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Great Britain: The Illusion of Governmental Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Norman H. Keehn
Norman H. Keehn
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Abstract

The capacity of the British Government to pursue and achieve economic purposes under liberal managed capitalism without the consent, cooperation, or passive acquiescence of organized producer groups is inherently limited. The ineluctable fact is that the British Government is dependent on the holders of economic power for achieving economic purposes. For this reason, national policy makers enter into partnership arrangements and contractual relationships with vital corporatist forces. Deliberate, premeditated, collaborative action is needed to ensure correlation between the government's intentions and achievements. Concertation, which represents a partnership between the public and private sectors as well as cooperative give-and-take in reaching agreements on economic objectives, enables the government to govern.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , July 1978 , pp. 538 - 562
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1978

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References

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