¹ Paul Reynaud called it “la plus humiliante défaite de notre histoire.”

² On August 29, 1946 the National Assembly voted unanimously to set up a commission to inquire into “l'ensemble des événements politiques, économiques, diplomatiques et militaires qui, de 1933 à 1945, ont précédé, accompagné et suivi l'armistice, afin de déterminer les responsabilités encourues et de proposer, s'il y a lieu, les sanctions politiques et judiciaires.”—Journal Officiel, Aug. 30, 1946, pp. 3389–3402. The commission consists of sixty members of the Assembly and eighteen representatives of the Résistance. It began its inquiry on Feb. 11, 1947, but no findings have as yet been made public.

³ An example is General Gamelin's, M. G.Servir, Tome III: “La Guerre, septembre 1939-mai 1940” (Paris, 1947)Google Scholar, which one reviewer described as “habilement calculé pour décourager dès l'abord toute critique malveillante.”—Reime de Dense Nationale, May 1948.

⁴ Paris, 1946; English translation, 1949. Professor Bloch was shot by the Germans as a Resistant in June 1944.

⁵ By now there must be a million books on the French revolutionary period, and they still keep coming. Tourneaux' Bibliographie de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française fills five volumes.

⁶ These included: 7 capital ships, 2 aircraft carriers, 19 cruisers, 70 destroyers, and 77 submarines. Much of this fleet was to be sunk later by the French themselves to keep it out of British and, later, German hands.

⁷ See Jacomet, R. (Contrôleur Général de l'Armée), L'Armement de la France, 1936–39, Paris, 1945.Google Scholar

⁸ In the levée en masse decreed by the Revolutionary government on August 23, 1792: “The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to rouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.”

⁹ “C'est ce sentiment de la supériorité morale qui, précisément, donne à l'Armée française la certitude de la victoire. … L'instinct collectif chez l'Allemand est ressenti comme l'oppression d'une masse immense, force obscure qui s'impose à chacun et lui enlève toute volontépropre. … Le Français, au contraire, ne se sent vraiment à l'aise collectivement que dans des réunions d'hommes restreintes, dont les individus lui sont connus, il supporte la discipline collective, non comme une force de coercition mais comme une limitation consentie.”—La France Militaire, Centre d'Informations Documentaires, Paris, 1940, p. 240.

¹⁰ Lt. Col. Vandaele, F., “L'Armée belge au Canal Albert,” Revue de Défense Nationale, June 1948.Google Scholar The Belgian forces consisted of 18 infantry divisions, 2 chasseur divisions, 1 corps of cavalry with 2 motorized divisions, 2 regiments of cyclists, 2 regiments of fort artillery, 1 brigade of field artillery, 2 antiaircraft regiments, 3 aviation regiments.

¹¹ But on June 4, in the ruins of Dunkirk, the Germans captured 80,000 French. See Zevaès, A., Histoire de Six Ans 1938–1944, Paris, 1944, p. 82.Google Scholar

¹² See Cére, R., La seconde guerre mondiale, Paris, 1947Google Scholar; Schwob, A., L'Affaire Pétain, edition de la Maison Française, 1944.Google Scholar

¹³ Many of these individual units, though cut off from any central command, continued to fight heroically but without hope. See, for example, the story of Pierre Keller (Général de division), La division de Metz, 42 D. I., pendant la bataille de France (Paris, 1947); Commandant Bourin, N., Le second drame de Maubeuge (Paris, 1947)Google Scholar; Laurencie, General de la, Les opérations du lile Corps d'Armée (Paris, 1947).Google Scholar See also Col. de Bardies, La campagne 1939–1940, and General Doumenc, , Dunkerque et la campagne de Flandre (Paris, 1947).Google Scholar All these are, of course, written by interested parties and should be read with caution.

