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The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: An Interpretation Based on an Analytical Framework of Political Coalitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Chong-Do Hah
Chong-Do Hah*
Affiliation:
Lawrence University
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The greatest convulsion in Chinese politics since 1949, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, has subsided. The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in April, 1969, seems to have been one of the final steps in consolidating the fruits of the revolution. It involved, above all, an unprecedented scale of upheaval in the party leadership and the party organization.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , January 1972 , pp. 182 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1972

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References

1 Hsiao, Gene T., “The Background and Development of ‘The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,’” Asian Survey, VII (June 1967), 390 Google Scholar.

2 Franz Schurmann, “The Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Ideology and Organization,” in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Bk. 2, Vol. I (Chicago 1969), 525-65. See also Tanio Matsutani, “Rin Pyō jidai no gaikō rosen” [The Foreign Policy Line of the Lin Piao Era], Jiyū (November 1966), 24-34, and his “Köeihei undō to Rin Pyō taisei” [The Red Guard and the Lin Piao System], Sekai (November 1966), 150; Humio Kusano, Zoku—Chūgoku shakai kenkyū [A Study of Chinese Society—Continued] (n.p., n.d.), 483-90; Symposium, “Chūgoku no bunka daikakumei shindankai e” [China's Great Cultural Revolution to a New Stage], Asahi janaru (February 5, 1967), 9; Tadao Ishikawa, Gendai Chūgoku no shomondai [Aspects of Modern China] (Tokyo 1967), 161. Cf. Eiichi Imakawa and Kazuhiko Hama, Chūgoku bunka daikakumei to Vetonam sensō [China's Great Cultural Revolution and the Vietnamese War] (Tokyo 1968); Ikurai, Yoshizō, Gendai Chūgoku ron [On Modern China] (Tokyo 1968), 189–96Google Scholar; Ezra Vogel, “Comments [on Franz Schurmann's chapter],” in Ho and Tsou (above), 568.

3 Lifton's, Robert J. Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York 1969)Google Scholar may be an exception. In this connection, we certainly do not wish to give the impression that those studies which fail to show methodological consciousness and rigor are necessarily inferior; many China specialists have made significant contributions without clamoring for “more political science or social sciences.” In fact, this paper shamelessly utilizes the ideas and research of many of these specialists, with a view to placing them in the perspectives of systematic approaches in modern social scientific analysis as a means of demonstrating the interplay between a frame of reference and data.

4 See Hirschman, Albert O., Journeys Toward Progress (New York 1965), esp. 358–84Google Scholar. For methodological orientations of this paper, we are also indebted to Karl Popper's discussion of theory and interpretation in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York 1961).

5 See, for example, Riker's, William H. elegant work, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven 1962)Google Scholar; Leiserson, Michael, “Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games,” American Political Science Review, LXII (September 1968), 770–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (September 1956),” reproduced in Chai, Winberg, ed., Essential Wor\s of Chinese Communism (New York 1969), 297 Google Scholar.

7 Strictly speaking, this division of functional lines was formalized in 1958, not in 1956. Lin Piao was elected as a Vice-Chairman in May, 1958. It should also be pointed out that by 1965, Chu Teh and Ch'en Yun had ceased to be major actors. Instead, such figures as P'eng Chen, Li Fu-Ch'un, and Ch'en I were more important.

8 Hsiao (fn. 1), 392. In October, 1966, Mao said, “When I retreated into the second line by not conducting the daily work and by letting others execute it, my purpose was to cultivate their prestige so that when I have to see God, the country can avoid great chaos.” Ibid.

9 Ibid., 395.

10 Schurmann, Franz, “Party,” in Schurmann, Franz and Schell, O., eds., Communist China (New York 1967), 118 Google Scholar.

11 In retrospect, however, one is tempted to argue that it marked a beginning of the split within the CCP leadership.

12 Explicitly, the criticism was not directed at the “walking on two legs” approach itself, but at the way the Great Leap was implemented.

13 Adie, W.A.C., “China's ‘Second Liberation’ in Perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xxv (February 1969), 18 Google Scholar.

