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² Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and Lynn-Jones, Sean, “International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field,” International Security 12 (Spring 1988), 5–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 24.

³ Freedman, , The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma (New York: Henry Holt, 1986), 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ A recent review of the literature on the domestic foundations of war notes that “it is difficult to read both the theoretical literature in political science on the causes of war and historians' case studies of the origins of particular wars without being struck by the difference in their respective evaluation of the importance of domestic political factors.” Levy, Jack, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988), 653–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Much the same can be said of the domestic foundations of security mobilization. While theoretically oriented political scientists have failed to integrate the friction that ensues between the state and societal actors for control over security-related inputs, there are numerous historical accounts that recognize its importance. See, for example, Tilly, Charles, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in Tilly, , ed., The Formation of the National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 3–83Google Scholar; Howard, Michael, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; Milward, Alan, War, Economy, and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)Google Scholar; McNeill, William, Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Kocka, Jurgen, Facing Total War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Godfrey, John, French Capitalism at War: Industrial Policy and Bureaucracy, 1914–1918 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987)Google Scholar. Furthermore, many case studies and overviews of the evolution of the U.S. national security doctrine have addressed state-society relations. Stein, Arthur, “Strategy as Politics, Politics as Strategy: Domestic Debates, Statecraft, and Star Wars,” in Kolkowicz, Roman, ed., The Logic of Nuclear Terror (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 186–210Google Scholar; Smoke, Richard, Nuclear Strategy and the Nuclear Dilemma, 2d ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1987)Google Scholar; Pollard, Robert, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 228–30Google Scholar; and especially Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. Although these studies are not explicitly concerned with theorizing about the nature of these constraints, such constraints are assumed to exist and are addressed where deemed appropriate.

⁵ There have been various calls for greater attention to this neglected factor of national power. See Haskell, Barbara, “Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of State Power,” International Organization 34 (Winter 1980), 89–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lamborn, Alan, “Power and the Politics of Extraction,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (June 1983), 125–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shaw, Martin and Creighton, Colin, “Introduction,” in Shaw, and Creighton, , eds., The Sociology of War and Peace (New York: Sheridan House, 1987), 1–13Google Scholar.

⁶ Waltz, Kenneth, A Theory of International Politics (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar. Waltz concedes that societal variables shape the state's military potential, but he downplays the importance of this insight. Richard Ashley's distinction between practical and technical Realists is useful here. “Political Realism and Human Interests,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981), 204–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Whereas “technical” Realists such as Waltz have failed to incorporate state-society relations adequately, many “practical” Realists have concerned themselves with the societal dimension, notably, Knorr, Klaus, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956)Google Scholar, and Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (New York: Basic Books, 1973)Google Scholar; Knorr, Klaus and Traeger, Frank, eds., Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1977)Google Scholar; and Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)Google Scholar. Samuel Huntington began his classic The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1Google Scholar, on the following note: “The most distinctive, the most fascinating, and the most troublesome aspect of military policy is its Janus-like quality. Indeed, military policy not only faces in two directions, it lives in two worlds. One is international politics, the world of balance of power. … The other world is domestic politics, the world of interest groups. … The currency here is the resources of society.” Despite the welcome attention given by “practical” Realists to the societal bases of the state's military policy, they have not put forward any coherent framework for understanding the societal constraints on security mobilization. Organski, A.F.K. and Kugler, Jacek, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar, develop a systematic treatment of the relationship between the state's relationship to society and war-fighting capacity; however, the approach fails to account adequately for the multiple objectives of government officials and to specify the exact nature of the societal constraints.

⁷ Walt, , The Origin of Alliances (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)Google Scholar. For the Egyptian case, see Baker, Raymond, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Gilpin, , War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Note that Gilpin, in “Economic Interdependence and National Security in Historical Perspective,” in Knorr and Traeger (fn. 6), integrates societal concerns in a more systematic way.

⁹ Although some may object to this characterization of the “systemic” tradition and point to those studies that include in their analyses forms of the state for the formulation of the security doctrine or crisis politics, these studies isolate the decision process within the state and essentially ignore state-society relations. See Halperin, Morton, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974)Google Scholar, and Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar, respectively.

