voice of Free Indonesia, I (1948), Nos. 11–12. Cf. also Why Political Negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia Failed, New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1948, pp. 10–13.
76 Report on Indonesia, I (1950), No. 43, p. 4. For a critique of this position see van der Kroef, Justus M., “Indonesia and the West,” Far Eastern Survey, XX, No. 4 (Feb. 21, 1951), pp. 39–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
77 HLV, pp. 56 ff.; INW, pp. 87 ff., 189 ff., but especially p. 192: “… one member [i.e., of the U. N.'s Commission of Good Offices]—the one from Australia—was in particular the defender of the Republic. What motives the Australian government had to bet so unreservedly on the Indonesian horse, will probably never become clear.”
78 INW, pp. 222 ff.
79 Cf., for example, the policy pronouncements made by E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Delegate to the Security Council, and Netherlands Herman van Royen, Ambassador J. in The Other Side of the Medal, New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947Google Scholar, and in Towards a Free and Sovereign United States of Indonesia, New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1948.
80 Cf. the discussion by Keuning, J., “Amerika's houding in het Indonesische problem,” Indonesia, II (1949), 474–76.Google Scholar
81 Vlekke, Bernard H. M., Nusantara, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1946, pp. 390–91Google Scholar; and Wolf, , op. cit., p. 93.Google Scholar
82 In the world press numerous stories were circulated about the hundreds of Dutchmen who were held captive by the Indonesians in the interior of the Republic and about the particularly harrowing conditions under which white women were forced to live during and after the Japanese occupation. That a factual background for these reports existed cannot be denied, but that much unnecessary hysteria on the part of certain Dutch spokesmen beclouded the issue is also certain. In this connection it is perhaps worth while to quote the report of a fairly reliable observer, the noted sociologist de Kadt: “A ‘committee’ of excited women has for months maintained, nationally and internationally, that approximately 15,000 Netherlanders were held in captivity by the Republic and that hundreds, if not thousands, of women were ‘;forced’ to live in ‘concubinage.’ When our troops occupied the Republic, it became evident that there were practically no prisoners and that two out of three cases of ‘forced concubinage’ were rather voluntary.” (de Kadt, J., De Indonesische Tragedie, het treurspel der gemiste kansen, Amsterdam, 1949, p. 193.)Google Scholar
83 Cf. INW, pp. 173–74. It should be noted, however, that the Republican government was apparently too weak to combat or to curb the steady campaign of hatred and extremism against the Dutch in the Republican press, even in those organs which stood nominally under governmental supervision. This campaign greatly amplified the seemingly uncontrollable animosity and antagonism of the Dutch, prevalent in many Republican circles, and materially contributed to the general tenor of violence and anarchy in the Republic during the revolution. See the highly incendiary excerpts from the Republican press and the violent military orders in The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia, New York, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1947, pp. 19–20.
84 On the viewpoint of the confessional group, in particular of the Anti-Revolutionary movement, see the articles by Kraemer, H., “Crisis der waarachtigheid,” Vrij Neder-land, Sept. 20, 1947Google Scholar, and “Nederland in de waagschaal,” Wending, Maandblad voor Evangelie en Cultuur, III (1947), 23 ff.; also Groen, C., Gedachten over een Christelijk Rijksbeleid, Franeker, 1948Google Scholar; and Zuidema, S. U., De lndische kivestie, Franeker, 1946.Google Scholar
85 For the circumstances of this dismissal see INW, pp. 213–18, and De Telegraaf, Oct. 12, 1948 et seg. Especially the influence of the Dutch “war party” on van Mook's recall requires investigation.
86 Especially such Dutch papers as De Volkskrant seemed to delight in adding insult to injury as regards van Mook. Cf. the issues of May 4, 1947 and Oct. 15, 1948.
87 SDS, pp. 22–23, 291 ff.
88 Ibid., p. 18.
89 Ibid., pp.71, 77.
90 Ibid., p. 248.
91 Notably by the report of P. J. Koets, adviser to van Mook who visited the interior of the Republic in 194–6 and was impressed by the widespread and genuine nationalist sentiment prevailing among all layers of the population. Declared Koets, for example: “I have had talks with many people whom I knew in former years, as well as with people whom I met for the first time. Each time I asked: ‘What is for you the essential thing that has happened during the last year?’… I received the same answer… ‘It is the feeling of human dignity.’” (Quoted in Wolf, , op. cit., p. 42.Google Scholar See also Helsdingen, van, op. cit., pp. 199–214.)Google Scholar
92 Van Mook wrote later (1950): “… it was a revelation for the Dutch–at least for me–that those who particularly wished the special relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands to continue were keenest on a very early independence for Indonesia.” (SDS, p. 220.) It will be recalled that it was primarily the federalist element which particularly was interested in a special relationship between Holland and Indonesia in the form of a federal-administrative union.
93 Ibid., p. 212.
94 Ibid., p. 73.
95 In more than one respect van Mook had a fin de siècle aura about him. He was perhaps the last representative of the long line of typically Dutch colonial servants who had come to Indonesia since the tough, rip-roaring days of the Dutch East India Company: of low birth, awkward and often vulgar in manner, but also brilliant, forceful, and sardonic. The American journalist Andrew Roth, after a visit to van Mook, once described him as follows: “Dr. van Mook is a rough-hewn diamond with a sharp cutting edge, but rasping rough spots that tend to dull appreciation of his undoubted abilities. In contrast Mountbatten is a highly polished man whose dazzlingly ingratiating charm and manners add further lustre to his political brilliance… [But] van Mook rubs irritated opponents with sandpaper.
“Burly van Mook is a striking contrast to Mountbatten at a public function. He too wears a uniform—the uniform of his rank in the civil service. But he fits into it like a Dutch farmer into a conscript's kit.
“He cannot relax at formal affairs and seems to have difficulty finding places for his hands.
“When he reads a speech it sounds heavy and academic. He is obviously not a product of a democratic society, where a man of ability is supposed to know how to win the support of his fellows. Nor is he the product of an aristocracy, to whom being at ease in public is second nature. Van Mook is a plebeian, a brilliant civil servant turned statesman.” (Straits Times [Singapore], Nov. 14, 1948, reprinted in Merdeka, The Voice of Free Indonesia, I [1948], No. 16, pp. 3–4.)