14 Oksenberg, Michel, “The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly, xxxvi (October-December 1968), 61–92 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Masahisa Suganuma, Chūgoku bunka daikakumei [China's Great Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1967), 41.

15 See Schurmann, Franz, “On Revolutionary Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs, XXIII, No. 1 (1969), 36–53 Google Scholar; Noboru Koga, “Mō Takutō kakumei to Chūgokuteki kanryō shugi kokufuku no kadai” [Mao Tse-tung's Revolution and the Problem of Overcoming Chinese Bureaucratism], Tōa bunka sōsho, I (September 1968), 23-46.

16 Schurmann (fn. 2), 544.

17 Baum, Richard and Teiwes, F. C., “Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question,” Asian Survey, VIII (March 1968), 329 Google Scholar.

18 John W. Lewis, “Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution,” in Ho and Tsou (fn. 2), 468.

19 For a general but good treatment of the Socialist Education Movement and the Red versus Expert debate, see Gray, Jack and Cavendish, P., Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution (New York 1968)Google Scholar; Suganuma (fn. 14), 124-70.

20 Keesing's Research Report, The Cultural Revolution in China: Its Origin and Course (Ne w York 1967), 7 Google Scholar.

21 Baum and Teiwes (fn. 17), 333.

22 Keesing's Research Report (fn. 20), 8.

23 North, Robert C., The Foreign Relations of China (Belmont, Calif. 1969), 80 Google Scholar.

24 Ibid., 74.

25 See the sources cited in fn. 2.

26 See, for instance, Chou En-lai's speech, “China Is Ready to Take up U.S. Challenge,” Peking Review (December 24, 1965), 5-6, reprinted in Schurmann and Schell (fn. 10), 592-96.

27 Ibid., 593.

28 See, for example, Hammond, Paul Y., The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since igtf (New York 1969), 209 Google Scholar.

29 Of course it is possible that the Chinese preparations for a protracted war were really aimed at the Soviets. Harrison E. Salisbury, for instance, presents this argument in his War Between Russia and China (New York 1969), especially chap. 11. Our paper, however, gives no special attention to such an argument. This is partly explained by limitation of space, and partly by the belief that the data available when our research was largely completed (mid-1969) did not seem to support such claims as Salisbury's.

30 See his statement to the people calling for the “proletarianization of intellectuals and the ‘intellectualization’ of proletariat” in the People's Daily, January 5, 1965. However, it is also true that Chou did attempt to defend such men as Chen Yi who seemed to favor the Expert over the Red.

31 Adie (fn. 13), 21.

32 Chu-yuan Cheng, “The Power Struggle in Red China,” Asian Survey, iv (September 1966), 472.

33 Piao, Lin, Long Live the Victory of People's War! (Peking 1965), 42–52 Google Scholar, reprinted inChai (fn. 6), 418.

34 One might be tempted to contend that his frequently quoted concept of the “four firsts” clearly supports his stand in favor of Red, but we want to stress that the “four firsts” were directed at the military.

35 See especially “Liu Shao-ch'i fan-tui Mao-chu-hsi chiao-yu lu-hsien wu-shih-li” [Fifty Examples of Liu Shao-ch'i's Opposition to Chairman Mao's Educational Line], Chiao-yü ko-ming (Peking, April 16, 1967), 1-4.

36 Gray, Jack, “The Economics of Maoism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xxv (February 1969), 51 Google Scholar. See also Suganuma (fn. 14); Chikashi Kamibeppu, “Bunka dai-kakumei ni okeru nōson no kōzō henkaku” [The Structural Change of Farming Villages under the Great Cultural Revolution], Tōa bunka sōsho, 1 (September 1968), 123-44; People's Daily, August 28, November 24 and 27, 1967.

37 Cheng, Chu-yuan, “The Root of China's Cultural Revolution: The Feud Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i,” Orbis, XI (Winter 1968), 1169–70Google Scholar.