¹⁰ See, for example, Viner, Jacob, “Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics 1 (October 1948), 1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1979 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)Google Scholar; Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987)Google Scholar. Also see Rasler, Karen and Thompson, William, “Warmaking and Statemaking: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars,” American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985), 491–507CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Goldstein, Joshua, Long Cycles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988)Google Scholar, for other traditions that link political economy and national security.

¹¹ This is one of the central points in Krasner, Stephen, In Defense of the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. Also see Gilpin (fn. 10).

¹² Kennedy (fn. 10).

¹³ Cf. Friedberg, Aaron L., “The Political Economy of American Strategy,” World Politics 41 (April 1989), 381–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The societal dimension is also overlooked by such distinguished sociologists as Immanuel Wallerstein, Michael Mann, and Anthony Giddens in a review symposium of Kennedy's book, British Journal of Sociology 40 (June 1989), 328–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ For broad overviews of Marxist approaches to international conflict and military strategy, see Semmel, Bernard, Marxism and the Science of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; Neumann, Sigmund and Hagen, Mark van, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and Army in Society,” in Paret, Peter, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 262–80Google Scholar. Also see Luxemburg, Rosa, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963)Google Scholar; Lenin, V. I., Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Bukharin, Nikolai, Imperialism and the Word Economy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Luxemburg (fn. 14), 454–67.

¹⁶ Mandel, Ernest, The Meaning of the Second World War (London: New Left Books, 1986)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Kaldor, Mary, “Warfare and Capitalism,” in Thompson, E. P. et al. , eds., Exterminism and Cold War (London: New Left Books, 1983), 261–88Google Scholar, attempts to address these concerns and oversights. Also see Shaw, Martin, “War and Social Theory,” in Shaw, , ed., War, State, and Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which laments the lack of adequate theorizing by Marxist scholars on the relationship between war and society.

¹⁸ “War preparation” can be measured by the “defense burden,” that is, military expenditure as a percentage of the country's budget, including the amount of total unilateral transfers minus that amount earmarked for defense purposes. This reflects the priorities of state managers; it also indicates the amount of available resources that is diverted to national security expenditures and is therefore unavailable for other types of social spending. See Berglas,, Eitan “Defense and Economy,” in Ben-Porath, Y., ed., The Israeli Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 173–75Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Huntington (fn. 6), 1.

²⁰ Chubin, Shahrom and Tripp, Charles, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 37Google Scholar.

²¹ Przeworski, Adam and Wallerstein, Michael, “The Structural Dependence of the State on Capital,” American Political Science Review 82 (March 1988), 11–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 11.

²² Mann, Michael, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” in Mann, , State, War, and Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 1–32Google Scholar.

²³ Stallings, Barbara, “International Lending and the Relative Autonomy of the State: A Case Study of Twentieth-Century Peru,” Politics and Society 14, no. 3 (1985), 257–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 260.

²⁴ Although states may pursue any number of fiscal strategies, including letting public structures depreciate, assets deplete, and consumption diminish, “the principal means were nonetheless taxation and borrowing.” Kindleberger, Charles, A Financial History of Western Europe (New York: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 292Google Scholar.

²⁵ Neuman, Stephanie, “International Stratification and Third World Military Industries,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), 167–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 185; Wulf, Herbert, “Developing Countries,” in Ball, Nicole and Leitenberg, Milton, eds., Structure of Defense Industries: An International Survey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Ball, Nicole, Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Although some major international conflicts have been successfully fought without the use of the most advanced weaponry, most notably the North Vietnamese campaign against the United States and most recently Chad's conflict with Libya, such instances are rare. The possibility for low-technology warfare has lead Wulf as well as Park and Park to argue for “self-reliant defense” that is premised on mass mobilization. Wulf, Herbert, “Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts,” in Neuman, Stephanie and Harkavy, Robert, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger Press, 1979), 259Google Scholar, and Park, Hans and Park, Kyung, “Ideology and Security: Self-Reliance in China and North Korea,” in Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-in, eds., National Security in the Third World (Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1988), 102–35Google Scholar.

²⁷ See Mandel (fn. 16), and Neuman (fn. 25), respectively.

