¹ According to statements by the Bonn government, 130,000 applications for volunteer service have been received.

² Gather, Gernot, Die Stunde der Jugend, Stuttgart, 1953, p. 21.Google Scholar

³ Dethleffsen, Erich and Helfer, Karl Heinrich, Soldatische Existenz Morgen, Bonn, 1953, p. 20.Google Scholar

⁴ Twenty generals and one admiral were executed and five other generals committed suicide after the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler. No Luftwaffe generals were murdered, but a few of them and a larger number of generals in the army took their own lives because of conflicts with Hitler earlier in the war. The number of younger officers who participated in the conspiracy and were killed thereafter is, of course, many times larger than that of the generals. See Folttmann, Josef, Opfergang der Generale, Berlin, 1952.Google Scholar

⁵ See Guderian's, HeinzSo geht es nicht, Heidelberg, 1951, p. 86. General Eisenhower's previous opinion was, of course, widely resented, as is evident in many German postwar publications.Google Scholar

⁶ “The purpose of the three-power decision was to relieve the pressure being exerted by West German veterans' associations on Dr. Adenauer to obtain the release of military war criminals and in so doing help the Chancellor win the forthcoming general elections” (New York Times, July 21, 1953).

⁷ Guderian, Heinz, Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden?, Göttingen, 1950Google Scholar; see also Guderian, So geht es nicht.

⁸ Wehrkraft im Zwiespalt, Göttingen, 1952.

⁹ As at the time of the great military reform after the Napoleonic victories over Prussia, Southern Germany again seems to be a better vantage point than Prussia from which to recognize clearly the faults of the old military tradition and advocate a new beginning. The most important and most radical recent reformist writings are Schweppenburg, Leo Freiherr Geyr von, Gebrochenes Schwert, Berlin, 1952Google Scholar; Etterlin, Frido von Senger und, “Von Schlieffen zur Europa Armee,” Aussenpolittk, March 1952Google Scholar; and Knauss, Robert, “Von Geist eines deutschen Kontingents,” Europäische Sicherheit, March 1951.Google Scholar

¹⁰ A poor slogan for such a reformed army, Armee ohne Pathos, was provided by the title of a book by Adelbert Weinstein, Frankfurt, 1951. The response of the more conservative elements of the old military elite may be gauged from the critical discussion of that book by Sodenstern, Georg von, “Bürgersoldaten,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, June 1952.Google Scholar See also Bürger und Landesverteidigung, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, and the preliminary reports (mimeographed) on the conferences in Andernach, March 19–20, 1952, on military structure, and in Wiesbaden, June 18–19, 1952, on problems of education, organized by the Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, Frankfurt am Main.

¹¹ The more searching books include Heusinger, Adolph, Befehl im Widerstreit, Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1950Google Scholar, and Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln, Bonn, 1950.Google Scholar For contrast, compare the memoirs by Kesselring and Rendulic.

¹² For example, Felix M. Steiner, Die Wehridee des Abendlandes, and the booklets published by Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde in which Steiner played a leading role—especially Ja oder Nein zum Verteidigungsbeitrag, Munich, 1952.

¹³ For example, Dethleffsen, Erich, Das Wagnis der Freiheit, Stuttgart, 1952Google Scholar; Blumentritt, Günther, Deutsches Soldatentum im Europäischen Rahmen, Geissen, 1952Google Scholar; Müller-Brandenburg, H., Neutralität?, Berlin, 1952.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The members of the reformist military opposition differ, of course, in their attitudes toward labor and Socialism.

¹⁵ Op. cit., pp. 37ff.

¹⁶ “Strategische Gedenken zur Gegenwart,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, May 1951.

¹⁷ For example, the CDU Deputy Strauss said in the July 195a debate, “What we must demand, if we are willing to say ‘yes’ to the treaty on the European Defense Community, is a clear European strategy with especial regard for the conditions in Germany as the last partner.” Again, “We expect of the Federal Government that it will press successfully for a strategic conception in which Germany cannot become the theater of a conflict.” (Deutscher Bundestag Record, p. 9,858.) Similar views on the strategy of European defense have been expressed occasionally in public by spokesmen of smaller NATO powers which fear being the first victims of a Soviet attack.

¹⁸ Rumpf, Hans, Der hochrote Hahn, 1952.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Panse, Friedrich, Angst und Schreck, Stuttgart, 1952, p. 189.Google Scholar

²⁰ Similarly, critical British writings by Paget and others on the issues of war crimes and unconditional surrender are popular in Germany. Paget's book on Manstein was serialized in a German newspaper.

²¹ For example, General Haider is of the opinion that A- and H-bombs cannot be used in areas one wants to occupy (Bor, Peter, Gespräche mit Halder, Wiesbaden, 1950, p. 248)Google Scholar; General Steiner suggests that the effectiveness of atomic bombing of Soviet targets has been rendered negligible by the vastness of the area to be attacked and by dispersion (op. cit., p. 46); General Guderian states that A-bombs are not usable in the vicinity of one's own troops because of radioactivity (So geht es nicht, p. 23). The best discussions that have appeared on the subject in Germany have not come from generals: Günter Bertrand, “Die H-Bombe,” Frankfurter Hefte, January 1953; Bericht über die Erste Wissenschaftlich-Technische Tagung der Total Kom. Ges, Foerstner Co. (August 10–11, 1951), Ladenburg-Mannheim. The Christmas issue, 1952, of the Deutsche Soldatenzeitung contained an article by J. F. C Fuller arguing that possession of the A-bomb by both sides was likely to lead to its use by neither side in a future war and might render war impossible. The November 1953 issue of Aussen-politik contained a German translation of the Foreign Affairs (July 1953) article by J. Robert Oppenheimer under the title, “Atomwaffen und die Politik Amerikas,” and an essay by Paul Scheffer, “Das Thema der Atombomben,” in which the development of atomic weapons was discussed. Der Flieger (September 1953) published a report on a lecture by General B. G. Nordenskjoeld, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Air Force, on changes in land warfare to be expected in consequence of the tactical employment of atomic bombs.

²² For a good survey, see Volursus, “Die Geheimwaffen der Soviet-Union,” Flugwelt, November 1953.

²³ Testimony of General Alfred M. Gruenther, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 1, 1953.

²⁴ See New York Times, February 25, 1953.

²⁵ The first test of a “tactical” A-bomb at Yucca Flats, Nevada, April 22, 1952, was widely reported in the United States. In more than thirty of the most widely read West German newspapers that reported the news briefly, only one (Süddeutsche Zeitung) carried an editorial—only because it wished to stress the fact that the test had been televised in the United States.