¹⁴ Among the patriots who were prevented from escaping and who paid with their lives was the Minister of Interior Georges Mandel. For studies of this remarkable man, see Coblentz, P., Georges Mandel (Paris, 1946)Google Scholar; Suarez, G., Nos seigneurs et maîtres (Paris, 1937)Google Scholar; Carrère, P., Profls (Paris, 1937)Google Scholar; P. Morel, Les grands hommes de l'Union Nationale. Mandel did manage to go to North Africa to organize a resistance there, but the Pétainists brought him back and delivered him to the Germans who, in turn, handed him over to the French fascist miliciens who murdered him on July 7, 1944.

¹⁵ A day later another French general, Gaulle, Charles de, whose book on mechanized warfare, vers l Armée de Métier (Paris, 1934)Google Scholar, was ignored by the French High Command but not by the Germans, spoke different words. Addressing the French people from London, whither he had escaped, he said: “Has the last word been said? No! The same means which have vanquished us can some day bring us victory. Struck today by a mechanical force, we can in the future win with a superior mechanical force. The destiny of the world lies there.”

¹⁶ Of all the major fronts on which the Germans fought in World War II, the one of France in 1940 was the least costly in casualties. See Padover, Saul K.: Experiment in Germany, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, pp. 266–69Google Scholar; “Was Germany Beaten?” Toronto Star Weekly, April 6, 1946; “Is Germany Really Kaput?” Science Digest, May 1946.

¹⁷ In a French public opinion poll concerning the weakness of France in 1939, 31% held the people responsible, 18% the politicians, 13% politics, 8% treason, 8% national disunity, 8% low birth rate. See Sondage de l'Opinion Publique française, June 15, 1945.

¹⁸ See Cugnac, General de, Les quarante jours, Paris, 1947.Google Scholar For a critique of the “extreme faiblesse du commandement,” see Col. Bardies, de, La campagne 1939–1940 (Paris, 1947).Google Scholar

¹⁹ “La défaite de 1940 a son origine moins dans notre infériorité du moment en moyens matériels que dans une éclipse de la pensée militaire française durant les vingt années quise sont écoulées entre les deux conflits mondiaux.”—T. Albord, “Appel à l'Imagination,” Revue de défense nationale, August-September 1949.

²⁰ See memoirs, Giraud's, Un seul but: la Victoire (Paris, 1949).Google Scholar The New York Herald Tribune (Paris ed., July 6, 1949) reviewer wrote of Giraud: “At heart he agreed with Pétain in many things, notably in maining a firm, disciplined, patriarchal society in France.”

²¹ For a sympathetic biography of Pétain, see the book by his Directeur du Cabinet, Tracou, Jean: Le Maréchal aux Liens (Paris, 1949).Google Scholar

²² Listed in the anti-Semitic sheet La Libre Parole, Dec. 19, 1898.

²³ Colonel Henry confessed the forgery, was arrested, and committed suicide. See Goguel, F., La Politique des Partis sous la Hie République, Paris, 1946, p. 92.Google Scholar

²⁴ On May 25, 1940, a month before Pétain asked for an armistice and while France still had her main forces intact, Weygand complained: “La France a commis l'immense erreur d'entrer en guerre n'ayant ni le matériel qu'il fallait, ni la doctrine militaire qu'il fallait.”—Les Documents secrets de l État-Général Français, p. 140; Bloch, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁵ This incident took place at Cangey, on June 11, during a Cabinet meeting at which Weygand was present. He said: “Je suis en mesure d'apprendre au Conseil qu'une émeute communiste va éclater à Paris. M. Thorez est arrivé, et, ce soir, monsieur le Président, il couchera à l'Elysée.” Mandel, in charge of police and security, replied promptly: “Je suisobligé de répondre au généralissime que les renseignements qu'il vient de nous fournir sont absolument inexacts.” Weygand: “Douteriez-vous de ma parole?” Mandel: “Il ne s'agit point de votre parole; mais ma source de renseignements est supérieure à la votre. J'ai eu, il y a à peine quelques minutes, une conversation téléphonique avec M. le préfet de police Langeron, et celui-ci m'a dit qu'en dépit de la gravité de l'heure, la population parisienne fait preuve d'un calme admirable. Au reste, il est aisé d'en avoir la confirmation immédiate: il suffit d'appeler au téléphone M. Langeron et M. Le Président de la République tiendra larécepteur afin qu'on ne puisse pas douter de la parole d'un civil.” This was done, and, while Weygand sat in silence, the Police Prefect of Paris confirmed by telephone that the capital was calm and that there was no sign of Communist activity.