²⁸ There are certainly a host of other variables that affect the state's conscription policy, including the societal attitude toward warfare. Corvesier, Andre, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494–1789 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 15–16Google Scholar.

²⁸ Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 418Google Scholar. Also see Weber, Max, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 328Google Scholar.

²⁹ Walzer, Michael, “Political Alienation and Military Service,” in Walzer, , ed., Obligations: Essays in Disobedience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 153–70Google Scholar. Even before the development of the modern nation-state, those European principalities that had a strong basis in society were able to enlist their populations for defense. See Beukema, Henry, “The Social and Political Aspects of Conscription: Europe's Experience,” in Anderson, Martin, ed., The Military Draft (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 479–91Google Scholar.

³⁰ Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press), 233–34.

³¹ This feature of Third World militaries is largely due to the postcolonial character of these states. Not only is the state's lack of legitimacy attributable to its colonial heritage, but most colonial powers built local armies with those ethnic groups, very often deriving from minority groups, that would be responsive to colonial authorities. The policy was consistent with the authority's divide-and-rule strategy, which would have important consequences for shaping the conscription policy of the postcolonial state. Consequently, the colonial power generally balked at arming those elements of society that might use such knowledge and arms against them. Janowitz, Morris, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Europe,” in Haries-Jenkins, Gwyn and Doom, Jacques van, eds., The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976), 127–30Google Scholar, and Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, “The International System and Third World Militarization” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1989).

³³ For example, Saddam Hussein attempted to instill a sense of nationality and increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi state in order to further his mobilization potential in the war against Iran. See Chubin and Tripp (fn. 20), 94. The importance of the state's legitimacy is not confined to the capitalist context but is also noted in socialist states. Park and Park contend that in China and North Korea “mass mobilization … is made possible by political indoctrination of the people with measures of ideological education” (fn. 26), 108.

³⁴ Howard (fn. 4), 69.

³⁵ I assume that these strategies are noncomplementary; however, it is immediately apparent that the state's mobilization strategies will usually evidence a mix of these strategies. This is as true for the state's war preparation strategies as it is for its strategies of domestic adjustment to shocks from the international economy. Although this typology obviously distorts what actually occurs, it is useful for analytical simplification and generation of hypotheses.

³⁶ This discussion is somewhat analogous to the state's adjustment strategy to changes in the international economy. See Ikenberry, G. John, Reasons of State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Ibid., 40.

³⁸ The state's ability to rely on foreign actors is also dependent on the type of resource that is being mobilized. For instance, in the modern era foreign troops are rarely attainable, thereby necessitating the reliance on domestic manpower. Alternatively, because there are numerous arms producers and merchants, the state may more easily depend on foreign suppliers for its immediate needs and not be compelled to intervene in the domestic economy.

³⁹ See Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration, and Policy Capacity: The ‘Software’ Side of Third World National Security,” in Azar and Moon (fn. 26), 81, and Knorr, Klaus, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956)Google Scholar. The importance of propagating the state's legitimacy in order to mobilize greater amounts of resources is observed in the cases of Israel, North Korea, and Iraq. See Yaniv, Avner, “National Security and Nation-Building,” International Interactions 11, no. 2 (1984), 193–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Park and Park (fn. 26); and Chubin and Tripp (fn. 20), respectively. See Stein, Art, “Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (March 1976), 143–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Levy, Jack, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Midlarsky, Manus, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 257–86Google Scholar, for good reviews of the cohesion literature.

⁴⁰ Israel represents a useful case study for the following reasons. First, the literature on Israel's security policy reproduces those scholarly biases that I noted earlier. For instance, Israel's wartime experiences and strategic policy have been a fertile testing ground and laboratory for many scholars of conflict behavior. Yet these studies have evidenced little explicit concern with how societal pressures have affected the state's mobilization of security-related resources. See, for example, Feldman, Shai, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)Google Scholar, and Beres, Louis Rene, ed., Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986)Google Scholar. Yaniv's, AvnerDeterrence without the Bomb (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987)Google Scholar discusses the importance of societal factors where immediately relevant, but these factors are decidedly secondary to his overriding strategic focus. I will demonstrate that the Israeli government's war preparation strategies were greatly affected by the domestic context and that this dimension provides a different explanation for various aspects of Israel's strategic behavior.

