¹ On the modern decline of the notion of the state, see Miliband, Ralph, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books 1969Google Scholar); Nettl, J. P., “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics, xx (July 1968), 559CrossRefGoogle Scholar–92; and Passerin, Alexander d'Entreves, The Notion of the State (London: Oxford University Press 1967Google Scholar).

² “Many but not all … identify the political system ultimately with the state in the Weberian sense.” Spiro, Herbert J., “An Evaluation of Systems Theory,” in Charlesworth, James C., ed., Contemporary Political Analysis (New York:Free Press 1967), 170Google Scholar.

³ “To limit political science to a study of that limited class of social phenomena known as states is therefore to associate it with those sciences which have previously proved least fruitful.” Watkins, , The State as a Concept of Political Science (New York:Harper 1934), 2Google Scholar.

⁴ “The importance of the concept of sovereignty really lies in the fact that it represents a limit beyond which the concentration of power cannot go.” Ibid., 50.

⁵ Ritter, Gerhard, “Origins of the Modern State,” in Lubasz, Heinz, ed., The Development of the Modern State (New York:Macmillan 1964), 20Google Scholar.

⁶ Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York:Harcourt, Brace & World 1966), 127Google Scholar.

⁷ Hsin, Yang and Chien, Ch'en, “Exposing and Criticizing the Fallacious Reasoning of Imperialists on Questions Concerning National Sovereignty,” Cheng-fa yen-chiu, 1964, No. 4, 6–11Google Scholar, translated in Chinese Law and Government, 1 (Summer 1968), 12–26Google Scholar.

⁸ Peking Review, xvii, June 21, 1974, p. 5Google Scholar.

⁹ “Theories of ‘Limited Sovereignty’ and ‘International Dictatorship’ are Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialist Gangster Theories,” Peking Review, xii, March 28, 1969, pp. 23–25Google Scholar.

¹⁰ “It can be seen from these fascist howls of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique that the theories of limited sovereignty’ and ‘international dictatorship’ flagrantly trample underfoot the universally acknowledged principle of state sovereignty and entirely serve the criminal aim of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism to dominate the world … other countries can only exercise ‘limited sovereignty’ while Soviet revisionism itself assumes unlimited sovereignty.” Ibid., 23.

¹¹ “Doctrine of Nationalism,” in Shihlien Hsu, Leonard, Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles: University of Southern California 1933), 185Google Scholar–86.

¹² For example, see “On the New Democracy,” in Selected Worlds of Mao Tse-tung, II (Peking:Foreign Languages Press 1965), 341Google Scholar.

¹³ See Michael, Franz, “Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China,” in Spector, Stanley, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle:University of Washington Press 1964), xxiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ See John Fincher's study, “Political Provincialism and the National Revolution,” in Wright, Mary C., ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913 (New Haven:Yale University Press 1968), 185–226Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Cassirer, , The Myth of the State (Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday 1955), 140Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Machiavelli, , The Discourses (New York:Modern Library 1950), 138Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See the account in Isaacs, Harold R., The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford:Stanford University Press 1961Google Scholar).

¹⁸ See Chiang Kai-shek's pessimistic evaluation of Chinese defense capabilities in his speech of July 1934, “Resistance to Aggression and Renaissance of the Nation,” in The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 1937–1945 (New York:Kraus Reprint 1969), 1–20Google Scholar.

¹⁹ “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework for Analysis,” in Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang, eds., China in Crisis (Chicago:University of Chicago Press 1968Google Scholar), I, 285; emphasis added.

²⁰ At the Fourth National Congress of the KMT, for example, it was admitted that “while the people continue to have faith in the Three Principles of the People, they have gradually lost their hope in our Party.” Party disintegration was cited as the main cause. Quoted in Shieh, Milton J. T., The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894–1969 (New York:St. John's University Press 1970), 154Google Scholar.

²¹ “On Coalition Government,” in Selected Worlds of Mao Tse-tung, III (Peking:Foreign Languages Press 1965), 270Google Scholar.

²² This promise was far more explicit with the KMT than with the CCP.

²³ D'Entreves (fn. 1), 6.

²⁴ Ibid., 10.

