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Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Graham T. Allison
Affiliation:
Harvard University
Morton H. Halperin
Affiliation:
Brookings Institution
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Extract

During the Tet holiday of 1968, North Vietnamese troops launched massive attacks on a large number of South Vietnamese cities. Why?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1972

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References

1 For an elaboration of the argument of this introductory section, see Allison, op. cit.

2 For an elaboration of this point, see Allison, op. cit.

3 In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim that foreign policy analysts have developed any satisfactory empirically tested theory. In this essay, the use of the term “model” with qualifiers should be read “conceptual scheme or framework.”

4 For a review of earlier proponents of the bureaucratic politics approach, see Allison, op. cit.

5 In order to highlight the distinctive characteristics of the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), we contrast it with the traditional approach. Our argument is not, however, that the approaches are exclusive alternatives. The relationships between these approaches is discussed in Allison, op. cit.

6 Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston 1965)Google Scholar; see Sorensen, Theodore C., Kennedy (New York 1965).Google Scholar

7 Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structures (rev. and enl. ed., New York 1957).Google Scholar

* More specifically, the outcome might be defined in terms of a set of variables: (a) the number of states that have formally renounced nuclear weapons, (b) the number of states that have announced intentions to acquire nuclear weapons, (c) the nuclear technology of various nations, (d) the number of states with a stand-by capability, (e) the number of states that have tested nuclear weapons, (f) the number of states that have nuclear stockpiles and the size of these stockpiles.

8 Martin, John B., Overtaken by Events (New York 1966).Google Scholar

9 In the statement of this paradigm we focus primarily on issues of foreign policy that arise as matters of national security. Extension of the argument to other issue areas, e.g., foreign trade, is straightforward.

10 For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational interests see Halperin, “Why Bureaucrats Play Games,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1971).Google Scholar

11 For an elaboration of the discussion of organizational routines, programs and SOP's, see Allison, op. cit.

12 For this proposition we are indebted to Ernest R. May.

13 This proposition is drawn from Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York 1960).Google Scholar

14 See Allison's “Model II,” op. cit. The discussion of organizational constraints draws heavily on that account.

15 On the ABM discussion see Halperin, Morton, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM,” World Politics, XXV (October 1972).Google Scholar

16 See Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor (Stanford 1962).Google Scholar

17 Ibid.

18 Kennedy, Robert, Thirteen Days (New York 1969), 119.Google Scholar

19 For examples from the Cuban missile crisis, see Allison, op. cit.

20 This point has often been made by A. W. Marshall.

21 On Suez and Skybolt see Neustadt, Richard E., Alliance Politics (New York 1970).Google Scholar

22 Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace (New York 1965), 692.Google Scholar

23 McGarvey, Patrick J., “DIA: Intelligence to Please,” Washington Monthly, 11 (July 1970).Google Scholar

24 On Korea, see Paige, Glenn, The Korean Decision (New York 1968)Google Scholar, and de Rivera, Joseph, Psychological Dimensions in Foreign Policy (Columbus 1968).Google Scholar

25 Nixon, Richard, Six Crises (New York 1962), 241.Google Scholar

26 Neustadt, Richard, “Memorandum on the British Labour Party and the MLF,” New Left Review, LI (September 1968).Google Scholar

27 On the 1958 Quemoy crisis, see Halperin, Morton and Tsou, Tang, “United States Policy Toward the Offshore Islands,” Public Policy, XV (Cambridge 1966).Google Scholar

28 Galbraith, John K., Ambassador's Journal (Boston 1969).Google Scholar

29 See Butow, Robert, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford 1954)Google Scholar, and Feis, Herbert, Japan Subdued (Princeton 1961).Google Scholar

30 On Pearl Harbor, see Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation (New York 1969)Google Scholar; Butow, Robert, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton 1961)Google Scholar; Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor (New York 1962)Google Scholar; Grew, Joseph, My Years in Japan (New York 1944)Google Scholar; Langer, William L. and Gleason, S. Everett, The Undeclared War (New York 1953)Google Scholar; and Wohlstetter (fn. 16). On Skybolt, see Neustadt (fn. 21).

31 New York Times, March 22, 1969, p. 16.

32 See Halperin and Tsou (fn. 27), and Sigal, Leon, “The Rational Policy Model and the Formosa Straits Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly, XIV (June 1970).Google Scholar

33 Andrew Marshall, unpublished paper.

34 See Johnson, Haynes, Bay of Pigs (New York 1964)Google Scholar; Schlesinger (fn. 6), and Sorensen (fn. 6).

35 Patrick J. McGarvey (fn. 23), 71–72.

36 Ibid.

37 York, Herbert, Race to Oblivion (New York 1970), 89.Google Scholar

38 See Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (New York 1967)Google Scholar, Schlesinger, op. cit. and Sorensen, op. cit.

39 Ernest May, unpublished paper.