¹ There is an endless argument over the definition of a small state, and whether the behavior of a small power is fundamentally different from that of a larger one. This study skirts the definitional question, but maintains that the small ally moves within certain general restraints and options. How this works out in practice will vary greatly from one case to another. Most recent works on small states include Vital, David, The Survival of Small States (London 1971)Google Scholar; Schou, August and Brundtland, Arne Olav, eds., Small States in International Relations (Stockholm 1971)Google Scholar; Mathisen, Trygve, The Functions of Smaller States in the Strategies of the Great Powers (Oslo 1971)Google Scholar; Singer, Marshall R., Weak States in a World of Powers (Riverside 1972)Google Scholar; de Rayemaker, Omar, “Signification de l'appartenance à une alliance pour les petits pays,” Chronique de politique étrangère, XXIV (January 1971).Google ScholarGeorge Liska's works, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore 1962)Google Scholar and Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore 1968), remain very useful.

² Cf. Holsti, Karl J., “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, XIV (September 1970).Google Scholar

³ The Generalissimo offered the United States troops and bases on Taiwan while simultaneously threatening to “liberate” the mainland. His threats were occasionally welcomed by the larger ally, and were deliberately stressed by the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 to induce China to accept a Korean armistice. In that context, the smaller ally's policy was not a trigger tactic.

⁴ Marshall, Charles B., “Alliances with Fledgling States,” in Wolfers, Arnold, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore 1959), 221.Google Scholar

⁵ Morgenthau, Hans J., “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in Wolfers (fn. 4), 190.Google Scholar Morgenthau specifically mentions Iceland's position in NATO. This seems an unfortunate example since Iceland does not have significant political standing in the alliance despite its contribution to NATO bases. On the contrary, Iceland is not represented on some of NATO's committees, and its government does not wish to alter this.

⁶ A smaller ally may want to dissociate himself from the alliance to enhance his diplomatic flexibility or to accommodate the adversary. This is a different bargaining situation in diat the rewards are not expected to come from the existing alliance.

⁷ Keohane, Robert O., “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, No. 2 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, stresses the rewards of this tactic.

⁸ Ellsberg, Daniel, Papers on the War (New York 1972), 42–131.Google Scholar

⁹ “Interference” and “intervention” are here used interchangeably to mean an act aimed at the political structure of the target nation, and one which departs from the existing policy of the intervening nation. Cf. Rosenau, James N., “The Concept of Intervention,” Journal of International Affairs, XXII, NO. 2 (1968).Google Scholar

¹⁰ This is stressed by most students of small states: Rothstein, Robert, Alliances and Small Powers (New York 1968), 26Google Scholar, 61; Fox, Anette Baker, The Power of Small States (Chicago 1959), 181Google Scholar; Vital, David, The Inequality of States (London 1967), 29–30Google Scholar; Sjaastad, Anders, Smaastater i Studiet av Internasjonal Politikk (Oslo 1970), 35–36Google Scholar; Bjöl, Eriing, “The Power of the Weak,” Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3 (1968), 159.Google Scholar

¹¹ In addition to the sources cited, the case study of Korea is based on interviews with officials in the U.S. Department of State, scholars who recently visited North Korea, and South Korean scholars.

¹² This view is elaborated in Lönn, Jan, Nordkorea. Mot välfärd under krigshot (Stockholm 1972).Google Scholar Rhee's reputation for unreliability was punished rather than rewarded in the years preceding the Korean War. Rhee's insistent threats of “marching north” made trie United States hesitant to build up ROK armed forces for fear of a pre-emptive attack on the North. Army levels were envisaged as only 65,000 men, one-tenth of the present strength. Henderson, Gregory, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 149.Google Scholar

¹³ Clark, Mark W., From the Danube to the Yalu (New York 1954), 16Google Scholar; parenmeses in original.

¹⁴ Rees, David, Korea: The Limited War (New York 1964), 424–28Google Scholar; Dono van, Robert J., Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York 1956), 121.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Washington officially disavowed itself from Rhee's action, but news of the release was favorably received in some quarters. General Clark had earlier suggested similar steps, and the Administration had during the previous summer authorized the release of 27,000 POW's, reclassified as civilians. Clark (fn. 13), 72–75.

