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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
On October 5, 1937, in the heart of America's isolationist belt, President Franklin D. Roosevelt denounced the dictators and called for a concerted international effort to quarantine the aggressors. His words drew the excited attention of the world and raised high the expectations for an immediate revision of America's neutrality policy. An opportunity was quickly provided Roosevelt to implement his new policy when the signators of the Nine Power Treaty were invited to Brussels to confer over Japan's undeclared war against China. These developments roused the ire of the American isolationists but brought fresh hope to those who believed a policy of resistance would restrain the dictators. For the next several weeks in this year of decision the balance swung away from the appeasers towards the resisters. For a time, because of American participation, the Brussels conference seemed to hold high promise for the success of the latter group. Then, as the United States backed away, the appeasers returned to lead Europe along the road to Munich.
1 For the text of the speech, see Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Washington, D.C., 1943, 1, pp. 379–83; hereafter cited as FR, Japan. For an analysis of Roosevelt's effort to implement his speech, see my article, “Roosevelt and the Aftermath of His ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Review of Politics (forthcoming).
2 The State Department Archives contain a separate file (711.00 President's Speech, October 5, 1937) and the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, has a special folder, both of which contain many letters dramatically revealing the world-wide attention the President's address received.
3 The League's Advisory Committee on the Far East had begun to draft a condemnation of Japan on October 3, and on the morning of October 5 its discussion turned to a Nine Power Treaty conference. See Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 4, 5, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Washington, D.C., 1954, IV, pp. 51–55; hereafter cited as FR.
4 The American Ministry in Geneva was alerted on the morning of October 5 that Roosevelt was to make an important speech within a few hours and that the League authorities should be so notified. See State Department Archives, 711.00 President's Speech, October 5, 1937/A (hereafter cited as SD); and Hooker, Nancy H., ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 154.Google Scholar
5 For texts of the League's notes and Hull's press release, see FR, Japan, 1, pp. 384–97.
6 For a recent denial that Roosevelt intended to relate the Chicago speech to the League and its focus on the Far East, see Borg, Dorothy, “Notes on Roosevelt's ‘Quarantine’ Speech,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (September 1957), p. 417.Google Scholar
7 A report in the New York Times, Oct. 7, p. 13, noted that in contrast to the moderate response of the British papers, the French press contained “exaggerated expectations” of the “quarantine” speech. For the importance of the French press as a reflection of French reaction to the foreign policy of the United States, see my articles, “The Paris Press, 1938: Mirror of a Tragedy,” Gazette, II (1956), pp. 150–56Google Scholar; “Once Again the Paris and Provincial Press,” Gazette, VII (1961), pp. 211–17.
8 See especially L'Action Française, Boucher, José le, “Roosevelt's Speech,” Oct. 7.Google Scholar
9 Bernus, Pierre in his lead editorial, “After the Chicago Speech,” for Le Journal des Debats, Oct. 8Google Scholar, expressed this belief succinctly: “The accord of the United States and the Western powers would certainly be a most sure means of ending the danger of war that is abroad throughout the world.”
10 See the Communist daily, L'Humanité, Oct. 7, and the editorial by its leading foreign commentator, Gabriel Peri. The Socialist organ, Le Populaire, Oct. 7, expressed this point of view in an editorial unsigned but presumably written by the Socialists' leader and the Vice-Premier of France, Léon Blum. See also the comments of Pierre Brossolette, another important Socialist news commentator, in L'Europe Nouvelle, a weekly of the center, Oct. 9, pp. 963–64.
11 L'Echo de Paris, Pertinax, Oct. 7; L'Epoque, Henri de Kerillis, Oct. 7; L'Oeuvre, Geneviève Tabouis, Oct. 7; L'Aube, Georges Bidault, Oct. 7.
12 Le Figaro, Wladimir d'Ormesson, “Roosevelt and Peace,” Oct. 7; Le Temps, “Bulletin du Jour,” “Roosevelt's Speech,” Oct. 6; Le Petit Parisien, Pierre Denoyer, Oct. 6; Agence Economique et Financière, Henri Bérenger, Oct. 7; Revue des Deux Mondes, “Chronique,” Oct. 15, p. 958.
13 Delbos' comments to a press conference were reported by Jules Sauerwein, the foreign editor of Paris Soir, in New York Times, Oct. 7. Chautemps' speech before the American Club in Paris focused primarily upon the Chicago address; for the text, see Le Temps, Oct. 8. For the private comments of both men to the American Chargé in Paris, Edwin C. Wilson, see his dispatches of Oct. 6 and 7, FR, 1, pp. 132–36.
