* The total number of volumes is actually 17, since most of them were issued in two parts. Several volumes are still to follow, including one on the Dutch East Indies and an Epilogue (scheduled for 1983 and 1985, respectively). The work has also been published by Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague) in an edition containing additional reference materials.

** A much abridged English translation was published in 1969, under the title The Destruction of the Dutch Jews (New York: Dutton).

¹ Steiner, , Language and Silence (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 123.Google Scholar

² Hilberg, , The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961)Google Scholar; Dawidowicz, , The War Against the Jews, 1933–194; (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975).Google Scholar

³ Adler, , Der Verwaltete Mensch; Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974).Google Scholar

⁴ Streit credits Ernst Nolte with being the first historian to depict the real nature of the German East War, in Der Faschiswts in seiner Epochc (Munich: Piper, 1963)Google Scholar; it had been ignored in the traditional coverages of World War II. It has been “virtually an article of faith” that the German military operations against the Soviet Union had been “asically normal,” that the German army's hands had remained clean (Streit, 21).

All translations from the German and Dutch in this article are the responsibility of the present author.

⁵ Haffner, Sebastian, Anmerkungen zu Hitler (Munich: Kindler Verlag, 1978), 22.Google Scholar

⁶ During World War I, only 5.4% of the millions of Russian prisoners of war had died in German captivity. The death rate among the millions of French prisoners captured by Hitler's armies during the “normal” war of June-July 1940 was even lower (Streit, 10, 135–37, l72) De Jong concluded that of a total of 5.5 million Soviet prisoners, I million were liquidated by the Etnsatzgruppen, and 2.3 million died from hunger, cold, and disease (VIII [1], 52). Although Streit's (and de Jong's) statistics have been disputed by some, as expected, there appears to have been no real challenge in Germany to Streit's main thesis concerning the involvement of the German army in the killings. Note, for example, Klaus Harprecht's favorable review article, “Eine traurige deutsche Wahrheit,” Merkur, XXXIII (December 1979), 1233–40.

⁷ Hilberg (fn. 2), 33; Hillgruber, Andreas, “Die ‘Endlosung’ und das Deutsche Ostim-perium,” Vierteljahrshejte jiir Zcitgeschichte, XX (January 1972), 143–48, 152.Google Scholar

This superb journal, published by the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte at Munich, will be referred to as Vjhefte ZG in the citations to follow.

⁸ Hilberg (fn. 2), 181; Buchheim, Hans, “Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer,” Vjheftc ZG, XI (October 1963), 365–69Google Scholar; Buchheim, , Anatomie dcs Staates, I (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1967), 226–27, 313Google Scholar; Adam, 239, 252.

⁹ Krausnick, Helmut, “Hitler und die Morde in Polen,” Vjhefte ZG, XI (April 1963), 204.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Sijes, B. A., Studies over Jodenvervolging (Assen: van Gorcum, 1974), 46–47.Google Scholar

¹¹ Mommsen, Hans, Beamtentum im Diitten Reich (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 120–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Kershaw, Ian, “Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung,” in Broszat, M. and Fröhlich, E., eds., Bay em in der NS-Zeit (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), 316–17.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid., 343–47. The basic indifference of the German public with respect to the measures against the Jews is emphasized also by Steinert, Marlis G., Hitlers Krieg und die Dcutschen (Diisseldorf and Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1970), 236–63.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Haffner (fn. 5), 176.

¹⁵ Kershaw (fn. 12), 337–40.

¹⁶ Conway, John S., “Frühe Augenzeugenberichte aus Auschwitz,” Vjhefte ZG, XXVII (April 1979), 260–61.Google Scholar In 1979, the American-made TV series “Holocaust” provoked a fervent discussion in the Federal Republic, which was centered on the extent of “knowing” on the part of the wartime German public. Cf. Marthesheimer, P. and Frenzel, I, eds., Der Fernschfilm “Holocaust” (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1979).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Cf Goldhagen, Erich, “Weltanschauung und Endlosung,” Vfheftc Zg, XIVv (October 1976), 379–405Google Scholar; Bein, Alexander, “Der Jüdische Parasit,” Vfhefte ZG, XXIII (April 1965), 121–49.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Robinson, Jacob, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 93–99. 309.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hilberg (fn. 2), 640; Presser, I, 6; Adam, 17, 229, 357.

