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The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Gidon Gottlieb
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Extract

International agreements perform functions worthy of the closest attention of the student of international affairs. They are a principal tool of diplomacy and the aim of most negotiations. Many such agreements are not intended to create legal relationships, and the demarcation line between legally binding agreements and other consensual relationships is correspondingly hazy and uncertain. International agreements have not, however, received in recent times nearly the degree of attention devoted in international studies to “force” and “power.” This is so despite the fact that they generally reflect the participants' power calculations and shared expectations. They are an essential mode of guidance and regulation in international relations, helping to shape decisions and claims sometimes even in the course of armed conflicts. International agreements loom large in the actual experience of statesmen, jurists, and military men—their conclusion, their application, and their breach represent complex political decisions with frequently serious outcomes leading to shifts in power relationships.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , October 1968 , pp. 108 - 132
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1968

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References

1 For an incisive analysis of this work, see Falk, Richard A., “On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects,” Virginia Law Review, LIV (May 1968Google Scholar).

2 The first four volumes are: McDougal, Myres S. and Associates, Studies in World Public Order (New Haven 1960Google Scholar); , McDougal and Feliciano, Florentino P., Law and Minimum World Public Order (New Haven 1961Google Scholar); , McDougal and Burke, William T., The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven 1962Google Scholar); , McDougal, Lasswell, Harold D., and Vlasic, Ivan A., Law and Public Order in Space (New Haven 1963Google Scholar). For a consideration of modern trends in international law, see Falk, Richard A., “The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law: Gaps in Legal Thinking,” Virginia Law Review, L (March 1964), 231CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “New Approaches to the Study of International Law,” American Journal of International Law, LXI (April 1967), 477Google Scholar. For other books reflecting the Yale approach, see Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven 1950Google Scholar); Johnston, Douglas M., The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework, for Policy-oriented Inquiries (New Haven 1965Google Scholar); and Murty, B. F., The Ideological Instrument of Coercion and World Public Order (New Haven 1967Google Scholar).

3 In 1956 the Institute of International Law adopted a resolution in which it formulated two articles containing some basic principles of interpretation (Annuaire de tlnstitut de Droit International, XLVI [1966], 359Google Scholar). In 1965 the American Law Institute published the final text of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States. In 1966 the International Law Commission of the United Nations published the final text of Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, UN Gen. Ass. Off. Rec, 21 Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1).

4 See also Degan, V. D., L'lnterpretation des accords en droit international (The Hague 1963Google Scholar). For recent periodical literature see the “Law of Treaties” issue of the ' American Journal of International Law, LXI (October 1967Google Scholar); Rosenne, Shabtai, “Intero pretation of Treaties in the Restatement and the International Law Commission's Draft Articles: A Comparison,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, v (New York 1966Google Scholar), 205; and Lissitzyn, Oliver, “The Law of International Agreements in the Restatement,” New York University Law Review, XLI (March 1966Google Scholar)

5 Miller, James C., “Research Tools Available to Lawyers,” in Allen, Layman E. and Caldwell, Mary E., eds., Communication Sciences and Law (New York 1965), 27Google Scholar.

6 P. 57, italics added.

7 Feigl, Herbert, “Logical Empiricism,” in Feigl, Herbert and Sellars, Wilfrid, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York 1949), 10–11Google Scholar.

8 See Keyser, Cassius J., “On the Study of Legal Science,” Yale Law Journal, xxxviii (February 1929Google Scholar), 413, 415, for an unequivocal statement by an early Realist.

9 McDougal appears to rely heavily on the philosophically discredited referential theory of meaning. For a critique of this theory, see Koller, Alice, A Hornbook of Hazards for Linguists (1967), 155Google Scholar, 186, mimeographed.

10 , Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford 1953), 170Google Scholar, 172.

11 Curtis, Charles R., “A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,” Vanderbilt Law Review, iii (April 1950), 407Google Scholar, 424.

12 See Fuller, Lon L., “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review, LXXI (February 1959), 630Google Scholar–33.

13 On the different techniques involved in reliance upon rules and policies for guidance, see Gottlieb, Gidon, The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality (New York 1968Google Scholar), chap. 8. We have frequently referred to this book without acknowledging every reference.

14 See De Visscher, Charles, Théories et Realties en Droit International Public, 3rd ed. Paris 1960Google Scholar), 317.

15 Frankfurter, Felix, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” Columbia Law Review, XLVII (May 1947Google Scholar), 527–43.

16 , Wurzel, “Methods of Juridical Thinking,” in Science of Legal Method (Cambridge 1917), 286–307Google Scholar.

17 P. 57.

18 Gottlieb, passim.

19 Theme for Reason (Princeton 1957), 6–7Google Scholar.

20 A modern treatment of interpretation can ill afford to ignore recent works with a “direct bearing on the subject. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations; Peter; Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London 1958Google Scholar); and Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind (London 1949Google Scholar). See also other relevant writings: von Wright, Georg Hendrik, Norma and Action (London 1963Google Scholar); Hare, Richard Mervyn, The Language of Morals (Oxford 1952Google Scholar); Rescher, Nicholas, The Logic of Commands (London 1966Google Scholar); Naess, Arne, Interpretation and Preciseness (Oslo 1953Google Scholar); Austin, John L., Philosophical Papers (Oxford 1961Google Scholar); Toulmin, Stephen E., The Uses of Argument (Cambridge 1958Google Scholar); Black, Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca 1962Google Scholar); Waismann, Friedrich, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, , Harre ed. (London 1965Google Scholar); and Hirsch, Eric D. Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven 1967Google Scholar).