14 During the spring of 1937, the French press reported these rumors widely and Delbos ordered his delegate to the London Sugar Conference to sound out the American delegate, Norman Davis, concerning them. He also requested his Ambassador to the United States, Georges Bonnet, to inquire directly of Roosevelt. For the talks of M. Spinasse, Minister of the National Economy and chief French delegate to the Sugar Conference, with Norman Davis, see Davis Papers, File Box 55, Sugar Conference, memo of conversation of April 9 and personal letter to President Roosevelt from Davis of April 13. For reference to Ambassador Bonnet's queries to Roosevelt, see Ickes, Harold L., The Secret Diary of Harold L. lckes, II, New York, 1954, p. 124.Google Scholar Miss Borg deals with the President's own plans and views them as part of his groping search for some means of forestalling war, a groping that led him directly to die “quarantine” speech (op.cit., pp. 409–10).
15 Bonnet, Georges, Déjense de la Paix, de Washington au Quai d'Orsay, Geneva, 1946, p. 24Google Scholar; see also pp. 14–16.
16 Ambassador in France (William C. Bullitt) to Secretary of State, Sept. 8, FR, I, pp. 389–90.
17 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Sept. 2, FR, IV, pp. 10–11; Secretary of State to Bullitt, Sept. 3, ibid., pp. 12–13.
18 Though a recent article questions whether Hitler would have been influenced by the threat of the United States' playing a positive role in Europe, most Frenchmen during the late 1930's believed that he would be. Remak, Joachim, “Two German Views of the United States: Hitler and His Diplomats,” World Affairs Quarterly, XXVIII (April 1957), pp. 25–35.Google Scholar
19 After asking this question, Chautemps went on to express his eagerness to sit down quietly with the President and talk over the problem. Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 7, FR, I, p. 135. Langer and Gleason read too much into this search for the meaning of Roosevelt's words. They regard it as an important French invitation for direct talks with the United States. See Langer, William L. and Everett Gleason, S., Challenge to Isolation, New York, 1952, p. 22.Google Scholar
20 For Hull's and Roosevelt's messages, see Department of State, Press Releases, XVII, No. 419Google Scholar, and New York Times, Oct. 20.
21 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, III, pp. 629–30. For the evolution of French thinking after the “quarantine” speech, see Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 6, FR, I, pp. 132–35; Oct. 8, SD, 852.00/6648; Oct. 9, FR, I, pp. 136–37; Oct. 16, FR, I, pp. 420–22; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, I, pp. 147–50. Bullitt had returned to Paris on Oct. 20 after an unusually brief leave of only fifteen days in the United States.
22 So far official policy of France has prohibited publication of most of the documents on international affairs during 1937.
23 See FR, III, pp. 560–61, 569, 573–74, 582–83.
24 See FR, III, pp. 600–2; 608–9.
25 See FR, IV, pp. 89–92.
26 On Oct. 19 the State Department believed that Eden was “not sure he would be able to go to Brussels himself.” (Davis Papers, File Box 4, Nine Power Conference Folder, Memo of talks with Roosevelt, Oct. 12 and 19, by Davis.)
27 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 23, FR, III, pp. 634–35.
28 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, III, pp. 629–30. For other reports on the Japanese threats, see Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, FR, III, pp. 623–25; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 21, SD, 793.94111/82; Oct. 23, FR, III, pp. 634–40; Oct. 25, FR, I, pp. 150–51.
29 For Roosevelt's message, see Acting Secretary of State (Sumner Welles) to Bullitt, Oct. 22, FR, III, p. 632; and the French Chargé d'Affaires in Washington (Jules Henry) to French Premier, Oct. 22, published in “Roosevelts Kriegswille gegen Japan. Enthullungen aus den Akten des Quai d'Orsay,” Berliner Monatshefte, February 1943, pp. 55–56. (My translation.) It is interesting to note that the German Foreign Office selected this and two other dispatches from Henry during the fall of 1937 as significant enough to publish in this special article.
30 Bullitt to Secretary of State, FR, III, p. 640.
31 See, for example, editorial reaction to Roosevelt's Buenos Aires speech of Dec. 1, 1936, in Le Populaire, André Leroux, Dec. 2, p. 1; and L'Humanité, Gabriel Peri, Dec. 2, p. 1. See also Léon Jouhaux's remarks before the national committee of the Confédération Générale du Travail, of which he was Secretary General, as published in Voix du Peuple, XVIII (December 1936), p. 752. This line was repeated in the editorials of Le Populaire and L'Humanité on the occasion of the “quarantine” speech (see note 10 above).