²⁰ Adler (fn. 3), xxvii, 29; Herbst, L., “Die Krise des Nationalsozialistischen Regimes am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges.…,” Vjhefte Zg, XXVI (July 1978), 354.Google Scholar

²¹ Broszat, Martin, “Hitler und die Genesis der ‘Endlösung,’” Vjhefte Zg, XXV (October 1977), 746–56.Google Scholar On July 16, 1941, a RSHA leader in Poland suggested to Eichmann that those Jews who could not be used for labor might be killed—some “quick-working” device for killing should be found, and then what sounded “fantastic” could well be made “thoroughly feasible.” See Hilberg, , Documents of Destruction (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 87–88.Google Scholar

The following book was published after completion of the present article: Krausnick, Helmut and Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich, Die Truppe des W eltanschauungskrieges; die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1918–1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981).Google Scholar This huge, amply documented work—another publication of the Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte—is likely to remain the definitive analysis of the phases of the Holocaust affected by the Einsatzgruppen. Krausnick and Wilhelm fully support Streit's conclusions, particularly those relating to the active collaboration of the German army with the Einsatzgruppen in the killing of more than two million Russian and Polish Jews. In an interesting concluding note, Wilhelm agrees generally with Adam's and Broszat's “incremental” theory, yet he warns that the Final Solution must not be seen as merely the result of improvisations and reactions to lower-level crises. Without Hitler's constant, “prophetic” guidance in the direction of the total destruction of world Jewry, the “incremental” actions of the lower echelons might have had very different outcomes (pp. 622–36).

²² Riickerl, Adalbert, NS-Vernichtungslager (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977), 13, 69, 206–7, 226–27Google Scholar; de Jong V (2), 996–98.

²³ Dörner, Klaus, “Nationalsozialismus und Lebensvernichtigung,” Vjhejte Zg, XV (April 1967), 147–49.Google Scholar

²⁴ Hilberg (fn. 2), 187–89; Trunk, Isaiah, Judenrat (New York: Stein & Day, 1977), 284–85.Google Scholar

²⁵ Rückerl (fn. 22), 47, 67, 72–74, 122–26, 134, 187–88, 206–7, 295–97.

²⁶ Rückerl, Adalbert “Für und Wider die NS-Prozesse in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch land,” in Essays über Naziverbrechen (Amsterdam: Wiesenthal Fonds, 1973), 235.Google Scholar

²⁷ Dörner (fn. 23), 151; Rückerl (fn. 22), 303.

²⁸ Morse, Arthur, While Six Million Died (New York: Random House, 1967), IX.Google Scholar

²⁹ Steiner (fn. 1), 156.

³⁰ Of a total of 143,000 Jews who lived in the Netherlands when the Germans invaded, 107,000 were deported. Of those deported, 5,200 survived, including 4,000 who were sent to the “privileged” camps of Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen. The main deportations to the East took place between July 1942 and July 1943: 43,000 from the Netherlands to Auschwitz (85 survivors), and 34,300 from the Netherlands to Sobibor (19 survivors). Not deported from the Netherlands were 10,500 Jews who were married to non-Jews; 22,000 Jews (including 8,000 children) who were able to remain undetected in “underground” hiding; and 3,000 Jews who had submitted to “de-Jewingrdquo; procedures—a phony but sometimes life-preserving bureaucratic enterprise conducted by one of the German officials. “Half-Jews” and “quarter-Jews” were also not deported to the East, but many “Christian Jews” were (de Jong, VIII [2], 673).

³¹ For example, an editor of a scientific journal was asked to resign; Jewish first-desk players of the Concertgebouw Orchestra were seated in the back; trade unions got rid of Jewish functionaries (de Jong, IV, 752).

³² Flinker, , Young Moshe's Diary (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1965), 71.Google Scholar

³³ Wasserstein, Bernard, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Feingold, Henry L., The Politics of Rescue (New Brunswick, N.f.: Rutgers University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; Morse (fn. 28); Laqueur, Walter, The Terrible Secret (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).Google Scholar Concerning the various Jewish groups in the United States, cf. Fein, Helen, “Socio-Political Responses During the Holocaust,” in Sherwin, Byron L. and Ament, Susan G., eds., Encountering the Holocaust (Chicago: Impact Press, 1979), 93–99.Google Scholar The role of American Jewry is also emphasized in the additions to the paperback edition of Feingold's book (New York: Schocken, 1980), where his earlier harsh indictment is considerably softened.