¹⁶ The economic aid program grew out of a study commissioned by President Eisen hower in April 1953, which suggested a three-year program of one billion dollars. Early in April, General Clark was authorized to expand ROK armed forces to twenty divisions on die grounds that augmentations should take place before the conclusion of an armistice which might formally freeze existing force levels (as it did). General Clark had taken the initiative to request such authorization. A bilateral security pact was initially suggested by Generals Clark and Herren and conveyed to Washington the same month. Hermes, Walter G., Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C. 1966), 436–59.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Executive Report, No. 1, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. 1954).

¹⁸ Similar clauses were attached to the defense treaty widi Taiwan, but were not included in the ANZUS Pact and the treaty with the Philippines.

¹⁹ For figures on American economic and military assistance to the Republic of Korea from 1949 to 1970, see Hearings, American-Korean Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C. 1971), 15–16.

²⁰ The Nixon Administration did not entirely discount the possibility mat South Korea might exploit a border incident for the purpose of preventing American troop reductions. Although the reductions were announced in advance of the talks as a non negotiable item, American officials patiently discussed the matter with President Park for seven months. Pardy as a precautionary move, the remaining U.S. forces were moved down from the DMZ so as to prevent any “automatic” involvement in a conflict.

²¹ Se-Jin, Kim, “Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and its Political and Economic Im pact,” Asian Survey, x (fune 1970).Google Scholar Details of the bargain are revealed in Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. 1970), 1539–49.

²² Kim, Joungwon Alexander, “A Comparative Study of the Role of a Leader in Political Development: Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Kim Il-song in North Korea,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Johns Hopkins University 1967), 469–74.Google Scholar Rhee recalled that towards the end of the Yi dynasty, competing internal factions had sought external aid and thereby contributed to the loss of Korean sovereignty.

²³ Most of the criticism and suggestions for reform were presented in the so-called Conlon report. United States Foreign Policy. Asia, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C. 1959).

²⁴ The Eisenhower Administration did, however, express its sympathy with the violent student uprising against Rhee in April 1960, and thereby possibly influenced Rhee's decision to step down.

²⁵ Henderson (fn. 12), 186. One source maintains that the UN/U.S. commander in South Korea, General Magruder, had prepared a contingency plan to use ROK forces against a coup. Se-Jin, Kirn, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill 1971), 77–125.Google Scholar This is denied by American officials who were with the Seoul embassy at the time. They note, moreover, that Pentagon spokesmen were less critical of the coup leaders than were State Department officials.

²⁶ The section on North Korea is rather inconclusive due to the scarcity of information and the welter of different interpretations by various observers.

²⁷ Paige, Glenn D., The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford 1966), 41.Google Scholar

²⁸ Kim, Joungwon Alexander, “Soviet Policy in North Korea,” World Politics, XXII (January 1970), 242–44.Google Scholar

²⁹ Paige, Glenn D., “North Korea and Sino-Soviet Behavior,” in Doak Barnett, A., ed., Communist Strategies in Asia (New York 1963).Google Scholar

³⁰ The account of the Sino-Soviet mission to Pyongyang is based on the report of a North Korean defector. Paige (fn. 29), 239, accepts it as factual. Two South Korean observers express some skepticism: Kim (fn. 28), 248—although he confirms the visit in some detail in his dissertation (fn. 22), 530; and Koh, Byung Chul, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York 1969), 15.Google Scholar

³¹ American University, Foreign Area Studies, Area Handbook for North Korea (Washington, D.C. 1969), 386.Google Scholar

³² Paige (fn. 27), 242–43.

³³ Kuark, Yoon T., “North Korea's Industrial Development,” in Scalapino, Robert A., ed., North Korea Today (New York 1965), 61.Google Scholar

³⁴ Cho, Soon Sung, “The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies 1950–1965,” World Politics, XIX (January 1967), 222.Google Scholar

³⁵ Figures are based on American University (fn. 31), 367–70; Koh (fn. 30), 60; and Richer, Philippe, Chine et le tiers monde (Paris 1971), 362–68.Google Scholar

³⁶ One possibility which undoubtedly worried Park's government was that further American troop reductions from the South would be negotiated among the United States, Norm Korea, and the latter's allies in a quid pro quo manner. Cf. Abramowitz, Morton, Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers (London 1971), 21–22.Google Scholar

³⁷ Suhrke, Astri and Morrison, Charles E., “The Koreas: Bargaining from Balanced Strength,” World Today, XXVIII (November 1972).Google Scholar

³⁸ Hoffman, Stanley, The State of War (New York 1968), 138.Google Scholar

³⁹ The smaller ally may have felt compelled to demonstrate its intransigence primarily for domestic reasons; we are here concerned with the results of, rather than die motives for, “unreliable” behavior.