¹ Clausewitz, Karl von, War, Politics, and Power, translated and edited with an introduction by Collins, Edward M. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company 1962).Google Scholar My citations of Clausewitz are taken from this useful and convenient compilation, one which emphasizes Clausewitz's analysis of the relationship between war and politics.

² For example, Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books 1964Google Scholar; originally published by Harvard University Press 1957); Spanier, John W., The Truman-Mac Arthur Controversy and the Korean War (New York: Norton, 1965Google Scholar; originally published by Harvard University Press 1959), esp. chap. XIV; Brodie, Bernard, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan 1973).Google Scholar

³ Brodie, Bernard, “On Clausewitz: A Passion for War,” World Politics, XXV (January 1973), 288–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 302.

⁴ Clausewitz, (fn. 1), 202.Google Scholar

⁵ William Fulbright, J., “The Foundations of National Security,” in Kaplan, Morton A., ed., Great Issues of International Politics (2d ed., Chicago: Aldine 1974), 255–65Google Scholar, at 255.

⁶ Clausewitz, (fn. 1), 259Google Scholar, 260.

⁷ Ibid., 262.

⁸ Ibid., 263.

⁹ Ibid., 263–64.

¹⁰ Huntington, (fn. 2), 3.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ibid., 2. Huntington's analysis is not as convincing as it might be, in that he does not demonstrate that the armies he considers to be professional are any better at fighting wars than the armies he considers not to be professional.

¹² Spanier, (fn. 2), 274Google Scholar, even advocates outright that the field commander in a limited war be a political ally of the President. This hardly seems a shrewd way to depoliticize the military.

¹³ See, for example, Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years hi the State Department (New York: Signet 1969), 573.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For the extended analysis, see Huntington, (fn. 2), 315ff.Google Scholar See also the interesting essays in Russett, Bruce and Stepan, Alfred, eds., Military Force and American Society (New York: Harper and Row 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Schurmann, Franz, The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon Books 1974), 288–91Google Scholar; Spanier (fn. 2); Taylor, Maxwell D., The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper 1960).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Clausewitz, (fn. 1), 63Google Scholar, 64.

¹⁷ Ibid., 67.

¹⁸ Ibid., 255.

¹⁹ Ibid., 76, 204.

²⁰ Brodie, (fn. 3), 306.Google Scholar It would appear that Clausewitz did not recognize the importance of this insight until late in his life, and thus it may not be as well integrated into his work as he might have liked.

²¹ Clausewitz, (fn. 1), 65.Google Scholar

²² Ibid., 204.

²³ Ibid., 64. The point seems obvious. But Sun-tzu, perhaps Clausewitz's only real peer as a military thinker, does not agree with Clausewitz here. See The Art of War, translated with an introduction by Griffith, Samuel B. (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press 1963)Google Scholar; for example, p. 87.

²⁴ I am influenced on this point by the works of Eilul, Jacques; see especially The Technology Society (New York: Knopf 1967)e.Google Scholar

²⁵ Tilly, Charles, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975), 42.Google Scholar

²⁶ Morris, Richard, “Class Struggle and the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., No. 19 (1962), 3–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 26.

²⁷ On the other hand, that war also saw unprecedented civilian embroilment in the making of military strategy. War was too important to leave to the generals—but how much better did the politicians do? See DeWeerd, Harvey A., “Churchill, Lloyd George, Clemenceau: The Emergence of the Civilian,” in Earle, Edward Mead, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (New York: Atheneum 1966Google Scholar; originally published by Princeton University Press 1941), 287–305.

²⁸ Quester, George H., Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: Wiley 1977), 114.Google Scholar

²⁹ Schurmann, (fn. 15), 11.Google Scholar

³⁰ Pipes, Richard, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 21–34.Google Scholar The Russians are not necessarily on to something clever that we are missing. Rather, in the Soviet Union, military strategy is worked out by career officers, and their doctrine is much what ours would be if it were determined by soldiers rather than civilians. See Wildavsky, Aaron, The Revolt Against the Masses and Other Essays on Polities and Public Policy (New York: Basic Books 1971), 159.Google Scholar

³¹ Brennan, “When the SALT Hit the Fan,” in Kaplan, (fn. 5), 548–64Google Scholar, at 557.

³² Clausewitz, (fn. 1), 225Google Scholar, 228.

³³ Ibid., 226–27.

³⁴ Huntington, (fn. 2), 465.Google Scholar

³⁵ I suspect that Huntington is really arguing a political position—that he has a preference for what he takes to be military values over the values he takes to be those of liberal America. He does not, however, argue for his set of values on their own merits, but urges that they be adopted as instruments of security: the value system should be subordinated to the needs of war.

One might wonder just what it is that Clausewitz and Huntington value the security of. Presumably the guiding value that is not sacrificed for the sake of war is the survival of the existing regime—although Clausewitz's policy entails risk for that regime. Or one can speak of the “nation” and so forth—but the trouble is that this is vague. And unless the regime or the nation represent certain values, why should anyone care whether either or both survive? The condition of total war is conducive to nihilism.

³⁶ Quoted by R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Earle, (fn. 27), 49–74Google Scholar, at 64. Palmer contends that Guibert was no prophet, since he thought the change would come only as a result of revolution, and did not think a revolution would happen. Guibert may not have been much of a fortuneteller, but he is “prophetic” in a scientific sense, in that he makes an accurate contingent prediction.