²⁶ Anti-British feeling existed also among the generals. When Giraud, for example, was spirited out of France in a submarine, the first question he asked was whether it was British or American; if British, he said, he would not care to set foot in it. (Personal conversation with the submarine commander.)

²⁷ At least three admirals were later condemned by French courts: Admiral Platon was executed in 1944; Admiral de Laborde was condemned to death but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment; Admiral Esteva is now in perpetual detention.

²⁸ Cot, Triumph of Treason, Chicago, Ziff-Davis, 1944.

²⁹ Darnand was a professional criminal who, under Vichy, became chief of the fascist militia. “Darnand … est un ancien cagoulard, mais il est surtout un bandit. Compromis dans des affaires d'assassinat, entrepeneur louche de transport, il avait à la préfecture de Police un dossier spécialement chargé.”—Aron, Raymond, De L'Armistice à l'Insurrection Nationale, Paris, 1945, p. 337.Google Scholar

³⁰ Juenger's diary, in German, was serialized in a Swiss journal in 1949.

³¹ On July 30, 1940, Pétain set up a Cour Supreme de Justice to try men like Blura, Daladier, Gamelin, etc., in order to discredit the Republic. This led to the famous Riom trial, which boomeranged against the Pétainists. As the Nazi Pariser Zeitung (April 3, 1942) remarked ironically: “The French Generals have been no more successful in the court than in the field.”

³² Forces Françaises Intérieures, the group name of the French army of Resistance.

³³ “En fait, la France entière avait commercé avec l'ennemi et la classe ouvrière n'avait pu subsister qu'en se mettant à la solde de l'ennemi. à ce subjet une sorte de compromis fut tacitement conclu entre gaullistes et communistes, chacun défendant sa clientèle. Les uns ne reprocheraient pas aux ouvriers d'avoir consciencieusement fignolé pendant quatre ans des camions et des tanks pour les ‘boches'; les autres ne poursuivraient pas à boulets rouges les grands industriels qui avaient gagné des milliards, grâce au travail des ouvriers.” Galtier-Boissière, J., Histoire de la Guerre 1939–1945, Vol. V, p. 391.Google Scholar

³⁴ lbid. “De tous les hauts militaires poursuivis, aucun n'a été fusillé. … Ni un gros industriel, ni un général, ni un magistrat ne serait envoyé au poteau.”

³⁵ This number does not include the “Reign of Terror” instituted by the Communists in the summer and autumn of 1944. How many people were murdered by them and by the criminals who infiltrated the ranks of the Resistance, is not certain. The figures given vary from 80,000 to 100,000, but this is probably an exaggeration. See American Mercury, April 1946; a letter in Aux écoutes, February 28, 1947; La Révolution Prolétarienne, August 1947. All that can be said for sure is that several thousand people were killed without trial.

³⁶ Of these, 2,777 were condemned to perpetual forced labor; 10,434 to a specified period of forced labor; 2,713 to confinement.

³⁷ See Figaro, April 29, 1949.

³⁸ Hayes, Carlton J. H., France A Nation of Patriots, New York, Columbia University Press, 1930.Google Scholar There is now a need for a clarifying analysis between patriotism and class identification. Numerous Frenchmen who collaborated with the Nazis unquestionably did so for reasons that seemed to them to be sincerely patriotic; the same can be said for those who killed their compatriots because they collaborated with the enemy. Under these circumstances the whole concept of “patriotism” obviously requires investigation.

