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America, Europe, and the International System
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Extract
A useful consequence of America's deepening involvement in Asian affairs is the widespread questioning of the premises that arc assumed to underlie United States policy, but debate stressing the weaknesses of American strategy in Vietnam without placing present dilemmas in a broader perspective is deficient. Similarly, discussion that ignores the distinctive features of the American historical experience, especially its influence on the processes of policy-making, courts irrelevance. Failure to look beyond the confines of the Vietnam predicament may prove as detrimental to observers as to officialdom, yet both find the process of distinguishing the relative importance of internal and external constraints increasingly arduous. In an era of contagious domestic unrest in industrialized countries and ambiguous conflicts in less developed geographical areas, both may be tempted to generalize too broadly from a dominant though still restricted series of events. Such, such are the joys of appraising American foreign policy during the Vietnam anguish.
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- Review Article
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- Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1969
References
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