32 See the introductory comments that André Lanux wrote for a special review of the writings and speeches of Roosevelt and Hull between March 1933 and November 1936, published as a special supplement by an important French weekly, L'Europe Nouvelle Documentaire, December 5, 1936, No. 49. Lanux's opinions of American foreign policy had just been published by the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère in a long pamphlet entitled La neutralité américaine en 1936. See also Raoul de Roussy de Sales' article of Dec. 11, 1937, reviewing the events of the past fall, “America Deceived by Europe,” in which he asks, “How can you expect to combat the ‘mystique’ of isolationism if the other democracies do not stop giving in to the dictators?” (L'Europe Nouvelle, Dec. 11, pp. 1205–7.) Here he restated a line he had continually supported since at least 1935. De Sales acted both as the leading representative in the United States for Havas, the French news agency, and as regular correspondent for the huge Paris Soir and its noontime sister, Paris Midi. He also sent frequent and long summaries of American foreign policy to L'Europe Nouvelle.
33 Pertinax, one of France's most astute and best informed foreign editors, reported that the action of the French as well as the British at the Brussels conference stemmed from their fear that “by taking an attitude of aloofness they would discourage President Roosevelt.” See his article in the New York Times, Nov. 6. This interpretation was in line with his initial reaction to the “quarantine” speech as well as that of other traditional nationalists. See note 11 above.
34 For Bullitt's position in the fall of 1937 and for his contribution toward Roosevelt's fireside chat of Oct. 12, see the entries for Oct. 8 and 12 in “The Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919–1943” (unpublished manuscript in custody of the Houghton Library, Harvard University; hereafter cited as Journals). See also Moffat Papers, p. 158. (The Journals are cited only when pertinent material has not been published in the Papers.) For an able analysis of Bullitt's beliefs in 1937, see Wright, Gordon, “Ambassador Bullitt and the Fall of France,” World Politics, X (October 1957), pp. 68–69.Google Scholar
35 Davis reported Bullitt's warnings in his final official report on December 16, 1939 (Davis Papers, Box 5, Brussels Conference). See also Moffat Papers, p. 158.
36 New York Times, Oct. 28.
37 For text, see Le Temps, Oct. 31, p. 3.
38 For pertinent section of Eden's comments, see FR, IV, pp. 140–41; and for Welles' statement, see New York Times, Nov. 3.
40 For example of pessimism, sec Le Temps, André Dubosco, Oct. 26, p. 1; Le Peuple, Maurice Harmel, Nov. 3, p. 1; Le Temps, “Bulletin du Jour,” Nov. 4, p. 1. The most optimistic note was sounded by Peri, Gabriel in L'Humanité, Nov. 1, p. 1.Google Scholar
40 See, for example, Edwin L. James, New York Times, Oct. 31, Section III. For an analysis of this attitude of the American reporters, see Moffat Papers, pp. 186–87; and Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 21, FR, IV, pp. 221–24.
41 New York Times, Nov. 4, p. 13.
42 For a record of this pre-conference talk, see Moffat Papers, pp. 165–66; Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 3, FR, IV, pp. 147–48.
43 For texts of speeches, see Department of State, U.S., The Conference of Brussels, November 3–24, 1937, Conference Series—37 (Washington, D.C., 1938), pp. 24–31.Google Scholar
44 L'Oeuvre, Tabouis, Nov. 4; L'Echo de Paris, Pertinax, Nov. 5; L'Humanité, Peri, Nov. 5; Le Matin, Nov. 5; L'Action Française, Jacques Delebecque, Nov. 6.
45 Moffat Papers, pp. 169–70.
46 For the fullest published record of the talks on Nov. 3, see ibid., pp. 168–70. See also Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, FR, IV, pp. 157–58; Nov. 7, ibid., pp. 162–64; and Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, III, pp. 666–67. Moffat Journals, Nov. 3, also contain some important unpublished material.
47 For information about these French tactics, see Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 7, FR, IV, pp. 162–64; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, ibid., p. 162; Moffat Papers, pp. 173–74; New York Times, Nov. 8.
48 See, for example, the weekly, , Candide, Oct. 14, p. 1.Google Scholar
49 On Nov. 2 at a luncheon meeting of the British and American delegation, Eden understood Hornbeck to say that the United States had already prepared plans for bringing pressure on Japan. See Memo by Assistant Secretary of State (Hugh R. Wilson) of conversation with the British Ambassador (Lindsay), Nov. 6, FR, IV, pp. 160–62. See also Hornbeck's note of Feb. 24, 1938, claiming Eden distorted his comments. This note is printed as a footnote to the above document. For an analysis of the position of the three Americans, see Moffat Papers, pp. 182–83.