³⁹ One must mention a number of other leading individuals sentenced by various courts: Henri Beraud, writer; Bernard Fay, historian and former curator of the Bibliothèque, who denounced fellow-Frenchmen to the Nazis as Freemasons; Stephane Lauzanne, former editor-in-chief of the newspaper Matin; Charles Maurras, director of Action Française and member of the French Academy; Robert Brasillach, editor of Je Suis Partout and a poet, shot on Feb. 6, 1945; Gaston Bergery, former ambassador to Turkey; Louis Auphan, an editor of Action Française, condemned by the Cour de Justice of Lyon to twenty years of hard labor; Jean Lousteau, speaker on Radio Paris, condemned to death on Nov. 30, 1945; Abel Hermant, author, condemned to life imprisonment on Dec. IS, 194S; Comte Armand de Chastenet de Puysegur, condemned to death in Oct. 1944, sentence commuted to life imprisonment on Dec. 19, 1945; Guy Bunau-Varilla, political editor of Matin, condemned for life in 1946; Jean Luchaire, editor, condemned to death in 1946; Michel Detroyat, aviator, condemned to national degradation for life in 1946; Robert Peyronnet, radio producer, condemned to twenty years hard labor in 1946; Jean Berthelot, minister under Laval, condemned to two years and national degradation; Hubert Lagardelle, another Laval minister, condemned to forced labor for life; Cayla, former governor of Madagascar, condemned to five years; Amédée Bussiere, prefect of police of Paris, condemned to forced labor for life; Admiral Auphan, for his rôle in the scuttling of the fleet at Toulon on Nov. 27, 1942, condemned to forced labor for life, but in absentia.

⁴⁰ “Le mouvement de concentration technique industrielle ne s'est pas poursuivi en France à un rythme aussi rapide qu'à l'étranger. … Ce faible dégré de concentration se traduit par l'usage réduit de la force motrice puisque 74.5% des établissements français ne sont pas dotés de la force motrice.” Hardy, J., La Crise Française, Paris, 1945, p. 198.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Dejussieu-Pontcarral, General, La Nation armée de la République Française, Paris, 1948.Google Scholar

⁴² A French intelligence report of Jan. 26, 1940 listed the Luftwaffe as having 5,150 planes of the line, of which 1,250 were fighters and about 2,500 bombers. Another 6,900 were in stock or in use by the aviation schools.

⁴³ “Lorsq'un avion sort d'usine, il est soumis à des essais de réception en vol. Tant que cetavion n'a pas été réceptionné, il appartient au constructeur. Au contraire, après réception, il appartient à l'état. C'est alors un avion pris en compte.” For the whole account, see P. Lyet and Lt. Col. de Cossé-Brissac, “Combien d'Avions Allemands contre combien d'Avions Français le mai 1940?” Revue de déjense nationale, June 1948.

⁴⁴ General Gamelin reported to him that, though German superiority in bombers was in proportion of 2.3 to 1, nevertheless the French and British aviation together were “en mesure, toute-fois, d'infliger des pertes telles à l'ennemi que celui-ci soit amené à renoncer en partie aux attaques de jour.” There was no ground whatever, either in the known tactics or in the known figures, for such an assumption.

⁴⁵ See Ferré, Colonel, Le défaut de l'Armure, Paris, 1949.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The bravery and skill of the French pilots were beyond question. In about forty days of combat they made 10,000 sorties and carried off 814 victories; but in the first three days of the blitz they lost 179 machines, almost half of the available craft. A total of 166 pilots, more than one-third of the total, were killed in action. See Lt. Col. Salesse, , L'Aviation de chasse française en 1939–1940, Paris, 1949Google Scholar; Paquier, P. (ed.), Les forces aériennes françaises de 1939 à 1945, Paris, 1949.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The French craft had a speed of 450 km per hour, as against 550 km of the German planes; in addition, 429 of them (and two days later, only 323) had to face 1,500 German machines. In bombers the French were outnumbered thirty-five to one.