²⁵ Hu Shih, the liberal educator and scholar, argued for the early termination of political tutelage: “The people … cannot be easily deceived by a verbal tutelage which furnishes no respectable example to be followed. They see their great leaders fighting with one another and with the defeated ones exiled. …What kind of training can the people derive from such kind of tutelage?” North China Herald, September 7, 1929. p. 357Google Scholar.

²⁸ Article 30 of the Provisional Constitution (June 1, 1931) reads: “During the period of political tutelage, the National Congress of the Nationalist Party shall exercise the governing powers of the Central Government on behalf of the National Assembly. During the adjournment of the National Congress of the Party, the Central Executive Committee shall exercise the said powers.” Tung, William L., The Political Institutions of Modern China (The Hague:Martinus Nrjhoff 1964), 346CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ Mao Tse-tung (fn. 21), 255–56.

²⁸ See the “Political Report” of Liu Shao-ch'i to the Eighth Party Congress, especially the section on “Party Leadership.”

²⁹ Promulgated on January 17, 1975.

³⁰ In The Social Contract, one can find what amounts to a summary of the modern Chinese amalgam of social solidarity, radical equality, and intense commitment: “If, then, we take from the social pact everything which is not essential to it, we shall find it to be reduced to the following terms: ‘each of us contributes to the group his person and the powers which he wields as a person, and we receive into the body politic each individual as forming an indivisible part of the whole.'” (Ne w York: Oxford University Press 1962), 181.

³¹ According to Friedrich, Carl J., “The eidos (idea) of justice is a transcendent reality, something that exists beyond the testimony of the senses. …The very transcendency of justice precludes its realization in a constitutional order.” Transcendent Justice (Durham, N.C.:Duke University Press 1964), 5Google Scholar.

³² The People's Daily (November 7, 1950) published a review of Japanese aggressions against China in the past, and depicted the United States as the postwar heir to the aims and practices of Japanese militarism. The American presence and operations in Korea were cited as possible preludes to action against China, in the same way that the prewar Japanese presence in Taiwan and Korea had led to conquest of northern and coastal China.

³³ On the tutelary duties of KMT members, see the “Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang” (January 30, 1924), in Shieh (fn. 20), 82.

³⁴ See Sun Yat-sen's “Outline of National Reconstruction,” in Hsü (fn. ii ), 85–89.

³⁵ See Piao, Lin, “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review, xii (April 30, 1969), 25Google Scholar.

³⁶ The Manifesto of the Second KMT National Congress, for example, was notable for its emphasis on world conditions, “the growing awareness of oppressed peoples,” and the “shaken foundations of imperialism” as a situation conducive to the Nationalist revolution. See Shieh (fn. 20), 111–19.

³⁷ The Fifth KMT National Congress, for example, stressed national morality, a system of rituals and national music, and other virtues that attempted to revive the moribund Confucian culture.

³⁸ Tse-tung, Mao, “Report to the Central Committee of the CCP” (June 6, 1950), in Current Background, No. 1, 1–2Google Scholar.

³⁹ Townsend, James, “Intraparty Conflict in China: Disintegration in an Established One-Party System,” in Huntington, Samuel P. and Moore, Clement H., eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York:Basic Books 1970), 284Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Building the People's Militia, for example, was in part a response to the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. See Ch'iu-t'ao, Fu, “Hold Aloft the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking and Strengthen Militia-Building,” People's Daily, April 7, 1960Google Scholar, in Current Background, No. 624, 6–10.

⁴¹ See Piao, Lin, Long Live the Victory oj People's War (Peking:Foreign Languages Press 1965Google Scholar).

⁴² Piao, Lin, “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review, xii (April 28, 1969Google Scholar).

⁴³ “Under the Communist regime, as in the past, morality and authority are inseparable, as if church and state were one. The Communist regime not only dictates laws in the public sector, it also seeks to ‘legislate’ the private morality of its people. Like the dynasties of imperial China, the Communist regime is not to be criticized or its authority challenged, an exemption it enjoys as long as its performance lives up to the expectations created by the official ideology. If that performance appears to fall short, as in 1957 and in 1966–68, forces within the Party or the society may question the mandate of the regime.” Hsiung, James Chieh, Ideology and Practice (New York: Praeger 1970), 107.Google Scholar