38 Gray (fn. 36), 45-46.

39 Ibid.

40 “Running Enterprises in Line with Mao Tse-tung's Thinking,” Peking Review (April 15, 1966), 11-15.

41 Gray (fn. 36), 45; Nung-yeh chi-hsieh chi-shu [Agricultural Mechanization Technology], No. 6 (Peking 1967), 4-8.

42 Of course it is possible that he advocated the united action primarily as a means to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

43 This is not to say that Mao has never strongly supported the Vietnamese. For example, Mao was quoted as saying to the Vietnamese that “if it is necessary in your struggle against the United States . . . , the Vietnamese people may rest completely assured of the strongest possible rear support gratis for a final victory from 700 million Chinese.” See “Cheng Shih-ching tung-chih tan Yueh-nam hsing-shih” [Comrade Cheng Shih-ching's Talk on the Vietnamese Situation], in Kung-ko-lien Hung-ch'i tung-hsin tzu-liao tsu, ed., Tzu-liao chuan-chi [Special Issues of Documentary Material], No. 1 (Peking, July 1968), 8.

44 See fn. 33.

45 “Chinese Government Statement,” Peking Review (July 8, 1966), 19-20.

46 For the text of the communique see Fan, K. H., ed., The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents (New York 1968), 173–82 (esp. 174)Google Scholar.

47 Ibid., 176; emphasis added.

48 Ibid., 177.

49 Ibid., 179.

50 Ibid., 182.

51 For the text of the Decision, see ibid., 162-73 (esp. 163).

52 “Chairman Mao Once More Receives a Million Young Revolutionary Fighters,” Peking Review (September 23, 1966), 6. However, during the high tides of the Cultural Revolution, such as December 1966 to January 1967, July 1967, and March 1968, these limits were relaxed.

53 “We Are Critics of the Old World,” The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in China, III (Peking 1966), 18-21.

54 “Never Forget the Class Struggle,” The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution in-China, I (Peking 1966), 37-52.

55 Bridgham, Philip, “Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power,” China Quarterly, XXXIV (April-June 1968), IIGoogle Scholar.

56 “Practice Economy in Carrying Out Revolution: Respect State Property,” Peking Review (February 3, 1967), 15.

57 “Cadres Must be Treated Correctly,” Peking Review (March 3, 1967), 5-9.

58 “Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review (February 24, 1967), 6.

59 “Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review (March 24, 1967), 5-6.

60 “Re-open Classes and Make Revolution in Primary and Secondary Schools,” Peking Review (March 10, 1967), 13-15.

61 “Cadres Must be Treated Correctly” (fn. 57).

62 “Thoroughly Repudiate Liu Shao-chi's Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Line on Party Building,” Peking Review (December 20, 1968), 10-15.

63 “Bury the Slave Mentality Advocation by China's Khrushchev,” Peking Review (April 14, 1967), 12-15.

64 Bridgham (fn. 55), 26.

65 Ibid.; “An Extremely Important Matter of Guiding Principle,” Peking Review (September 1, 1967), 7.

66 Johnson, Chalmers, “The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective,” Asian Survey, VIII (January 1968), 1–15 (esp. 13-15)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 “A Directive from Chairman Mao Concerning the Great Strategic Plan for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” Peking Review (March 15, 1968), 5.

68 “Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive,” Peking Review (August 2, 1968), 3.

69 “Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Latest Directive,” Peking Review (April 5, 1968), 2.

70 “Absorb Fresh Blood from the Proletariat,” Peking Review (October 25, 1968), 4-7.

71 “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review (April 30, 1969), 16-35.

72 See fn. 70.

73 “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Peking Review (April 30, 1969), 36-39.

74 In this context, we found Zagoria's, Donald S. Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York 1967) interestingGoogle Scholar.

75 “Chairman Liu Shao-chi Replies to President Ho Chi Minh,” Peking Review (February 4, 1966), 6-8; emphasis added.

76 Adie (fn. 13), 21. For Lo Jui-ching's strong statement calling for unity with the Soviets and a hard line on Vietnam through a united front, see his “Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!,” Peking Review (May 14, 1965), 7-15.

