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³ Jervis, , “Security Regimes,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 362CrossRefGoogle Scholar–68; Elrod, Richard B., “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics 28 (January 1976), 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar–74; Lauren, Gordon, “Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy,” in George, Alexander, with others, Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 31–64Google Scholar. Paul Schroeder argues that, contrary to the commonly held view, Metternich did not fit the description of a concert statesman. See Schroeder, , Mettemich's Diplomacy at its Zenith (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 251Google Scholar–66 and throughout. Matthew Anderson argues that Alexander I is the best model of such a statesman who had “a real sense of European responsibilities and a willingness to make sacrifices to meet them.” See Anderson, , “Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821–41,” in Sked, Alan, ed., Europe's Balance of Power, 1815–1848 (London: Macmillan, 1979), 82Google Scholar.

⁴ For a somewhat different list of criteria, see Claude, Inis, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 90–91Google Scholar.

⁵ The frequent argument that the balance of power assumes that states seek to maximize their power is unnecessary and leads to confusion. See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 118Google Scholar, 126, and Keohane, Robert O., “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Finifter, Ada, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), 514Google Scholar–15.

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⁹ Jervis (fn. 2), 167–86. Note that this is not the same as saying that the chances for cooperation increase as the payoffs for cooperation increase and those for defection decrease. It is equally important that payoffs for outcomes in which one side defects and the other cooperates be moderate—that the former not gain too much or the latter suffer too greatly.

¹⁰ Medlicott, W. N., Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 18Google Scholar.

¹¹ Serious threats of war were made on several occasions. See, for example, the incidents and attitudes discussed in Bullen, Roger, Palmerston, Guizot, and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: Athlone, 1974), 54Google Scholar; Temperley, Harold, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827 (London: Cass, 1966), 81–83Google Scholar, 371 Craig, Gordon, “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” in Bury, J. T. P., ed., New Cambridge Modern History, X, The Zenith of European Power, 1830–70 (New York: Cambridge Universit y Press, 1960), 254Google Scholar–57.

¹² Blainey, Geoffrey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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¹⁵ As early as May 1946 the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, understood this. He noted that one cost of keeping Germany divided was that “we should have lost the one factor which might hold us and the Russians together, viz. the existence of a single Germany which would be in the interest of us both to hold down.” Quoted in Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 268Google Scholar; emphasis in original. French strength after 1815 as a source of cohesion of the concert is discussed in Roy Bridge, “Allied Diplomacy in Peacetime: The Failure of the Congress 'System,' 1815–23,” in Sked (fn. 3), 34–53.

¹⁶ For discussions of how American domestic constraints affected the chances of Soviet-American cooperation after World War II, see Dallek, Robert, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979Google Scholar); Gaddis, John, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, igqi-iyqj (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972Google Scholar); and George, Alexander, “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy,” in Holsti, Ole, Siverson, Randolph, and George, Alexander, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 233Google Scholar–62.

¹⁷ Waltz, Kenneth, “The Stability of a Bipolar W'odd,” Daedalus 93 (Summer 1964Google Scholar), and Waltz (fn. 5).

¹⁸ Ibid., 125–26; Walt, Stephen, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9 (Spring 1985), 3–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

¹⁹ Factors beyond our structural model have to be taken into account for a complete explanation of the difference between the British and French positions. On this topic, one of the earliest discussions still remains unsurpassed: Wolfers, Arnold, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940Google Scholar). For a discussion of the extent to which France was a revisionist state after 1815, see Roger Bullen, “France and Europe, 1815–48: The Problem of Defeat and Recovery,” in Sked (fn. 3), 112–44.

²⁰ Quoted in Albrecht-Carrie, Rene, ed., The Concert of Europe (New York: Walker, 1968CrossRefGoogle Scholar), 32.

²¹ Quoted in Temperley (fn. 11), 135.

²² Thus, in late July 1914, French statesmen were disturbed to learn that Austria and Germany rejected a role for the other European powers in the dispute between Austria and Serbia; this indicated a non-cooperative approach and a desire to inflict a settlement that others would find objectionable. See Keiger, John, France and the Origins of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1984), 153Google Scholar. For a discussion of the relationship between cooperative processes and cooperative outcomes, see Deutsch, Morton, “Fifty Years of Conflict,” in Festinger, Leon, ed., Retrospection on Social Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985Google Scholar)

²³ Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1914: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Knorr, Klaus, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227Google Scholar–62.

²⁴ This is not to deny Hinsley's argument that the British realized that their Continental partners' habit of demanding too extensive collaboration would make the concert impractical. Only a somewhat looser arrangement, the British felt, would allow the concert to succeed. See Hinsley (fn. 13), 202–12.

²⁵ Quoted in Albrecht-Carrie (fn. 20), 109.

²⁶ Ibid, 69.

²⁷ Jones, R. V., Most Secret War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 23–26Google Scholar.

²⁸ Buchheim, Robert and Caldwell, Dan, The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission: Description and Appraisal (Providence, RI: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, May 1983Google Scholar), Working Paper No. 2.

²⁹ For instances of deception, especially on Metternich's part, see Schroeder (fn. 3), 46, 82–83, 207, 212, 219.

³⁰ Van Evera (fn. 8).

³¹ See Downs and others, “Arms Races and Cooperation,” pp. 118–46 of this collection; Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 67Google Scholar–83, 354–55.

³² Bullen (fn. 11), 81, 93; also see Craig (fn. 11), 257.

³³ Kagan, Donald, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 30Google Scholar.