¹ Métral, André, “'Le Plan Schuman Constitue un Saut dans l'Inconnu,'” Nouvelle Revue de l'Economie Contemporaine, Nos. 16–17Google Scholar: Le Plan Schuman (no month; 1951) (cited hereafter as Plan Schuman), p. 41.

² European Movement, European Economic Conference of Westminster, April 20th–25th, 1949: General Account and Resolutions, pp. 17–18; a good account of the Westminster Resolutions, stressing similarities and differences between them and the provisions of the Coal and Steel Treaty, is given in Conseil Economique, Etudes et Travaux: Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Paris, 1951Google Scholar (cited hereafter as CE., Communauté), p. 56.

³ Jean Constant, “Westminster,” Les Industries Mécaniques, No. 51 (May 1949), pp. 1–4.Google Scholar

⁴ Quoted by René Mayer, then Vice President of the Council and Minister of Finance, during the ratification debate in the National Assembly on December 7, 1951 (Journal Officiel [cited hereafter as J.O.], Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale, 1951, p. 8, 940). The ratification debates in trie National Assembly took place on December 6, 7, and 11, 1951, and are recorded in ibid., pp. 8,854–98, 8,911–23, 8,926–74, 8,999–9,030, 9,048–52. For the debates in the upper house, held on March 25, 27, and April 1, 1952, see J.O., Débats Parlementaires, Conseil de la République, 1952, pp. 713–41, 748–67, 793–840, 843–50. Unless otherwise noted, all references made hereafter to the debates and votes in either house of parliament are to the pp. cited above. For a general account of the debates, see Pickles, Dorothy, French, Politics, London and New York, 1953, pp. 204–9.Google Scholar

⁵ Bulletin du Conseil National du Patronat Français, IV, No. 54 (July 20-August 5, 1950), p. 22. There seems to have been no discussion of the resolution that was passed. It is true that the General Assembly of the CNPF, like other similar bodies, is an organ for the dissemination of information among the affiliates rather than for policy-forming.

⁶ See Le Monde des Affaires en France de 1830 à Nos Jours, Paris, 1952, p. 122. This work contains (pp. 80–130) an excellent survey of the development of the French steel industry, showing also the business connections of the leaders of the Steel Associations and its affiliates.

⁷ Decree of June 28, 1947, J.O., Lois et Décrets, 1947, pp. 6,234–35.

⁸ For the cartel activities of French steel industry before the war, see Hexner, Ervin, The International Steel Cartel, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1943, pp. 123–24Google Scholar; and Lederer, J. J., “La Sidérurgie Européenne et les Cartels avant le Plan Schuman,” Politique Etrangère, XVI (1951), pp. 397–412.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Among those who were ousted was the Secretary General of the Association, Jean Constant. His editorials, “Le Plan Schuman” and “Le Problème de l'Acier,” in the Association's official bulletin. Les Industries Mécaniques (No. 64 [July 1950], pp. 1–4, and No. 70 [February 1951], pp. 1–4). listed the reasons why the engineering industries viewed the Schuman Plan with favor.

¹⁰ This threatened temporarily the internal cohesion of the Council's active minority: for about two years the influential Association of Electrical Equipment Industries all but withdrew from the CNPF, partly because it did not wish to be identified with the defense of steel interests in the political arena.

¹¹ The total investments in the steel industry between 1947 and 1951 amounted to 262 billion francs, 30 per cent of which came from public funds; see Commissariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement, Cinq Ans d'Exécution du Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement de l'Union Française, Paris, 1952Google Scholar —Interesting details on the relationship between industry and the Monnet Office are given in Harbold, William H., “The Monnet Plan: The French Experiment in National Economic Planning” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1953), p. 128Google Scholar, et passim.

¹² For bitter criticism of the role of Jean Monnet and his staff, see Lavergne, Bernard, Le Plan Schuman: Exposé Critique de sa Portée Economique et Politique, Paris, 1951, pp. 10–13Google Scholar (one of tne most violent of all attacks on the Schuman Plan, written by a professor at the Law School of the University of Paris); Pierre-Etienne Flandin, , “Les Aspects Politiques du Plan,” Plan Schuman, p. 6Google Scholar; other writers, ibid., pp. 13, 38, 66; the deputy André, Pierre, “Le Pool Acier-Charbon: Une Synarchie Internationale Omnipotente,” Tour d'Horizon, No. 24 (January 1953), pp. 29–36Google Scholar; and the senator Ernest Pezet during the debate in the Council of the Republic.