Second, given that this study represents a first effort at defining and approaching a research question, it makes sense to examine it in the context of an “exceptional case.” Lijphart, Arend, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review 65 (September 1971), 653–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Because war preparation was particularly intense and vigorous during this decade, the researcher is in a privileged position to observe the various manifestations of the mobilization process.

Scholars have often objected to the use of Israel for comparative and theoretical purposes on the grounds of its historical uniqueness (though this never applied to its conflict behavior). I reject this common understanding and the exclusion of Israel from social scientific inquiry on the following grounds. (1) Israel's social-structural characteristics are not so unique that its exclusion from theorizing is self-evident. The comparability of the Israeli case has been affirmed by other scholars, who have noted its “late-industrializing,” “developing,” and “postcolonial” characteristics. See Eisenstadt, S. N., The Transformation of Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985)Google Scholar; Shalev, Michael, Labour and the Political Economy of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; and Migdal, Joel, “The Crystallization of the State and the Struggle over Rulemaking: Israel in Comparative Perspective,” in Kimmerling, Baruch, ed., Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albany: State University of New York, 1988), 1–27Google Scholar. (2) For those who argue that the Israeli case is not generalizable because of its strategic relationship with the United States, I evoke Lijphart's “deviant case strategy,” in which the case is selected in order to reveal why it is deviant, “that is, to uncover the relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or td refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables” (p. 692). In other words, Israel's decision to rely more heavily on the U.S. is something to be explained, not assumed. My contention is that situating Israel's war preparation strategies in its societal context can help to explain this deviance. In general, Israel represents a good example of a developing state attempting to mobilize scarce (and sometimes nonexistent) resources for national security while pursuing its other political and economic objectives. That it does not resemble all other developing countries does not deny Israel's appropriateness as a case study, although it does caution us about drawing sweeping generalizations from this one case.

⁴¹ The share of defense in the gross national product rose from approximately 8% in 1965, to 25% in 1970, to 35% in 1977.

⁴² Peres, Shimon, David's Sling (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Eisenstadt (fn. 40), 219.

⁴⁴ My contention is that Histadrut is best conceived as private capital, particularly as it became less responsive to state demands and its investment decisions were motivated by profit criteria. See Michael Shalev (fn. 40).

⁴⁵ Total taxes as a percentage of GNP were 26.0, 26.6, and 21.0 for the Israeli, Canadian, and Swiss states. Berglas, Eitan, “An Empirical Evaluation of Israel's Income Tax, 1953–1965,” in Uri, Pierre, ed., Israel and the Common Market (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 69–130Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ See Spiegel, Stephen, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 158–65Google Scholar, for an analysis of the U.S. decision to commit to a strategic alliance with the Israelis following the 1967 war.

⁴⁷ Moshe Zambar, interview with author, Tel Aviv, June 29, 1987.

⁴⁸ Although these unilateral transfers were legally restricted to financing development, they essentially freed more resources for defense. Zambar made the point that “legally all this money … was used for social development … while our domestic resources were used for defense. In reality it made little difference. If we got more money for development, we could just channel that much more for defense. … Money has no taste and no smell.” Ibid.

⁴⁹ Radian, Alex, “The Dynamics of Policy Formation: Income Tax Rates in Israel, 1948–1975,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 2 (August 1984), 271–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Yaacov Arnon, interview with author, Jerusalem, June 10, 1987. Arnon was director general for the Treasury from 1956 through 1970. Also see Pack, Howard, Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 188–91Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Nadav Halevi, “The Economy of Israel: Goals and Limitations,” Jersusalem Quarterly (Fall 1976), 83–92.

⁵² Israel's occupation of the captured territories provided it with additional fiscal burdens and opportunities. While generally maintaining the pre-1967 fiscal arrangement, Israeli officials did introduce three changes: (1) West Bank and Gaza workers were subjected to payroll deductions; (2) West Bank and Gaza residents had to bear the burden of Israeli duties on goods imported through Israel; and (3) residents of Jerusalem after the 1967 annexation were subject to the higher Israeli taxes. Despite such measures, from 1967 until 1972 “revenues directly accruing to the public sector in the territories have been consistently lower than expenditures, the balance being met from military government sources.” After this date the picture becomes more ambiguous; it is likely that the territories were no longer a financial drain but were rather a net contributor to the Israeli budget. Arkadie, Brian Van, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies since 1967 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), 98–101Google Scholar.