³⁴ Feingold (fn. 33), 35, 306. Allied intelligence agents, who were interested in everything else in occupied Europe, were never dispatched to keep track of the Final Solution, let alone to try to prevent it (de Jong, VII [1], 359). Presser suspects that if the Germans had offered the remaining Jews to the Allies in late 1943, the Allies would have refused to accept them (Presser, II, 135).

³⁵ Goldhagen, Erich, “Der Holocaust in der Sowjetischen Propaganda und Geschichts-schreibung,” Vjhefte Zg, XXVIII (October 1980), 502–7.Google Scholar

³⁶ Hochhuth's, Rolf passionate condemnation of Pius XII, in his play The Deputy (New York: Grove Press, 1964)Google Scholar, is balanced somewhat by Michaelis's, Meir treatment of the Pope in Mussolini and the Jews (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).Google Scholar A fair coverage of the Swiss meanderings with respect to the admission oi Jewish refugees is provided by iLudwig, Carl, Die Vluchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933 bis zur Gegen-wart (Bern: 1957).Google Scholar De Jong is among numerous writers who have condemned the International Red Cross for its almost total lack of concern for the Jews’ disasters (VIII [2], 862–64).

³⁷ Yahil, , The Rescue of Danish Jewry (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 61, 152–54.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., XVIII, 268, 504.

³⁹ On the Budapest reversal, see Wasserstein (fn. 33), 243, 268–69; a more extensive treatment appears in Braham, Randolph L., The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 2 vols.Google Scholar The Italian attitude is depicted by Michaelis (fn. 36).

⁴⁰ Feingold (fn. 33), 307; Yahil (fn. 37), 64.

⁴¹ On “not knowing” on the part of the Jewish victims, see Presser, II, 333: de Jong, VII (1), 334; Rückerl (fn. 22), 202, 334; Adler (fn. 3), 479; Trunk (fn. 24), 419; Con-way (fn. 16), 275–76; Tushnet, Leonard, The Pavement of Hell (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 22–23, 45, 54–57.Google Scholar

⁴² Hilberg (fn. 2), 207.

⁴³ At Westerbork, the Dutch transit camp, the Jewish camp administration picked the individuals to be deported to the East from the “Auschwitz material” available, in accordance with the “batch of Jews” specified by the Germans for each train (de Jong, VIII [2], 716–719; Presser, I, 263–64).

Presser observed that the greatest blow the Jews inflicted on the Nazis may well have been the rolling stock taken from the German army for their transportation to the East (II, 370). The first 50 trains, during November 1941, started rolling at the very moment when the German army was attempting its final offensive near Moscow. At the time of the attack on Moscow, as 50,000 Jews were transported to the East, the German army needed 240,000 freight cars daily, but only 124,000 were available (Streit, 353). Later, at the very height of the Stalingrad crisis in January 1943, Himmler requisitioned numerous additional trains from the army for the Jewish transports— for which freight cars were almost always used (Riickerl [fn. 22], 115–16).

⁴⁴ Trunk (fn. 24), 567.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 420–21, 437.

⁴⁶ Adler (fn. 3), 113.

⁴⁷ Tushnet (fn. 41), 208.

⁴⁸ Judge Landau's opinion, as cited by Trunk (fn. 24), 568.

⁴⁹ Currently, neo-Nazi propaganda tries to convince us that the Holocaust did not really take place, or that it was less gruesome than presented in the “Jewish media.” Actually, none of the current TV series or best-selling novels comes even close to depicting the real drama of the Jewish fate during World War II. The horror and scope of the Holocaust are understated in most of the historical, literary, and popular coverage of the present period.

⁵⁰ Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963).Google Scholar Arendt was vehemently attacked for describing Jewish victims as “accomplices of the hangman” and Jewish Councils as “the very cornerstone” of Nazi Holocaust policies. Cf. Holthusen, Hans E., “Hannah Arendt, Eichmann, und die Kritiker,” Vjheftc Zg, XIII (April 1965), 181–84Google Scholar; also Robinson (fn. 18), throughout.

The following bibliographical essay came to my attention only after completion of the present article: Kwiet, Konrad, “Zur historiographischen Behandlung der Juden-verfolgung im Dritten Reich,” Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, XXVII (No. 1, 1980), 149–92.Google Scholar Kwiet provides an exhaustive and carefully focused survey of Holocaust literature, with emphasis on German research. Special topics covered by him include German decision making, the behavior of the non-Jewish bystanders, and Jewish reactions.