¹³ For the arguments used by industry, see François Perroux, “Le Pool du Charbon et de l'Acier et le Plan Schuman: Illusions et Réalités,” Plan Schuman, p. 34; Robert Fabre, “Le Charbon Français dans la Communauté Européenne Charbon-acier,” ibid., p. 47. For the opposite point of view, see, among others, C.E., Communauté, pp. 30–31.

¹⁴ J.O., Bulletin du Conseil Economique, November 29, 1951, p. 172. For a summary of the employers' criticism of the anti-cartel provision, see CE., Communauté, pp. 64–67, 95–97. The most forceful critique was formulated by a working group of ACADI in the Association's Bulletin, No. 45 (February 1951), pp. 54–75. It is likely that M. Charvet at least co-authored the unsigned report.

¹⁵ See Lavergne, , op.cit., p. 10Google Scholar; Flandin, , op.cit., p. 10.Google Scholar Since his role under Vichy prevented him from taking an active part in political life, M. Flandin has become a noted columnist of the employers' press. For a balanced account of the advantages that may accrue to the Ruhr industries under the Schuman Plan, see Sethur, Frederick, “Schuman Plan and Ruhr Coal,” Political Science Quarterly, LXVII (1952), pp. 503–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Goriély, Georges (“L'Opinion Publique et le Plan Schuman,” Revue Française de Science Politique, III [1953])Google Scholar concludes (p. 592) that the root of all opposition to the treaty was unregenerated nationalism; Aron, Raymond (“Problems of European Integration,” Lloyd's Bank Review, No. 28 [1953], p. 11)Google Scholar is of the opinion that the French opponents “feared above all else” stepped-up exports from other participating countries.

¹⁷ For a summary of these arguments, see CE., Communauté, pp. 27–37, 40–42; and Lacoste, Louis, “Notre Fer en Péril,” Plan Schuman, pp. 49–52.Google Scholar Many of the data submitted by the trade associations were disputed by the report of the Economic Council, For an objective evaluation of the facts involved, see Mendershausen, Horst, “First Tests of the Schuman Plan,” Review of Economics and Statistics, xxxv (1953), pp. 272ff.Google Scholar, which points out inter alia that only 4 per cent of Germany's iron ore requirements come from Community countries. See also the complete data presented by Zawadzki, K. K. F., “The Economics of the Schuman Plan,” Oxford Economic Papers, v (1953). pp. 157–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ See Schuman Plan, pp. 7, 66–72, and passim.

¹⁹ See Proceedings of the First International Conference of Manufacturers, Sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States of America, New York, 1953, pp. 234–35, 316; Lavergne, , op.cit., pp. 91, 99.Google Scholar

²⁰ Lavergne, , op.cit., p. 58Google Scholar; ACADI, op.cit., pp. 73–75Google Scholar; René Fould, Point de Vue d'un français sur le Plan Schuman, Paris, n.d.

²¹ L'Information Politique, Economique et Financière, February 6, 1951. This news paper account, it is true, eliminates the part of M. Fould's statement which was favorable to the Schuman Plan.—As early as 1950, Diebold, William Jr, (“Imponderables of the Schuman Plan,” Foreign Affairs, XXIX [1950], p. 121)Google Scholar, suggested that French industry might not keep a united front in regard to the Schuman Plan, “since individual firms may be affected in very different ways.”

²² Among them, the magazine Fédération, which, although presumably devoted to the cause of European federation, voiced much of the employers' criticism of the Schuman Plan; see, e.g., Harmel, C., “Le Traité Schuman ou l'Europe Travestie,” Fédération, VIII (1951), pp. 757–68.Google Scholar The same magazine also published articles in favor of the treaty, but had opened the discussion in November 1950 with the very critical analysis of Professor Perroux, reproduced later in Plan Schuman (see n. 13 above).

²³ See L'Humanité, December 5, 1951; Le Peuple, September 20, 1950; and especially J.O., Débats, Conseil de la République, April 2, 1952, pp. 794–95.

²⁴ For a discussion of this episode, see Lapeyère, Roger, “Un Specimen de la France Moderne,” La Révolution Prolétarienne, XXI (1952), pp. 17.65–23.71Google Scholar; and “Documents à Conserver,” Documents Franco-Européens, IV (January 1952), pp. 5–6. This writer has seen the materials in question and the letters of protest addressed by M. Charvet to persons connected with the Documents.