⁵³ Seliktor, Ofira, “The Cost of Vigilance: Linking the Economic and Social Costs of Defense,” Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 4 (1980), 339–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Eitan Berglas, interview with author, Tel Aviv, June 6, 1987. Berglas was director of the Budget from 1977 to 1979.

⁵⁵ Berglas (fn. 18), 187.

⁵⁶ Arnon Gafni, interview with author, Tel Aviv, June 24, 1987. Before his term as governor of the Bank of Israel from 1976 to 1981, Gafni was director general of the Finance Ministry.

⁵⁷ Gafni (fn. 56).

⁵⁸ According to one public opinion poll conducted soon after the 1973 war, “65.1% of the public are unreservedly prepared to tighten their belts and pay higher taxes and another 15.2% are prepared to pay a little more. Only 14.9% are absolutely opposed to paying any more taxes and 4.9% have no views one way or another.” Israel Economist 29 (December 1973), 20Google Scholar.

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⁶⁰ Zambar (fn. 47). Originally U.S. military assistance came in the form of grants. Only later was it a mixture of grants and loans. Most grants had to be spent on U.S. products. See Liviatan, Oded, “Israel's External Debt,” Bank of Israel Economic Review 48–49 (May 1980), 1–45Google Scholar.

⁶¹ For example, Tadiran was nominally private until purchased by the Defense Ministry. Only when the company was placed under the guidance of the Defense Ministry did it begin to receive defense contracts. Peres (fn. 42), 132–35.

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⁶³ Tzvi Dinstien, interview with author, Ramat Aviv, June 16, 1987.

⁶⁴ Before 1967 the government had already established a policy of favoring those industries that were considered essential to the state's national security, notably chemicals, metals, machinery, and electronics. Kanovsky, Eliyahu, The Impact of the Six-Day War: Israel, the Occupied Territories, Egypt, Jordan (New York: Praeger Press, 1970), 117Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ This contributed to increased industrial concentration. Jerusalem Institute of Management, Export-Led Growth Strategy for Israel: A Final Report (Tel Aviv: Jerusalem Institute of Management, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Pinchas Zusman, interview with author, Rehovot, June 24, 1987. Zusman was economic adviser to, and then director general of, the Defense Ministry from 1968 to 1975.

⁶⁷ Tzvi Tropp, interview with author, Tel Aviv, May 30, 1987. The actual investment figures are classified; it is therefore impossible to verify the percentage of defense funds that went to the private and public sectors.

⁶⁸ Also see Mintz, Alex, “Arms Production in Israel” Jerusalem Quarterly 42 (Spring 1987), 89–99Google Scholar. There was also increased interest in the benefits from increased foreign capitalist activity (although foreign capital had been courted in some fashion since before 1967). See Sheila Ryan, “U.S. Military Contractors in Israel,” MERIP Reports (January—February 1987), 17–22.

⁶⁹ Because military industrialization became more sophisticated and expensive and domestic demand was not enough to lower production costs, there was a turn to export promotion. This market became more central to the industry's success and an increasing source of the state's revenue. For overviews of Israel's arms export market, see Steinberg, G. M., “Israel: High-Technolgy Roulette,” in Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas, eds., Arms Production in the Third World (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1985), 181–88Google Scholar, and Klieman, Aaron, Israel's Global Reach (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

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⁷¹ Dinstien (fn. 63).

⁷² Zusman (fn. 66).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Arnon (fn. 50); Dinstien (fn. 63).

⁷⁵ Dinstien (fn. 63); Tropp (fn. 67).

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⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Luttwak, Edward and Horowitz, Dan, The Israeli Army (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 327Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 359.

⁸¹ Yaniv (fn. 40), 191–92.

⁸² Ibid., 192.

⁸³ Eisenstadt (fn. 40), 160–61.

⁸⁴ Yaniv (fn. 40), 206.

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