77 “Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Towards U.S.,” Peking Review (May 13, 1966), 5.

78 “Statement of Chairman Liu Shao-chi,” Peking Review (July 29, 1966), 9.

79 “Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China,” Peking Review (March 8, 1968), 7.

80 NCNA (New China News Agency), June 15, 1969. Cited in China Quarterly, XXXIX (July-September 1969), 164.

81 In preparation of the following three sub-sections, we have consulted diverse sources too numerous for a complete listing. In addition to the bibliographical information given in this paper, the following sources will be found useful for more data on those listed in the power configuration tables: Mineo Nakazima, ed., Chū-goku bunka daikakumei [China's Great Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1966); Union Research Institute, Who's Who in Communist China (Hong Kong 1966); Chung-kung jen-ming-lu pien-hsiu wei-yuan-hui, ed., Chung-kung jen-ming-lu [Who's Who in Communist China] (Taipei 1967); Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural Revolution in China (Hong Kong 1967); Chūgoku no kenryoku kōzō to bunka kakumei [China's Power Structure and the Cultural Revolution] (n.p. 1967); Ting Wang, ed., Chung-kung wen-hua ta-ko-ming tzu-liao hui-pien [A Compendium of Material on the Great Cultural Revolution in Communist China], I, Tou-cheng tan chuan pat [Struggle Against the In-Power Faction] (Hong Kong 1967); Oksenberg, Michael, “China: Forcing the Revolution to a New Stage,” Asian Survey, VII (January 1967), 7 Google Scholar; Huang Chen-hsia, ed., Chung-kung chün-jen chih [Mao's Generals] (Hong Kong 1968); Kikuzō Itō and Minoru Shibata, Dokyumento: Bunkaku no sannen [Document: The Three Years’ Cultural Revolution] (Tokyo 1968); Pan, Stephen and Jaegher, Raymond de, Peking's Red Guard (New York 1968)Google Scholar; Union Research Institute, The Case of Peng Teh-huai (Hong Kong 1968)Google Scholar; Kōgo Tsuji, “Kyū-zen-daikai eno dōtei” [Journeys Toward the Ninth National (Party) Congress], and Katsuhiro Ōta, “Ryū Shōki hihan no shosokumen to sono shŌten” [Sidelights on the Criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i and Their Focus], Sekai (June 1969), 145-52 and 153-62, respectively.

82 Funnell, Victor, “Social Stratification,” Problems of Communism, XVII (March-April 1968), 16 Google Scholar.

83 Oksenberg (fn. 14), 66.

84 For a brief survey and analysis of the Ninth Party Congress, see Chōsa geppō (A Special Issue on Recent Trends in Communist China) (August 1969), 2-33.

85 Ibid., 61-67.

86 Baum, Richard, “China: The Year of the Mangoes,” Asian Survey, IX (January 1969), 6–7 Google Scholar.

87 For additional information on the individuals who were purged, see fn. 81.

88 Data are from Chang, Parris H., “Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet,” Problems of Communism, XVIII (March-April 1969), 5 Google Scholar.

89 Ibid., 6.

90 Data are from Klein, Donald W., “The State Council and the Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly, xxxv (July-September 1968), 78–87 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91 Chang (fn. 88).

92 Ibid., 7.

93 Baum (fn. 86), 4.

94 Chang (fn. 88), 8.

95 Schurmann (fn. 2), 542.

96 Michel Oksenberg, “Comments [on John W. Lewis's chapter],” in Ho and Tsou (fn. 2), 499.

97 Cf. Chōsa geppō (fn. 84), 41-53; I Fan, Wen-ko Asia ti chung-kung ching-chi [Communist Chinese Economy under the Cultural Revolution] (Hong Kong 1968).

98 See Oksenberg (fn. 96), 500. See also Koga (fn. 15); Hah, Chong-Do and Schneider, Jeanne, “A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization,” Social Research, xxxv (Spring 1968), 130–58Google Scholar. Cf. Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven 1968)Google Scholar; LaPalom-bara, Joseph P., ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.