⁴⁸ In this respect there have been some changes since the Liberation. Not only were a number of underground leaders, whose record was heroic, incorporated into the regular French Army as officers (despite the strong protest of the professionals), but there is now evidence of the realization that a democratic society has certain moral obligation to its soldiers. On May 27, 1949 Le Monde Militaire published a remarkable statement to this effect by X. Louis, Chaplain of the Invalides. He wrote: “Mon expérience de quatre années d'aumonier militaire m'amène à certifier que la cause la plus profonde de l'antimilitarisme d'une notable fraction de la nation réside dans l'irrespect de la dignité humaine. Le plus souvent, de la part des cadres de carrière, ce manque de respect est inconscient et non coupable: ce qui est d'autant plus grave. … Un chef doit avoir le souci du bien-être, de la santé, du moral de tous ceux dont il a la charge. Mais il doit avoir le souci majeur de leur dignité. … Le devoir le plus essentiel du chef vis-à-vis de ses subordonnés est, dans l'exercice même du commandement, de reconnaître leur valeur d'hommes. … Un mot maladroit, un manque d'égards, une expression dure ou méprisante peuvent semer aujourd'hui une rancune qui lèvera demain en clore. … Une injure dans la bouche d'un chef le déshonore et ouvre dans l'âme de l'inférieur une blessure inguérissable.”

⁴⁹ To remind oneself of this, one only has to look at some of the great monuments, such as the Arc de Triomphe and the Vendôme column, in Paris. The Latin inscription on the latter, a monument to Napoleon's Bella Germanica in 1805, has a magnificent sound of old-Roman triumph: TRIMESTRI SPATIO DUCTU SUO PROFLIGATI EX AERE CAPTO GLORIAE EXERCITUS MAXIMI DICAVIT. As a comment on the vanity of all such efforts, one may remark that 135 years later it took Hitler considerably less than a trimestri to achieve his triumph in France.

⁵⁰ At Bir-Hakeim in North Africa, May-June 1942, the French showed what they could really achieve when their fighting spirit was aroused. There the First Brigade of the Free French, commanded by General Koenig, dug in and held off the combined attacks of Italian tanks, Rommel's Panzers, and concentrated Stuka bombers. At a loss of 900 of their own men, they inflicted heavy damage on the Axis, and finally retired with two-thirds of their effectives, including the wounded, part of their matériel and 300 German and Italian prisoners.

⁵¹ See Le Monde, April 27 and 28, 1949; France-Soir, April 28, 1949.

⁵² See L'Armistice 12–16 juin 1940 (Témoignages et textes), éd. by Vexin (é;dition de Minuit: Paris, 1944), which raises the question of the absence of self-criticism in France and asks why, four years after the armistice, so many French still ignore the causes of the defeat.

⁵³ Professor Bloch's conclusion is that France's regeneration must come through the youth. “La France d'un nouveau printemps devra être la chose des jeunes. … Je n'aurai pas l'outrecuidance de leur tracer un programme. Ils en tireront eux-mêmes les lois du fond de leur cerveau et de leur cœur.”—Op. cit., p. 191.

⁵⁴ New York, éditions de la Maison Française, 1941.

⁵⁵ “C'était d'ailleurs les femmes qui paraissaient éprouver la douleur la plus profonde en face de la capitulation. … Les hommes cherchaient un dérivatif. Ils le trouvaient dans de méchantes accusations: c'est la faute à Blum. … La faute aux chefs de l'Armée. … ”—Ibid., p. 276. “Les prêtres disposant de l'unique tribune en France accusaient la vie facile d'avant guerre; le relâchement des moeurs, voir le divorce, d'être les causes de la catastrophe, penitence infligée par Dieu.”— Ibid., p. 281.