50 Bullitt reported this pessimism to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, FR, IV, p. 162; Nov. 8, ibid., p. 168.
51 Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, IV, p. 168; and Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Davis, Nov. 8, ibid., pp. 168–69.
52 Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 7, as printed in Berliner Monatshefte, February 1943, pp. 56–58. See also Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, III, pp. 666–67. Langer and Gleason refer to Henry's talk with Roosevelt and cite the article in the Berliner Monatshefte, but fail to relate Henry's cable to the Brussels conference; see Challenge to Isolation, p. 24.
53 Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Bullitt, Nov. 9, FR, IV, pp. 170–71.
54 Apparently it was not by chance that at this time Bonnet issued a warning to Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Austria, who was visiting Paris. Von Papen reported it as fellows: “In his capacity as French Ambassador in Washington he [Bonnet] had discussed the political and economic future of Europe in detail with Roosevelt, and he could assure me that the United States intended to support Franco-British policy in Europe with the full weight of its moral convictions and its material resources.” See Memo on Report to the Führer, Nov. 8, 1937, enclosed with German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Minister (Neurath), Vienna, Nov. 11, 1937, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Washington, D.C., 1942, 1, pp. 41–42.
55 For Chautemps' talk with Bullitt, see the latter's dispatch of Nov. 10, FR, IV, pp. 172–74. For further French reaction to Roosevelt's remarks, see Memo of conversation by the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) with Henry, Nov. 10, FR, III, pp. 672–73.
56 For the most detailed record of these sessions, see Moffat Journals, Nov. 10, and published excerpts in Moffat Papers, pp. 174–78. This record is amplified by Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 11, FR, IV, pp. 177–78; Nov. 14, ibid., pp. 183–85.
57 This important statement by Delbos appears in the Moffat Journals but was not published in the Moffat Papers. The latter, however, contains (p. 178) the subsequent quotations from Delbos' remarks at this second meeting on Nov. 10.
58 Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, FR, IV, pp. 175–77. See also The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, 1948, 1, p. 556; Moffat Papers, pp. 174–75.
59 Memo by Under Secretary of State (Welles) of conversation with the British Ambassador (Lindsay), Nov. 13, FR, IV, pp. 152–55.
60 Davis reported on Nov. 14, “The French attitude has improved appreciably of late and Delbos has been cooperative and helpful,” FR, IV, p. 184.
61 Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 12, FR, IV, pp. 180–81.
62 For Davis' reaction to Hull's orders, see Moffat Papers, pp. 182 and 184. For many of the details concerning the events after Nov. 10, see the résumé that Davis forwarded to Hull, Nov. 21, FR, IV, pp. 221–24.
63 The record that Davis kept of his talks with Roosevelt on Oct. 12 and 19 verify that this was Roosevelt's plan; see Davis Papers, File Box 4, Nine Power Conference Folder, Memo of talks with Roosevelt, Oct. 12 and 19, by Davis.
64 Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 14, FR, IV, p. 185.
65 For texts, see U.S. Department of State, The Conference of Brussels, pp. 58–63.Google Scholar
66 See Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 14, FR, IV, p. 183.
67 Sec Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 15, FR, IV, pp. 187–88; Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, ibid., pp. 200–2. Hull had cabled, Nov. 16, that there was “no present prospect of a repeal or a suspension or a modification” of the Neutrality Act (Hull, 1, p. 556).
68 Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 21, FR, IV, p. 223. Hull complained to Davis, , “In one capital at least they have endeavored to convey the impression of sole responsibility of the United States in this situation” (Nov. 17, FR, IV, pp. 203–4).Google Scholar
69 New York Times, Nov. 17 and 18.
70 For text, see Le Temps, Nov. 20.
71 For excerpts, see New York Times, Nov. 18.
72 Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 18, as printed in Berliner Monatshefte, February 1943, pp. 58–60.
73 For Delbos' activities during the last days of session of the Brussels conference, see Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 20, SD, 793.94 conference/278; Nov. 21, ibid., 1279; Moffat Papers, p. 187. For text of the “Declaration of the Conference, November 24, 1937,” see U.S. State Department, The Conference of Brussels, pp. 76–77.Google Scholar Compare its text with the proposals that Hull forwarded to Davis, Nov. 17, FR, IV, pp. 205–10.
74 With Chamberlain's approval, Viscount Halifax met Hitler for talks at Berchtesgaden, Nov. 19, just as Eden was attempting to build up a resistance policy at Brussels.
75 On Nov. 5 Hitler unveiled for his top commanders the plans for aggression that he subsequently implemented.
76 The term is Duff Cooper's and he used it on the morrow of Munich to castigate Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.