²⁵ For the text of the employers' amendment, the debates and votes in the Economic Council, see CE., Communauté, pp. 150–61, 166–69; J.O., Bulletin du Conseil Economique, November 29 and 30, 1951, pp. 172–92. Cf. also the interesting press release by the CNPF in Bulletin du Conseil National du Patronat Français, vi (February 20, 1952), p. 23.Google Scholar

²⁶ For the significance of the RPF split, see Neumann, Robert G., “Formation and Transformation of Gaullism in France,” Western Political Quarterly, vi (1953), pp. 266–68.Google Scholar

²⁷ Among the pièces de résistance were, e.g., an article critical of the Community by Randall, Clarence B., “European Steel: Monopoly in the Making,” Atlantic Monthly, CLXXXVIII (October 1951), pp. 34–38Google Scholar; a warning by Van Zeeland; a report by the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany about the reemergence of the Ruhr; and the issue of the Nouvelle Revue de l'Economie Contemporaine mentioned above.

²⁸ M. Henri Lafond, one of the politically most active board members of the CNPF, is also on the board of directors of the Tréfileries.

²⁹ See J.O., Débats Parlementaires, Assemblee Nationale, January 3, 1950, p, 26.

³⁰ M. Jean Constant, the dismissed Secretary General of the National Association of Engineering Industries.

³¹ See the statement by Schuman before the National Assembly and by M. Uri, one of Monnet's principal advisers, in CE., Communauté, p. 116. The significance of this point is stressed by both Aron, (op.cit., p. 6)Google Scholar and by Mendershausen, (op.cit., p. 271)Google Scholar, who comments: “By a stroke of genius, the treaty bypassed the negatives of contemporary policy debates and established an institutional setting to which even the dogmatic extremists could not easily object.”

³² The Bulletin du Conseil National du Patronat Français, VI (February 20, 1952), p. 22, admitted that the majority in favor of ratification had been “surprisingly large.”

³³ This is the conclusion reached after a very careful investigation of the questions involved, in Groupe d'Etude de l'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles, , La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Paris, 1953, esp. pp. 316–22.Google Scholar In 1950 a French public opinion poll revealed that only 9 per cent of those questioned were able to describe the essential features of the Schuman Plan. Among those informed, only 25 per cent approved of the Plan. See Sondages, No. 1 (1951), pp. 23–24.

³⁴ Both the President of the Republic and Premier René Mayer have spoken about the parliament elected in 1951 as a “corporatist Chamber,” dominated by the interest groups.

³⁵ To this point, see Parker, William N., “The Schuman Plan—A Preliminary Prediction,” International Organization, VI (1952), p. 394.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Bulletin du Conseil National du Patronat Français, VI (July 20-August 5, 1952), p. 27; Allocution Prononcée devant la Presse par M. Pierre Ricard … le 10 Décembre 1952; Le Monde, January 11–12, 1953.

³⁷ La Volonté du Commerce et de l'Industrie, February 1953.

³⁸ Officials of the Steel Association congratulated the French cabinet for having chosen more wisely than the other participating countries, since the latter had not nominated any industrialist to the High Authority. This was tantamount to saying that only the French government had ignored, or at best arbitrarily interpreted, an important treaty provision.

³⁹ See Combat, February 4, 1952.

⁴⁰ See Le Monde, September 17, 1952; and, for the so-called law, Pinay, J.O., Lois et Décrets, 1952, p. 7,227.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Representative of this approach is C. J. Gignoux; see, e.g., his L'Industrie Française, Paris, 1952, pp. 174–76. M. Gignoux, who before the war was president of the CNPF's predecessor, still holds authority with some sectors of the employers' movement. His views on the point under discussion are shared by several trade associations, especially those which have formed the Comité Européen pour le Progrès Economique et Social (CEPES).

⁴² For a quite impressive exposé of his thoughts, see his address, “La Mécanique Française en face des Problèmes Nationaux et Européens,” supplement to the March-April 1953 issue of Les Industries Mécaniques.

⁴³ See the thoughtful analysis by Diebold, William Jr, “Where Is the Schuman Plan Heading?”, European Union, III (August 1953), pp. 8–15Google Scholar; and Mendershausen, op.cit.

⁴⁴ See J.O., Débats, Conseil de la République, December 17, 1952, pp. 2,504–20, 2,526–32.

⁴⁵ See European Coal and Steel Community, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress, ist Session, June 4–5, 1953, Washington, 1953, esp. pp. 18, 21.Google Scholar On other occasions M. Monnet has expressed himself far more realistically; see, e.g., Le Monde, April 21, 24, and 25, 1953.