⁵⁶ Paris, 1945.

⁵⁷ “Les responsabilités de toutes ces erreurs doivent certainement être imputées à l'esprit théorique et peu réaliste des principaux chefs de l'Armée, toujours bornés aux méthodes de 1914.”—Ibid., p. 135.

⁵⁸ Angoulême, 1941.

⁵⁹ “Le grand coupable, nous le designons du doigt, c'est M. Albert Lebrun” [the man whom Laval and the collaborationists forced to resign!]. —Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁰ Published at Avignon (Aubanel Père), undated.

⁶¹ Published at Clermont-Ferrand, 1940. Typical extracts: “Les institutions ont corrompules hommes; il faut changer les institutions. Mais les hommes ont aussi corrompu les institutions; il faut changer les hommes” (Xavier Vallat). “Le plus grand crime qui ait été commis dans notre pays depuis longtemps, est certainement celui d'avoir déclaré la guerre” (Laval). “Si ce pays est descendu au point où il est tombé … il le doit à une décadence généralisée et il faut attribuer la responsabilité à cette éducation affreuse de l'opinion publique qui luia été faite par la presse, par la radio et par le système d'information. … C'est l'argent quia tout corrompu” (Flandin).

⁶² For a plaidoyer of the French episcopate, see Msgr. Guerry (Archbishop of Cambrai and Secretary of the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops of France), L'Église Catholique en France sous l'Occupation (Paris, 1947).

⁶³ See Noguères, Henri, La République Accuse, Paris, 1945Google Scholar; François, and Bourgin, Georges, Les Démocraties Contre le Fascisme, Paris, 1946Google Scholar; and Blum, Léon, L'Histoire Jugera, Montreal and Paris, 1945Google Scholar, which contains articles and utterances by him from 1932 to 1942, the most important of which are his statements before the Riom court in February and March 1942, during which, in effect, the Socialist leader turned tables on his Vichyite accusers. In general, Socialist defensiveness is due to the fact that many important members of their party held ministerial posts in the government up to 1939, and hence they bear a share of the total responsibility.

⁶⁴ See the typical Communist line in Bonté, Florimond, Le Chemin de l'Honneur, Paris, 1948.Google Scholar “Notre pays connaît les terribles conséquences de la politique criminelle suivie par des gouvernements indignes, responsables de la défaite et de l'occupation. … Situons les responsabilités: la clique des dirigeants”—a tract written by Thorez and Duelos, cited on p. 388.

⁶⁵ Aron, , Précis de l'Unité Française, Paris, 1945.Google Scholar In 1939, he writes, there was a kind of general decay; words took the place of action; everyone was concerned only with himself, his own career: “plus de culture, plus d'initiative, plus d'audace, plus de souci de l'état, ni de sens de la continuité du régime ou de la permanence française.”—p. 31. See also Schumann, , Honneur et Patri, Paris, 1946.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Flavian, C. L., De la Nuit vers la Lumière, Paris, 1946, p. 17.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Gen. Prioux, , Souvenirs de Guerre 1939–1943, Paris, 1947, p. 156.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Lyet, Pierre, La Bataille de France Mai-Juin 1940, Paris, 1947, p. 149.Google Scholar In connection with the Maginot Line troops, Lyet writes: “Des milliers d'hommes dont les chefs refusent de se rendre le 26 juin ne s'inclinent que devant l'ordre formel du Général Huntziger, chef de la délégation française d'armistice, mais d'énergiques protestations accompagnent cette reddition d'ouvrages fortifiés invaincus, contraire à toute tradition militaire.”

⁶⁹ Audiat, Pierre, Paris pendant la Guerre, Paris, 1946, p. 17.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ambrière, Francis, Les Grandes Vacances 1939–1945, Paris, 1946, p. 63.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Leproux, Marc, Nous les Terroristes, Monte Carlo, 1947, p. 5.Google Scholar Describing the general confusion, he writes: “Les gens répètent: ‘Il faut faire quelque chose,’ sans savoir quoi faire. … La foule se porte aux concerts ou aux parades données sur les places publiques. Mais il est vrai qu'un bon nombre de personnes se rendent la comme on va au cirque.”

⁷² Sondage de l'Opinion Publique Française.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ This and the subsequent statements are based upon prolonged interviews carried on by my assistant, Fleury Peyrachon, in the summer of 1949 in Paris.

⁷⁵ This respondent claimed that he was completely unpolitical and that he had never belonged to any political party.

⁷⁶ Organized on Oct. 24, 1945, the Institute is charged with “étudier les problèmes de population sous le double aspect du nombre et de la qualité. Son champ d'action ne selimite pas au rassemblement et à la comparaison des données statistiques; aucune des sciences humaines ne lui est étrangère et, dans ses différentes sections, il fait appel alternativement ou simultanément à l'histoire, à la giographie, à l'ethnographie, à l'économie, à labiologie, à la psychologie et au droit comparé.” See Familles dans le Monde, January-March 1949.

⁷⁷ The annual per capita consumption of wine and alcoholic beverages in France is around 25 quarts, as compared to 11 for Italy, 9 for Belgium, and 4 for Germany. See “Le problème de l'alcoolisme en France,” Ministry of Information, Notes documentaires et études, No. 51, April 19, 1945; “éléments d'un bilan national de l'alcoolisme,” Population, April-June, 1946; also New York Herald Tribune, Paris ed., June 16, 1949.

⁷⁸ There is more and more discussion of a general amnesty. But here, too, opinion is divided. The conservative writer Raymond Aron says: “The rancors and hates are too deeply rooted to disappear in one coup. But one does not suppress either Maurrassism or Anglophobia by keeping Maurras and Béraud in jail.” Socialist deputy André le Troquer argues: “Too early to speak of indulgence.” Marc Sangnier, MRP leader, writes: “An amnesty is an act of political wisdom.” For other statements, see Carrefour, March 2, 1949.

⁷⁹ Today France's army consists of some three armored (more or less) divisions, virtually no air force, and practically no war industry. Mechanized equipment is foreign, American or British. There are some 707,000 men under arms, but most of them are neither equipped nor trained as a modern army. As for the navy, there are more admirals than ships-that is, 22 vice admirals and 49 rear admirals, plus an additional 1,286 navy captains.

⁸⁰ Duverger, M., in Le Monde, Oct. 27, 1949.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Speech at Montigny-les-Metz: New York Times, Nov. 14, 1949.

⁸² Only about 65% of those who take it pass the rigorous bachot exam which progressive educators have attacked as a “savage rite of French bourgeois snobbism.” The philosopher étienne Gilson has called the bachot together with alcoholism the “twin scourges of the French people” see Time, Oct. 17, 1949.

⁸³ Peyre, “Le Rayonnement de la Culture Française,” Le Monde, May 13, 1949: “Notre agrégation produit chaque année un demi-millier de jeunes gens des deux sexes dont la distinction d'esprit est probablement inégalée ailleurs dans le monde. Beaucoup d'entre eux sont en vérité trop bons pour un enseignement secondaire où ils végètent. … D'autres sont lassés par le dur effort qu'a exigé leur concours et n'auront pas trop de leur vie entière pour se remettre. Nous devrions orienter beaucoup plus d'agrégés vers l'enseignement supérieur, et pour cela créer libéralement des postes qu'ils auraient intérêt a briguer.” See also, “L'Université française: une pépinière de Gendres,” Carrefour, June 29, 1949; and “Les docteurs de Sorbonne n'animent plus de grand débats idéologiques,” Carrefour, June 6, 1949. Also P. Boyance, “L'impression des thèses de doctorat,” Le Monde, April 8, 1949.